Paphitis wrote:Nikitas wrote:The military conflict has some interesting points to ponder.
Seeing the situation from the point of view of the commanders of each side provides some challenges.
The National Guard has a comparatively limited objective, to recapture the north. The area is right next door, so there is no major logistical problem. The biggest problem the NG would face is preventing the air force and navy from operating, which is doable but not with current military thinking.
Inventive thinking would require preparations to deal with HARM and HOPPY weapons that the Turkish air force has, and so far there is not much preparation in that direction.
In the event of a defensive action, the NG will have the task of dealing with 400 tanks in addition to the air force and navy. Again, it is doable, on the same conditions as above. There are weapons in the arsenal of the NG right now that can deal with tanks very effectively.
Looking at the situation from the other side, in the case of a defensive action they would have to call in air support and possibly naval bombardment of coastal areas. The question here would be to bomb what? During the first minutes of a military action there is dispersal of forces and all bases are empty and basically useless as targets. Bombing ports and civilian targets would not offer much support to the military.
In an offensive action presumably the objectives would be to capture key poins such as ports, air ports, communications and to blockade the island, cutting off the seaway between Greece and Cyprus.
The actual situation on the ground would quickly become secondary to the international political situation that would arise. Whoever is the attacker, or is seen to be the attacker, would be quickly slapped down by powers that value stability. It is unlikely that any projection of power in international waters would be tolerated for long. Neither could the conflict be kept localised for more than a day or two before it escalates to a full confrontation between Greece and Turkey on a front stretching from Cyprus to the triple border point with Bulgaria. Whatever happens must happen in hours rather than days.
I agree with everything above Nikitas.
What you state is pure common sense.
However, I would like to also add that the GC side, at present, does not have the
psychology to fight an offensive war. The capability within the CNG is certainly present, but the nation is in no condition to start anything.
The best we can expect is to maintain our
defensive lines should Turkey beak the cease fire.
To start an offensive operation from our side would require many years of defense planning, mental preparation, and new weapon acquisition programs to the extent that the RoC economy must be sacrificed and bought upon its knees....a very unlikely scenario.
Suppose one side prevails, and takes over the whole island, then comes the problem of "now you got it, what are you going to do with it". Which of the two sides has the means to police hundreds of thousands of armed people who will be taking pot shots at the enemy?
Definitely not an easy one.
Let's just say that the CNG went an the offensive. At present, the best outcome would be to push the Turkish Occupation forces further back to within lets say 25%, or even 20% of Cyprus.
It is inconceivable to expect that the CNG will manage to completely defeat the TA, although I am the first to admit that anything is possible.
The CNG or Greece would be completely powerless to cut supply lines from Turkey, so it is important that some other country gets involved with the necessary naval power and capacity. We need to remember, that the HAF and HN will be preoccupied in the Aegean and Thrace, and this alone would benefit us as Turkey would be required to dedicate more assets towards the west. Having said this, Turkish reinforcements will arrive in Cyprus without intervention from another power.
The above might be desirable if the CNG is successful in forcing a Turkish retreat to within lets say 25% or even 20% or less. This in itself would be deemed a major victory.
This of course will mean that approximately 100,000 Turks will be trapped behind CNG lines. These could form an insurgency (TMT style) which would be a head ache for our conventional army. They should be encouraged and allowed to evacuate behind Turkish Lines in order to avoid this outcome.
The CNG should then bunker down, and maintain defensive positions. Turkey will continue to bring in reinforcements and there will be some air bombardment. There would be very little the TA will be able to do against an army that is well dug in.
Whether an operation is deemed a military success or not, would depend on our predetermined objectives. The CNG's primary objective is defense, and at best, to commence a limited offensive resulting in a Turkish retreat and loss of territory.