Cyprus-Forum.com

[insan]

Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Jones) and the Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)11. Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 26. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Torp (NEA/CYP) and sent through Davies.

Washington, March 19, 1970.

* SUBJECT
* Possible Cyprus Coup: U.S. Options in UNSC

The following options would present themselves under the various circumstances of a coup d'etat in Cyprus.

1. Assumption: Coup d'etat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but without Greek Government approval.

Under these circumstances, the Cyprus Government would very likely request Security Council action. It is conceivable, as suggested in Ankara's 1633,22. In telegram 1633 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that Turkey had informed it of a Soviet démarche which laid blame for the attempt on Makarios on the Greek Government or its officers; that Turkey was receiving reports of planning for a coup against Makarios; and that the Greek Government had approached Turkey regarding joint action in the event of a coup attempt. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974) that the Greek and Turkish Governments would join in such a request. In this situation U.S. support for the request for Security Council consideration would seem to be adequate to counter any similar Soviet request.

2. Assumption: Coup d'etat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but with Greek Government approval.

In this contingency, Turkish military intervention would be almost inevitable. In the face of such developments, it would be desirable for the U.S. and the U.K. to move quickly for Security Council consideration, prior to any USSR request for a Security Council meeting. Presumably the Cyprus UN representative would in any event request UNSC action. Whether we and the British would join in a formal request for a meeting or simply support a Cypriot request would best be determined in light of the precise circumstances at the time.

3. Assumption: Cooperative action on the part of the Greek and Turkish Governments designed to bring about double enosis. Once again the Cypriot Government could be expected to request Security Council action. Moreover the Soviet Union would probably join in or strongly support such a request. In such circumstances we would wish to move quickly in support of a Cypriot request, or on our own initiative but in cooperation with the U.K., to request Security Council action in order to beat the Soviets to the punch.

The precise terms of any UNSC Resolution would, of course, have to be designed to meet the exact situation. However, in any of the above circumstances we would seek action critical of the coup d'etat calling for the end to any hostilities or violence, urging peaceful settlement procedures, and perhaps providing for some specific immediate UN measures to assist in restoring peace. Unless the specifics of the developing situation make it impossible, both in terms of the realities of the situation on the ground and broader political considerations, we would seek both in direct talks with the parties and in the UN to have the status quo ante restored.

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 26. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Torp (NEA/CYP) and sent through Davies.

2 In telegram 1633 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that Turkey had informed it of a Soviet démarche which laid blame for the attempt on Makarios on the Greek Government or its officers; that Turkey was receiving reports of planning for a coup against Makarios; and that the Greek Government had approached Turkey regarding joint action in the event of a coup attempt. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... 354#fnref2
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It sounds like an entrapping tactic on Turkey... On the other hand, in 1970; it was known that there was a faction in Greek Junta that had high ranked Greek officers in "CNG" had been carrying on activities at variance with officially expressed GOG policy...

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There is increasing evidence that some Greek National Guard officers, and some Greeks on mainland notably Aslanides, were plotting to achieve what they considered quiet solution to Cyprus problem and to cause trouble for present junta leadership in Athens.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... 76v29/d352

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After about 1 year passed over this developments that even US was not informed officially by GOG; Grivas [supposedly] secretly returned to Cyprus and formed EOKA-B... for a well known purpose... suppressing the GC left on one hand and achieving the Enosis when Ionnides would tell him go on! ...For Yorgacis, TPap and most of the Hellenic National front this wasn't a secret of course...


I'm looking forward to read the comments of Nikitas on this issue...

[insan]

100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger11. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente with President Nixon; Schlesinger was in Washington.

July 19, 1974, 8:15 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello. Jim.

S: Yes Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we're in step on it. My view is that—you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.

S: Right. They're landing.

K: They're landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don't fire. So we're going to pass that message and we're also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That's—that means they have gotten rid of MAKARIOS and they'll have to give up Sampson. And we'll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don't think this will really fly but at least it's a slender thread.

S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.

K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.

S: That's very generous of them. That's good. OK…

K: If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enosis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enosis or Clerides.

S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.

K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I'm not against it, I just wish they'd do first things first.

S: Well, my feeling on that is we can afford to wait and see what circumstances develop.

K: That is my feeling.

S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US Government.

K: Agree completely.

S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint—the statement that I got—was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.

K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.

S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.

K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of—if they convince me that we need it, I assume we can appeal to you.

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.

S: We can move by car.

K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.

S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.

K: So we will work either for double enosis or for Clerides, whichever works out.

S: OK, bye.

K: Bye.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente with President Nixon; Schlesinger was in Washington.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... 76v30/d100

[insan]

95. Memorandum of Conversation11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian.

Washington, July 18, 1974.

* SUBJECT
* Cyprus Crisis

* PARTICIPANTS
* Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
* Honorable Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
* Honorable William Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
* Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
* Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State
* Mr. Edward Djerejian, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Ambassador McCloskey: We want to review where we go from here. We want to send a message out giving our rationale.

Secretary: If we tie ourselves to Makarios without any precise way of returning him to power on the Island we will be giving anyone the right to support him. Also, such support for Makarios could foster unilateral attempts to get enosis. If we attempt a strong anti-Greek posture it could trigger a Turkish attack.

We want our European allies to understand that we do not want to elaborate any theory which would bring the Soviets in, or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs.

Nevertheless, we do not want to exclude the Makarios option at this point. We want to avoid the United Nations being used in an unconstitutional way during a Civil War which is a situation independent of the UN.

Specifically, I want it known that we are not drifting and our Ambassadors should understand that we want the situation to crystallize. What, in effect, is the possibility of the British using force on the Island?

Ambassador Buffum: There has been one report of British use of one Sovereign Base area, but this is highly unlikely.

Secretary: The British cannot use force. Also we have to determine what we would gain from supporting MAKARIOS, except for psychic satisfaction and playing up to the New York Times.

We are not opposed to the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the Island because it interferes with the internal affairs of Cyprus, but rather because it tips the internal balance on the Island and may foster the rabble in the National Guard.

Our Ambassadors should go into their host governments and not give the impression of a USG that is in doubt of its position but should definitely convey the current position that the USG is not going along with the howling mob. We want the situation to crystallize in order to enable concerted action later.

To attempt to overthrow the Greek Government to satisfy our goals and bring MAKARIOS back is a high price to pay. Whatever our views of the Greek Government, to precipitate the present situation to a crisis which results in the overthrow of the Greek Government would open the way to Soviet intervention, force Turkish intervention and initiate a course of action that could not be sustained. Everyone must analyze the situation closely.

We must not be in an anti-Makarios position. In 1971 we were highly criticized over our policy toward India and now the Indians are coming to us. It just shows that it doesn't work that way. We require a calm and cool approach to this present situation.

McCloskey: Do you want us to send any further instructions to Sisco?

Secretary: Sisco should surface the Clerides possibility with the Turks and the British and he should get the Greeks to London on Sunday to have them face up to the situation. Basically, we have to get ourselves in a situation similar to that in which we are in the Middle East where everyone needs us and comes to us. At that point we can deliver the Greeks.

I was pleased with the French reaction.22. Reported in telegram 17519 from Paris, July 18. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

McCloskey: Should we be telling the French any more?

Secretary: Tell the French they can share our analysis with the EC–9 as much as they wish to. You should send Ambassador Irwin a cable telling him to approach Sauvagnargues on this basis.33. Telegrams 156348 and 157174 to Paris, July 19. (Ibid.) That should make the French quite happy.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d95
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In this conservation, it is very clear that US didn't know how to act in this not yet crystallized, complicated and geo-politically very sensitive situation... Yeah, since 1970 they had 3 different assumptions regarding the possibility of a coup and if it happens how to act but they were not sure about which one was happening...

[insan]

Let's hear what the retard Ionides told on 16th of July, 1974...

Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USNATO. A handwritten note by Clift, presumably to Scowcroft, reads, “Read this one in detail!”

Athens, July 16, 1974, 1645Z.

4528. Subject: Cyprus Coup: Meeting with General Ioannides. Ref: State 152379.22. Document 82. For the Secretary.

1. I used secure reliable channel directly to General Ioannides to deliver message reftel. He began by explaining he had personal message from USG. After emissary had read two paragraphs, Ioannides commented message must be same as that Ambassador had given Kypreos, in which case emissary wasting his time since he would receive message anyway. Emissary explained his job was to finish reading message and hand it to him and would do so, to which General Ioannides said fine.

2. After emissary completed message, the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says “consistent with the above principles …” and threatens interference. “No matter what happened in Cyprus I (Ioannides) will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the Communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July 1974 Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists”.

General stated that Greece also believed in non-interference and in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus; Greece would abide by the decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom were nationalists, and these nationalists were the ones who had moved against MAKARIOS. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. At this point he went off on a tangent stating that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots had asked for enosis, that GOT had obviously accepted these developments in Cyprus, that Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair.

Well, if the situation was like how İonnides the retard expressed; decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of who were nationalists might have moved against the TCs as well with or without the prior blessing of Greece... in this case Greece would abide by the decision of the majority of GCs...

Yes and Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair... an educational matter it was... Sampson and his mob were teaching about democracy...

Ioannides stated that everyone should forget that MAKARIOS was an international figure, that he was a national hero, that he had served several useful functions and that he was a man of the cloth; MAKARIOS had become a rotten priest homosexual; he was perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate and the owner of half the hotels on the island. To preserve his position and to continue his activities, MAKARIOS was willing to sacrifice seventy per cent of the Greek Cypriot population (only thirty per cent were AKEL) and entire anti-Communist Turkish Cypriot population. Ioannides asserted Greek Cypriots in National Guard realized these facts and had begged motherland for chance to act against MAKARIOS; General claimed that he only assisted after being presented with a fait accompli.

If so, he might have assisted the "feee Cypriots" led by Sampson had they declared Enosis with another fait accomply after all Sampson was the leader of majority of Cypriots, according to this retard...

At this point emissary interjected and told Ioannides point-blank that, with coup only twenty-four hours after his reporting to us regarding a possible overthrow of Makarios this was very difficult for anyone to believe. At this point the General again blew up with arms waving, knocked over the same table, broke a second glass and, between obscenities, stated that he did not plot and arrange the coup, initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July, after latter learned that GOG intended to accede to MAKARIOS' demands to reduce number of Greek officers in National Guard. General stated he could not accept at least 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from MAKARIOS ' tyranny. This coupled with MAKARIOS' anti-regime efforts, made him decide to assist Greek Cypriot nationalists. The General stated that if Makarios succeeded in kicking Greeks out of Cyprus what could keep him from thinking he could not kick junta out of Greece. After deciding to assist Greek Cypriots, the General claimed that he did not tell the Armed Forces leadership nor any Greek official. He limited knowledge of his intentions to few select officers on 13/14 July; no one else knew and even after events unfolded on 15 July only a handful of people were aware of his role. Ioannides justified this action by asserting that if he had briefed numerous people they would have raised suggestions, advice, alternatives, and possible problems. He added that he acted on spur of the moment.

No comment!

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d88

[Nikitas]

"or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs."

The never ending obsession of the Americans with communism. Ironid that today they agree that the best choice for president of the RoC is a communist and they have welcomed his election. These goons were supposedly the best that the USA could field in diplomacy at that time. Imagine if they were employing people from the second tier what would have happened!

[insan]

On 17th of July, 1974; Turkey laid her cards on the table...

Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

Ankara, July 17, 1974 , 1329Z.

5629. Subj: Cyprus Coup: Amb–PriMin Meeting. For Secretary From Ambassador. Ref State 154148.22. Dated July 17. (Ibid.) I had eighty minute meeting with PriMin noon (local time) July 17. Acting FonMin (normally DefMin Isik) and DCM Bergus also present.

After I had made points outlined para 1, reftel,33. According to telegram 154148 to Ankara, the Embassy “made fully known to GOG, including Ioannides, our support for single, sovereign and independent Cyprus (and you should give Ecevit gist of State 152379), and urged the GOG to carry out the rotation of their contingent on Cyprus in a routine way without increasing the total number of their forces on Cyprus (State 154147).” Telegram 154147, July 17, is ibid. Telegram 152379, July 15, is printed as Document 82. PriMin responded as fols:

1. Current GOT assessment of situation:

A. Coup appears to have succeeded. While there are still undoubtedly MAKARIOS resources on island, they probably are lying low now so as to avoid risk of exposure and destruction at this time.

B. Coup completely engineered by Greek Govt.

C. GOT does not fear de jure enosis move in immediate future. On contrary, Turks believe that Athens will maintain fiction of separateness, as this will enable GOG in effect to have two votes in UN, while it has one foot in NATO camp and another in non-aligned world.

D. GOT does not accept this as an internal Cypriot problem. On contrary, it is international matter involving violation of an agreement to which Turkey is a party and guarantor.

E. Deterioration of position of Turks on island is inevitable, if new regime stays in power.

F. Vulnerability of Turks on island greatly increased by lack of their having secure access to sea coast.

G. Current situation therefore completely unacceptable to the GOT. If acceptable situation not recreated, Turkey will have to directly intervene with military force on island.

H. If intervention necessary, it will be “bloodier” the longer it is put off. Therefore, GOT not prepared to delay intervention beyond “few days”.

I. Situation has brought to head growing GOT conviction that Greek Turks cooperation within NATO must be terminated (see septel).44. Not found.

J. GOT seeking to work closely with British as a “joint-guarantor” on this situation. (Shortly after his advising me that they were seeking high level meeting with British message was handed to PriMin saying UKG had agreed to such meeting right away in London. PriMin read me message and indicated that he and Isik would be leaving immediately for UK. He will arrive there tonight. He expected visit to last for day or so.)

K. With respect to Soviet attitude, PriMin said Russians were restless over situation, and not keeping this a secret. He saw considerable significance in official TASS statement that Cyprus developments endangered détente. SovAmb had repeated this statement in meeting with Pres Koruturk last night. I said that we had heard of Soviet offer to put troops on island and that was one thing situation definitely did not need.

2. GOT objectives:

A. PriMin said that GOT basic objective is restitution of Cyprus' constitutional govt. By this he meant return of MAKARIOS to his head of govt position, or if this not feasible, that MAKARIOS successor should emerge through previously established constitutional procedures.

B. That Greek officers of Cyprus National Guard must leave the island.

C. That a secure corridor to the sea must be obtained for Turkish community.

3. I asked PriMin if he and British should reach agreement on above objectives during London meetings, how he expected them to be brought about. PriMin said “We will see. They have bases there. If they do not use them now what are they for? We will see what the British think. We will explore all peaceful solutions before considering others.”

4. At end of conversation PriMin summarized situation as follows:

A. New regime on Cyprus completely unacceptable to GOT. GOT hopes status quo ante can be restored without Turkish military intervention. If this is not done, GOT prepared carry out military intervention. It believes latter would be better done within a few days rather than waiting weeks or months.

B. If new regime retains control of island, GOT might be willing hold off military intervention if a corridor to the sea guaranteed to Turkish residents of island. This, combined with clear Turkish military superiority in area, would give GOT assurance that it could rescue Turkish population if that were needed.

5. PriMin wishes to stay in close touch with USG and would be very grateful to have Secretary Kissinger's comments on foregoing. He expressed hope that these could be conveyed to him while he was still in London.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu ... -76v30/d90

[zan]

"or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs."

The never ending obsession of the Americans with communism. Ironid that today they agree that the best choice for president of the RoC is a communist and they have welcomed his election. These goons were supposedly the best that the USA could field in diplomacy at that time. Imagine if they were employing people from the second tier what would have happened!

What...The goons that were in touch with the Russians all the time...What where those Russians ships doing around Cyprus in 1974 Nikitas.....Surely not fishing!!

[AWE]

"or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs."

The never ending obsession of the Americans with communism. Ironid that today they agree that the best choice for president of the RoC is a communist and they have welcomed his election. These goons were supposedly the best that the USA could field in diplomacy at that time. Imagine if they were employing people from the second tier what would have happened!

That is because he is not a threat as Communism has failed and is no longer a threat to the USA. The west won that cold war.

[wyoming cowboy]

Whats new here nothing really, Kissinger was in touch with the Turks and the junta directing the invasion of Turkey. There are reports from soldiers serving in the CNG that they were ordered not to fire on the Turks, to make it a total cakewalk for the Turks ,,important CNG units were moved from the coast of Kyrenia and towards Limassol and Paphos. There was no way the Turks could fail in their attempt. If they were stopped then the ships outside of Kyrenia would take over.. The junta would fall a few days after the invasion and the Turk had a foothold on Cyprus, something they would not dare do before. /There was invasion to save any Tc because the Tc were not in danger. These articles and others prove many things including the illigitimacy of the occuppied areas of Cyprus

[insan]

Whats new here nothing really, Kissinger was in touch with the Turks and the junta directing the invasion of Turkey. There are reports from soldiers serving in the CNG that they were ordered not to fire on the Turks, to make it a total cakewalk for the Turks ,,important CNG units were moved from the coast of Kyrenia and towards Limassol and Paphos. There was no way the Turks could fail in their attempt. If they were stopped then the ships outside of Kyrenia would take over.. The junta would fall a few days after the invasion and the Turk had a foothold on Cyprus, something they would not dare do before. /There was invasion to save any Tc because the Tc were not in danger. These articles and others prove many things including the illigitimacy of the occuppied areas of Cyprus