Cyprus-Forum.com

[Alexandros Lordos]

When we sign a deal I want it to be a deal that will create a normal country based on principles of democracy, human rights etc. Not something undemocratic and against human rights that we accepted only because we were forced to accept and we will just be waiting for the right time to change it.

Perhaps our TC friends would be interested to know that amongst those who voted Yes on the GC side, a large proportion did so thinking that "well, a few years down the line we'll just change it", or that "we will find ways around the restrictions". Is this the way to make a new beginning?

Again, I repeat Prendergast's conclusion, which I believe is the key to achieving a settlement: Each side must be mindful to achieve a Yes not just in its own community, but in the other also.

[Othellos]

Alexandros wrote:

....The very next week, AKEL and CTP start intensive discussions, obviously heeding Prendegast's request. All this, to me, are signs of a new development.

Intensive??

Bananiot, I'll repeat my question: Are you content to accept Turkish intervention rights, most settlers to remain, and severe limitations to the right of GCs to relocate in the north? Are you also content to accept that GCs should pay for their own compensation-for-loss-of-use, and that more generally they will receive compensation for their homes in shares rather than cash (having in mind the XAK experience)? Are you happy that the various treaties which Turkey has signed with the "TRNC", to bring about a closer integration of the north with Turkey, will still apply after the settlement? And are you so convinced that all this package of proposals would have led to the re-unification of Cyprus, and not to its partition?

The question is why didn't Papadopoulos raise all these issues before the referendum? Better yet, why did he ask the UNSG in writing to resume talks on the Annan plan (which was unacceptable to him anyway) after the Turkish side had already rejected it first? To all these I have my own answers but i am also curious on what others have to say.

Perhaps our TC friends would be interested to know that amongst those who voted Yes on the GC side, a large proportion did so thinking that "well, a few years down the line we'll just change it", or that "we will find ways around the restrictions". Is this the way to make a new beginning?

Change it to what? And what is your source on this one?

O.

[Bananiot]

Alexandros wrote

Again, I repeat Prendergast's conclusion, which I believe is the key to achieving a settlement: Each side must be mindful to achieve a Yes not just in its own community, but in the other also.

No doubt this is a correct statement but to believe that AKEL and TCP waited for Prendergast to show the way is another story. AKEL is frantically looking for movement in order to appease its members that were fooled by Christofias who voted "NO" in order to cement the "YES". Parliamentary elections are just around the corner and AKEL needs the votes of its "yes" people who otherwise may turn elsewhere.

Are you content to accept Turkish intervention rights, most settlers to remain, and severe limitations to the right of GCs to relocate in the north? Are you also content to accept that GCs should pay for their own compensation-for-loss-of-use, and that more generally they will receive compensation for their homes in shares rather than cash (having in mind the XAK experience)? Are you happy that the various treaties which Turkey has signed with the "TRNC", to bring about a closer integration of the north with Turkey, will still apply after the settlement? And are you so convinced that all this package of proposals would have led to the re-unification of Cyprus, and not to its partition? Yes, perhaps my question is trying to prove a point, but can you deny this point?

I have already explained the reason I voted "yes" in the referendum and I cannot understand why you keep asking the above questions. We rejected the Plan and we are left with an ever increasing number of settlers, a turkish army which according to our government is being reinforced constantly with new weapons. Not a single yard of ground was returned to us and not a single refugee returned to his home. So, are you saying the alternative to the A plan is better? Please do not tell me that the President is capable of negotiating for a substantially improved Anan plan because simply I cannot take it. Yet, even if he could, the lessons of history teach us different. Every plan that we rejected was better than the one that followed.

[Dhavlos]

the problem with the votes for the constitution was that they were not simple yes votes- im talking about GC votes, i dunno the arguements in the TC community.

There were at least two sides of the yes camp/voters....those who accepted the plan wholeheartedly as it was, and those who beleived it could be changed later on.

Also in the no camp/voters the differing views were that it was either totally unacceptable or it needed to be changed...

am i right?

whatever is accepted by either side, it needs to be an acceptance of a plan as it stands, not what it could be, ....... as others have said, people need to vote yes for something that is good for all cypriots, not just think narrowly for their community....that goes for TCs as well as GCs.

[Alexandros Lordos]

Alexandros wrote:

....The very next week, AKEL and CTP start intensive discussions, obviously heeding Prendegast's request. All this, to me, are signs of a new development.

Intensive??

From what I heard, they'll be meeting every few days, discussing, in turn, each aspect of the solution in depth.

The question is why didn't Papadopoulos raise all these issues before the referendum? Better yet, why did he ask the UNSG in writing to resume talks on the Annan plan (which was unacceptable to him anyway) after the Turkish side had already rejected it first? To all these I have my own answers but i am also curious on what others have to say.

I think Tassos wanted to give it a decent shot at finding a solution, but became alienated half-way through the process when he felt that the UN was not listening to his concerns. After that point, he lost faith in the process and stopped co-operating.

Perhaps our TC friends would be interested to know that amongst those who voted Yes on the GC side, a large proportion did so thinking that "well, a few years down the line we'll just change it", or that "we will find ways around the restrictions". Is this the way to make a new beginning?

Change it to what? And what is your source on this one?

My source is conversations, both with simple GCs and with prominent leaders of the Yes campaign. For instance, one prominent leader of the Yes camp told me that the economic restrictions to investing in the TCCS were not a problem, because it would be easy to bypass such provisions through off-shore companies under a different name. One GC told me that "We should have said Yes, despite the problematic aspects, and then, two or three years later, we could have changed it". When I argued that this is what happened in 1963, the point didn't seem to register.

[Alexandros Lordos]

Alexandros wrote

Again, I repeat Prendergast's conclusion, which I believe is the key to achieving a settlement: Each side must be mindful to achieve a Yes not just in its own community, but in the other also.

No doubt this is a correct statement but to believe that AKEL and TCP waited for Prendergast to show the way is another story. AKEL is frantically looking for movement in order to appease its members that were fooled by Christofias who voted "NO" in order to cement the "YES". Parliamentary elections are just around the corner and AKEL needs the votes of its "yes" people who otherwise may turn elsewhere.

Aren't elections a wonderful thing?

I think the only difference between Yes voters and No voters, essentially, was that Yes voters judged that the consequences of No would be worse, whereas No voters judged that the consequences of Yes would be worse. In that sense, everyone voted "patriotically".

Personally, I tend to think that the consequences of Yes would have been worse than what we have now, because in my analysis the situation would have been explosive, with grave risks of economic breakdown, rising animosities, a potential for violence, and an overall divisive dynamic.

[gabaston]

dhavlos wrote

There were at least two sides of the yes camp/voters....those who accepted the plan wholeheartedly as it was, and those who beleived it could be changed later on.

those who vote yes believing it can be changed later play a dangerous game. Some had this attitude about the 60 constitution. The result was a civil war.

of-course - it may be possible to change later, but to base your vote on it is not advisable.

[Alexandros Lordos]

the problem with the votes for the constitution was that they were not simple yes votes- im talking about GC votes, i dunno the arguements in the TC community.

There were at least two sides of the yes camp/voters....those who accepted the plan wholeheartedly as it was, and those who beleived it could be changed later on.

Also in the no camp/voters the differing views were that it was either totally unacceptable or it needed to be changed...

am i right?

Yes, I think you've hit the nail on the head.

[Bananiot]

Indeed Alexandros, but meeting up with TCP for the wrong reasons will not bring the solution nearer.

Alexandros wrote

I think Tassos wanted to give it a decent shot at finding a solution, but became alienated half-way through the process when he felt that the UN was not listening to his concerns. After that point, he lost faith in the process and stopped co-operating.

I think this is a weak argument. Tassos is shrewd, he knew exactly what he was doing. He has wasted valuable time and all the good hands we had to apply pressure on Turkey for more concessions. He does not want this kind of a solution. At least Koutsou and some others are honest and we all know where they stand. Tassos can fool some people in Cyprus but he cannot fool the UN any more. The biggest service he can do to his people is to resign because we do not need a discredited president to lead us. Of course, these things do not happen in Cyprus.

Alexandros, I cannot believe that you actually said the above. Sorry to come back but as it sinks in I am flabbergasted to even consider that for 8 whole months Tassos did nothing because he had a score to settle with the international community. You are saying that while he was grinding his political axe he allowed our national issue to sink to the rock bottom! Perhaps you should call for a snap election.

EDITED. Personal attacks are not permitted.

[Bananiot]

I bid you goodnight with Loucas Charalambous's column in today's Cyprus Mail. I think he raises a valid point on our President.

"IN THE PAST, I had referred to President Papadopoulos’ tendency to be economical with the truth. I had also urged senior officials to take a serious interest in investigating this worrying tendency, because if there is something wrong with the president it is not just a personal matter.

This is the President of Republic we are talking about. His thoughts, actions, decisions, omissions and mistakes have a direct effect on the future of all the citizens of this country. The problem he appears to have is not just personal. It is our problem. Unfortunately, House President Christofias, to whom this column had appealed at the time, did not take the matter seriously enough, and made no attempt to get to the bottom of this sad phenomenon.

I must confess feeling a bit bad about dealing with this issue yet again, but the two incidents which took place in the previous week do not permit anyone to stay quiet. A couple of weeks ago, the President went to Limassol to open a museum in honour of the Cypriot composer Solon Michaelides. And there he started to tell a fairy tale about how the honoured composer had been his teacher at the Pancyprian gymnasium and was very fond of him, despite the fact he did not have a good singing voice.

It was later revealed that Michaelides had never been a teacher at Papadopoulos’ school. Some said that he may have confused Solon with a certain Yiangos Michaelides, who was the music teacher at the Pancyprian gymnasium. Then again, as we saw on the television coverage of the event, while Papadopoulos was making his speech, right in front of him was a picture of Solon. It would be stupid to suggest that he had not recognised that the man being honoured was not his teacher. Did Solon also look like Papadopoulos’ teacher who shared his surname?

If this was the only such incident, it could have been dismissed as a result of confusion, but there is a long catalogue of similar gaffes by the president. A few days after the Limassol incident, last Sunday, we witnessed another. Papadopoulos spoke about a new initiative on Cyprus that was supposedly in progress. This was an audacious lie, coming only a few days after the UN Secretariat had made it emphatically clear that there would be no peace initiative in view of the “chasm” separating the positions of the two sides.

Restricted space does not allow me to go through the countless similar examples, but here is a selection. He told the President of Poland, who was visiting Cyprus, that he had asked the UN to undertake a new Cyprus initiative, a claim flatly denied by the UN. Another lie was his claim that he had secret dinners with Serdar Denktash at Plaka tavern in Engomi, which was denied by the tavern owner. He even went as far as to deny having ever said that the Annan plan “legitimised the Turkish invasion”, despite all Cyprus hearing him say this at a ceremony held at the Presidential Palace in July 2003.

Then there were all the lies he had said back in 2002, regarding his links with the Cyprus-based offshore companies of Slobodan Milosevic. He had repeatedly claimed that his law office was just providing legal advice. The fact is that the companies had been established and run by members of the Papadopoulos law office, who had made sworn statements in Nicosia district court about this role. Incidentally, I am informed that the Serbian authorities now have in their possession hundreds of documents showing that transactions, worth many millions of pounds, had been conducted by these companies and bore the signatures of lawyers – from the president’s law office – who acted as administrators of the accounts.

I repeat that the president’s problem is not as much his problem as it is ours. Christofias, who put him in the Presidential Palace, has an obligation to investigate what is happening and take the necessary action. After all, he is responsible for the fact that the country is being run by a man who seems incapable of distinguishing between myth and reality".