Nikitas wrote:Insan,
If you do not know the events on the other side, then it is easy to believe that Turkey suddenly found itself facing a situation which was a total surprise. But it was not.
Makarios had been agitating for Enosis since the late 40s. Grivas was in Athens trying to convince the gvoernment of Papagos to help, which it did not do. It is hard to believe that a lone renegade army officer managed to spring a surprise on the Turkish foreign ministry and MIT.
It is more likely that MIT and the British realised that continued colonial occupation was not on the cards anymore and they would put their plans into action. Which they did. Bringing the fight to the cities, a major TMT tactic outflanked EOKA since it had neither the people nor the required freedom of movement to fight back.
Just look at the record of arrests and convictions by the British during the four years of the EOKA campaign and see that almost no TCs were arrested for arms possession. One man, sergeant Tuna who was arrested, magically managed to escape before his arraignment and ended up in Turkey.
Obviously there was a plan and a well laid out plan at that.
As for the title neo partitionists, it refers to those in here who keep flogging the dead horse of Enosis, the one that died on July 15 1974, to justify the continued occupation of Cyprus by foreign troops and the perpetual stationing of foreign troops after a so called "solution". Their views justify the title not as negative term but a realistic abbreviation of their vision for Cyprus- perpetually divided on ethnic lines with foreign troops permanently stationed there.
Nikitas, I have enough knowledge abt everything happened in Cyprus throughout it's whole history. Nothing was surprise for Turkey since 40s because Turkish leadership was informing then the Turkish officials either with letters or visiting personally.
Don't forget that after 1950; Britain, Turkey and Greece were all in same alliance. The 2 communities in Cyprus were also considered in same alliance and all of the solution plans that were presented to 2 communities, Greece and Turkey envisaged to satisfy all concerned parties that were NATO members.
However, Greek and GC leadership have never felt satisfied with any of the presented solution plans because none of them envisaged to make their self-interests come true.
Any solution plan that wouldn't kick Turks and Brits out; make sole rulers of Cyprus Greek and GCs was very far from being satisfactory for themselves. This is crystal clear to me.
Only 2 Greek Prime ministers Konstantin Karamanlis and George Papandreu were wise and intelligent enough to get the meaning of being in NATO alliance and acting accordingly in order to contribute developing good, multi-lateral relations with all countries in the same alliance; NATO.
The political lives of these wise, intelligent, respectable politicians didn't last long unfortunately.
Two NATO allies at the threshold of war: Cyprus, a firsthand account of crisis managementhttp://books.google.com.tr/books?id=Yu7 ... ce&f=falseAs ambassador to Turkey during the Cyprus crisis (1965-1968), Parker T. Hart provides an insider's view of the management of that crisis in NATO and Greek-Turkish relations. Greece and most Greek Cypriots favored "enosis" (union with Greece), but Turkey and the Turk Cypriots were prepared to go to war to prevent such an annexation. A massacre of Turk Cypriot villagers in November 1967 focused the anger of Turkey, which was prepared to send troops to Cyprus to equalize the preponderance of forces led by General George Grivas. The determined mediation of special presidential envoy Cyrus R. Vance prevented the initiation of all-out hostilities. Vance engineered a withdrawal of mainland Greek forces in excess of existing treaty levels in exchange for a standdown of Turkish forces. The Vance mission diffused the crisis and salvaged the integrity of NATO, and a Greek-Turkish agreement to sponsor and encourage intercommunal negotiations followed.
Hart has relied on his own papers from the period, as well as on United Nations sources from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, and on the papers of the other key participants in the Crisis, Ambassador to Greece Phillips Talbot, Ambassador to Cyprus Taylor G. Belcher, and Cyrus Vance, to provide a rare play-by-play analysis of the crisis and its resolution
Ps: We will question the red highlighted part of ur reply, Nikitas. You will be surprised when u will learn that tones of arms lay underneath mediterrenean sea... there was an article abt this issue that Tim would translate it into English.