Cyprus-Forum.com

[Bananiot]

Can we review aspects of the recent Cyprus history without fanatism and bigotry or is it too much to ask from the champion of democratic rights - Piratis, who also excells in slander and mad slinging at anyone that disagrees with his ideas?

[Piratis]

You started the mad slinging. You indirectly said that people that voted "no" are brainless and they simply followed the directions of some nationalists. You threw in the trash all the real reasons that led Greek Cypriots to vote "no" and you tried to discredit with empty and baseless adjectives not only the president, but also that 76% that disagrees with you. This is how you respect the opposite opinion?? When you do not show any signs of respect to the position of the great majority of GC, why do you expect from us to show any respect to your extreme ideas?

Now you say you want to discuss aspects of our recent history. From what I see, you tent to forget the oceans of wrongdoings and criminal actions by Turkey and Britain, and you keep emphasizing and exaggerating the wrongdoings of Greek Cypriots.

The question is: why you specifically choose to talk about those specific aspects that our enemies have used for years as an excuse for their crimes? Is your aim to excuse the invasion and the occupation of our country?

Or maybe you think that you are going to enlighten us? Turkish Cypriots already know very well your position from the constant propaganda they receive. Every wrongdoing or crime of Greek Cypriots against them has been first exaggerated, and then reproduced and recycled over and over. They know all these by heart already. Greek Cypriots also know that we have done mistakes in the past. Do you think we believe that we were angels, or that our leaders were mistakeless?

Wrongdoings, crimes and mistakes have been done from all sites, but no mistake of Greek Cypriots can be an excuse for 30 years of occupation.

Do you believe that Greek Cypriots after an invasion and 30 years of occupation have to be punished yet one more time for their past mistakes, and Turkey, with crimes against us of an incomparably larger magnitude, should be declared innocent and even receive a price for their illegal actions?
For every crime a Greek Cypriot has committed in the past, Turkey has committed 100 against Greek Cypriots with their invasion and the 30 years of occupation.

All problems of the past came from problems in democracy and functionality, and disrespect for human rights. Whatever the past might have been, one thing is for sure: We do not want it to repeat. No more mistakes. No more racism. What we ask for is a secure future within a democratic state where all our human rights are respected and we are all equal EU citizens and nothing less. Can you ever be wrong when all you ask is democracy and human rights for everybody?

[mehmet]

On eof the things I find hardest to understand is the position and role of AKEL thorughout recent Cyprus hisory.

Firstly, is it correct to describe it as a Communist party? Were they loyal to the Soviet Union thorughout its existence? Or did they believe in a more social democratic gradualist approach?

Secondly they have for a long time been described as the largest party in Cyprus. Why then have they not had more presidents, is Vasillou, the only one ever to belong ot AKEL? There influence in evolution in Cyprus history seems to have been small compared to their size. How do they justify backing Papadopoulos when EOKA treat AKEL so harshly in the past?

Thirdly, where is the internationalism in AKEL that you expect to see in most left wing parties that owe their ideology to the writings of Karl Marx? Why did they appear to line up behind nationalists for most of recent CYpurs history?

[Piratis]

Mehmet, your problem is that you put all EOKA in one huge bag and label this bag nationalists. While AKEL disagreed with the tactics of EOKA (armed straggle) the great majority of its followers did not disagree with EOKA's cause (union with Greece). Also, while some of the leaders of EOKA (e.g. Grivas) truly where nationalists anti-communists, EOKA as a whole was supported by almost all Greek Cypriots from far right to far left. Many of the fighters of EOKA are true heroes that fought against colonialists. Many people participated in the straggle against the British without receiving direct commands from EOKA's leadership. Unlike Turkish Cypriots, very few Greek Cypriots wanted the British to stay and most of them wanted union with Greece.
So if you are going to say that "EOKA = Bad" it will be equal as to saying that "90% of GC = Bad". I am sure you don't want to do that.

[Piratis]

Some people say that AKEL in the past did used to get directions from USSR. I don't know if thats true or not.

In any case AKEL supports democracy and it was always clear to everybody that voting AKEL doesn't mean voting to bring communism to Cyprus but it means giving power to a party that will support the lower classes and the poor. Actually the word "communist" does not appear in its name. Its name means "Progressive Party of the Working People".

Yes, its the biggest party along with DISI (both around 34%), but 34% is not enough to elect a president. So they have to cooperate with the socialists and the center if they want to be in the government.
Probably they would prefer to have Chrisophias as the president, but Papadopoulos is accepted by most of the followers of AKEL.

[insan]

I've read several articles reagrding EOKA, EOKA-B, Grivas, AKEL and Resistance Fighters..

Here's my outcomes:

1- GCs right wing always believed that Cyprus should be purified from all colonialists(Brits and Turks) and annexed with Greece. They even took the issue to the Hague in order to make their demands legal and get worlds support to achieve annexation. Like our friend piratis they had a strong belief that Cyprus belonged to Hellens due to majority of its population and Hellenic historical background of Cyprus.

After the achievement of Greek independence in 1830, the Megale Idea played a major role in Greek politics. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Greek people remained outside the borders of the limited Greece permitted by the Great Powers, who had no intention that a large Greek state should replace the Ottoman Empire. King Othon became "King of Greece" and not "King of the Greeks" for exactly that reason: the latter title would have implied interests outside the new border.Greeks and their leaders uniformly wanted to liberate the "unredeemed" Greeks abroad, but differed about when and how to do so. In the 1880s, Kharilaos Trikoupis (seven times prime minister between 1875 and 1895) stood for reform and modernizing the domestic economy before taking international risks. His rival, Theodoros Deliyannis (five times prime minister between 1885 and 1905) took the opposite tack, and his career shows the risks at work. When the small Bulgarian principality expanded into Eastern Roumelia in 1885, Deliyannis mobilized the Greek army in an effort to secure more territory for Greece as well: but the Great Powers reacted with a blockade that damaged Greece's economy. Deliyannis went to war with Turkey in 1897 over the island of Crete, leading to twin humiliations: the Ottomans soundly defeated Greece in battle and a state bankruptcy led to Great Power control of the Greek national budget. But despite these setbacks, pursuit of the Megale Idea remained a viable basis for a political career.The legacy of the Megale Idea in the 1920s and 1930s became a destructive cycle of political rivalry and dictatorships. Instead of seeking compromise and solving national problems, the two sides expended their energy attacking each other. It is safe to say that the immediate interests of the Greek nation were sacrificed in the service of an illusory Greek nation that might have been, based on the Megale Idea. This fundamental flaw in Greek politics continues as an influence even today: the Megale Idea and aggressive nationalism reappear whenever one side or another needs a rallying point at times of crisis. Both the right-wing Colonels of the 1970s and their leftist successors have employed nationalism this way, and the ongoing Cyprus crisis is fueled by it. After generations of population exchanges, the rationale for Greek irredentism has dwindled but its power has not.

2- Papadopulos comes from Makarios tradition but Klerides is from Grivas tradition... In that case of coarse AKEL supported Papadopulos in presidential elections...

In the 1950s AKEL was both banned by the British and terrorized by EOKA because it had provoked Grivas's dangerous wrath. Makarios by contrast did not lose contact with the communists, who got five of the 35 Greek seats in the first House of Representatives, which were otherwise bestowed on Makarios's various followers, loosely grouped in a Patriotic Front. There was no further election until 1970 when AKEL decided to fight nine seats, almost certainly a deliberate underestimation of its optimum strength, and won all nine, with an average vote per candidate greatly in excess of others in the field. Wherefore this modesty? The answer must lie in Moscow's policy priorities. Makarios was keeping Cyprus non-aligned and was blocking NATO's diplomatic initiatives. A communist victory or near-victory would have attracted undesirable attention. AKEL's policy towards the Turkish Cypriots has always been a conciliatory one, springing from colonial days when the communist-led Pan Cyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) had at least 4000 Turkish members. After 1974 both party and union have preserved such contacts, for example at international conferences, as seemed possible.

The election of 1976 followed the final break between Glafkos Clerides - - hitherto the second man in the Republic and invariable Greek Cypriot interlocutor in intercommunal talks - - and the President-Archbishop. It brought out the issues which operate still. Clerides and his new Conservative party, the Democratic Rally, were firmly pro-western and anti-communist

.....

It isn't surprising that the Turks were against the Greek Enosis movement. But the Greeks themselves were split on this matter. The Communist party AKEL supported self - government but not Enosis, because of the persecution of communists in Greece. Latter AKEL denounced EOKA out of fear of persecution because EOKA's leader was a well known military officer who fought against the communists in Greece (I can't blame AKEL, I guess I would of also if I was in their shoes). Unfortunately with time the AKEL followers forgot why they opposed closer ties with Greece, and have kept on even though the reasons are long gone. This split in the Greek Cypriots has been to the expense of the Greek Cypriots interests, since Turkey has repeatedly used the Greek Cypriot inability to have a common front to its benefit.

3- Todays situation have no differences than what it was backwards for AKEL... AKEL consider the 5th Annan Plan as an Anglo-American imperialist game over East Meditarrenean region which has been playing in favour of Turks because of their strategical and economical interests over Turkey. Even AKEL was opposing the RoCs EU accession but they obliged to chose one to support... They would either submit "the imperialists" plans or resist against it...

On 16 February 2003, presidential elections took place. There were ten candidates. In a surprise result, the leader of the centre-right Democratic Party (Diko), Tassos Papadopulos, who was also supported by Akel, Kisos (Edek) and the Ecologists, won 51.5% to secure his election in
the first round, well ahead of the incumbent, Glafcos Clerides, who gained 38.8% of the vote. Alecos Markides, the Attorney-General, came third with 6.6% and Nicos Koutsou, leader of the New Horizons Party, came fourth with 2.1%. The turnout at the elections was 95.95% (voting is mandatory).
Although the handling of the UN-sponsored draft settlement for the island was the main issue, the election was more than just a referendum on this question. All three main contenders supported the plan to varying degrees with only Mr Koutsou expressing open opposition to the plan. The split in Disy, which supported Mr Clerides, was probably crucial to Mr Papadopoulos' victory. Mr Clerides had intended to retire but announced shortly before the election that he would stand again in order to oversee the expected rapid developments on the Cyprus issue but that he would not serve a full term. Mr Makides then announced his candidacy. Disy abandoned its agreement to support the Social Democrat leader, Yiannakis Omirou, as a joint candidate forcing him to seek the support of his previous allies in Akel and Diko. Disy split over the question of whether to support Mr Clerides or Mr Makides.

In practice the views of Clerides and of AKEL, at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, seem remarkably similar on the issue which is supposed to have priority. But when it comes to the point AKEL could not take any course that would contribute to the election of a pro-NATO presidential candidate like Glafkos Clerides.

If we sum up all...

GC right wing which had been backed by Greece right wing believed that the only way to purifying Cyprus from all colonialists and ensure security of GCs is armed struggle and annexation with Greece...

GC left and TCs were opposing this idea because of persecution of rightists...

Turkey had to interfere because she was against the annexation of Cyprus to Greece due to both security of TCs and her Geo- Political interests...

In 1960 the Greeks made up 80% of the population, and the Turks 18.4% (note that their contribution to public expenditure was only 7.6%). A minority of 18% was given 30% of the House of Representatives and all governmental, administrative and state posts, 40% of the army, and a vice - president with veto power!

The Constitution, which had been imposed by Turkish right wing and supported by her allies was completely unacceptable to the Greek community.Traditionaly at least, 80% of the Cypriots have been very conscious of their Greek language, Greek culture and history, and Greek Orthodox religion; and these things make them NOT Cypriots that just happen to have Greek origins, but Greeks living in Cyprus, and as such members of the larger Greek (Hellenic) nation. Analogously, the 18% have thought of themselves as Turks living in Cyprus, and members of the Turkish nation. Thus, although Andreas and Ali may be natives and residents of Cyprus, and regard the island as their common homeland, they do not normally regard themselves as compatriots, but rather as neighbours.

The Constitution gave to much power to the Turkish minority, and the Government (that is, the Greek Cypriots in the government) decided in 1963 to change the Constitution so as to make it fairer (in proportion to the communities sizes 80:18). The Turkish Cypriots were not willing to give up their power and therefore rebelled.

This case was justified by Turkish right wing(see Denktash Klerides letters) in 1971 but it was too late...


Extreme right of GCs and Greece abused dissatisfactions and fears of innocents GCs in order to achieve their prohibited aim Enosis.... TCs right wing retaliated with Taksim idea and used the same methods to achive Taksim. Onwards 1963, tensions raised and intercommunal strife were spreaded to island wide...


Greek junta was decisive regarding the annexation of Cyprus to Greece....

Grivas and EOKA-B whic were backed by Greek junta attemted several times to assasinate Makarios and rejected any agreements between two communities...

Makarios had abondoned the Enosis idea when junta came into power in Greece(1967)

GC left was always against Enosis and unlawful actions of EOKA-B after the establishment of RoC, though they weren't satisfied with 60s agreements, provisions and treaties..


GC left was democraticaly struggling to overcome the difficulties and undemocratic conditions....

Unfortunately, there wasn't a strong TC left to contribute with them in order to overcome all difficulties and undemocratic provisions of 60s treaties and agreements.

The Sampson coup which had been backed by Greek junta had been the final unlawful action of the Greek right wing... Turkey intervened and exercised her right given by the 60s treaties...

Then both parties leaders and representatives agreed on population exchange in order to find a bi-communal, bi-zonal federative solution. For 30 years they have been working on this base to solve the Cyprus problem... Or do they?

Very many innocent people of both communities were killed and went missing in the turmoil of 1974, and in the heat of battle there must have been excesses by individuals on both sides, but the responsibility for this must rest firmly upon the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots for creating the conditions in which Turkey had no choice but to intervene by force. There is in any event a big difference between excesses or mistakes committed in war, and systematic massacres committed in cold blood.

The population exchanges themselves have also caused hardship to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, but people have over the past twelve years adjusted to their new circumstances. It nevertheless remains essential for people on both sides to be properly compensated as part of any overall settlement.

It is further argued that even if the 1974 landings were lawful the Treaty permitted Turkey to intervene with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty, and that the continuing presence of Turkish forces is not to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs but with intent to annex Cyprus wholly or in part Turkey or to create two separate States. Again the facts do not support the argument, because if such had been Turkey's intention they would never have supported the framework for a new constitution for the whole island proposed by the UN Secretary-General in 1984, and again in 1986, and which excluded both annexation and two separate states.

Having regard to the events of 1960 and 1974 no serious section of Cypriot opinion, whether Greek or Turk, regards re-establishment of the 1960 Constitution itself as practical, and indeed on 12th February 1977 Makarios and Denktas agreed that thenceforth they were seeking a bi-communal federal Republic. This was reaffirmed by Kyprianou, successor to Makarios, in 1979, and was even the view of the British Foreign Secretary, who answered "yes" to the following question from the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (HC. 331 1975/76, page 55 para, 141):

"Would the Foreign Secretary agree that we could hardly restore the 1960 Constitution, since at least two of the provisions which were enshrined in the Constitution, the separate municipalities and the Turkish (Cypriot) share of the police and civil service, were never in fact implemented?"

Although it is impossible to re-establish the 1960 Constitution itself it continues however to be practical to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in substance, namely respect for the human rights of all Cypriots and respect for the existence of both communities as political entities, and in the meantime for the most basic right of all, namely the right to live in peace, to be guaranteed. It would be absurd to argue that by making it impossible the re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in its entirety, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots could deprive Turkey of its right to guarantee the survival of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Negotiation for a New Constitution
At the first Geneva Conference on 30th July 1974, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom acknowledged the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots respectively, and it was agreed that negotiations should be carried on to secure a workable constitution for Cyprus as a whole. Since then the leaders of the two communities have held frequent talks. In 1978 the Turkish-Cypriots proposed the reopening of the Famagusta suburb of Varosha which contains many hotels and had lain derelict since 1974, provided Nicosia airport was opened to all, but this was rejected.

The Turkish-Cypriots could not live fore long in a state of limbo. They needed a constitution to regulate their political affairs and democratically elected institutions to govern them, and accordingly, on 13th February 1975, they declared Northern Cyprus to be a Federated State, with the intention that it should one day form part of a federal republic for the whole of Cyprus. They did not at that stage declare independence.

However, by November 1983, having failed to reach agreement with the Greek-Cypriots on the creation of a Federal Republic, they declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic functions as a multi-party democracy, with a President, Prime Minister, and Legislative Assembly.

They nevertheless made it clear that establishment of the Republic does not preclude the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation for the whole of Cyprus, and this was formally reaffirmed by the Legislative Assembly as recently as 12th March 1985.

The framework for a future political solution based on a federal system of government uniquely structured for the circumstances of Cyprus will be found in the Denktas-Makarios accords of 1977, the Denktas-Kyprianou 10 point agreement of 1979, the UN Secretary-General's "Opening Statement of 1980" and the Secretary-General's 1984 and 1986 draft framework agreements.

The UN Plans
The 1984 draft framework agreement had been prepared by an exhaustive series of talks under the auspices of the Secretary General, and the Turkish-Cypriots were assured by him that the document, dated 27th November 1984, was acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots. On that basis the Turkish-Cypriots agreed to go to the UN to sign it, but when Denktas arrived in New York he found that Kyprianou wished to re-negotiate it.

Kyprianou's announcement at the Summit surprised even his own people, and on his return home a motion censure upon him was passed by the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives. In the course of the debate Mr. Clerides, leader of the Democratic Rally Party said:

"Right from the first day of the meeting, Kypranou asked for the re-negotiation of everything from A to Z. Among the points he asked to re-negotiate were issues that did not fall within the scope of the Summit, and issues which were already discussed and agreed upon. He should not have brought forth again issues already debated and agreed upon with Denktas."

In the same debate Mr. Papaiannou, Secretary-General of the AKEL party, said: "Kyprianou never adopted the basis of the federation, which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denktas, and Kyprianou never exerted any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the Summit agreements."

The Secretary-General resolved to try again, and on 12th April 1985 he prepared a document which he described as a "consolidation" of the 1984 draft. It did however contain major differences, and since it had been negotiated with the Greek-Cypriots alone it was a document different in kind from the draft framework agreements of 1984 and 1986. Denktas rejected it in a letter to the Secretary-General on 8th August 1985 and in the same letter expressed surprise that the document had first come to his attention through the Greek-Cypriot press.

However, after the two rounds of intensive technical talks held separately with both sides at official level in November -- December 1985 and February-March 1986, the Secretary-General on 29th March 1986 presented the two sides with a new "Draft Framework Agreement". He had again laid a compromise position on the table after full consultation with both sides. He had again proposed a solution in the belief that it was acceptable to both sides, and that it formed a framework which dealt with the entirety of the Cyprus problem. He fully understood the interrelated nature of all elements involved and offered the plan as an integrated whole.

The Secretary-General's 1986 plan called for the reunification of Cyprus as a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic with a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, each with defined veto powers over a bi-cameral legislature. The proposals would have reduced the land area under Turkish-Cypriot control from 35.8 % of the island to a little over 29% but they were nevertheless accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots on 21st April 1986.

Kyprianou on the other hand, after consultation with Athens, refused to accept it and rejected the entire draft saying that it had "negative points," and he is once again seeking to re-negotiate. However, the UN Secretary-General made it clear on 11th June 1986 that his proposals took fully into account the concerns of all parties and that he did not intend to take up counter-proposals put forward by Mr. Kyprianou. He called on the Greek-Cypriots to think again.

And so on...

[michalis5354]

But recent actions done by Papadopoulos have been questioned by high officials of the AKEL party and thats the reasons two of Papadopoulos Officials in the government have withdrawn expressing strong disagreement on Papadopoulos path to reject the UN plan as a whole. Even members of AKEL party do not favour that rejectionist approach of Papadopoulos and Papadopoulos had been elected mainly on the votes of AKEL party.

What Cyprus needs right know are forward thinking politicians that were not directly or directly involved in the Cyprus issue . Christofias made a mistake of choosing Papadopoulos , having known his long history in politics. Politicians are there to solve problems , empower people, giving the right direction Following Long term strategies for the benefit of the whole island and all communities that live therein.

[michalis5354]

Yes G. Vasiliou has been elected and supported by AKEL in 1998(is that right?) . However the opinions of Vasiliou right now are in exact opposite direction from the views of Papadopoulos and maybe AKEL as well. G.Vasiliou together with Clerides had supported a strong YES to the Plan.

Vasiliou still can not undertsand the path that AKEL is taking as well and especially his attempt to support PApadopoulos given his well known rejectionist views on Cyprus issue.

For example how can AKEL propose two presidents with 100% opposite views regarding Cyprus issue , Financial Aspects , Social etc This reduced greatly the Credibility of AKEL.

[Bananiot]

I am trying hard to understand the logic of Piratis (despite him calling me names and making wild accusations) but to no avail. All I am asking from this person is to lay down the historical facts and then we can discuss them. Historical facts should be viewed with a clear head and from a neutral person's angle; otherwise the exercise makes mockery of all principles regarding the scientific method and becomes meaningless.

AKEL's story is quite intriguing. It has been a staunch pro-Moscow communist party (the fact that the word communist does not appear in it's title is of no significance and it was a clever ploy used by demonized Ploutis Servas to get the party out of isolation in the 40's) and it is still structured on old Stalinist formats (democratic centralism etc). In 1950 it disagreed with the armed struggle and paid a hefty price for "betraying" the aspirations of Gcpst. Hundreds of its members and supporters were murdered by EOKA as traitors and thousands were forced to emigrate in order to avoid meeting the creator prematurely.

In 1959, AKEL disagreed with Makarios and rejected the London-Zurich agreement, only to become entangled in the policies of Makarios and form the basis of Makarios's popular support right to his death in 1977. Why did AKEL make a U turn, you might ask. Why did AKEL supported Enosis in the 60's alienating the thousands of Tcpts who believed in AKEL? In my humble opinion AKEL does not have a stomach for a confrontation with the nationalists. Even today, when the confrontation is clearly on a political level, AKEL chooses the safety of appeasing the extreme right instead of confronting it. The question remains. Why? Again, it is my opinion that AKEL, through the years has become another run of the mill conservative party with a Central Committee that comprises of party hags almost in its entirety. They do not want change and if they can share power, so much the better. The party faithful are well served, with a share in the government, the semi-government organisations and so on.

This carried on right up to 1993 when AKEL’s candidate (Vasiliou) failed by a whisker to get re-elected. AKEL never forgave Vasiliou for this and over the next decade AKEL had only one vision; to return in any way to the share of power. The only way to do this was in coalition with DIKO party, despite its president whom the Akelites despised as a hard core rejectionist. Using its huge resources (not financial) the leadership of the party persuaded its supporters to vote for Papadopoulos who promised that he had changed his idea of Tcpts and that he would work for an agreed solution to the Cyprob on the basis of the A plan.

What happened next is pretty well known and from Akelite friends I hear that there is a real struggle inside the party which (by the way, AKEL has lost a huge 7% of its power base in the Euro elections) is pondering on the idea of lifting the support for Papadopoulos not solely on the issues of the Cyprob but also on financial issues as the government is getting ready to tackle serious matters that may keep us out of the euro zone. AKEL may not want to appear as a party that will embark on almost thatcherite policies to reduce the deficits and improve the financial indices.

So, we may yet get another transformation from AKEL.

[insan]

Why did AKEL make a U turn, you might ask. Why did AKEL supported Enosis in the 60's alienating the thousands of Tcpts who believed in AKEL? In my humble opinion AKEL does not have a stomach for a confrontation with the nationalists. Even today, when the confrontation is clearly on a political level, AKEL chooses the safety of appeasing the extreme right instead of confronting it. The question remains. Why?

bananoit,

Did they really support Enosis in 60s? As far as I know, they were fighting against both sides extremists(Enosists and Taksimists).

What I know is that they obliged to support Enosis in 50s...

The Communist party AKEL supported self - government but not Enosis, because of the persecution of communists in Greece. Latter AKEL denounced EOKA out of fear of persecution because EOKA's leader was a well known military officer who fought against the communists in Greece

Furthermore they had a fear of had been invaded by Turkey. So, they prefered to join Enosist forces in the 50s.

1949 First TC public protest against enosis in Nicosia; two TC groups unite in Turkish National Party. AKEL switches from supporting self-government to support for enosis.

www.cyprus-conflict.net

If they supported Enosis in the 60; so why did EOKA-B target the GC leftists in 1967-74 period?

Or they supported Enosis right after the establishmnet of RoC untill 1967...?

Missed Opportunity: Denktash-Clerides Letters, Spring & Summer 1971

The intercommunal negotiations resumed in 1968 and continued right up to the troubles of 1974. The two interlocutors for their communities were Rauf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots, and Glafkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots, the same two who continued to be, off and on, the main negotiators throughout the remainder of the century. What is interesting about these letters is that they demonstrate, as the set from the early 1960s also did, that the parties were never very far apart on significant issues; most of what separated them were procedural matters that could have been negotiated, had the will been present for a settlement. At root of the ostensible differences was again the matter of local self-governance. Of course, Clerides was not wholly in control of his side=s negotiations, just as Denktash was not the sole decision maker on his side. What happened in this period was a classic missed opportunity to settle the issue, as all sides now acknowledge.
Here we include Denktash's letter to Clerides, setting forth concessions but an insistence on local autonomy; a report on Clerides' rendition of the Greek government's pushing Makarios to accept this "surrender," but Makarios resisting; Clerides' formal response to Denktash, which adhered to Makarios's cautious line; a new round of letters in August; and Clerides, from his memoirs, underscoring the missed chance to settle the two communities' differences peacefully.

A quotation from Denktashes letter to Klerides:

In order to complete this review I would like to put on record, once again, the vital concessions which I have indicated willingness to make; concessions, for which, the Greek side seems determined not to give anything in return, thus raising the pertinent question whether the exercise of the local talks was merely for amending the 1960 Constitution in such a way as to make the Independent Republic of Cyprus a convenient spring-board for Enosis! My whole purpose in these talks has been to amend the Constitution in such a way as would satisfy your side's demands without diminishing in any way or form the juridic stat- us of the Turkish Community and without imperiling the ultimate safety of the independence of Cyprus:

Concessions which the Turkish side has shown willingness to make:

(a) Abolition of the provisions of the Constitution which necessitated the appointment of non-Cypriots to the posts of Presidents of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court;

(b) The amalgamation of the Supreme Constitutional Court with the High Court;

(c) The amalgamation of the gendarmerie with the police;

(d) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20%;

(e) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring majority vote of both Communities in the public commission;

(f) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring separate majority votes in the House on legislation dealing with all taxation matters, elections, municipalities.

(g) Abolition of veto powers in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security;

(h) Reduction of Turkish participation in the Army from 40% to 20%;

(i) Making it optional, for litigants to resort to the protection of Article 159.

(j) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20% in Town Planning Affairs as per Article 176.

I hope the above will give us a new ground for tackling the problem anew in a spirit of give and take. So far the Turkish side has been on the giving end; I hope your side will find it possible to be a little generous and understanding so that we can reach agreement on all outstanding issues.

Yours sincerely,

Rauf R. Denktash
President, Turkish Communal Chamber

If Greek junta hadn't intervened the internal affairs of RoC in early 70s most of the necessary ammendments would be made on 60s constitution...

Makarios admitted the intervention of Greek colonels in one of his interviews had been made in 1974...

O.F.: Maybe it was helped along by the letter you wrote to Gizikis in July.

M.: Let's say that that letter speeded things up. If I hadn't written it, the coup would have happened all the same, a month or two later. As Kissinger admits, it had been more than decided on; all that remained was to set the date. I was too big an obstacle to enosis, and they were too anxious to have enosis. Every time we were on the point of reaching an agreement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, officials in Athens intervened by shouting about enosis. "We don't care about your local agreements, our goal is enosis." I remember one of these officials who came to me one day and said, "You must declare I enosis. Anyway it will take three or four days before the Turks can send troops to Cyprus. In the meantime the United States will intervene and keep them from invading the island. In a week enosis will be a fait accompli." Maybe they really believed that annexation to Greece was a viable alternative. Anyway, they expected me to take orders from Athens, they wanted e to obey like a puppet, and that's absolutely impossible with my temperament. I obey only myself.

Taken from www.cyprus-conflict.net