Cyprus-Forum.com

[insan]

Washington, July 18, 1974, 11:41 a.m.–12:22 p.m.

* SUBJECT
* Cyprus

* PARTICIPANTS
* Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
* State
* Robert Ingersoll
* Robert McCloskey
* Wells Stabler
* John Day
* Defense
* William Clements
* Amos Jordan
* Harry Bergold
* JCS
* Gen. George S. Brown
* Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly
* CIA
* William Colby
* George Lauder
* NSC
* Richard Kennedy
* Rosemary Niehuss
* David Ransom
* James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

* —the JCS would draw up a list of what units were available in the U.S. and Europe for movement to Cyprus, and how long it would take to move those units to the island;
* —that the carrier Forrestal and the amphibious task force would stay 24 hours distant from Cyprus at the present time; and
* —there would be no cut-off of military aid to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.22. Not attached and not found.

Secretary Kissinger: What's this you're talking about?

Mr. Colby: The Soviet statement (on its position on the dispute).

(The Secretary left the room to take a phone call at 11:45 and returned at 11:51)

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements)?

Mr. Clements: I don't have a lot to say. We do have this report that DIA…

Secretary Kissinger: The one about Soviet forces at Odessa?

Mr. Clements: No, the one about [less than 1 line not declassified]. We got it through your Sit Room. I think you have seen it already. We tend to discount the information since [less than 1 line not declassified] are not going to publish it until this afternoon.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I don't put much credence in that. I don't think that would happen while Ecevit is in London. George (General Brown)?

General Brown: There's only one small point of concern to us. As you know, our naval forces are now in a holding pattern—well to the west of Cyprus as we discussed the other day. The amphibious forces are 24 hours away from Cyprus. Do you think it would be wise to permit them to come closer, say 10 to 12 hours from the island?

Mr. Clements: One thing that bears on that, Henry. You know we have several military programs—hardware—ongoing with the Greek regime. You may want to play with that one. I am not advocating we stop the program, just that you may want to consider it.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I'll think about that.

General Brown: Another thing. We have not upgraded any alerts. I don't know whether you might want to or not.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't see any reason at this point. It would only draw attention, wouldn't it? The Soviets would know that we have upped our alert status. How long would it take the 82nd Airborne, for example, to get to Cyprus if we had to?

General Brown: There's one company on two hour alert at all times at Fayetteville (North Carolina). It would take C130s to get them over there. They could be loaded in about two hours, but it would take about twelve hours to get them to Cyprus. I would say it would take 18 hours to get one or two battalions there.

Secretary Kissinger: (to General Brown) Can I get a chart on how long it would take to send troops over there? Could we slightly increase the alert?

General Brown: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It's a bit premature to increase the alert now. No need at this point.

General Brown: There are, of course, other units in Europe and Germany that we could send on a quicker basis.

Secretary Kissinger: Get me a chart of the units available and how much time it would take from each place—here and in Europe. Can you do that? By the end of the day?

Mr. Clements: Sure. That amphibious force, however, is still what we want to count on; it's the closest.

General Brown: Yes, but it's 24 hours away from Cyprus right now. Maybe we should move them to within, say, ten hours distance.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think we should make any movements now. I think it's premature. If the Soviets find out—and they will—they might misunderstand. We don't know what this Odessa thing is anyway.

Mr. Colby: How long would it take a division to get there? Five or six days?

General Brown: At least. It would probably take a battalion about the same time.

Mr. Clements: Our best bet is still that amphibious group.

Secretary Kissinger: How many British troops are on the island?

General Brown: I think it's about 8,000.

Secretary Kissinger: Are those all combat units?

General Brown: Some are. Some are housekeeping units. Not all, I'm sure, would fight.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to know what we have. Get me that chart.

Mr. Colby: I think I have it here, 2,700 British army troops and 5,300 Royal Air Force personnel.

Secretary Kissinger: The UN Security Council meets today.33. The Security Council began deliberations on July 16, which culminated in Resolution 353 being passed 15–0 on July 20. See Document 109. We have instructed our delegation to delay a vote on the resolution, if they can. We want to assess the Sisco diplomatic effort from London first. We have to find out first what is negotiable between the Greeks and the Turks. I agree that an ideal solution would be to get negotiations started, within the Zurich framework, towards a solution on which all sides would agree. I know some of my colleagues believe we are advocating the overthrow of the Ioannidis government, but that is not our policy. We still have the Cyprus problem with Turkish intervention. Our first objective is to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intervention. We can worry about Ioannidis later. We do not want to tip our hand on a Cyprus solution yet til we know what will come out of it.

Mr. Colby: I'm not sure that we can stall MAKARIOS that long.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we'll see. But how can you bring him back? It's fine to say that everybody is behind MAKARIOS—that is easy to proclaim. But the problem still remains of how to bring him back?

Mr. Colby: And we don't want a split to develop between the U.S. and the Soviets over the Cyprus issue, with the Soviets backing MAKARIOS.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. We are not opposed to MAKARIOS. What we want to do is try to avoid taking a stand. It's bad to get the Security Council involved.

Amb. Ingersoll: Have you heard from Joe (Mr. Sisco)?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Mr. Clements: We can't do much til we find out what the British and Joe have been talking about.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going to come out against MAKARIOS. If he does come back (to power), fine, but it's better that he comes back with U.S. backing than with Soviet backing. If the Turks go in and restore MAKARIOS, he has no alternative but to lean more towards the Soviets and the Eastern bloc.

Mr. Clements: Exactly right. Let's let the British move out in front on this thing.

Secretary Kissinger: And see what they offer for our support. If we declare first, the Soviets will get bold and we will give up our bargaining position. If we say that the Greek officers must go, how can they resist the pressure? We have a de facto government on the island and a de jure outside. We must find a compromise between the two. We do not want to elaborate a theme for Soviet intervention, or Turkish. If the Turks and the British want MAKARIOS, then we will reassess.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Now, (returning to the Cyprus problem) on our press line. For the noon briefing we want to say nothing about the Sisco visit. As far as MAKARIOS, play it cool, don't say anything if you can avoid it. Just repeat our standard line on the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Mr. Colby: I would like to put in a pitch for what the British and Ecevit talked about.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, of course. But, we don't have a report yet. Oh, you said Ecevit and the British. I thought you meant Sisco. Ecevit proposed increasing the level of Turkish forces on the island and placing the National Guard under UN control and then MAKARIOS might be able to come back. This, of course, would make MAKARIOS a Turkish stooge and he would then look for a counter to Turkish influence, i.e., the East bloc. This would amount to a total shift in the balance of power on the island in part towards Turkey, but really towards Soviet/East bloc influence. Even the UK is going along; they have pulled back slightly in their public line of support for MAKARIOS. If MAKARIOS accepts to come back, we still have the problem of how to get him back. If the Turks brought him back, he would look for a counter to the Turks. But we have nothing personally against Makarios.

Mr. Colby: How strong is Ioannidis?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not worried about Ioannidis. If he falls, fine. That doesn't worry me. Let him fall because of his own incompetence. Getting rid of Ioannidis is no more a worry than keeping Ioannidis; it's no factor. Preventing a Greek-Turkish war and a shift in the balance of power are factors. I don't think Ioannidis is going to survive very long anyway.

Mr. Colby: He is the weakest link in the chain.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not in the interest of the U.S. to cooperate in the fall of Ioannidis. We should walk carefully on this matter and not go off half cocked.

Mr. Stabler: On the Sisco visit. He plans to go to Athens and possibly to Ankara. Should we announce that he is going to Ankara?

Secretary Kissinger: He is not going to Nicosia! What I said was that Sisco would go to Athens but that we can't confirm that he will go on to Ankara. That depends on the results of his talks in London and Athens.

Amb. Ingersoll: I do think it would be wise, however, to say that he may go on to Turkey, just to bring the Turks into this thing.

Mr. Clements: I have just one quick thing on military sales to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we made it clear yesterday that no ambassador will unilaterally decide about military aid programs. That is an interdepartmental matter and should be brought to this group for decision. We should be careful on heavy deliveries of military aid. Don't stop the stuff already in the pipeline. We'll know more in one week. I don't exclude pressure on Greece at some point, but we must wait until we see what kind of position the US/UK/Turk talks produce. But I agree I wouldn't send the heavy equipment.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files(H–Files), Box H–097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

2 Not attached and not found.

3 The Security Council began deliberations on July 16, which culminated in Resolution 353 being passed 15–0 on July 20. See Document 109.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d94

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Most people don't know how sensitive was the situation in Cyprus and how serious consequences it might have led... All concerned parties had to act responsibly by taking into account their own national interests besides the interests of the alliance... The only ones who were not acting in this manner were the Ionnides faction and irregulars of Hellenic National Front...

[insan]

C: I think the Greek regime is a bit worried. _______22. Omission in the original. has called our man in Athens to see when tomorrow… and I think he is going to ask what we and the Turks are up to. We think there is a chance that if there is concerted diplomatic pressure they might calm down by withdrawing some of their officers. I am thinking about the Turks tomorrow or tonight. But, if you think six months ahead, my view is that it is better to have MAKARIOS there than Sampson.

K: That is almost certainly true, I agree.

C: The problem is three to one or five to one chance it won't succeed, but it would be worthwhile to do…

K: Well, we want to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to make what happens legitimate.

C: Yes. Again, looking six months ahead of Sampson—If Sampson stays, he would be accused of running a Fascist regime and the Russians are stepping up their activity so I come back again to—we may not succeed but it could be that we may crack the regime and get Sampson to withdraw.

K: Let me get somebody over to talk to you. We agree on the general approach. We are not too far apart on it.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d92


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Junta was worried of what it had done but Ionnides the retard had set forth a road that had no turning back....

After emissary completed message, the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says “consistent with the above principles …” and threatens interference. “No matter what happened in Cyprus I (Ioannides) will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the Communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July 1974 Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists”.

At this point the General again blew up with arms waving, knocked over the same table, broke a second glass and, between obscenities, stated that he did not plot and arrange the coup, initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July, after latter learned that GOG intended to accede to MAKARIOS' demands to reduce number of Greek officers in National Guard. General stated he could not accept at least 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from MAKARIOS ' tyranny. This coupled with MAKARIOS' anti-regime efforts, made him decide to assist Greek Cypriot nationalists. The General stated that if Makarios succeeded in kicking Greeks out of Cyprus what could keep him from thinking he could not kick junta out of Greece.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d88

Mr. Ionnides the retard... had you succeeded in kicking the number one obstacle leftists, in front of Enosis what would keep a retard like you from thinking you could not kick TCs and Turkey out of Cyprus with a second fait accompli? even the father of Ionnides wouldn't trust him under such circumstances...

[Get Real!]

Re, this phone call shit is not popular…. can’t you see nobody cares?

[DTA]

Re, this phone call shit is not popular…. can’t you see nobody cares?

I care, it is all very interesting, I thought you liked credible sources.

[denizaksulu]

Re, this phone call shit is not popular…. can’t you see nobody cares?

I care, it is all very interesting, I thought you liked credible sources.

Only if written by him(GR).

I read these two years ago (or most of them), they still make fascinating reading.

Hucking fell, I hate politics and that fine line between love and hate..................

[Get Real!]

So what are these great revelations that you have all "discovered"?

Enlighten us!

[Nikitas]

The interesting thing is the confusion that reigned everywhere- on the invasion front at 5 mile point, in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the State Department. And above all it shows that the "best in NATO" were having a hard time dealing with the bedraggled and demoralised NG.

The rest is old stuff.

[Murataga]

The interesting thing is the confusion that reigned everywhere- on the invasion front at 5 mile point, in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the State Department. And above all it shows that the "best in NATO" were having a hard time dealing with the bedraggled and demoralised NG.

The rest is old stuff.

"NG" is an unconstitutional group of armed thugs who saluted the Greek flag and terrorized a the TCs of this island. They were solely defeated by a NATO member Army.

The rest is old stuff.

[Paphitis]

The interesting thing is the confusion that reigned everywhere- on the invasion front at 5 mile point, in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the State Department. And above all it shows that the "best in NATO" were having a hard time dealing with the bedraggled and demoralised NG.

The rest is old stuff.

"NG" is an unconstitutional group of armed thugs who saluted the Greek flag and terrorized a the TCs of this island. They were solely defeated by a NATO member Army.

The rest is old stuff.

Don't kid yourself.

The evidence is all there, and it seems the RoC has Turkey on the ropes with no where to go.

[zan]

The interesting thing is the confusion that reigned everywhere- on the invasion front at 5 mile point, in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the State Department. And above all it shows that the "best in NATO" were having a hard time dealing with the bedraggled and demoralised NG.

The rest is old stuff.

It also states that the only thing the factions of Greeks where united in was to fight the TURKS......Hardly left on their own where they