Cyprus-Forum.com

[halil]

so whats all about this PANIC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! FEAR !!!!!!!!! ANXIETY !!!!!!!!!

[halil]

so whats all about this PANIC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! FEAR !!!!!!!!! ANXIETY !!!!!!!!!

Kosovo's declaration of independence by the decision of the International Court of Justice have been approved in a sense, an alternative to the TRNC's recognition of the agenda once again moved into first place.

Everyone is self-evaluation decision.........No one knows what to expect in this day and tomorrow.

I hope the decision of the court of justice is motivated toward the solution of some environmental...... some parties...............EU....UN .....and third parties..... and decision of Kosova will force both sides to find solution to Cyprus problem.......... Hoping that Xmuhtari will realise how urgent to find solution in Cyprus. and he will not play with time .....

[Oracle]

so whats all about this PANIC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! FEAR !!!!!!!!! ANXIETY !!!!!!!!!

Are your worried, greedy, thieving family causing you problems?

[Get Real!]

GR

An invader from the past leaves behind a bunch of his people who gradually grow in number, isolate themselves because in their minds they are “different” (often spurred by their country of origin), and refuse to assimilate with the natives/locals, so the authority of the country decides that if they won’t assimilate they want them out thus resulting in ethnic conflict and rebellion!

The correct procedure is for ethnic minorities to either assimilate or be repatriated to their country of origin, as nobody is interested in having rebellious foreigners roaming around!

Sick answer GR. You are in effect saying that they got slaughtered because they deserve it. Sick, very sick indeed. Never, never in your life talk about human rights (or war crimes) ever again.

It's your interpretation of what I'm saying that is intentionally fashioned to sound sick! What a cheap shot!

[Get Real!]

The corrupt and immoral Copperline is salivating at the destruction of Serbia and theft of her territory that now forms this “Kosovo” ambiguity.

I’ll remind the fool that in 1999 the US attack of Serbia (which ultimately led to everything else) was a war crime in its own right of which I doubt the ICJ bothered to take into consideration!

That’s the problem when international law & order breaks down because we allow the main corrupt protagonists like the US, UK, and Israel, to conduct crimes against humanity around the world thus making it impossible for justice to prevail!

A law abiding court would’ve never approved of an illegal invasion such as that of the US against Serbia, contrary to the UN Charter! If anything, this decision by the ICJ proves that corruption, chaos and anarchy reign supreme and that the Cyprus Problem can only be solved militarily.

The correct procedure is for ethnic minorities to either assimilate or be repatriated to their country of origin, as nobody is interested in having rebellious foreigners roaming around!

Not so ambiguous here:



Looks like it is the serbs who are in actual fact, 'the minority' in Kossovo!

Silly Paphitis! By the same token the "TRNC" is probably 95% comprised of people of Turkish/Turkic origin but does that make it a valid contender for independence? Of course not because of the 1974 ethnic cleansing!

And what have you done here? You have presented a map of a portion of Serbia and very recently called “Kosovo”, AFTER all the ethnic cleansings, NATO bombings, population exchanges, and God knows what else took place there from the 90s to this day!

Twit!

[bill cobbett]

so whats all about this PANIC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! FEAR !!!!!!!!! ANXIETY !!!!!!!!!

Halil, fileh,.... are you ok....?

Oh dear...think he's having a breakdown. Anyone got any pills?

[Bananiot]

Did you think of that all by yourself GR or did some one tell you? In three lines you solved the problem of ethnic minorities (lesser number of people) and if we were to take you seriously, in 1960 had we got our way, we would have sent all TC's packing back to where they came from, even if they were born here, because they did not integrate (learn Greek and get baptised). This more than sick, it is pervert too. We are talking about people here not bloody objects.

[Get Real!]

Did you think of that all by yourself GR or did some one tell you?

I had to get the assistance of the audience because you’re just too clever!

In three lines you solved the problem of ethnic minorities (lesser number of people) and if we were to take you seriously, in 1960 had we got our way, we would have sent all TC's packing back to where they came from, even if they were born here, because they did not integrate (learn Greek and get baptised). This more than sick, it is pervert too. We are talking about people here not bloody objects.

You mean like the 185,000 odd Greek Cypriots that were ethnically cleansed by Turks and Turkish Cypriots?

[Kikapu]

In my opinion; their cultural idendity should be respected and depending on their population ratio within the major ethnic group(s) and the regions mainly inhabited by those minorities should be granted local autonomy or a consociational democratic system in order to allow them effectively participate in state affairs... Only a culturally sapiential people of a country could really achieve this... if of course there aren't many external factors/powers continually destablizing the system and people in direction of their national, regional and global interests...

THE 1960 CONSTITUTION: AN ATTEMPT AT CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

"When it comes to managing and settling ethnic conflicts, power-sharing arrangements often seem appropriate: the former antagonists have to work together and make decisions by consensus, the ultimate goal being to turn opponents into partners. This concept of conflict regulation, called ‘consociational democracy’ (a form of government, involving guaranteed group representation), is often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. This concept can only be successful under specific conditions.

Lijphart has identified four key characteristics of consociational democracies: (1) Government by grand coalition – the government includes representatives from all groups in society; (2) Proportional representation – all groups are adequately represented within the executive, parliament, legal system and public service; (3) Mutual veto – each group has the opportunity to block political decisions using its veto rights, the aim being to foster consensus-building and compromise; (4) Segmental autonomy – each group enjoys some degree of self-government, maintaining its own elected bodies and institutions, leaving only few issues to be coordinated with other segments of society, thus allowing for different culturally-based community laws.

The 1960 Cyprus constitution embodied all the principles of consociational democracy. The president, a Greek-Cypriot, and the vice-president, a Turkish-Cypriot, were to be elected by their respective communities and were to share prerogatives and executive power. A 50- member house of representatives was composed of 35 Greek- and 15 Turkish-Cypriots elected by their respective communities. Either the president or the vice-president could veto legislation passed by the house of representatives in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, but not legislation passed in the communal chambers. The principles of grand coalition and proportionality were further strengthened by the provisions that the council of ministers, the legislature and the public service were all to be apportioned in a ratio of 70% Greek-Cypriot and 30% Turkish-Cypriot, while the army was to have a 60:40 ratio. Measures for autonomy included separately elected communal chambers as well as provisions for separate municipalities in the five main towns, reflecting the separation of the ethnic populations in urban areas.

However, the state of affairs established by the constitution lasted only three years, due to “[c]hronic disagreement, growing deadlock, and mounting acrimony between the communities. It is thus necessary to examine certain favorable conditions8 under which consociationalism is more likely to be successful, and see whether these were present in Cyprus.

The first favorable condition is a balance of power, whereby the state or region is not dominated by a clear majority group. Instead there exists a relative equilibrium between groups, either through the existence of a number of groups, none of which constitutes a majority, or the existence of two practically equal segments. Secondly, similar socioeconomic conditions across the groups are favorable. Indeed, “[t]he smaller the economic and social differences between the groups, the better the conditions for consociationalism. Thirdly, the existence of overarching loyalty is very important, as the disparate groups share a feeling of belonging to one nation/region, and are held together by a common loyalty. Fourthly, a multi-party system ensures that each group is represented by several political parties or movements. Fifthly, the existence of cross- cutting cleavages is important, whereby the population is characterised by cleavages which cut across ethno-national/linguistic lines, preventing the creation of homogeneous groups.

The sixth favorable condition is that of comprehensive participation: all relevant groups are represented at the negotiating table and in the power-sharing system itself. It is important that the agreed consociational structure was developed by the groups themselves and not forced upon them by external powers. This will help ensure the seventh favorable condition: that the consociational solution is not questioned by any side, and all parties to the power-sharing arrangement are interested in maintaining the agreed status quo. Eighth, it is important that elites occupy a dominant position in society, whereby the political leadership of each group is able to win internal support for compromises and agreements. Finally, territorial segmentation is believed to be helpful, as, where groups live territorially segregated, it is possible to combine consociational democracy with territorial arrangements to allow more regional self-rule for each group.

We shall now consider whether these conditions were present in Cyprus. Firstly, there was no equilibrium between the two communities, but clear domination by the Greek-Cypriot group. Secondly, there were huge socioeconomic disparities between the groups: the Turkish population was clearly disadvantaged in comparison to the Greek majority, and this split deepened after independence. Thirdly, and possibly most significantly, there was no overarching loyalty which united the two communities, nor was there the concept of a common, inclusive Cypriot identity. Indeed, “[t]he Cypriots were not a single people with differing tendencies but, rather, two different peoples...Greeks and Turks on Cyprus thought of themselves as Greeks and Turks, not as Cypriots”. Fourthly, there was no multi-party system in Cyprus, but rather, national fronts existed in each camp, marginalizing any internal, potentially more moderate position. Fifthly, there were no cross-cutting cleavages (this was reinforced by the constitution, which separated the population into two electorates), and bi-communal parties did not exist at all. Sixth, there was no comprehensive participation in the negotiating process. The guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain) established a solution, while the two ethnic groups in question were only partly and indirectly involved in negotiations. As the power-sharing constitution was written and tabled by international mediators, it was viewed, especially by the Greek-Cypriots, as having been forced upon them. According to Lijphart, “consociationalism cannot be imposed against the wishes of one or more segments in a plural society and, in particular, against the resistance of a majority segment”. As for the seventh favorable condition, respecting the status quo, the Greek-Cypriots did not want to give up their former hegemonic position, while the Turkish-Cypriots largely supported separatist options. With both sides oriented towards the nation-state model, power- sharing was seen as insufficient for safeguarding the ethno-national identities. Eighth, the leaders of the two communities did not exhibit a spirit of moderation and refused to compromise. Finally, regarding territorial segmentation, while the groups lived in segregated neighborhoods, the population was still, to a large extent, mixed.

Furthermore, “the infant Cypriot state’s experiment in consociational government was doomed to break down because...it lacked any provision for close, neutral, international supervision and mediation during its implementation”. But more importantly, the constitution itself proved to be unworkable, especially with the mutual veto power resulting in repetitive deadlock. In short, the conditions prevailing in Cyprus at the time of the implementation of the constitution did not favor success."


http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/downl

[Bananiot]

Well GR, according to your theory, the Turkish army did the right thing in order to establish an ethnically pure area without the bother of minorities. You may come up with another important finding, that the invasion was illegal, but who will remember this in 100 years?