from Official records..........Sundays Cyprus Mail
By Makarios Drousiotis Published on July 25, 2010
THE ROLE played by the US during the Turkish invasion has always been the subject of much debate. In the first years after 1974 it was considered an absolute certainty that the coup and invasion were part of an orchestrated operation to partition Cyprus. With the passing of time, however, this theory has faded as it became apparent that a variety of divergent factors were at play.
In the last few years, the US has de-classified a large volume of diplomatic correspondence and minutes of meetings which shed new light on 1974.
From the available material we learn that, because of the Watergate scandal the Cyprus problem was handled exclusively by the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger disliked President Makarios because of his ties with the Eastern Bloc; he was also blamed for the unsolved Cyprus problem which de-stabilised Greek-Turkish relations. The fundamental principle of US policy on Cyprus was the maintenance of a Greek-Turkish balance on the island. All US decisions of the time were shaped by the fear of the Soviet Union increasing its influence in the area.
It is by recourse to these factors that Kissinger decided the US policy in the Cyprus crisis. Immediately after the July 15 coup, a number of meetings took place in an attempt to shape American policy.
Arguably the most important was held on July 17, 1974 and was attended by Kissinger, the CIA chief, high-ranking State Department officials, as well as representatives from the Defence Ministry, the General Staff and the National Security Council.
By this time, Makarios had fled to London via the British Bases and Nicos Sampson had been sworn in as the President of the coupist government. In Turkey preparations were being made for the invasion while its Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced he would be flying to London to discuss a military intervention with the British government. It is against this background that the Washington meeting took place. Detailed excerpts of the recently released minutes of this meeting are published below.
Secretary Henry Kissinger: What do you think they want to achieve by doing that? (referring to information that Ankara is moving troops into positions in southern Turkey)
Bill Colby (CIA): They probably want to move into this area (pointing to North Central Cyprus on the map). They probably want to establish an enclave in that area.
Secretary Kissinger: (To Wells Stabler, State Department) Have we told the Turks that we know of their concern?
Stabler: Not yet, but a telegram is being prepared....
Kissinger: That takes too long. Call the (Turkish) Ambassador. They should know right away what our position is.
Joseph Sisco (State Department): I’ll give him a call right now. (Sisco left the room.)
William Clements (Defence Department): What’s this you’re doing?
Kissinger: Informing the Turks that the Greeks are not increasing the number of their forces in the island.
Kissinger: Bill (Clements), do you have anything?
Clements: I don’t think the Turks will move in (on Cyprus). They may make some noise, but I don’t think they’ll move.
Colby: Oh, I think they’ll try to avoid having to move. I didn’t mean to say that we think they’ll move. I think they’ll try the diplomatic route first, but may feel in the end that they have to move in.
Kissinger: To what end? Why should they do this?
Colby: To maintain the status quo ante.
Kissinger: I still do not understand why Turkey wants Makarios back.
Colby: Well, look at it this way. It’s either Makarios or Sampson at this point. Makarios is certainly better than Sampson from a Turkish point of view.
(Kissinger is handed a cable. Not further identified)
Kissinger: This just talks about the influx of forces; we already knew that. (Pointing to the map) If the Turks intervene, if they take that quadrant (Southwest), what is the proportion of Turks to Greeks in that area?
Colby: It is largely Turkish.
Kissinger: If they take that quadrant (pointing to the northeast section of the island) what’s the population there?
George Lauder (CIA): It’s about 50 per cent Greek and 50 per cent Turkish.
Colby: Their main purpose would be to establish themselves on some portion of the island just to gain a foothold.
Kissinger: With the ultimate objective of permanent occupation?
Colby: That’s one proposition.
Clements: But what would they want?
Colby: To partition or divide the island.
Kissinger: I am going to talk to the President about sending someone to London to see Makarios and (Bulent) Ecevit (Turkish Prime Minister). I think it is important that we send somebody over there to explain what our position is. The Sampson regime, it seems to me constitutes de facto enosis in the Turk view. He (Sampson) is a most unattractive guy. It’s not in our interest to have him. It’s my feeling that if Makarios is brought back it can be done only by the removal of Sampson and the Greek officers and Makarios would then have to lean more to the East.
Colby: Greece continues to pretend that this is strictly an internal Cypriot affair.
Kissinger: Yes, but once they (the Greek officers) are removed the balance of power changes. If a Greek engineered coup fails, it would be a disaster from the Greek standpoint. It would be more than a slap in the face, it would be disastrous.
Colby: Not necessarily.
Kissinger: How’s that? If a coup fails, it would weaken the influence of Athens in the entire area. As I assess the situation, for us the best outcome would be a Clerides government. I just don’t understand why the Turks would want to bring Makarios back. I don’t think (the Turks) understand our analysis of the situation. Somebody has to go to London and explain our position.
Clements: It’s one thing for the Turks to invade, and another thing to take over only part of the island. That would downgrade Greek influence throughout the entire area.
Kissinger: If the Turks bring Makarios back, he (Makarios) would have to rely more on the Eastern bloc. We can’t let Makarios become a stooge of the Turks.
Robert McCloskey (State Department): Well, that would depend on how much support we give him (Makarios).
Colby: There seems to be no alternative to Makarios.
Thomas Boyatt (State Department): This is not a Greek-Turkish ethnic fight; it’s basically a political squabble.
McCloskey: Whoever has the blessing of the US will also have the necessary popular support.
Kissinger: That means we can pick and choose whoever we want. That makes us king makers.
McCloskey: Whether we pick Makarios or Clerides it would stick because we could back them.
Boyatt: In my opinion Makarios would be the best for stability, but Clerides would be better from the Turkish standpoint.
Kissinger: Well, the first problem is that the National Guard is in control. How would you bring Makarios back?
Clements: That would be tougher than hell.
Kissinger: It would take a massive US-Soviet effort and that would probably bring down the Greek government. How do we bring Makarios back?
McCloskey: I think we should work for Clerides.
Boyatt: We could try a diplomatic ploy. We could go to (Dimitris) Ioannides (a leader of the Greek junta), tell him to withdraw the Greek officers, and insist on a constitutional change, i.e., Clerides. Sampson certainly is not acceptable.
Kissinger: Yes, but what if Greece doesn’t agree? It might be tough to do. We all love to conduct these grand stand plays, but where do we go after that? What do we want after that?
Colby: The status quo ante.
Kissinger: Yes, that’s easy to say, but where are you after that?
Boyatt: We have stability because Clerides has been neutralised.
Kissinger: I’m not so sure that serves our long-term interest. The trick is to diffuse the situation without tilting the present structure.
Colby: I’m not sure that Ioannides has all that long a future.
Kissinger: Joe (Sisco) what do you think?
Sisco: I think there is a faint hope of a political compromise. I would think our hopes rest in the restoration of a constitutional arrangement under Clerides. He has support in Cyprus. In my view, Makarios has had it. Another point I would like to make is that I don’t see a Sampson–Ioannides axis as making for a long-range stability. It is a very shaky situation with the possibility of Turkish intervention.
Kissinger: I think both are primitives (Makarios and Ioannides).
Sisco: I share Bill’s (Colby’s) views. In my judgement the Turks won’t leave. That would be a difficult exercise.
Kissinger: I think constitutional continuity is what we want. We want to keep the Turks from interfering and the London talks from collapsing.
Clements: Do you feel that this will escalate to the UN?
Kissinger: Yes, I do, but it is not in our interest to get it there. I will talk to Callaghan and see what we can do. We will send somebody over to London to talk to the Turks. I will talk to the President about this in a while. We can’t let them run loose over there when they don’t know our analysis of the situation.
Robert Ingersoll (State Department): It is in our interest to work out a constitutional solution and not get the UN involved.
Kissinger: If we can keep something going on in London, we can stonewall in the UN. We want to keep Britain and Turkey out in front of the game.
Sisco: The British judgement is that Makarios has had it.
Kissinger: Are there any other points? (To Richard Kennedy CIA)
Can you arrange for a call to (James) Callaghan (British Prime Minister)?
Kennedy: Yes.