Extract from Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis 1
July 23, 2010 D&FA Confidential © 2010 Global Information System, ISSA
Founded in 1972. Formerly Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily Volume XXVIII, No. 49 Friday, July 23, 2010 © 2010 Global Information System/ISSA.
Special Report Turkey Now Escalating its Moves Toward the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. A debate is now gaining momentum within senior circles of the governing Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party: AKP) in Turkey as to whether or not this is the time to proceed rapidly with the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, so that Turkey maintains strategic parity with other nuclear powers in the region: Russia, Israel, Pakistan, and Iran. Highly-placed sources indicate that Turkey has been delib-erating the acquisition of military nuclear capability for some time, but has been constrained by its need to maintain good relations with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) partners generally, as well as the European Union (EU). The Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanları: GB) is also engaged in this debate, but, for the most part, this is a debate dominated by the civilian leadership. Turkish acquisition of nuclear weapons would significantly transform the balance of power and the strategic dynamic of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greater Black Sea Basin (GBSB), and the Caucasus, and would be the cornerstone of Turkey‟s ambitious program to restore what it sees as its historical pan-Turkist mission. Indeed, without nuclear weapons — at least as far as regional perception is concerned — Turkey could not compete against a nuclear Iran or be seen as an independent “great power” in the region. Nuclear weapons research has long been underway, under conditions of extreme secrecy, in Turkey, and the AKP leadership is aware that it is probable that this will become public knowledge as the effort be-comes more intense. It is not totally dependent on, but benefits from, the acquisition by Turkey of uranium-based nuclear power reactors, which will ultimately provide a base of fissionable materials to sustain an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, however, nuclear weapons research — which requires only a minimal amount of fissionable material, obtainable on the world market — can continue separately. There is no doubt that Turkey‟s growing relationships with Iran, Brazil, and Pakistan have been — as far as the Turkish leadership is concerned — with the military nuclear program partially in mind.
As far back as 1998, Turkish media reports indicated that then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had offered Turkey cooperation in the development of nuclear weapons.1 [Significantly, Nawaz Sharif is poised to make a political comeback in Pakistan in the next general elections.] The dramatic lowering of leverage which the US and EU have over Turkish strategic direction over the past 18 months, coupled with the growing separation with Israel at the behest of the AKP as a means of reducing the domestic Turkish political influence of the General Staff, along with the perceived need to firmly establish a stronger measure of Turkish independence from Russia, are all contributory factors in the Turkish Government‟s moves to press ahead as rapidly as possible with the nuclear weapons and nuclear power programs.
What is significant is that Turkey played a significant rôle in the early 1980s in helping Pakistan acquire systems for the development of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and there is little doubt that Turkey now expects a quid pro quo. Pakistan, despite ill-informed Western media speculation, has been extremely cautious about sharing its nuclear weapons knowledge, and may not deliver what Ankara wants with regard to nuclear cooperation at this point. Nonetheless, the growing military supply relationship between Turkey and Pakistan highlights the quiet cooperation between the two former
Extract from Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis 2
July 23, 2010 D&FA Confidential © 2010 Global Information System, ISSA
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) member states, and now Turkey and Iran (another former CENTO member) have cautiously come back together under the aegis of the Russian regional energy networking. In 1992, US Senator John Glenn and other US congressmen accused Turkey of supplying sensitive technology to Pakistan in order to aid in Pakistan's acquisition of uranium enrichment technology.
read more:- http://www.kalami.net/2010/cosmos/NUCLEAR_TURKEY.pdf
Very senior sources in Israel, Russia, and the US have privately expressed concern that Turkey is proceeding with its nuclear weapons program, and that Turkey has obtained a significant knowledge of nuclear weapons technology, protocols, and operational doctrine from its association with NATO and Israel. Moreover, officials in Israel, Russia, and the US are fully aware that neither the Turkish Government nor the Turkish military pays any attention to confidentiality clauses, end user certificates, or use strictures on weapons, intelligence, or defense systems made available to Turkey by its allies. One Israeli official told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs: “We are all fully aware that when the Turkish Armed Forces invaded Cyprus in 1974 they did so using US military equipment in defiance of the use strictures placed on that equipment when it was provided by the US to Turkey. Today, Turkey is in open violation of all of its agreements with the US and Israel with regard to the US and Israeli military systems which are the backbone of the Turkish Armed Forces now occupying Northern Cyprus.” This was the first disclosure that Israeli military equipment was being used by the Turkish military in Cyprus, and that this was a violation of understandings between Turkey and Israel when the equipment was supplied.
Turkey's scorched earth policy, grand genocides and maximum annihilation of other groups of peoples can all be done more quickly and efficiently. Like cockroaches, they remain resistant to any after-effects of such actions.
