Cyprus-Forum.com

[Viewpoint]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

[Piratis]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

[bigOz]

Educate yourselves Piratis and Oracle! Below is especially for your two extremist polluted minds - not that I think it will change anything because you are both possessed, but I must put the picture right!

Frankish Period (1192-1571)
French Lusignans: repression of Orthodox Church, bishops replaced by Latins. Rule by Venice.
Turkish invasion, siege of Famagusta, capitulation to Turks.

The Ottoman Period (1571-1878)
Millet system allowing cultural autonomy; restoration of Greek Orthodox church by the Ottoman Turks.

Cyprus under the British (1878-1960)
1878 Cyprus Convention with Turkey assigned the island to British occupation & administration. Gov. Wolseley greeted with request for enosis. Tribute to Sultan continued & used to pay off Ottoman debt.
1914 Formal British annexation at outset of World War I, when Turkey sided with Germany against Britain

1915 Offer of Cyprus to Greece turned down

1922 Ataturk and newly established Republic of Turkey defeats Greece after brutal two-year war; enormous population exchange is conducted between Greece and Turkey.

1923 Lausanne Treaty; annexation recognized, and all claims to the island renounced. Turkish Cypriot (TC) delegation to Ankara to press for return of island to Turkey.

1925 Cyprus becomes a British colony

1930 Primary education put under direct British control; growth of Greek (and later, Turkish) identity, beginning of split between economic & cultural elites.

1931 Civil riots against British; constitution suspended.

1941 AKEL, the Cypriot Communist Party, formed

1942 Turkish Minority Association (KATAK, 1942), formed

1943 First TC trade union formed

1948 Winster proposals for self-government excluded self-determination; rejected by Greek Cypriots (GCs). TCs form special committee in response to rising GC demand for enosis.

1949 First TC public protest against enosis in Nicosia; two TC groups unite in Turkish National Party. AKEL switches from supporting self-government to support for enosis.

1950 Makarios III becomes Archbishop; petition for enosis in churches signed by 96-97% .

1952 Makarios blocks Grivas' plans for an armed campaign, asked Greece to make UN effort. Turkey and Greece enter NATO.

1954 British move of joint HQ of Mideast Forces from Suez to Cyprus; "never" statement from Hopkinson with regard to self-determination. In July, attempt to put Cyprus question before UN, defeated by Anglo-Turkish cooperation. In August, TCs hold mass meeting in Nicosia, and formation of "Cyprus is Turkish Committee" in Ankara, encouraged by PM Menderes.

The Struggle against British

1955 Armed violence against British begun by Grivas & EOKA. Küçük renames National Union Party as Cyprus is Turkish Party. London Conference: Britain invited Greece & Turkey to discuss problems, including Cyprus. Conference ended without agreement. Riots orchestrated in Istanbul. Gov. Harding cracks down on EOKA.

1956 Negotiations for self-government. Makarios deported. Violence & repression intensifies. EOKA targets police, GCs as well as British murdered. GCs in police replaced by TCs; some TCs are casualties of EOKA terrorism. Radcliffe Plan for self-governance rejected; first official reference to partition.

1957 Bombing kills one TC, wounding three; TCs retaliated. TC riots in Nicosia against British forces; seven TCs killed. Trade unions joint appeal for calm. EOKA cease fire, release of Makarios to Athens. TC demand for "taksim"; rise of TMT. Demand for Turkish army base. Governor Foot pursues new policy of conciliation.

1958 Plan for self-government postponed sovereignty issue; rejected by Turkey. TCs riot for partition. EOKA boycott of British, end of year-long ceasefire. Turkish Cypriot PIO office bombed, EOKA blamed (later established that TC extremists responsible). TC violence against GCs in Nicosia, 8 GCs killed near Guenyeli. MacMillan plan involving Greece & Turkey; some implementation begun. EOKA targets TCs; villages burned. Intercommunal ceasefire. Makarios announced he would agree to guaranteed independence.

1959 Greek and Turkish foreign ministers met at Zurich to draft treaties for independence of Cyprus. Averoff & Zorlu draft basic articles of constitution. Makarios & Küçük brought to London to sign without alteration. Treaties provide for guarantee of limited independence, British bases, Greek & Turkish troops to be stationed on the island. Makarios & Küçük elected president, vice president. Grivas retired to Athens. Cypriots disarm with some exceptions.

The First Years of the Republic (1960-1963)

1960 Cyprus - an independent republic - established on August 15, Makarios president. Initial efforts at governing under the new constitution.

1961 Disputes over certain basic articles: separate municipalities, public service and Cypriot army ratio, taxes. TCs veto tax law.

1962 Failure to agree on separate municipalities; continuing gridlock and terrorism. April, murder of two Turkish Cypriot journalists, Hikmet and Gurkhan, who advocated intercommunal cooperation.

1963 Constitutional crisis after court rulings: taxes imposed but cannot be collected; ruling against both sides on municipalities issue. Akritas Plan formed. Makarios submitted 13 points for constitutional reform to Küçük to revise the constitution; rejected by Turkey.
VIII Constitutional Breakdown and Intercommunal Conflict (1963-1967)

1963 Dec 21, intercommunal violence explodes. Truce force set up with British troops, Greek & Turkish liaison officers. Ceasefire after Turkish jets buzzed Nicosia. Casualties in first ten days (known dead & missing presumed dead): TCs, 136, GCs 30.

1964 January, London Conference. British, US efforts to create NATO force. Makarios announces abrogation of treaties (then backs away); TCs want partition. Denktash summoned to Ankara, return to Cyprus barred until 1968. NATO plan rejected by Makarios. February, brutal attacks on TC civilians in Limassol. March, UNFICYP established; British troops on island seconded to UN force. National Guard put under command of Greek army general. Some 20,000 TCs flee areas where violence occurred, taking refuge in enclaves; some Turkish villages looted and destroyed. June, Turkish invasion threatened. Grivas returns to command Greek army contingent; expanded control to National Guard leading Greek commander to resign. President Johnson's letter to Inonu deterring invasion; Acheson Plan for "double enosis" proposed and rejected. August, arms & men imported by both sides. GC attack on and capture of TC villages in the Tylliria area in effort to control the coastline led to Turkish bombing of GC villages which included the use of napalm. Ceasefire arranged.

1967 Military coup in Greece; secret talks with Turkey. Grivas orders attack of TC villages; threat of Turkish invasion; recall of Grivas & thousands of excess Greek troops. Provisional TC administration created in enclaves.

Divisions Among Greek Cypriots (1967-1974)

1968 Makarios re-elected overwhelmingly; acknowledges that enosis is not realistic. Restrictions on TCs lifted. Intercommunal talks began.

1970 EOKA-B attempts to assassinate Makarios; Georgadjis murdered.

1971 Talks deadlocked on local autonomy issue. Secret Greek-Turkish talks. Return of Grivas; EOKA-B attacks on GC left & supporters of independence.

1972 Intercommunal talks resumed and expanded

1973 Col. Papadopoulos overthrown by Ioannides in Athens

1974 Death of Grivas; Greek junta takes control of EOKA-B. Near breakthrough in talks, negotiators agreed on proposal for local autonomy. Turkish PM Ecevit statement stipulating federation; talks broken off by Clerides.

Coup, Invasions, and de facto Partition (1974)

1974 July 15, Greek junta supports EOKA-B coup, led by Nicos Sampson, against Makarios; Makarios survives assassination attempts, flees to London; Sampson Agovernment@ takes power. July 20, Turkish military intervention. Actions, or lack of, by UK & US. Greek junta & Sampson regimes fall; Clerides becomes Acting President of Cyprus; democratic government returns to Greece. Ceasefire declared. Mid-August, Collapse of peace talks in Geneva: Second Turkish military intervention in August in which 6,000 die; Turks control of 37% of island; between 150,000 and 200,000 GC refugees take flight. Return of Makarios in autumn.

Deadlock and Negotiations (1975 - present day)

1975 TFSC declared. Intercommunal talks in Vienna; Vienna III agreement, partial implementation.

1976 Exchange of proposals, Clerides resignation.

1977 Framework Agreement between Makarios & Denktash setting parameters for a bicommunal federation. Death of Makarios; Kyprianou becomes president of Republic.

1979 Ten-point agreement between Kyprianou & Denktash; priority to be given GC resettlement of Varosha.

1981 Guidelines for the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus. Committee on Missing Persons established with ICRC.

1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus unilaterally declared. No country besides Turkey recognizes TRNC.

1984 Proximity talks on Draft Agreement, to be finished & signed at high-level meeting, Jan., '85.

1985 Kyprianou-Denktash meeting; draft initialed, not signed. In April, Kyprianou agreed to a slightly altered draft, rejected by Denktash.

1986 Denktash agreed to a new altered draft, rejected by Kyprianou. Exposure of Turkish military buildup triggered GC military buildup.

1987 May, EU protocol initialed.

1988 February, Vasiliou elected president. September, direct negotiations begun under UN auspices.

1989 Perez de Cuellar's summary of ideas for the basis of a comprehensive settlement. Vasiliou agreed to ideas as basis for negotiations; rejected by Denktash.. Vasiliou proposals.

1990 February, UN negotiations resumed. March, UN Sec.-Gen. definition of political equality. Talks abandoned because Denktash insisted on a "separate right to self-determination for these two peoples" in contradiction to the 1977 and 1979 agreements. May, TC elections won by Denktash. July, formal application made for EU membership.

1991 High-level meeting planned, Greece & Turkey to be included, but canceled in September due to lack of basic agreement on territory, return of refugees, and sovereignty.

1992 New UN Sec-Gen, Boutrous Ghali, says Cyprus a priority. Talks in NY begin midyear; Boutrous-Ghali "Set of Ideas" for a draft settlement accepted as basis for negotiation by Vasiliou but rejected by Denktash. Third round of talks in October suspended without agreement.

1993 February, Vasiliou loses narrowly to Clerides in runoff presidential election. March, confidence-building measures proposed, with negotiations for implementation to begin in May. Talks resumed; canceled in June when Denktash declined to respond to UN proposals.

1994 February, UN begins proximity talks to negotiate implementation of CBMs following confirmation of acceptance by both sides; disagreement over terms dooms effort.

1995 EU agreement to open accession talks with Cyprus. April, Denktash reelected in second round of voting. October, successful bicommunal events at Ledra Palace - open house on UN's 50th drew over 5,000, more than half were TCs, & bicommunal friendship concert, over 1000 attending.

1996 UN special representative met with leaders of both communities. August, bikers' demonstration on Green Line; two GCs killed.

1997 Clerides orders Russian S-300 missiles; Turkey makes threats against deployment. May, bicommunal concert draws 3,000; protest by a few GCs became violent. July, Clerides, Denktash met for 5 days of UN-sponsored talks in Troutbeck, NY; August meetings in Glion, Switzerland. Further talks canceled after dispute on UN proposals, and Denktash objections to application to join EU.

1998 EU accession negotiations opened. Denktash said that TCs would unite with Turkey if Cyprus joins EU. Formalized association accord signed in 1997; joint economic zone announced. GC election gives narrow victory for Clerides; December, Clerides agrees not to deploy Russian missiles; to be sent to Crete instead.

1999 Earthquakes in Turkey, Greece lead to warming of relations between countries. December, UN-sponsored indirect talks in NY end without progress, but will continue. Turkey given candidate status for EU; must change its relations with Cyprus to achieve full membership.

2000 Negotiations continued without result. Denktash re-elected in disputed process. July reunion of hundreds of former GC & TC villagers at Pergamos. Talks end in November with no progress.

2002-03 UN Secretary General Kfi Annan and Special Representative Alvaro DeSoto present a plan* for the island's partial reunification; both sides essentially reject the Plan.

2003, Spring The Green Line is opened by the Turkish Cypriot administration and the Greek side also allows unfettered access between north and south. Some 2 million people pass across the line during the remainder of 2003 without incident.

2004, April 24 The Annan Plan for reunification was rejected in the south, with 70% voting against; in the Turkish north, 65% voted in favor of the plan despite official opposition.

2004, May 1 The Republic of Cyprus enters the European Union, with the Turkish north declining to join.


PLEASE TELL ME WHICH PART OF THE ABOVE YOU STILL DO NOT UNDERSTAND OR DISAGREE WITH AND IT WILL BE A PLEAURE TO EXPAND ON IT (later on tonight though - now I am going down to Lokmaci for a drink with some friends from the south )

[Oracle]

Cyprus during the 16th century:
a Frankish kingdom, a Venetian colony and a multicultural society


EVANGELIA SKOUFARI
Università degli Studi di Padova

Abstract

Cyprus has always experienced a constant flow of people staying on the island for long or shorter
periods of time, leaving in any way their mark on its cultural character. The geographical position of
the island has determined Cyprus’ history as one of continuous alternation of dominants and transfers
of populations. After experiencing three centuries of Arab attacks, the island was conquered by
Richard Lion Heart and then sold to Guy de Lusignan. The Lusignan dynasty established in Cyprus a
kingdom based on the political and juridical institutions of the other crusader’s political formations of
Syria and Palestine, from where large numbers of people moved to the island after the fall of the
crusaders’ strongholds in 1291. The French royal family was supported politically and militarily by a
group of other families originating either from the West or from the former crusader states. In any case
all of them were considered lords over the rest of the island’s population on the basis of their catholic
religion. The Venetian Republic, assuming the power over Cyprus for almost a century (1473-1571),
preserved the cultural and institutional traditions which characterized the political and social context in
some way already developed during the previous centuries of the Frankish domination of the island.
During the four centuries examined the eastern and the western cultures mingled with minor incidents
of contrast, resulting to the unique Cypriot identity of the late medieval and early modern times.


The geographical position of Cyprus has greatly influenced the island’s destiny and the
formation of its people’s identity throughout the centuries. The island is located in the eastern corner of
the Mediterranean, a sea that has been a meeting place for different cultures and religions and a
crossroads between the areas that are conventionally considered as having created the civilisations of
East and West. It is on the most important sea trade routes in the Mediterranean and has always
experienced a constant flow of people. They remained on the island for different periods of time and,
in one way or another, left their mark on its cultural character. In this way, the Cypriots were linked to
the process of intercultural communion between the peoples of the Mediterranean area.

The island’s fortunate geographical position, its small size and consequent defensive
weakness, its rich natural resources and the presence of great political powers in the area of the
Middle East have meant for Cyprus a long series of foreign dominations. These were also the cause of
a ceaseless influx of people, resulting over the centuries in meetings and confrontations between the
different cultures on the island. In ancient times, Cyprus was considered to be the birthplace of
Aphrodite and was a traditional meeting place for the worship of this divinity (Karageorghis, 1986).
Cyprus continued to be visited over the centuries by faithful pilgrims travelling from Europe to the holy
sites of the three monotheistic religions. Furthermore, for a long time Cyprus was one of the most
popular landing places for merchants trading European products for those from the Orient, and for
soldiers serving in the armies either of the European or Eastern powers. Both these groups
represented the mass of the middle classes, the bearers of traditions and beliefs of various origins,
who influenced the cultural identity of Cyprus through frequent interaction with the native population.

The variety of rulers to which Cyprus was subjected over time made of the island a kind of
pendulum that swung between one cultural environment and another, between East and West,
according on the cultural leanings of the dominating power. However, it cannot be denied that
between the first great colonization by the Mycenaeans in the 13th century AD and the present day, the
majority of the population has managed to preserve the Greek identity of Cyprus. Indeed, the
dominations that followed did not overwhelm the Greek population and its traditions, even though their
cultural influences can be distinguished in the fields of art, language and religious customs. Therefore,
the peculiarities of the island’s character are the fruit of invasions, migrations and the interchange of
cultural influences with the civilizations of the surrounding territories. The Minoans, Mycenaeans,
Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians and Persians all ruled Cyprus before the island became part of the
great empires created by the political unification imposed on the two shores of the Mediterranean, first
by Alexander the Great and his successors, and then by the Roman empire. Cyprus subsequently
shared the fate of the major provinces of the eastern Roman empire, which was differentiated from its
western counterpart, particularly after the reign of emperor Justinian I, who promoted a policy of
Hellenisation of the empire’s institutions.

The island’s population reflected the principal characteristic of the Byzantine empire, in other
words, it was a multicultural society administered by a Greek elite. The Greek population of Cyprus
also participated in the deep devoutness cultivated in the Byzantine empire, marked by such events as


the emergence of heresies such as Monophysitism and the Nestorianism, the conflicts during the
Iconoclast period, and the imposition of the Patriarch of Constantinople as the spiritual guide in
opposition to the Pope of Rome. More significantly, however, from the 7th to the 10th century Cyprus
witnessed the incessant confrontation between Christianity and Islam during the period of Arab
invasions. Cyprus not only became a common battlefield between the Byzantine emperors and the
caliphs, but also a place where refugees from the coasts of Syria and Palestine sought temporary
refuge from the raids. The Arab presence on the island is testified to by a monument near Larnaka, on
the south coast, that is still today one of the most venerated sites for Muslim pilgrims. It is the mosque
known as Hala Sultan Tekké, where tradition says that Umm Haram, presumably a relation of the
Prophet, was buried in 632 (Mas Latrie, 1861, 87, note 1). After a period of Arab and Byzantine coadministration
and co-exploitation of the island, in 963 it returned to its status an autonomous province
of the Byzantine empire.

At the end of the 12th century, the Crusader movement marked a turning point in Cyprus’
history. Being only a few miles away from the coast of the Holy Land, Cyprus was unable to avoid the
consequences of these large-scale late-medieval military operations. Actually, the first two crusades
organized by the Christian powers did not directly involve Cyprus, but they allowed western
merchants, mainly from the Italian trading cities of Genoa, Pisa and Venice, to obtain privileges from
Constantinople allowing them free access to the seaports of the Byzantine empire, including those of
Cyprus, and to establish colonies and acquire property. Many merchants took advantage of these
privileges, using Cyprus as a base for their trade with the Middle East. Thus, when Richard the
Lionheart conquered Cyprus in 1191, during the Third Crusade (Painter, 1962), when he disembarked
at Limassol, he found a large group of Europeans to give him a warm welcome (Mas Latrie, 1852, 4;
Hill, I, 19722, 306, 318).

However, the king of England did not intend to occupy Cyprus and, after sacking it, he sold it
to the Knights Templar for a hundred thousand gold coins. The Templars soon realised that they were
not numerous enough to deal with a rebellious population, and a year later, they in turn sold Cyprus to
Guy de Lusignan, a French knight from Poitou and a former king of Jerusalem (Mas Latrie, 1861, 4158).
Guy established himself in Cyprus and distributed fiefs to knights and sergeants who would
militarily guarantee his authority over the island and the local population. However, it was Guy’s
brother, Amaury de Lusignan, who would be crowned king of Cyprus in 1197, beginning a dynasty of
Lusignans that would reign over the island for the following three centuries (Mas Latrie, 1861, 120170;
Hill, II, 19722, 32-38; Edbury, 1991, 5-12).

The Lusignan dynasty established a kingdom based on the political and judicial institutions of
the other political formations that had been created in the territories of Syria and Palestine by the
Crusaders, particularly that of the kingdom of Jerusalem. In order to consolidate their power over the
native Greek population, the Lusignans offered fiefs and other grants to a large number of European
knights and merchants, who came to the island in search of the social advancement, profit and
adventure possible in a newly established kingdom. The European families that had acquired vassal
bonds with the island’s lords made up the social and political elite of the new Frankish-Cypriot


kingdom and they expelled the Greek nobles who until that time had maintained links with the
Byzantine empire from the ranks of high society. The fate of the Greek population was now in the
hands of a restricted group of mostly French, Italians, Catalans and other Europeans, who were
frequently considered to be Syrians due to their previous long stay in the Crusader territories of the
Middle East (Jacoby, 1977).

Thus, at the end of the 12th century, Cyprus stopped being a part of the Eastern world
characterized by the Greek Orthodox culture of the Byzantine empire, and became a part of the West
transplanted in the Middle East by the Crusaders. Almost all aspects of public life on the island
changed from that time onwards. Cyprus turned from a distant province of a declining empire into an
autonomous kingdom. Roman-Byzantine law was abandoned (albeit not completely) in favour of the
western-style feudal law of the Assizes of Jerusalem. The use of Greek in the administration was first
replaced by Latin and later by French. In religion, the Church of Cyprus lost the supremacy it had
enjoyed among the other Orthodox churches, to become subordinate to the Catholic Church, which
was established for the first time on the island. Nevertheless, this political swing did not bring about
major changes for the lower social classes; the great majority of peasants of Greek, Maronite,
Armenian and other ethnic origins and religious creeds continued to come under the jurisdiction of the
feudal lords, the only difference being that these were no longer Greek Orthodox nobles, but mainly
European Catholics.
From the time of its establishment, the kingdom of Cyprus became one of the most fervent
promoters of the cause of liberating the Holy Land from the Mamelukes. This could not be any other
way, as the Lusignan kingdom itself was founded by the protagonists of the first crusades. The
Lusignan kings of Cyprus participated in war alliances with financial and military aid destined for the
organization of new Crusader operations in the Middle East. The island was thus considered a
stepping stone to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This was especially true of the 13th and
14th centuries, when the coasts of Cyprus were the seaports most frequently visited by merchants,
pilgrims, missionaries, ambassadors and soldiers. When the last Crusader territories fell to the
Muslims in 1291, Cyprus received the legacy of the kingdom of Jerusalem, its royal insignia and, most
of all, its refugees. These newcomers increased the number westerners of noble rank among the
island’s society, but not to such a degree as to overcome the numbers of the Greek population. Thus,
the royal court, the various official positions in the island’s administration and most of the feudal
properties were in the hands of a small group of foreigners, the majority of whom did not have noble
titles, but in Cyprus were considered to be nobles and were treated as such (Luke, 1975).

Over time, some of the island’s older, better-off Greek families managed to raise their heads
and obtain royal privileges that gave them the opportunity to participate at the court of the nobles.
Furthermore, the middle-class Greek town dwellers also had the opportunity to raise their social and
financial status by being recruited into the royal administration. Mixed marriages among Orthodox and
Catholic members of the middle and the higher social classes were the most successful means of
intercultural approchement that engendered among the population a feeling of belonging to a common
society and sharing, in a way, the same special characteristics of a cultural identity. In fact, even


though the families that made up the island’s higher social ranks originated from different ethnic
groups, they identified themselves with the kingdom of Cyprus to such a degree that they were
recognised as Cypriot nobility by the rest of the Europeans. The cultural osmosis achieved in Cypriot society is proven by the fact that the two chronicles
written in 15th century Cyprus, covering the history of the island from the conquest of Richard the
Lionheart to the establishment of Venetian rule, were written in its Greek dialect by Leontios
Machairas and Georgios Bustronios. They were intended to be read not only by members of the
Greek community, but also by the French nobility, which, by that time, had learnt to speak and read
the language of the native population. Moreover, the overall religious tolerance imposed on Cyprus
and the aforementioned close interaction between the Greek population and the kingdom’s European
nobility helped create a confessional mixture, which was demonstrated by the presence in the same
family of members professing the Catholic creed and others who declared themselves to be Orthodox.
Furthermore, not only did members of Catholic families attend mass in Orthodox churches, but they
also paid for them to be decorated with the frescoes and icons that today make up the most precious
heritage of late-medieval Cypriot art, with a mix of Gothic and Byzantine styles.
The decline of the Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus began with the division imposed by the
Genoese. The Lusignan kings had granted the Genoese a large number of financial privileges, but in a
war that lasted for two years, the citizens of the Italian maritime power conquered the port of
Famagosta and its surrounding territory in 1374. Not only did the kingdom lose the mainstay of its
economy, but it also had to pay substantial compensation to obtain peace. The war with Genoa was
followed by the Mameluke invasions of 1424-1426. These placed another financial burden on the
kingdom - the obligation to pay an annual tribute to the Egyptian sultan in return for maintaining the
kingdom’s autonomy (Ziada, 1975). Cyprus would continue paying this tribute even after the Ottoman
conquest of Egypt in 1517, until it was conquered itself in 1571.

As Genoese and Mameluke control of the kingdom’s economy grew tighter, the Venetians
grabbed the opportunity to enhance their own power on the island by offering the Lusignan kings large
loans, by which they made themselves almost indispensable for the kingdom’s economic survival. In
the meantime, the Greek influence grew mostly in the cultural sphere and the royal court. King John II
(1432-1458) twice chose to marry Greek princesses. His first bride was a descendant of the Frankish-
Byzantine family of Monferrato-Paleologue, while the second was the daughter of the despot of Morea
and the niece of the last emperor of Constantinople. The arrival of the numerous members of the court
of this Greek queen, Elena Paleologue, brought a renewal of relations with the Byzantine empire,
which were ultimately strengthened after the influx into Cyprus of refugees escaping from the Ottoman
conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The heiress to the throne, Princess Carlotta, was raised with a
Greek-Orthodox way of thinking and when she needed to speak French on formal occasions, she had
to resort to the services of an interpreter. King John’s successor, James II (1460-1473), was the son of
his mistress, the Greek, Marietta of Patras, and he too was most probably Greek-speaking, even
though he was a Catholic. Later, he would also marry a girl of distant Greek descent; Caterina

Cornaro was in fact a Venetian noblewoman, but her great-grandfather had been the Greek emperor
of Trebizond (Colasanti, 1979). James II was the dynamic king who once again united the whole island into a single kingdom
and expelled the Genoese from Famagosta. He had actually usurped the throne from his stepsister
Carlotta, thus creating a number of enemies among the Cypriot nobility from whom he had removed
many offices and benefits. His power was supported by the Egyptian sultan, to whom James
continued paying the annual tribute, becoming his vassal. The young king was very conscious of the
fact that he needed a Christian power as an ally to protect his throne from possible attacks from his
enemies, the embittered Genoese, the resentful supporters of Carlotta and her husband’s family, the
dukes of Savoy, and most of all, the Ottoman Turks who were advancing ever more rapidly through
the former Byzantine countries.

The Venetian Republic was the perfect ally for James. The kingdom had maintained close
political and financial relations with it since its establishment, and the Venetians had not only exploited
large tracts of its territory with crops of sugar cane, cotton and cereals, but had also frequently
contributed to the crown treasury. The alliance was sealed with a marriage, the king of Cyprus having
promised to take as his bride Caterina Cornaro, the daughter of an influential patrician with
considerable financial interests on the island. However, before the marriage, Caterina was declared an
adopted daughter of the Venetian Republic, so that in the future Venice could inherit the right of
succession to the throne, and hence possession of the kingdom itself. In fact, when King James Il died
prematurely in 1473, his widow, Caterina Cornaro, having the right to succeed to the throne, was
immediately acclaimed queen of Cyprus by the royal court of nobles. It might have been thought that
nothing would change in the way the kingdom functioned, but Cyprus was soon placed under the
control of the Venetian senate. The Venetians took over all aspects of the kingdom’s organization,
relieving the queen of all decision-taking powers (Arbel, 2000a, 73). From that time, the kingdom of
Cyprus lost its autonomy, even though it retained its royal status (Richard, 1977).

Being very distant from the Venetian metropolis and very close to enemy territory, Cyprus was
exposed to Ottoman, as well as pirate attacks. The Venetian senate decided in 1489 to drop all
diplomatic pretence and completely take over Cyprus. They removed Caterina Cornaro from the
kingdom and annexed Cyprus as one of its maritime colonies. As such, the island could be included in
the peace treaties Venice had signed with the Turks. From now on, the kingdom of Cyprus was placed
under the full jurisdiction of the Venetian doge. In fact, the Republic had reason to fear that the young
queen, reluctant to abandon her kingdom, would enter into a new marriage, thus excluding the
Venetians from the royal power.

Nevertheless, the Venetians did not want to bring many innovations to the political and judicial
administration of Cyprus. For the Republic, it was more important to gain the loyalty of the population
by preserving their previous privileges and not provoking a backlash among the powerful local nobility
that would have been dangerous for Venetian interests. In line with the policy of the Venetian senate
elsewhere, in Cyprus the various officials were replaced with supporters of Venetian policies, without
changing the whole administrative, economic, social and ecclesiastical organization of the colony.


The Venetian government of Cyprus was placed in the hands of a lieutenant, who was
assisted by two counsellors and a captain in charge of the military organization of the island, all of
whom were Venetian patricians and elected by the Great Council of Venice. At first the senate had
decided that the colony’s administrative capital should be Famagosta, as Venice’s inextricable links
with the sea dictated that the main town in every colony should be a seaport, in order to facilitate
communication with the ships carrying merchandise and news from the metropolis. However, it was
later decided that Nicosia should remain the island’s capital, thus preserving the royal heritage of three
centuries during which that town, at the centre of the island and almost equidistant from all its strategic
points, had been the king’s residence and seat of the royal court. Other institutions of the Lusignan
kingdom of Cyprus, that revealed the particular feudal and royal traditions of the island in the late
Middle Ages, were also preserved by the Venetian authorities in their Cypriot colony. The conservation
of these royal aspects of the kingdom was an additional asset for the Republic’s diplomatic status in
international politics. In fact, having a genuine kingdom among its dominions gave a considerable
boost to the Republic’s prestige on the international political chess-board.

In the 16th century, Cyprus no longer had a king, a queen or a royal court, but the feudal lords
continued to be the prominent social class and the preservation of their privileges was the main
condition for the peaceful acceptance of regime change. That is why Venice agreed to acknowledge
the prerogatives previously granted to the nobles by the Lusignan dynasty. However, it was inevitable
that one measure would be taken by the senate in order to guarantee Venetian political control over
the kingdom; they abolished the High Court, the assembly of feudal lords that had the authority to
judge even the king if he were found to be working against the prescriptions of the kingdom’s laws,
and obviously against the interests of the nobles. A body of such political power could have
jeopardized the senate’s jurisdiction over the island and therefore could not be tolerated (Hill, II, 19722,
50-52; Richard, 1983).

On the other hand, the Law Courts of Nicosia and Famagosta were preserved by the Venetian
authorities, as they did not constitute a danger to the Republic’s power over Cyprus. These courts had
jurisdiction over civil law disputes involving islanders not of noble rank. They were presided over by a
viscount belonging to the Cypriot noble classes, who should not be Venetian. It was not only the office
of the viscount, who also had the duty of controlling law order and the prices of the merchandise sold
in the town markets, that was entrusted to a Cypriot; other important offices in the island’s political and
financial administration were also entrusted to locals, i.e. natives of the middle classes who were not
Venetians.

Apart from the authorities of the island’s five most important provinces (Nicosia, Famagosta, Pafos,
Larnaka and Kerynia), the island was administered by Cypriots elected every two years by their fellow-
countrymen, although their election had to be confirmed by the senate. These offices reserved for
Cypriots were filled by members of the higher social classes. Venetian citizens were also included in
this rank from the time of the annexation of Cyprus to the Venetian dominions, although they could not
accept an office of this kind if they had not lived in the island for at least five consecutive years.

The laws still in force in Venetian Cyprus governing almost all judicial matters were those of


the kingdom of Jerusalem’s Crusader Assizes. It was not until the year 1531 that the senate took the
decision to translate these regulations into Italian and to eliminate the laws that were in disuse or not
in the interests of the Republic. In fact, during the whole period of Venetian domination of the island
jurists would often consult Cypriots who knew French and Greek, the languages of the native
population, and also Italian, the language of the government, in order to gain information on the old
privileges and tax and military service exemptions granted by the kings to the population. The
knowledge of Florio Bustron, a Cypriot member of the Greek bureaucracy, was used to translate the
kingdom’s law books from French to Italian. More surprising is the fact that for almost the entire
Venetian domination of Cyprus, Famagosta, the island’s most important seaport, both from a
commercial and a military point of view, continued to be ruled according to the previously imposed
Genoese legislation.

The fact that the laws of Cyprus during the Venetian domination continued to be those of the
Crusader kingdoms, based on late-medieval European feudal law, did not make a great deal of
difference to the administration of justice on the island. The most important thing for the Republic was
that the final decision was reserved for the senate, the power of which always had to be
acknowledged. Somewhat stranger was the preservation by the Venetian republican authorities of
other feudal customs from the Lusignan kingdom, such as the liege homage paid to every new king by
his vassals. With the replacement of the king’s authority by the Venetian government, the homage was
renewed by the Cypriots every two years on the arrival of the new lieutenant from Venice. We can only
imagine how proud this tradition made the lieutenants, who in other circumstances could not accept
any more privileges than their fellow patricians, in keeping with the principle of equality among
Venetian citizens. Furthermore, on Christmas eve, the Venetian officers received offerings of falcons,
capons, candles and spurs from the fief holders, a tradition dating from Crusader times (MCC, Donà,
no. 215, 163-170).

Apart from the liege homage, the fief holders were obliged during the Venetian domination, as
they had been during the kingdom, to pay for the equipment and other expenses of one or more
knights, who always had to be ready for battle in case of an enemy attack. These knights were the
core of the Cypriot defensive power, along with the soldiers sent from the other Venetian dominions
every time there was the threat of an Ottoman attack. During the first years of Venetian rule, the
senate even gave permission to preserve the royal privilege of offering a knighthood to noble visitors
to the island, who would thus assume the duty of defending the kingdom against attack. This
increased the paradox of a republic governing a kingdom and preserving its political and judicial
institutions (MCC, Donà, no. 46, 129).

The Venetian policy of not eliminating the royal traditions of Cypriot society was also aimed at
bringing the nobles over to the Republic’s side and acquiring their loyalty. It was important to obtain
support for the Venetian power among the Cypriot society, as the plan of transporting settlers from
Venice had failed. To gain the support of the most influential families of the Cypriot nobility, the
Venetian senate acknowledged the preservation and the hereditary character of the royal titles
originating from the Crusader kingdoms. These included such titles as the Counts of Jaffa, Tripoli,


Rochas-Edessa and Carpass, and the titles that went with the offices of seneschal and constable.

However, the most important concession made by the Venetian government to the higher
echelons of Cypriot society was the right to assemble and discuss matters of common interest, such
as the preservation or increase of ancient privileges, the election of representatives to send as
ambassadors to the Doge in Venice in order to present their requests, etc. This council could be
considered to be the continuation of the kingdom’s High Court, but without any of the former judicial
authorities. The assembly had also the prerogative of electing the candidates for the various offices
reserved for Cypriots, such as the administrators of the secondary provinces, viscounts, chancellors,
bishops of the Orthodox bishoprics, and abbots of the Catholic and Orthodox monasteries. Although it
was the duty of the Venetian lieutenant to elect the persons to each of these offices, the very nature of
his mandate, which lasted for only two years, prevented him from getting acquainted with the
candidates and the needs of the local society. Therefore, the council of the nobles offered him
proposals and suggestions on the character and morality of the candidates. In this way, the town
council controlled the assignment of every office reserved for Cypriots, giving it considerable power
among the native population of the island.

It was not only the nobles, in other words the higher ranks of Cypriot society, who the right to
assemble and discuss matters of their interest; the rest of the town-dwellers also had their own council
that met at least once a year. Requests from the representatives of such councils reached Venice
from the inhabitants of Nicosia, Famagosta and Kerynia (Arbel, 2000b). It is understandable that this
kind of assembly, usually held in the large town square, could sometimes erupt into riots or assume
other dangerous aspects hostile to the Venetian authorities, who tried to limit the number of the
participants at the meetings, which were in any case always held in the presence of the Venetian
officials.

Some scholars point out that the Venetian Republic’s assumption of power in Cyprus brought
a halt to the Hellenisation of the kingdom’s bureaucracy, which had been started during the 15th
century. After the chief chancellors of the kingdom were replaced by officers sent from Venice, all
formal documentation had to be written in Italian, whereas previously the insertions in Greek were
almost equal in number to those in French, which had been the kingdom’s official language. However,
one should not underestimate the spread of the Greek language, through the population of the higher
social classes. The literature of the 16th century supports the view that, in parallel with Italian, the
Greek vernacular continued to be used, not only for the everyday needs of the Cypriots, but also for
the compilation of literary works, such as the collection of love poems influenced by Italian
renaissance poetry (Siapkaras-Pitsillides, 1952).
We have already mentioned that the upper ranks of Cypriot society originated mainly from the
Crusader territories and the most active European trading cities. The majority of the rest of the island’s
population were Greek-speaking Orthodox peasants, farmers or craftsmen. Among them, as the
documents testify, were thousands of Armenians, Maronites, Hebrews and members of other eastern
Christian faiths, such as Abyssinians and Nestorians. They used Greek for their day-to-day
communication, as is attested by the French merchant Jacques le Saige, who visited Cyprus in 1518

(Cobham, 1908, 58 ). However, each community used its own language for religious celebrations. The
Armenians used Armenian, the Maronites Arab, the Hebrews Jewish, and the Abyssinians the Coptic
language. Every religious community had its own religious leader elected by the community members
and, as always, confirmed by the Venetian authorities. In this way, the senate preserved religious
peace on the island in order protect Venetian political and economic interests. However, the Orthodox,
who were far more numerous than any other faith, were occasionally able to impose their will on the
Venetian authorities in matters of ecclesiastical tax payments and agricultural exploitation, or in the
use of churches belonging to Maronites, Copts or Armenians (ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 37, 154). ***
The members of these communities were mainly present in the towns and in some villages
located in the districts north of Nicosia and Famagosta. The Armenians and the Maronites, who spoke
good Arabic, were used by the Venetian government for expeditions to Egypt or Syria, chiefly to
negotiate the purchase of grain in times of shortage. These same interpreters were used for the
administration of justice, in cases where it was necessary to take testimonies from individuals who
could not understand or speak Italian. To this multicultural mix of the lower ranks of 16th century
Cypriot society, we can add the hundreds of soldiers from the Republic’s various dominions sent by
the Venetian senate to defend the island.

The large numbers of the lower social classes were united by the same living conditions that
were often tantamount to poverty. The peasants had to hand over a large share of their crops to the
fief holder and the central treasury, an obligation that weighed heavily on them in times of poor
harvests. Furthermore, most of the Cypriot cereal production was exported (mainly to Venice and the
Republic’s other dominions), thus diminishing the island’s supplies and causing discontent among the
population. In addition to official Venetian documents of the time, the diaries of foreign visitors to the
island in the 16th century tell us that many of the Cypriot peasants were fleeing the island in search of
better living conditions on the opposite coasts of the Ottoman territories (Cobham, 1908, 52, 55). The
lack of grain was the main reason behind the few rebellions there were against the Venetian
authorities. In any case, for the masses of farm workers throughout the island the situation was more
or less the same under the authority of the Venetian Republic as it had been under the French kings.

What is very significant, on the other hand, is the relationship between Cypriot society and the
subjects of the Ottoman empire. The Venetian senate considered the imperialism of the Sultan of
Constantinople as a threat to the Republic’s dominions. However, the peace treaties provided that all
Ottoman subjects should be free to enter Venetian lands as long as they did not cause any upheaval.
In fact, Turkish merchants were most welcome in Venice, where they had their own warehouse and
inn. Nevertheless, the situation in Cyprus during the 16th century was more delicate. Citizens of the
Ottoman empire could be found in the strategic fortresses of Famagosta and Nicosia, and even
around the island, hiding their identities by dressing in Christian clothing (ASV, Senato, Secreta, reg.
61, c. 14r; Bellenger, 122). On the one hand, the senate instructed the government of Cyprus not to
harass them, but on the other, to keep them under strict supervision in order to avoid unpleasant
episodes (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Parti Secrete, filza 13, 15 agosto 1569). Very often, the ships of
the Ottoman fleet would disembark on the coasts of Cyprus and pretend to receive money and gifts,


instead of taking them by force. They claimed to be protecting the island from pirate attacks.
Therefore, every time the Turkish captains appeared on the coasts of Cyprus, the Venetian authorities
were obliged to offer them at least six silk cloths of different colours and 200 silver coins. This was a
kind of tribute that the Cypriot treasury had to pay to the Ottoman sultan, who already received 8,000
ducats annually from Cyprus, in virtue of the tribute previously paid to the Mameluke sultan of Egypt.
However, this was not all. The sultan and other high officials of the Ottoman empire often used to send
requests to the Venetian government of Cyprus asking for some of the island’s renowned sweet wine
and fine hunting falcons. These frequent visits by Ottoman representatives, and the lavish reception
they had to be offered, caused great expense to the island’s treasury (ASV, Senato, Dispacci, filza 1).
Under these terms, the Cypriots already felt in a way subjected to the Ottomans, even years before
the full Turkish conquest of the island was finally consummated in 1570-1571. During the 16th century, while the island was part of the Venetian dominions, Cyprus’ society
and institutions were a mosaic of past multicultural influences. As we have seen, the lower social
ranks of the Greek population shared their fate with the peasants and craftsmen of Armenian,
Maronite and other ethnic or religious communities, while the multi-ethnic families of the higher ranks
saw their prerogatives augmented under the government of the Venetian Republic. In any event, for
the whole of Cypriot society the period of Venetian rule was one of relative participation in the island’s
administration, even though the highest authority remained under the control of the Venetian
patricians and its senate. The degree to which a large portion of the Cypriot population linked
themselves to the Republic of Saint Mark is proven by the fact that after the Ottoman conquest, many
of the Cypriots who could afford to do so moved with their families to Venice.

Main sources

Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Cipro (ASV, Senato, Dispacci); ASV, Senato,
Mar; ASV, Senato, Secreta; ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Parti Secrete.

Museo Civico Correr, Donà dalle Rose (MCC, Donà)

Bibliography

ARBEL, B. (2000a): “The reign of Caterina Corner (1473-1489) as a family affair”, in Cyprus, the
Franks and Venice, 13th-16th centuries, Aldershot 2000, I, pp.67-85.

ARBEL, B. (2000b): “Urban assemblies and town councils in Frankish and Venetian Cyprus”, in
Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th-16th centuries, Aldershot 2000, IV, pp.203-213.

BELLENGER, Y. (2004): “Les îles dans le récit de voyage de Jacques le Saige”, in L’Europa e il
Levante nel Cinquecento, II Le isole del Mediterraneo orientale nella letteratura di viaggio, ed. L. Zilli,
Padova 2004, pp.105-129.


COBHAM, C.D. (1908): Excerpta Cypria. Materials for a history of Cyprus, Cambridge 1908.

COLASANTI, F. (1979): “Caterina Corner”, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, XXII, Roma 1979,
pp.335-342.

EDBURY, P.W. (1991): The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374, Cambridge 1991.

HILL, G. (19722): A History of Cyprus, Cambridge 19722.

JACOBY. D. (1977): “Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIIe au XVe
siècle”, in Byzantinische Forchungen, 5 (1977), pp.159-188.

KARAGEORGHIS, V. (1986): Cyprus between the Orient and the Occident, Acts of the International
Archaeological Symposium (Nicosia, 8-14 September 1985), Nicosia 1986.

LUKE, H. (1975): “The Kingdom of Cyprus 1291-1369”, in A History of the Crusades, ed. K.M. Setton,
III The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. H.W. Hazard, Madison 1975, pp.340-360.

MAS LATRIE, L. de (I, 1861; II, 1852): Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la
maison de Lusignan, I, Paris 1861; II, Paris 1852.

PAINTER, S. (1962): “The Third Crusade: Richard the Lionheart and Philip Augustus”, in A History of
the Crusades, ed. K.M. Setton, II The Later Crusades, 1189-1311, ed. R. Lee Wolff – H.W. Hazard,
Philadelphia 1962, pp.45-85.

RICHARD, J. (1983): “Le droit et les institutions franques dans le royaume de Chypre”, in Croisés,
missionnaires et voyageurs. Les perspectives orientales du monde latin médiéval, London 1983, IX
pp.3-20.

RICHARD, J. (1977): “Chypre du protectorat à la domination vénitienne”, in Les relations entre l’Orient
et l’Occident au Moyen Age. Etudes et documents, London 1977, XII, pp.657-677.

SIAPKARAS-PITSILLIDES, T. (1952): Le petrarchisme en Chypre. Poèmes d’amour en dialecte
chypriote d’après un manuscrit du XVIème siècle, Athènes 1952.

ZIADA, M.M. (1975): “The Mamluk Sultans, 1291-1517”, in A History of the Crusades, ed. K.M. Setton,
III The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. H.W. Hazard, Madison 1975, pp.486-512.



No other invaders destroyed as much of the normal day-to-day functions as the Otto-Turks!

[shahmaran]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

[Jerry]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

We have no rights to Enosis but you have the right of union with Turkey. United Nations conditions? Huge (?) amount of population- 18%. You are having a laugh aren't you?

I think it's time for a name change Sha moron.

[Piratis]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

What we established is that we had every right for Enosis, which you used force and blackmail in order to deprive us from it. I provided the facts already and this is clear to anybody with IQ over 100.

18% is not "huge". 82% is what is huge, and still you want to silence the vast majority of the Cypriot people and undemocratically impose your will on us.

[Viewpoint]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

We have no rights to Enosis but you have the right of union with Turkey. United Nations conditions? Huge (?) amount of population- 18%. You are having a laugh aren't you?

I think it's time for a name change Sha moron.

Big enough % to make a difference, you cannot go against your own constitution which is what you tried to do and lost control of 37% of the island, obviously you have not learned any lessons from your past mistkaes and do not know what it is to share a country.

[Viewpoint]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

What we established is that we had every right for Enosis, which you used force and blackmail in order to deprive us from it. I provided the facts already and this is clear to anybody with IQ over 100.

18% is not "huge". 82% is what is huge, and still you want to silence the vast majority of the Cypriot people and undemocratically impose your will on us.

Its at this point that you show how wrong you are, this island is belongs to all of us the fact that we arrived so many years ago does not make any difference and you cannot just brush us to one side when you wish to do something that will place us in danger or go against the constitution because it does not suit you. You need a lesson in understanding that running a nation means you cannot have everything your own way, you have to take into account all aspects of the country otherwise you will have rebellion.

[shahmaran]

You wanted to give Cyprus to Greece thinking that we would be OK we fought for survival and will continue to do so, thats why you wil never have full power over the whole island you cannot be trusted and we will always make sure of that.

And who are you to tell us where our island should belong? When you came to our island did you ask us if we wanted Cyprus to be given to the Ottomans?

I remember when the Turks where threatening Cyprus when we were about to unite with EU. As if we can not unite our own island with whomever we want and we have to get the permission of some foreign invader.

That is where you keep getting it wrong Piratis, this island is not yours!

And we have established that you had no right to Enosis what so ever, you do not even comply with the conditions the UN has set.

You can't ignore a huge amount of your population and "decide" to unite with Greece, that's how you loose half of the island...

We have no rights to Enosis but you have the right of union with Turkey. United Nations conditions? Huge (?) amount of population- 18%. You are having a laugh aren't you?

I think it's time for a name change Sha moron.

This is not Taksim is it genius??

It is obvious who the moron is