Nikitas wrote:It sounds complicated when described. But it goes like this: 100% of TC voters vote for the GC president, there is no weighting of their vote.
100% of GCs vote for the TC Vice President, but their vote is negatively weighted to bring it to the level of 25 per cent of the total vote. Thus the TCs always have the upper hand when voting for the TC Vice President. Presumably the GC vote then gets divvied up according to vote percentage to the candidates.
In each case the vote of the "other" community does not exceed 25 per cent of the total votes, ie equality and cross communal political participation. It also makes the rotating presidency palatable to the majority.
First of all, the 25% downscaling is only indicative. The real percentage will be the one that equals the percentage of the TC community as part of the whole, and it might as well be less than that. Only if all the settlers who are given "citizenship" by the "TRNC" are allowed to stay in Cyprus as citizens, the TC community will become the 25%; and if none of them stays, the TCs may only count for 12-13% of the total.
Now, even though any TC percentage, be it 20%, 15% or even 10%, will be enough to determine the outcome of the GC elections, since throughout the RoC history all presidential elections were decided on a mere 1%-3% difference; in the case of the TC VP elections, such is not the case. Even if 20% of the electorate comes from the GCs, it is always possible that it will not determine the outcome, even if all of it shifts towards one single candidate. It is always possible that as much as 75% of the TCs (including settlers) will vote for a nationalist candidate (in a second round,) upon instructions from Turkey, and we had many examples in the past in which TC leftist parties (most probable allies of GC voters) did not receive more than 25% in presidential elections.
A system in which both the GC president and the TC vice-president (essentially co-presidents) would receive a minimum percentage (say 35% or 40%) from each of both GC and TC electorates, separately, would have been much better in ensuring that extremists with nationalist agendas are ruled out from winning the presidency on behalf of either community.
Nevertheless, it is always better that the 1960 system in which each community was electing its own co-president separately. What I do not understand, nor digest, is why Christofias proposed a rotation presidency on the basis of 4:2 (66% : 33%,) instead of a 4:1 or at best 3:1 (80:20 or 75:25,) which are more representative to the actual demographics of the two communities. Is it a case in which, whenever it suits the TCs they are only the 20% of the total, and therefore the GC electorate should be downscaled to reflect their numerical output; and when it doesn't suit them (rotating presidency ratio,) they are not the 20% only, but something much more than that?