observer wrote:Tim Drayton wrote:One point worth considering is that America kept flashing a red light at Turkey every time she wanted to intervene in Cyprus up until 1974, when Kissinger suddenly turned the light to green.
Is there any real evidence for Kissinger giving a green light? Without convincing evidence, I'm more inclined to think that as Washington was at the height of the Watergate scandal at the time, with President Nixon within days of resigning, the US State Department just had other, more important things on its collective mind, than a little problem (as seen from Washington) in the Eastern Mediterranean. The failure to stop Turkey (or Greece) was more likely to have been a case of indecision rather than switching on a light of any colour.
There is certainly evidence that Kissinger could have but did not prevent the second part of the invasion according to Jim Callaghan. The US wanted a strong anti communist presence on the island, at first it was to be Greek but when the Junta fell Kissinger settled for Turkey.
Extracts from,
http://web.archive.org/web/200710181006 ... laghan.htm
Hartman added that the Secretary of State would react very strongly against any further announcement of British military activities, because it would have an adverse effect on his tactics with Ecevit.
….the Turks would at the last moment back off. They had done this in earlier years and once again within the previous few days, when they had been faced by the 16/5th Lancers at Nicosia Airport.
Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further.
I continued with our diplomatic efforts, but with every hour that passed our team became more gloomy. There were flashes of common sense. Acting President Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Committee, both brought intelligence and genuine concern to the discussion on the future of their country. If it had been left to them it is conceivable that they might have hammered out an understanding. But Denktash was not a free agent, and confessed to me that in the last resort he was obliged to obey his masters on the Turkish mainland.
Despite this, the death throes of the conference continued for several hours, Clerides and Mavros repeated once again that they must have time for consultations in Nicosia and Athens. They were ready to return to Geneva within thirty-six hours. I asked Denktash if he would agree but he replied that he was bound by the Turkish Government; he would attend a further meeting only if the Turkish Foreign Minister would do so. I appealed to Gunes to accept the time that Clerides and Mavros had asked for. Once more Gunes refused. There was no formal end to the proceedings. Gunes rose from the table at which we sat, ungracious as ever, and departed, followed by his aides. The time was 2.25 a.m. on the morning of 14 August. The rest of us shook hands and filed out wearily. I gave a press conference in which I did not spare the Turkish tactics. Even while I was speaking, the Turkish Army was advancing once more, breaking the cease-fire. Gunes had played out time
