By Simon Bahceli
Published on October 17, 2010
FEARS are growing in the north that Ankara plans to sell off all of most of the breakaway state’s ‘assets’, potentially putting thousands of jobs at risk and possibly muddying the waters in a potential Cyprus solution.
Ever since Cyprus Turkish Airlines (CTA) was disbanded and handed on a plate to Turkish air operator Atlas Jet last June, suspicion has been growing among Turkish Cypriot public sector workers that Ankara, aided and abetted by the ‘government’, plans to sell off all or most of the north’s ‘state’ enterprises, potentially putting thousands of jobs at risk.
With economic austerity the norm across Europe, such fears are natural. What’s more is that workers themselves know better than anyone the sorry state of the corporations, and that keeping them afloat is simply a matter making sure Ankara pumps in more money each month to pay salaries and pensions of staff past and present.
Echoing and amplifying these fears, their leaders, like Turkish Cypriot Teachers Union (KTOS) head Sener Elcil, say they will oppose any form of austerity head on, and call on workers not to bow to Ankara’s “colonialist intention to make slaves of Turkish Cypriots”.
Whatever the intentions behind austerity, economic planners and workers alike are aware that something has to change. But for workers, who will bear the brunt of a transition, there is real fear.
Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) economist Musfafa Besim believes a “transition” in the Turkish Cypriot economy is nevertheless long overdue and that enterprises like Ercan Airport, Famagusta harbour, telecommunications and the electricity provider KIBTEK need to be rescued from their current loss-making status so that they can’t provide decent and decently priced services for consumers, as well as revenue for the ‘state’.
“A big part of the economy is aid dependent, and this has to change,” he says, and called on the authorities to seek rational ways to implement a transition without inflaming unions unduly.
“The main thing that needs to be done is for a proper mechanism to be established for privatisation,” he says.
At present such a mechanism does not exist – something that was clearly illustrated by the farcical scenes witnessed during the privatisation of CTA.
“The tender was done in a very dishonest way,” Besim said, referring to the fact that the authorities made sure no other applicants got a look in on the deal and presented the agreement between themselves and Atlas Jet as a fait accompli to existing staff, many of whom were not offered new jobs.
“Such experiences make workers very wary of the government’s intentions,” Besim said, but added that unions to should avoid knee-jerk reactions and try to provide a more “positive input”.
“They too should be involved in the process. If there is going to be unemployment created by a privatisation, society has to be able to see that the privatisation will have benefits in the long run”.
“If privatisation is done in a proper, legal and transparent way, the suspicions will disappear,” he adds.
Many in the private sector naturally agree with privatisation, seeing themselves as having for too long paid taxes for little more than the upkeep of public sector salaries.
“We cannot continue subsidising loss-making operations,” businessman Fikri Toros insists, adding that the only way forward for the Turkish Cypriot economy is for it to struggle towards EU standards and prepare itself for competition in the free market.
“Telecom is the most desperate case,” followed by KIBTEK, which he says produces electricity in the “most outdated way for the most expensive rates”.
If privatised, these two corporations would receive investment in modern technology that would allow them to produce efficiently and at competitive prices, Toros believes.
However, such privatisations would not be in the interests of the community, or the economy in general if carried out with political, rather than economic motives in mind.
And this is perhaps where the economic and political motives behind the current privatisation project become confused.
“Tenders must never be restricted to companies in the north and Turkey,” he insists.
“This would lead to nothing but more corruption,” says Toros, not because he believes Turkish companies to be corrupt, but because to limit tenders in such a way would expose purely political motives that would manifest a move towards economic stagnation rather than away from it.
“I’m sure that in an open tender there would be applications from Turkish companies,” he says, but theirs, like all applications, would need to be examined on economic and performance criteria alone, he adds.
But what are the chances of foreign, non-Turkish, companies applying to buy out or run the Turkish Cypriot telecommunications network, Famagusta port or KIBTEK?
“With all the property disputes here in the north, it might be hard to imagine,” says Toros, but points that privatisation of services does not have to mean the total selloff of assets.
“It can mean joint ventures between public and private enterprise,” he says, giving the example of mobile phone services provider Turkcell, which is now managed privately but who’s transmission infrastructure is provided by the ‘state’.
But if one accepts such economic arguments for privatisation, does it mean the denial of political motives on the part of Ankara?
According to Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) international relations expert Ahmet Sozen such things are not mutually exclusive.
In recent years, at least since the currently ruling AK Party, took power in Ankara in 2002, “there has been a rationalisation of economic life, and a rationalisation of foreign policy,” Sozen says, adding that “rationalisation here means acting like a normal, democratic European country”. With Turkey seeking rationalisation in such spheres, “Cyprus is viewed as an aberration,” Sozen says.
“Money spent here by the Turkish government here is seen as wasted. Whatever you put in disappears. So now it wants its money spent rationally, and privatising these loss making corporations is part of this, he adds”.
But this is a two-pronged approach that can also fulfil a political objective.
“I believe Turkey wants to solve the Cyprus problem, which means that when it happens, whether it be in five years or ten years, Turkey will one day not have an army on Cyprus. It will no longer have hard power on the island,” he says.
What Turkey now seeks on Cyprus, Sozen believes, is soft power.
“This is what Turkey has been doing in northern Iraq and Syria, expanding trade and cultural links, he says. And here Turkey plans a similar approach through encouraging Turkish investment in the infrastructure, tourism and education. Sozen points to recent investments, such the Turkish-built 5-star tourism complexes in Kyrenia.
“If companies are going to invest 220 million dollars in a hotel they must be pretty sure they’re going to make a profit,” he says.
Sozen believes these “rational economic and foreign policy objectives” constitute Turkey’s “plan A and B” for Cyprus. And while he accepts this may be painful for Turkish Cypriots, there appears to be little the unions, or even the ‘government’ (which would naturally be happier handing out cash from Ankara to contented voters) can do about it.
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/north-cyprus ... c/20101017
I thought of putting this in the for sale section!