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Kissinger and Callaghan’s unknown tug-of-war over the Cyprus crisis

By Makarios Droushiotis
Published on August 17, 2010

IN THE wake of 1974 we had grown accustomed to talking of the ‘Anglo-American’ factor and of its role in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in the sense that the United States and Britain had implemented a joint policy which in advance was designed to serve Turkish interests.

This ‘reality’ started to come into question once the diplomatic correspondence of the period was declassified. Over the last few years, several books have been published, particularly by foreign authors, debunking theories that had long been taken for granted.

Now Polys Polyviou, a member of Glafcos Clerides’ negotiating team at the Geneva conference of August 1974, seeks to set the record straight in a book of his own. Polyviou makes a convincing case that the British and US roles were distinct. In his book, titled “The diplomacy of invasion” (Kastaniotis publishers) which came out recently, Polyviou draws on personal experience and official documents as well as primary source material.

Among other things Polyviou has studied the memoirs of British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan which are kept at Oxford University. In his book Polyviou highlights the hitherto unknown aspects of the US-British clash over the handling of the Turkish invasion:

“For reasons that are elucidated, the Americans – and Henry Kissinger in particular – had no intention whatsoever to put pressure on Turkey to halt or to limit its military action on the island,” it says.

“By contrast, Britain, which had interests in Cyprus, was willing even to provide the UN with troops in a bid to stop the Turkish advance and takeover of the island’s north.”

On 15 July 1974, when the junta overthrew Makarios, the reactions in London and Washington were vastly different:

London recognised Makarios as the President of Cyprus, called for his reinstatement and issued a strong demarche to the regime in Athens to withdraw Greek military officers from the island.

Washington on the other hand did not want to snub the Greek junta nor question the new state of affairs in Cyprus before the air cleared. First and foremost, the United States was not interested in restoring Makarios as soon as possible.

When the Turks invaded on 20 July, Callaghan spearheaded efforts aimed at brokering a ceasefire, which was achieved on 22 July, 1974. The Turks had already established a foothold in Kyrenia which they managed to link to the Turkish Cypriot pocket in Nicosia.

Callaghan’s strategy was to bring the situation under control through the ceasefire and by restoring the 1960 constitution, followed by talks on constitutional reform that would take into account the new realities.

This was his agenda when he convened the conference of guarantor powers (Geneva, 10 August 1974). Taking part in the talks were Callaghan himself and the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, Georgios Mavros and Turan Gunes. Also present were Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash as the representatives of the island’s two communities.

This endeavour failed, the conference collapsed on 14 August, the Turkish army marched forward on two fronts and went on to capture 36 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. In his book, Polyviou records in chilling detail the frantic efforts at the Geneva conference to prevent the second phase of the Turkish invasion.

Callaghan thought he could foil the second invasion. Subsequently, however, he came to realise that the Geneva conference was always going to be a lost cause: “At that point, I did not suspect, as I do now, that the Turks regarded the conference as little more than an opportunity to secure more time and diplomatic cover to prepare for a second attack.” he wrote two years later in a memoir the contents of which are revealed in Polyviou’s book.

Willing but unable

Already, before the actual conference got underway, the initial consultations in Geneva indicated that Turkey had no desire to cooperate. Callaghan grew frustrated with Turkey’s stance, especially with Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes. At a meeting with Arthur Hartman - Kissinger’s representative - Callaghan conveyed to the US official his displeasure with Gunes’ attitude. Gunes was said to be behaving improperly and would often disappear, as it became obvious that his aim was to scupper the talks. It was completely unacceptable, Callaghan told Hartman, that Britain’s Foreign Secretary should be humiliated in this way by Turkey’s Foreign Minister.

During a meeting with Clerides, Callaghan said he was genuinely willing to help. However, he also stressed to Clerides that Great Britain was no longer a superpower and that Her Majesty’s Government could not afford to deal with “another Suez”, and that it was impossible for it to undertake “any dynamic initiative” except for acting within UN auspices or in consultation with the United States.

Callaghan meanwhile tried to secure Kissinger’s backing in threatening Turkey militarily to get Ankara to cooperate in a diplomatic solution at Geneva. He conveyed his observations and thoughts to Hartman, asking in the strongest terms that the United States lean on Turkey. Hartman said that Kissinger viewed US involvement or pressure on Turkey as neither desirable nor necessary; the ongoing British “intercession” was sufficient, he said.

Playing the military force card

It then occurred to Callaghan to play the military force card: British troops on Cyprus would be placed at the disposal of the UN. This was an issue he had discussed with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the eve of the Geneva conference. Callaghan proposed that British troops become part of an international peacekeeping force to be deployed between the two combatants in a zone considered “neutral.” He reckoned that such action would stop Turkey’s expansionist designs in its tracks, especially since it would be preceded by a relevant announcement. But Callaghan needed Kissinger’s backing before embarking on this course of action. On 11 August 1974 Hartman informed Callaghan of Kissinger’s response: The US Secretary of State conveyed in the strongest possible terms that the US government was “not pleased with the handling of the matter or with the approach of the British government.”

Kissinger had spoken with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, telling him that “in the event of a new Turkish advance, he would not have the support of the US government.” Hartman told Callaghan that Kissinger was satisfied with “Ecevit’s assurances on the matter” and that there must be no further British pressure on the Turks.

Kissinger rejected the British proposal for the deployment of British troops as part of the international peacekeeping force. Speaking on Kissinger’s behalf, Hartman also mentioned that the US government had noticed that the British sovereign bases in Cyprus had been placed on a heightened state of alert. In addition, the British government had taken certain precautionary military steps, which it had in fact made public. According to Hartman, Kissinger was extremely displeased with these developments and would “react very strongly to any further military actions by the British government or publicisation thereof.” Any such actions, Hartman said, would have a negative impact on Kissinger’s consultations with Ecevit.

Callaghan, however, persisted and let it be known that he was not satisfied with Kissinger’s stance. He disagreed with Kissinger’s handling of the Turkish government, and moreover he was displeased that no discussions had taken place between the United States and Britain on a possible joint reaction to a further Turkish advance in Cyprus. Kissinger, Callaghan said, was “making the wrong assessments.” In spite of Kissinger’s disagreement, Callaghan could not overlook certain other aspects of the situation, such as Britain’s responsibilities as a guarantor power or the fact that thousands of Britons were living on the island at the time. He therefore resolved to persist in efforts to thwart the – by now clear – Turkish plans vis a vis the Geneva conference. Nevertheless, he had no doubt that diplomatic means solely would not sway the Turkish government. The Turks needed to be convinced of the prospect of military action by Britain and the United States.

In response to Hartman’s remark that Turkish intentions were unclear, Callaghan retorted that in his view there was no longer any doubt. Therefore, the British government was obliged to take any necessary military precautions in order to deal with any eventuality. Callaghan, however, was not willing to stay at Geneva indefinitely, particularly if he did not have the “necessary support from Dr Kissinger.” He reiterated his disapproval of Kissinger’s handling of the situation, adding that Kissinger was not dealing with the Turkish government and Ecevit in the correct manner. What was needed was a decisive stance toward Turkey. It was Callaghan’s intention to send additional British troops as well as Phantom fighters to the British bases in Cyprus. Hartman then indicated that Kissinger must be informed of any such action beforehand. Callaghan agreed, but remarked that whereas the US government took into account the broader strategic and geopolitical interests of the region, Great Britain had to take into consideration that it was a guarantor power with strong ties to Cyprus. If Kissinger continued to not support his efforts, Callaghan warned, then perhaps he should withdraw from Geneva and stop trying.

The fix: bizonal confederation

Lacking Kissinger’s support, Callaghan was unwilling to act alone and threaten Turkey with military action. He therefore shifted his efforts toward diplomatic management of the crisis. Turkey had proposed the establishment of a bizonal federation on the basis of geographical separation. In short, it wanted the surrender, there and then, of the territories which it subsequently occupied by the force of arms.

Callaghan knew it would be impossible for Clerides to accept a proposal that would kick 90,000 people out of their homes. But as he writes in his memoirs, he was convinced by Denktash that under the circumstances a geographical separation, in the form of a bi-regional federation was the only solution. Callaghan then asked Clerides to commit to the “existence of two autonomous communities within set geographical boundaries within the framework of a federal state” as the only hope of preventing the talks from collapsing and averting a second invasion.

Clerides and Greek Foreign Minister Mavros proposed returning to Athens and Nicosia to consult with the respective political forces and convey to them the latest developments. Callaghan felt that Clerides and Mavros were ready to “advocate a single Turkish Cypriot administrative zone and they would return with a positive decision; but it would be for a Turkish Cypriot zone less than 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic, which was what the Turkish side was at present demanding.”

Clerides proposed that the conference be postponed for 48 hours giving him time to conclude his consultations. His proposal was backed by Callaghan, who in fact contacted Kissinger to seek his cooperation for a delay, but to no avail.

According to Polyviou, “Callaghan tried earnestly to salvage the conference and stop Turkey from taking further military action. But he was acting within the context of a predetermined US policy which without doubt conveyed to the Turkish government the message that no substantial action would be taken to thwart the latter’s plans for Cyprus.”

Callaghan’s final assessment of Kissinger’s inaction, as he describes it in his memoirs, was this: “It is certainly the case that Dr. Kissinger was concerned with the maintenance of Turkish goodwill as a bulwark between the Soviet Union and the Arab states as well as with the continued use of US bases in Turkey. He was also concerned with the effects of United States policy over Cyprus on the resolution of the Arab/Israeli problem, and regarded this as more important than Greek hostility towards the United States, despite the effect of Greek withdrawal from NATO on the Southern Flank.”

http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/kissi ... s/20100817

[Baggieboy]

Thank you for posting this. Its something I've become familiar with from my own research, but have never mentioned it on Cyprus boards for fear of causing offence. Britain's record with Cyprus is not without fault, but I do genuinely believe we did what we could in 74. My own research suggests the USA had very different ideas about how Cyprus could be used to their advantage - regardless of the human cost to the island. Unfortunately, as is now, the USA holds the biggest stick on foreign policy. 1974 served 2 purposes for the USA, get rid of the Greek Military Junta and Makarios, all in one fell swoop. It all seemed too perfect to be co-incidence.

From anecdotal evidence I am also aware that british troops were champing at the bit to get involved, but were not allowed to.

A whole new can of worms I suppose, but nonetheless another interesting point for discussion.

[cymart]

While I was in England in 1975,the boss of the firm I was working for then was a close friend of the local Labour Party M.P.,himself a regular visitor to Cyprus in the early 1970's and he was very upset about the Cyprus situation and felt that Britain could have done far more the previous summer to stop Turkey invading.He managed to get a private interview with Callaghan,who apparently told him the same as Makarios Droushiotis article reveals.i.e. that Kissinger was largely responsible and with Makarios,who he did not trust because of his close links with the Soviet block already out of power, the U.S. were far more interested in their overall Middle-East policy and they thought Cyprus was just a detail that would no longer cause a problem,regardless of how much territory Turkey wanted here etc!
To be honest,I never bothered posting this before,presuming that most people probably already knew anyway.After so long I suppose it is 'water under the bridge now'.
But it does raise speculation once again that if Makarios had consented to insistent demands for a western base in the Karpas during the 1960's,the islands history would be very different from what it is now??

[zan]

86. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

Washington, July 16, 1974, 10:36–11:20 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
Thomas D. Boyatt
Defense
William Clements
Robert Ellsworth
Harry Bergold
JCS
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC Staff
Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
James Barnum
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—that the two U.S. naval task forces now in the Mediterranean would remain out of ports, in a holding position;
—that Ambassador Tasca ask President Ioannides for an unambiguous statement on Greek intentions toward Cyprus;
—that the Turkish Government be asked what they want to prevent on Cyprus;
—that our assessment of the situation be sent to relevant diplomatic posts; and
—CIA would prepare a situation report on the status of forces on Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing for us?

Mr. Colby began briefing from the attached text.2

Secretary Kissinger: What time? (In reference to the scheduled meeting of the UN Security Council.)

Mr. Colby: Sometime this afternoon, I think 3:00 p.m.

Mr. Sisco: Before Bill goes on I would like to bring you up to date with some later information. I was just on the phone to Buffum in New York. USUN has been informed that Weckman (the Special UN Representative on Cyprus) saw MAKARIOS this morning—talked to him. MAKARIOS said that the British had offered him (MAKARIOS) protection and evacuation to any place he wanted to go. MAKARIOS refused, but asked for UN protection. Waldheim is planning to convene the UNSC this afternoon to deal with this request.

Secretary Kissinger: I just talked to (British Foreign Minister) Callaghan on the phone five minutes ago.3 He says that MAKARIOS has accepted—wants British protection. From what I understand, the British are flying him to the aircraft carrier Hermes and then to Malta. He was asking whether we had any ideas on where MAKARIOS could be taken next. Everyone, at least now, agrees that MAKARIOS is alive.

Mr. Sisco: Well, our information seems to be conflicting. I would think that the Callaghan information is more reliable.

Secretary Kissinger: I told him (Mr. Callaghan) the line we were taking and he said go easy on the legitimate government issue because MAKARIOS is leaving the island.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they mean by this? (In reference to plans for a special Turk parliamentary meeting to be held July 18.)

Mr. Colby: It could mean that they intend to move their forces to Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: I just can't believe that. I just can't believe they want MAKARIOS back in power.

Mr. Sisco: The Turks would intervene to (a) protect the Turk Cypriot community and (b) to prevent enosis from taking place.

Secretary Kissinger: It just seems inconceivable to me that they would support him (MAKARIOS).

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: They are moving in an easterly direction away from Cyprus? (In reference to Mr. Colby's briefing on Soviet fleet movements.)

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of forces do we have in the Eastern Mediterranean now?

Gen. Pauly: There are two main task forces. One has the aircraft carrier Forrestal with it and the other is an amphibious task force. That group is located south of Crete. The task force with the Forrestal in it is now somewhere between Crete and Athens. There are other small elements around, but those are the two main task forces. We've told them all to remain out of the ports, in a holding position and to be prepared for a 24 hour lead time in case they are needed.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we ought to do anything with them now, even if the Soviet ships are moving, am I right?

Mr. Sisco: Definitely. They are close enough anyway if we have to call on them. They are in a holding pattern and can be moved quickly. Besides, any movement might be seen as attempts to internationalize the situation. Holding is consistent with our policy.

Mr. Colby resumed his briefing which touched on the Greek-Turk Aegean dispute…

Secretary Kissinger: Let's finish with Cyprus first.

(to Mr. Clements) Bill, do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Only that I think we ought to keep the forces where they are. No movement.

Gen. Pauly: I agree.

Mr. Sisco: I suggest we continue to maintain a low profile, remain cautious. Anything else at this time would be counterproductive. The situation is as murky today as yesterday. We just don't know what's going on. First, if the UK provides MAKARIOS protection, that changes the situation. Second, we need to provide some guidance for today's UN meeting. Also, Henry, we need some guidance on what to do about recognition.

Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) I don't understand what you said earlier about the UN. What's happening at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Well, in general, the way I understand it, the Secretary General will make this report to the Security Council. It's scheduled to meet at 3:00 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger: Is (Ambassador) Scali there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I believe it will be Rossides (the Cypriot UN representative), who represents MAKARIOS, who will raise the question. He will say that they will ask for the UN to support MAKARIOS consistent with UN resolutions. The Soviets will jump in.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump. We have to look at the possibility of (1) civil war and the role of MAKARIOS forces or (2) the Sampson regime establishes control with MAKARIOS off the island. I think we ought to be careful that we don't provide the Soviets the excuse to legitimatize the situation. I propose that in the noon briefing, if asked about recognition, we say that the issue has not arisen, or something like that. But, we do not want to be positive about who we do recognize. If MAKARIOS is off the island, this might raise the Soviet angle.

Mr. Clements: That sounds reasonable to me. This UN thing concerns me, however. I mean, it could be a stamp of endorsement that would be premature from our standpoint.

Mr. Sisco: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Our first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized. We need to put stronger pressure on Athens, and today. We must get our Ambassador in to see the President, or Prime Minister, or whoever it is, and get our views across forcibly. We've got to get somebody in there who will ask the Greeks for a statement of their intentions. [1 line not declassified] We want an unambiguous statement of Greek intentions towards Cyprus from him. We want to defuse the Turk angle. They mainly want to prevent enosis. If civil war develops then we'll have to assess the situation then. As far as the public line is concerned, we can say that the recognition issue just hasn't arisen. Tomorrow we can decide on the internal situation when we know just where MAKARIOS is. Callaghan can't be wrong.

Mr. Ellsworth: I might suggest that (Ambassador) Macomber also say something to the Turks. There has not been enough attention here to Turkey. It really fears the new Cypriot government.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K., but what should he say? Ask what they want to achieve.

Mr. Sisco: We need to make the point with Greece not to fool around with this troop rotation tomorrow.

Mr. Ellsworth: Something like, “don't do anything”, just play it cool.

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: I don't want to use it, but the Ambassador is insisting on it.

Mr. Lauder: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Let's get the word to Ioannidis. I don't care which way, but do it.

Mr. Sisco: Ambassador Tasca should go see Ioannidis and tell him what we said yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: Right.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is also a protocol problem of a reception for military attachés in Athens in a few hours. We should get a cable out to them for some guidance.

Mr. Clements: What's this you're talking about?

Mr. Stabler: It's the annual reception for military attachés that the Greek Government is holding this afternoon.

Mr. Sisco: The question is, should all of them go—I think there are 12—or only a few?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should cut it down a bit. Tell the top man not to go. Second-level our attendance.

Mr. Clements: O.K.

Secretary Kissinger: We should also write an assessment of the situation and send it to the various posts. Ambassador Davies in particular, and cut the number of attachés to the reception to about four. What do you want to do at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Providing the British information is correct, we ought to try to slow or deflect it. We should tell Scali to limit this round to what they want to say. Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey will certainly want to say something. We can be sure of that. They can go ahead and have their say, but we should say nothing. All we should say is that we support the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. I agree.

Mr. Colby: There is a good chance that resistance will develop on the island if the Turks invade.

Secretary Kissinger: What, MAKARIOS and the Communists? But if he (MAKARIOS) is off the island, it seems to me resistance would collapse.

Mr. Sisco: If he remains on the island, there is a better chance, I agree. MAKARIOS in the past has had Communist support. He also has a broad-based popular support.

Ambassador McCloskey: That's right, in past elections MAKARIOS has received upwards of 95 percent of the vote—in honest elections.

Secretary Kissinger: At issue here is what is the balance of forces if a civil war develops. If the organized forces are Communist, it's an entirely different situation than if they are not.

Mr. Sisco: What are the political leanings of MAKARIOS' Tactical Reserve Forces?

Mr. Boyatt: They are basically pro-Makarios. They are certainly not Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a basis on which to move until the situation clarifies. It's too complicated at this point. When talking to Callaghan, I could give him no ideas on what to do with MAKARIOS. I just don't think it is in his (MAKARIOS') interest to leave the island.

Mr. Clements: What is the size of the organized forces there, again?

Mr. Colby: There are 950 regular Greek forces, 650 Greek officers in the National Guard, and about 6,000 total forces on the island.

Mr. Sisco: Through the London-Turkish agreement the Greeks have a right to station officers on the island.

Secretary Kissinger: Our objectives as I see it are: (1) to prevent the internationalization of the situation, and (2) if civil war develops to conduct ourselves so that the Communists aren't encouraged to exploit the situation. The first thing we have got to do is decouple the Greeks, and do it today. We also have to get the Turks to stay out of it. If he (MAKARIOS) is indeed leaving, it seems to me that organized resistance will collapse. Callaghan told me it was at MAKARIOS' initiative to leave. Callaghan said that MAKARIOS asked to be moved to a British Sovereign Base and from there to Malta. I just don't understand his reasons for not staying.

Mr. Boyatt: I can't either. It's quite unlike him. He has guts, and this I don't understand.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing we cannot accurately assess is what paramilitary forces are going to do. History has proved this. We have to see what develops on the island before we can really do anything. I see no problem on the recognition thing. We don't want to recognize Sampson. He's just a figurehead anyway, isn't he?

Mr. Stabler: That's right. If asked, we should just say that the question of recognition just hasn't arisen.

Mr. Colby continued to brief on the implication of the Aegean dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have anybody who can talk to the Turks?

Mr. Ellsworth: I've got some contacts in New York. I would like to get their assessment of the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Can Macomber see Ecevit?

Mr. Sisco: Sure.

(At this point the Secretary was handed a cable from which he read.)4

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan has just reported that MAKARIOS is now in a Sovereign Base Area. He is not off the island yet. I had better call Callaghan and get some clarification because we can't make a judgment until we know the status of MAKARIOS. We need to get a better view of the ground situation on the island. Can I get that from you (to Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby: You can have what we have, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to find out what the situation on the ground is first, then we can decide who we will support.

Mr. Colby: We aren't getting much information. We are getting some traffic now on military moves, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) Give me a situation report by the end of the day. Today we will concentrate our moves on Athens and Turkey. We want a clear reading on what the Turks want. Tomorrow we can take up the internal situation.

Mr. Clements: What are the Greeks doing? What is their objective in this?

Mr. Colby: They want to take over the country. They think that MAKARIOS is nothing but a bloody Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep the Turks and the Soviets out of this. We must see how the internal situation on Cyprus evolves.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

2 Not attached and not found.

3 Kissinger phoned Callaghan at 10:15 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

4 Telegram 8934 from London, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

[Nikitas]

"But it does raise speculation once again that if Makarios had consented to insistent demands for a western base in the Karpas during the 1960's,the islands history would be very different from what it is now??"

Any document in support of the above request?

What I have is Patroclos Stavrou, close aide to Makarios, in whose account of the meeting between George Ball US Underscretary of State went like this:

Makarios- Mr Ball, is there anything in the Cyprus foreign policy which we are doing that the US deems undesirable?

Ball- No sir.

Makarios- Mr Ball, is there something that we are not doing that the US would llike us to do?

Ball- No sir, can't say there is.

The US had asked for and got the retransmission station in Mia Milia and permission to use the Arkotiri air base. The permission was a matter of international courtesy, and although not strictly needed the US asked and got it.

So when was the ruquest for a Karpasia base tabled and by whom and when was it rejected and by whom?

Considering that the National Guard was led by staunch anti communist officers, many of whom had served in the Greek civil war against the communists, can we not say that the whole of Cyprus was an effective western base in the 1960s and 1970s?

[zan]

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968
VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 258

258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, March 3, 1967, 8:27 p.m.

148939. NATUS. Joint State/Defense cable. Subject: Considerations of NATO Presence on Cyprus. Ref: State 97095.2

1. Prior to suspension in December Greek-Turkish dialogue on Cyprus included consideration of base on Cyprus as compensation to Turkey for enosis. Reftel explored possibility of a “NATO base” on Cyprus in very general terms as part of a Cyprus solution. Responses at that time indicated that:

a. While a NATO peacekeeping force on Cyprus was not considered advisable, a NATO presence such as a headquarters, command, airfield, port or support base (possibly for AMF) might provide a Turkish and/or multinational military presence on the Island that could satisfy the Turks in the interests of reaching a solution to the problem.

b. The major problems to overcome are the possible opposition of Makarios, the Turkish stand against enosis and the requirement for guarantee of the rights of Turkish Cypriots.

c. The Turks (according to Ambassador Hart) might be willing to accept enosis provided the right formula could be found. This formula must include Turkish troops on the Island under a Turkish-dominated joint or NATO base at Dhekelia and guarantee of Turkish Cypriot rights by the UN.

d. Other NATO nations might go along with such an idea if it becomes a critical factor in a solution. Subsequently, the situation has been altered: (1) Recently the Greek Crown Council (including Makarios) agreed to accept NATO base concept after enosis, and (2) the problems of troop rotations, fortifications, and Czech arms have increased tensions. In order to provide some ideas for further consideration, a closer look at the possibility of utilizing NATO in a Cyprus solution appears necessary, even though we have no assurance this will satisfy the Turks who were “offered more” during 1964 Acheson effort.

2. General concepts in para 3 below might be developed in an attempt to accommodate Turkish-Greek requirements. Their consideration along with response to questions in para 4 is requested. These ideas are entirely exploratory, are aimed at providing plausible NATO role for continued presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus, and represent an expansion of the ideas contained reftel. The US would not initiate or advocate them but would propose them discreetly to the Greeks and/or Turks for their use or sponsorship if NATO base idea proves feasible. They do not represent a US position. These concepts presuppose enosis, adequate guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots, demilitarization of the Island less the SBA bases and the retention of a UN presence on Cyprus as observers. Additionally, all parties involved must accept and have valid assurance of fulfillment of all conditions in advance of execution.

3. The following are listed as possible concepts for utilizing NATO forces on Cyprus at the Dhekelia Base:

a. A Greek-Turkish joint command with the possible addition of UK forces as an extension of LANDSOUTHEAST with a mission of planning and training ground forces. The forces assigned would be from those now on Cyprus.

b. A headquarters and/or exercise base for units of the AMF or other NATO force. The same Greek, Turkish and UK forces as in 3a, above, would be based at Dhekelia as a permanent nucleus force with the addition of limited numbers or representatives of nations providing forces to the AMF as a part of the staff.

4. The questions listed are issues that should be considered and answered in connection with the above concepts:

a. What is the probable reaction of host nations to these ideas at this time?

b. Should sovereignty of Dhekelia be retained by UK?

c. Who should the commander and vice commander of such a force be and should these positions be rotated among the nations involved?

d. Should there be an honorary base commanding officer (Turkish) in addition to the force commander to enlarge the number of prestige positions?

e. Should the size of the Greek, Turkish and UK forces be limited in size to possibly a battalion each?

f. Should the Greeks and Turks contribute to the cost of such a concept particularly in view each spends over $10 million annually on Cyprus?

g. Should other NATO nations contribute towards financing, and to what degree?

h. Would participation by the Turks, by having a military force on Cyprus and a degree of command, satisfy their requirements?

6. Your comments on these ideas and questions are requested by March 10. This material should be closely held. NATO base concept should not be discussed with SYG Brosio at this time. However we realize necessity discuss base concept with Brosio at appropriate stage.3

Rusk

[yialousa1971]

Thank you for posting this. Its something I've become familiar with from my own research, but have never mentioned it on Cyprus boards for fear of causing offence. Britain's record with Cyprus is not without fault, but I do genuinely believe we did what we could in 74. My own research suggests the USA had very different ideas about how Cyprus could be used to their advantage - regardless of the human cost to the island. Unfortunately, as is now, the USA holds the biggest stick on foreign policy. 1974 served 2 purposes for the USA, get rid of the Greek Military Junta and Makarios, all in one fell swoop. It all seemed too perfect to be co-incidence.

From anecdotal evidence I am also aware that british troops were champing at the bit to get involved, but were not allowed to.

A whole new can of worms I suppose, but nonetheless another interesting point for discussion.

The Anglo brought the Turk back to Cyprus it's as simple as that so don't try and suggest overwise.