On 3 December 1963, three days after Makarios’ proposals for constitutional revision had been communicated to the Turks, members of the Organisation blew up the statue of EOKA hero Markos Drakos near Paphos Gate in Nicosia. The Greek Cypriot leadership blamed the Turkish Cypriots and the first anti-Turkish demonstrations took place in Nicosia, while the Organisation went into a state of emergency. Some of its members, on instructions from the leadership, patrolled the Turkish enclaves in order to monitor Turkish Cypriot movements. The climate in the capital deteriorated rapidly and everybody braced themselves for the impending clash.
A tripartite committee under Rauf Denktash set about preparing the Turkish Cypriot answer to Makarios’ proposals. On 20 December, British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Clark had meetings with Makarios and Vice-President Fazil Küçük in Nicosia. The British diplomat, who was leaving for London on holiday, received assurances from Küçük that the Turkish Cypriots were working on their answer, which was due to be submitted to the Greek Cypriot side at the beginning of January. Makarios assured Clark that he would not be making any moves before receiving the Turkish Cypriot answer, which he said he would study carefully. Makarios told Clark he could go to London and enjoy his holiday in peace. Clark was surprised by their moderate approach, but, taking stock of the situation on the island, he told Fraser Wilkins, the American Ambassador, that “there would be no new developments in the immediate future, unless there should be some bombing incident”.
Only 24 hours after Clark’s assessment, there was indeed an incident, which provided the spark for a general clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriot para-state organisations. At dawn on 21 December, one of Yiorkadjis’ armed patrols clashed with some Turkish Cypriots. Shots were exchanged and two Turkish Cypriots were killed. In Nicosia, which was already a powder keg, there was little patience for more sober reflection. The crisis rapidly escalated and, on 23 December, clashes broke out all over town.
At lunchtime on 23 December, Makarios and Küçük addressed a joint appeal to the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus “to put an end to the fighting between them”. This intervention from the Repubic’s President and Vice-president had no real influence on events. The fighting continued, and 10 people were killed - nine Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot. Twenty people were injured, 13 Greek Cypriots and seven Turkish Cypriots.
At 10 in the evening, Makarios made another appeal to the people, asking them to refrain from any unlawful act or provocation. Vice-president Küçük addressed a similar message but to no avail. On the morning of 24 December, the clashes in Nicosia spread along the entire length of the line separating the Turkish quarter from the rest of the town. The fiercest fighting took place in Kaimakli, Constantia, Neapolis, Ledra Palace and especially Omorphita, where the armed groups of Vassos Lyssarides and Nicos Sampson fought side by side. According to American sources there were 17 dead, most of them Turkish Cypriots, and 70 wounded.
Makarios requested a meeting with Küçük in the presence of the Acting British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador. The meeting took place at midday on December 24 at the Paphos Gate police station, between the Greek and Turkish sectors of Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot representatives attended the meeting unshaven, denouncing the fact that the water supply network had been cut off, and protesting vigorously to Makarios about the imposition of a total blockade on the population. Küçük raised the humanitarian issue of 800 Turkish Cypriots who had moved from the Omorphita area to the Turkish sector of Nicosia inside the walls and were living in squalid conditions, without water or food. One side blamed the other for the incidents, as well as for the failure to implement the ceasefire. It was decided to set up a mixed team under the president of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, Defence Minister Osman Orek, Interior Minister Yiorkadjis and Agriculture Minister Fasil Plümer, who would oversee the ceasefire and ensure a return to normality. Clerides and Orek undertook to visit the areas where fighting had taken place and make sure that the wounded were attended to. This committee failed entirely in its mission.
In the American Ambassador’s view, Makarios and Küçük were trying to secure a ceasefire, but that “Greek and Turkish Cypriot extremist groups and especially EOKA [meaning the Organisation] are out of control”. The British found Clerides’ efforts to secure a ceasefire during the meeting at Paphos Gate extremely constructive. However, in the case of Yiorkadjis, who controlled 80 per cent of the Greek Cypriot military forces, they noted that he had made no contribution at all to that end.
?t midnight on December 24, and in view of the escalation of hostilities especially in the Omorphita area, Turkey took the decision to ask the other two guarantor powers to mount a joint intervention in Cyprus. On December 25, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ismet Inönü sent an ultimatum to Makarios that, if the attacks did not cease, Turkey would intervene militarily. At 2.30 that afternoon, three Turkish fighter jets flew at low altitude over Nicosia, while four Turkish ships appeared north of Kyrenia. At 3.20pm, the Turkish Military Contingent left its camp in Yerolakos, west of Nicosia, and moved towards Gönyeli. The movements of the Turkish troops sowed panic among the Greek Cypriot leadership, which now dreaded a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Through the British High Commissioner, therefore, it threatened that if the Turkish Contingent did not halt its movements, 300 Turkish Cypriots being held hostage at the Kykkos Gymnasium in Nicosia would be executed. The Turkish Cypriots had been detained by irregulars a
cting on Sampson’s orders in the Omorphita area.
According to the Greek Cypriot leadership’s operation plans, in the event of a clash, the Organisation would become responsible for the protection of the Greek Cypriots, with the assistance and cooperation of the Greek Military Contingent. However, as soon as hostilities broke out, those Greek officers, who were members of the Organisation’s commanding staff, abandoned its headquarters.
Chrysafis Chrysafi, an officer in the Cyprus army who was transferred to the Organisation, describes the scene where Yiorkadjis, clearly annoyed, was ringing the Greek Military Contingent’s commander, Colonel Tzouvelakis, requesting he keep to the promises he had made. “It appears that ELDYK’s (the Greek Contingent’s) commander was telling him he had orders that every single soldier should stay in camp. ‘What’s to become of us, we have no weapons, nothing,’ Yiorkadjis told him. Tzouvelakis must have replied something and Yiorkadjis retorted furiously: ‘Screw you, Commander’. Tzouvelakis answered back to Georkadjis, who replied, ‘Screw you again,’ and slammed the phone down”.
According to Chrysafis, Yiorkadjis, beyond himself with rage, ordered a van to be brought to him. “We went out on the street and requisitioned the first van passing by. Yiorkadjis ordered Kyriacos Patatakos to fit loudspeakers on it and then he sent his men outside ELDYK’s barracks, calling on the soldiers to come out”.
Makarios asked Greece for military support, but the response was negative. Turkey was threatening to invade and Greece was refusing to help. Makarios finally realised that the situation was grave. He then put the blame for the dramatic turn of events on Yiorkadjis and the Organisation and set out on foot from the Presidential Palace to the Organisation’s headquarters in the nearby government housing complex to assess the situation first hand.
The Organisation’s leadership was in a meeting. “There was panic and confusion and nobody knew what to do when we were told that Makarios was on his way to the headquarters on foot,” Chrysafis explained. “Yiorkadjis was not in a position to face him and he asked Clerides to try and appease him. He then hid himself behind a large curtain so that Makarios would not become aware of his presence”.
Clerides stayed there and took the brunt of Makarios’ fury, as the latter pounded his staff angrily on the table. “Why did you start the troubles? You will ruin the country with your idiocies,” he yelled furiously, while Clerides tried to calm him down. “An attempt was made to convince the Archbishop that it was not our fault and that it was the Turks who had started it all first, which was not, in fact, true,” said Chrysafis.
What took place at the Organisation’s headquarters was indicative of the irresponsibility of the Cypriot political leadership. Fixing loudspeakers to a van so that the Greek soldiers would come out of their barracks, Yiorkadjis hiding like a little boy behind a curtain to avoid Makarios’ wrath, and the latter pounding his staff on the table in despair reveals the astonishing thoughtlessness with which the Greek Cypriot leadership provoked and then handled a crisis that brought Cyprus to the brink of war with Turkey.
The price Cyprus paid as a result of this latest crisis was an agreement on the first form of separation in Nicosia. Following long negotiations, a memorandum was signed on December 30 which set the boundaries of a neutral zone - under British control - dividing the Greek and Turkish sectors of the city. This zone was drawn on the map with a green pencil and therefore came to be known as the Green Line.
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