magikthrill wrote: the same argument shows the the
main reason why TCs did not return is because they were not allowed to.
exercised substantial coercion to prevent returning in most cases to government-controlled areas.
can you accept this erol?
This is going to disapoint you no doubt - but no I do not accept this - not in the way I consider the first assertion to be 'beyond any reasonable doubt'. I think it _might_ be the main reason (or the reason most) TC did not return but I do not carry the same conviction or lack of soubt that this is the case for the second assertion than I do for the first.
Let me explain why.
Firstly my sense of conviction (for the first assertion) does not come from the one reference alone but from a range of such. It is also I bleieve consitent with plain common sense (what is more likely to cause some to flee their homes, leaving suddenly and leaving behind posessions - fear of violence or persuit of politcal aims?). Even for the sake of 'briefness' necessary in a forum like this, if you take the two parts of the Cyprus Conflict website reffered to in this thread (the overview and the detailed study of this issue by My Patrick) they both concurr with the first assertion but they differ on the second (re the issue of why most TC did not return) to some degree. In general terms I place more reliance on the detailed study by Mr Patrick because it is a specific detailed study of the issue vs the more genral and generalised 'overview' section. What Mr Patrick has to say about this is as follows.
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/patrick% ... pt%202.htmAlthough it appears unlikely that there was any centralized co-ordination of the Turk-Cypriot refugee exodus, there is ample proof that Turk-Cypriot political and military leaders controlled the return of refugees to their former homes. It is known that in late 1964 some local Fighter commanders resorted to armed threats and even murder to prevent some refugees from moving into government controlled areas,[69] but it is not known to what extent such actions were directed or condoned by leaders in Nicosia. However, such coercion should be put in perspective. The government was prepared to encourage the return of Turk-Cypriot refugees provided that they accepted government authority and that they did not return to 'sensitive' areas. Such areas included locations adjacent to Turkish-Cypriot enclaves or National Guard positions, and also mixed villages in which returned Turk-Cypriots would outnumber Greek-Cypriots. In addition, known Fighter leaders were specifically prohibited from returning. The acceptance of such pre-conditions would have won for the government the victory that it had failed to achieve by its armed offensive. In addition, the hostility of many local Greek-Cypriots was such that Turk-Cypriots did not believe that the government could fulfill its guarantees that returning refugees would not be molested. In any case, by August 1964, the abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out ruins. Neither community had the resources to rebuild the houses, to purchase new farming equipment or to provide resettlement grants. The side that undertook such indemnities would also be tacitly admitting to a degree of responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem, and that neither community was prepared to do.
For some TC I have no doubt that they wished to return to their homes they had fled by were prevented from doing so because of orders from their leadership not to do so (and in a smaller set of cases because of violence by TC against them or the fear of it). For others I also have no doubt that the reason they did not return was the continuation of the fear they held that led them to flee in the first place and for others they were prepared to accept the risk of returning but had nothing to return to.
To recap then I accept that your assertion re the return of TC may well be correct but it might also not be correct (re wheter it was the main reason - I do not dispute whether it happened - it did). I am not sure we can ever know which to the same degree of certainty that I feel we can re the first assertion.
I would also add that if this was a 'negotiation' and the offer of a 'trade' was being offered along the lines of 'we will accept that the main reason TC fled their homes was GC violence and fear of it as long as you also accept the main reason TC did not return to their homes was orders and pressure and use of violence by TC against TC' - then I would 'take' such a deal. Pretty much as I would accept that we use the cyprus conflict website as the 'accepted shared hsitory' even though it does contains one sided versions in it and conflicting versions of events as well - on the simple basis that it is still better (more objective and more balanced) than either sides 'offical versions' of what happened.
So in summary - in terms of my actual personal beleifs I do not have the same level of conviction that the second assertion is 'betyond resoanble doubt' as the first, but would accept the 'trade' that you accept the first and we accept the second on the basis that this is an improvement on 'we refute the first and we assert the second' which seems to be the current position of some GC posters here.
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