Bananiot, acting once more as a water bucket carrier of the Turkish propaganda watermills and a fervent apologiser of Denktashic politics, has stricken again.
A typical response from someone who has no answers. After makng his wild predictions about the course Makarios was "forced" to take he comes up with the following advice:
At least, read Drousiotis books first, since you are a fervent admirer of his analysis and his writings!
I have read them and the following is exactly what Drousiotis says in one of his books on this matter which he claims to be a lost opportunity for a comprehensive settlement.
Drousiotis says
History gave Cyprus a great opportunity to shake off the weight of the national problem. Six years after the collapse of Zurich, the Turkish policy of partition for Cyprus was at a dead end. The Turkish Cypriots were becoming more and more dependent on the strong Greek Cypriot economy. The enclaves began to dissolve and the young began to emigrate, while the cost of 20 million dollars a year to Turkey for maintaining the Turkish Cypriot administration was hard to bear for the economic circumstances of the era.
At that point when the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to make a series of compromises. Within the framework of intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash, they were obliged to accept a solution improving on the Zurich agreements, and abolishing many of the privileges they secured with the 1959 agreements. Makarios did not dare to compromise while he was in a position of advantage and postponed the solution to an indeterminate future, expecting to fully absorb the Turkish Cypriots and adhering to the logic of "All or nothing".
In life as well as in politics, no-one knows what the next day will bring. The monster of nationalism, which had its roots in the policies of conflict of the 50's and 60's, caused chaos inside Cyprus which climaxed in the coup of July 15th 1974.
Had the Cyprus issue been solved, there would never have been a coup, for the simple reason that there would be no army on Cyprus. And if the Junta dared a coup to prevent a solution that was an imrovement on Zurich, the Cyprus crisis would have been handled completely differently by the international community, including the US.
Only after the dramatic consequences of the Turkish invasion, on July 29th 1974, did Makarios submit, via Henry Kissinger, a memo to the Turkish government, suggesting the immediate return to the status outlined by Zurich! But Zurich had already been obsoleted by the facts. The circumstances had changed. The rules of the game were now determined by the strong party, which under those circumstances was Turkey.
At the end of July 1974, while the Turks occupied less than 20% of the land area of Cyprus, the US was pressing the Greek side hard to accept a solution of geographic federation as the only antidote to the completion of partition. Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides were in agreement, but Makarios, despite the national disaster caused by the invasion, remained attached to "All or nothing": "The Archbishop will never attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey, even if the Turks occupy the whole of Cyprus", he wrote to Karamanlis on August 2nd 1974. Two years later, the faits accomplis of the invasion forced him to "attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey", by accepting a federal solution to the Cyprus issue.
Of course anyone can argue that Drousiotis is an even bigger water bucket carrier of the Turkish propaganda watermills and a fervent apologiser of Denktashic politics than Bananiot. He even writes all this rubbish in books which sell by the thousands ...
