Turkey is a bridge too far for Europe
By Josef Joffe
Published: August 25 2010 14:58 | Last updated: August 25 2010 14:58
Gideon Rachman made a compelling case this week for Turkey’s admission to the European Union, if also with one key qualifier: no freedom of movement for workers and immigrants. There are simply too many Turks who would love to move west and, no matter how much reasonable people may dislike the backlash, that kind of influx would create strains from Narvik to Naples. As Mr Rachman puts it: “Mass migration, particularly from Muslim countries such as Turkey, is unpopular enough to transform domestic politics in some western European countries.”
Rationing the flow might reduce the resentment and the political profits of rightwing populism. But there is another issue, the geopolitics, that is usually obscured by invoking Turkey as a “bridge” between west and east. With Turkey in, the EU would harbour a country that will soon exceed all the other members in size of population while abutting on the Middle East, the world’s most dangerous place.
Until now, the EU has never faced the “Roman empire syndrome”, the strategic conflicts invariably associated with relentless expansion. When the Union moved beyond its original core of six into Britain, Scandinavia, Austria et al, it took in solidly pacified, even pacifist societies that were stable democracies as well (with the exception, granted, of post-fascist Spain and Portugal). Gradual expansion has bought neither domestic strife nor foreign quarrels.
But Turkey is a different kind of animal, never mind its Islamic coloration though this becomes stronger by the day. On the inside, democracy is as yet untested. The government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, though democratically certified, is using illiberal means to finish off an illiberal rival, the generals. But the means tend to corrupt the end, and so a “demilitarised” polity may not shine forth as Sweden-on-the-Bosporus.
The government is also conducting brutal warfare against its own Kurds, as have its secular predecessors. This does not enhance domestic tranquillity, nor undying respect for the rule of law. On the outside, the EU would suddenly abut on Syria and Iran, states of dubious repute that Europe has been able to keep at arms length.
This would be a lot for Europe to digest. Compared with Ankara’s campaign against the Kurds, Spain’s battle against Basque separatism looks like a walk in the park.
Now to Erdoganism in foreign policy. In the past, Turkey did not take positions that riled the western soul, give or take an assault on Cyprus or almost-war with Syria. Today, Ankara is striking out towards the east, crafting marriages of convenience with Damascus and Tehran.
The new strategy should not be confused with a prod to make Europe more receptive to Turkish membership – “take me in or else”. It reflects a new ambition, and a compelling one, to boot. With Egypt almost out of the game, and Saudi-Arabia quaking with fear of Iran, the leadership of the Sunni-Arab world is up for grabs.
If post-American Iraq disintegrates, the Turks will want to secure the Kurdish north, which is two for the price of one: lots of oil and the end of sanctuary for Turkey’s Kurds. In the longer run, Turkish ambitions would inevitably collide with those of an Iran that eyes the same geopolitical prize – primacy over Araby.
Such a dynamic is not foreordained, but it is plausible. If so, why would the EU want to take in a “hinge” country that is a conduit to serious trouble? The EU, this serene and inward-looking place, is not a real empire that would impose order within its borders and out. It presupposes stability. It is an “empire by example”, which – pace Britain or France – has neither grand ambitions nor a grand strategy.
The EU could vouchsafe tranquility in Spain and Portugal, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. But these were exhausted countries without an eye for extra-European ventures; they were happy to live under the rules and among the fleshpots of Brussels. Turkey, on the other hand, would be “one bridge too far”, to borrow a phrase.
Let us give the Turks all the trade and investment privileges Europe has to offer, by all means. Let us reserve for them a berth for the day when they will want to accept Europe as their home port. But not now, and not for at least a generation. Or look at it this way: tiny Greece, with a population of 11m today, wasn’t ready for Europe when it was admitted in 1981. It still isn’t ready now. Turkey is a country of 72m.
The writer is editor of Die Zeit, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Institute for International Studies and Abramowitz fellow of the Hoover Institution