Cyprus-Forum.com

[Tim Drayton]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

[insan]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

[Jerry]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

[insan]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

[Jerry]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

The plans were not "presented" to us. Makarios was told to accept or face partition. The "moderates" you refer to was Turkey.

Ask yourself why Cyprus was the ONLY British colony not to gain majority rule. I'll save you the trouble, it's because divide and rule was an astounding success and Turkey was more important to NATO than Greece. The 1960 constitution was a poisoned chalice, so complicated and undemocratic that it was doomed from the start.

[insan]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

The plans were not "presented" to us. Makarios was told to accept or face partition. The "moderates" you refer to was Turkey.

Ask yourself why Cyprus was the ONLY British colony not to gain majority rule. I'll save you the trouble, it's because divide and rule was an astounding success and Turkey was more important to NATO than Greece. The 1960 constitution was a poisoned chalice, so complicated and undemocratic that it was doomed from the start.

Were there any other colonies which had a demographic structure similar or same with Cyprus?

Had there been national antagonism between ethnic groups of in any of the ex-British colonies?

Was any of the ethnic groups in those colonies once the rulers of the British colony?

Different circumstances lead to different results. Cyprus have a unique demographic structure and an extra-ordinary historical background when compared to other ex-British colonies.

The circumstances of Cyprus require a solution that is satisfactory to all concerned parties of the same alliance. This is what ultra-nationalists and so-called ultra-leftists don't want to understand.

[Nikitas]

"Give the Turkish Cypriots everything they ask for and then give them a loukoumi on top"

Advice from the late Greek PM Kramanlis to Makarios in 1960. Makarios failed to understand the full meaning of the phrase. Papadopoulos understood it, but too late.

[Tim Drayton]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

The plans were not "presented" to us. Makarios was told to accept or face partition. The "moderates" you refer to was Turkey.

Ask yourself why Cyprus was the ONLY British colony not to gain majority rule. I'll save you the trouble, it's because divide and rule was an astounding success and Turkey was more important to NATO than Greece. The 1960 constitution was a poisoned chalice, so complicated and undemocratic that it was doomed from the start.

Were there any other colonies which had a demographic structure similar or same with Cyprus?

Had there been national antagonism between ethnic groups of in any of the ex-British colonies?

Was any of the ethnic groups in those colonies once the rulers of the British colony?

Different circumstances lead to different results. Cyprus have a unique demographic structure and an extra-ordinary historical background when compared to other ex-British colonies.

The circumstances of Cyprus require a solution that is satisfactory to all concerned parties of the same alliance. This is what ultra-nationalists and so-called ultra-leftists don't want to understand.

I think there are striking parallels with Sri Lanka and the conflict there between the Sinhalese and Tamils.

[insan]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

The plans were not "presented" to us. Makarios was told to accept or face partition. The "moderates" you refer to was Turkey.

Ask yourself why Cyprus was the ONLY British colony not to gain majority rule. I'll save you the trouble, it's because divide and rule was an astounding success and Turkey was more important to NATO than Greece. The 1960 constitution was a poisoned chalice, so complicated and undemocratic that it was doomed from the start.

Were there any other colonies which had a demographic structure similar or same with Cyprus?

Had there been national antagonism between ethnic groups of in any of the ex-British colonies?

Was any of the ethnic groups in those colonies once the rulers of the British colony?

Different circumstances lead to different results. Cyprus have a unique demographic structure and an extra-ordinary historical background when compared to other ex-British colonies.

The circumstances of Cyprus require a solution that is satisfactory to all concerned parties of the same alliance. This is what ultra-nationalists and so-called ultra-leftists don't want to understand.

I think there are striking parallels with Sri Lanka and the conflict there between the Sinhalese and Tamils.

So, which regional power is behind this conflict? who have interests in Sri Lanka?

[Tim Drayton]

According to Martin Packard on page 332 of his book Getting It Wrong, Tassos Papdopoulos came to visit him in Athens shortly after the former’s sudden removal from his peacekeeping job in Cyprus. Of course, we only have Packard’s word for it that such a meeting took place. Some of the comments which Packard alleges Papadopoulos made seem very interesting to me.

Tassos Papadopoulos came to Athens to meet me. […]

Then he talked about the current situation. As always, he was vigorously optimistic. Despite all the setbacks and difficulties he was confident that the Greek Cypriot cause would in the end prevail. He believed that the tide of world politics had turned inexorably towards the right of former colonies to achieve genuine self-determination, and that an overwhelming wish for it of the Greek Cypriot population made certain that enosis would eventually become possible. He added: “But will we still want it when it’s on offer? I and everyone else will have to decide then whether we’d rather be little fish in someone else’s big pond or big fish in our own little pond.” He suggested that the romance of the struggle had been more alluring than the outcome might be.

Papadopoulos said: “We shot ourselves in the foot by letting the Turkish Cypriots provoke us into a violent confrontation. It needn’t have been so, but now our future is going to hang on how the wind blows in Ankara. We should have realised from the beginning that we needed to keep the trust of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. We should have been patient. Even Makarios kept running behind events rather than controlling them.”

He went on to say how much the present situation was complicated by misrepresentation. Ankara and London and Washington all wanted to see Cyprus under NATO control and Athens, whatever it was saying in public, now went along with that view. They all claimed that the Makarios government was unable to control Greek Cypriot extremists and ignored the fact that the motivating of those extremists came almost entirely from foreign intelligence services. Ankara, Athens, London and Washington all wanted to work out a future for the Cypriots, as they had tried to do so before, without Cypriots taking part in the discussion.

In which solution discussions the representatives of Cypriots didn't take part?

I think you will find that although both sides were at the pre 1960 discussions they had very little influence on the outcome. The Zurich agreement was imposed for the benefit of NATO, which meant in practice Britain and Turkey.

I consider all of the solution plans presented to us as a product of supposedly existing western alliance... In this respect all were satisfactory for moderates but not for ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists.

The plans were not "presented" to us. Makarios was told to accept or face partition. The "moderates" you refer to was Turkey.

Ask yourself why Cyprus was the ONLY British colony not to gain majority rule. I'll save you the trouble, it's because divide and rule was an astounding success and Turkey was more important to NATO than Greece. The 1960 constitution was a poisoned chalice, so complicated and undemocratic that it was doomed from the start.

Were there any other colonies which had a demographic structure similar or same with Cyprus?

Had there been national antagonism between ethnic groups of in any of the ex-British colonies?

Was any of the ethnic groups in those colonies once the rulers of the British colony?

Different circumstances lead to different results. Cyprus have a unique demographic structure and an extra-ordinary historical background when compared to other ex-British colonies.

The circumstances of Cyprus require a solution that is satisfactory to all concerned parties of the same alliance. This is what ultra-nationalists and so-called ultra-leftists don't want to understand.

I think there are striking parallels with Sri Lanka and the conflict there between the Sinhalese and Tamils.

So, which regional power is behind this conflict? who have interests in Sri Lanka?

That is a good question. If you spoke to Sinhalese people at the time of the civil war, they would tell you that the Indian state of Tamil Nadu was giving covert support to the Tamils. It is clear that a group like the Tamil Tigers, which even had its own primitive navy and air force, could not have survived without support from somewhere. I would suspect involvement from one or more of the major neo-imperiliast world powers, but I don't really know. The ethnic conflict that tore Sri Lanka apart must surely in part be a legacy of the British policy of divide and rule.