Cyprus-Forum.com

[The Cypriot]

Here is some paraphrased political analysis on where things stand and what's to come in Cyprus...

The Report on EU accession of Turkey is probably already in preparation. The settlement needs to be in sight before the December summit when the EU agrees the continued accession of Turkey, or not. The referendums on a Cyprus settlement therefore need to take place early in 2010.


1. AKP government continues in a power struggle with the Turkish military – who resist constitutional change to protect secularism in Turkey. To avoid confrontation, it would be easy for AKP to insist on the continued presence of Turkish troops and 1960 guarantees. But AKP realises this is incompatible with attaining a settlement because:

a) Greek Cypriots will never accept either. Security was the main reason for their "No" in 2004;

b) The legal position of Greek Cypriots is strongest on troop withdrawal. Even Turkey voted for this in 1974 in UN Security Council Resolution 365;

c) Turkish EU accession progress is problematic; some countries are turned off on human rights considerations. Concessions on Cyprus is one way to kick-start the process and close and open some chapters;

d) We have until April 2010 to conclude discussions before the real possibility of Eroglu becoming leader in the north – something both Cypriot leaders realise and warn against.

Behind the scenes preparation for security aspects is going on while all other provisions of a settlement are being worked out between the Cypriot negotiators.

Ankara is likely to insist on existing security and guarantee arrangements until the eleventh hour – when agreement between the Cypriot leaders on others issues is close.

Ankara may then move on security, if assured EU accession was to progress. Behind the scenes horse-trading to convince EU hard-liners on Turkey's accession, Austria, France and Germany is needed. That will be down to Britain, Greece and Cyprus itself.

2. A referendum needs to be carried in both communities but with one key difference: the views of the Turkish government is critical for the Turkish Cypriot while the views of the Greek government are immaterial to Greek Cypriots. If the Turkish government endorses solution, the electorate in the north is likely to accept.

3. Left backgrounds of both Cypriot leaders means it is difficult for the US and NATO to form part of any future security arrangements. The UK can play a role but this must mean transforming the British bases from relics of a colonial past to serving Cypriot security interests.

4. Left leaderships, because of the paramilitaries in both communities (encouraged by Greece, Turkey, UK and US in 1950s and 1960s) prefer to talk about demilitarisation and prominent role of UN.

5. The Greek government will endorse the abolition of guarantee system, as inappropriate for an EU member-state. Both Greece and Turkey will have to agree to doing so before proposal is put to the two Cypriot electorates.

[Viewpoint]

Here is some paraphrased political analysis on where things stand and what's to come in Cyprus...

The Report on EU accession of Turkey is probably already in preparation. The settlement needs to be in sight before the December summit when the EU agrees the continued accession of Turkey, or not. The referendums on a Cyprus settlement therefore need to take place early in 2010.


1. AKP government continues in a power struggle with the Turkish military – who resist constitutional change to protect secularism in Turkey. To avoid confrontation, it would be easy for AKP to insist on the continued presence of Turkish troops and 1960 guarantees. But AKP realises this is incompatible with attaining a settlement because:

a) Greek Cypriots will never accept either. Security was the main reason for their "No" in 2004;

b) The legal position of Greek Cypriots is strongest on troop withdrawal. Even Turkey voted for this in 1974 in UN Security Council Resolution 365;

c) Turkish EU accession progress is problematic; some countries are turned off on human rights considerations. Concessions on Cyprus is one way to kick-start the process and close and open some chapters;

d) We have until April 2010 to conclude discussions before the real possibility of Eroglu becoming leader in the north – something both Cypriot leaders realise and warn against.

Behind the scenes preparation for security aspects is going on while all other provisions of a settlement are being worked out between the Cypriot negotiators.

Ankara is likely to insist on existing security and guarantee arrangements until the eleventh hour – when agreement between the Cypriot leaders on others issues is close.

Ankara may then move on security, if assured EU accession was to progress. Behind the scenes horse-trading to convince EU hard-liners on Turkey's accession, Austria, France and Germany is needed. That will be down to Britain, Greece and Cyprus itself.

2. A referendum needs to be carried in both communities but with one key difference: the views of the Turkish government is critical for the Turkish Cypriot while the views of the Greek government are immaterial to Greek Cypriots. If the Turkish government endorses solution, the electorate in the north is likely to accept.

3. Left backgrounds of both Cypriot leaders means it is difficult for the US and NATO to form part of any future security arrangements. The UK can play a role but this must mean transforming the British bases from relics of a colonial past to serving Cypriot security interests.

4. Left leaderships, because of the paramilitaries in both communities (encouraged by Greece, Turkey, UK and US in 1950s and 1960s) prefer to talk about demilitarisation and prominent role of UN.

5. The Greek government will endorse the abolition of guarantee system, as inappropriate for an EU member-state. Both Greece and Turkey will have to agree to doing so before proposal is put to the two Cypriot electorates.

Have pigs started to fly in your world?

[The Cypriot]

Why do you say that?

BTW, this isn't my analysis.

[Viewpoint]

Why do you say that?

BTW, this isn't my analysis.

Whos is it?

[The Cypriot]

I am not at liberty to say. But not knowing the source doesn't preclude you from commenting and explaining yourself.

[Viewpoint]

I am not at liberty to say. But not knowing the source doesn't preclude you from commenting and explaining yourself.

So what if it was written by a GC? then pigs fly in his world. The credebility of the piece is very relevent to the writter and their objectivity.

[The Cypriot]

I am not at liberty to say. But not knowing the source doesn't preclude you from commenting and explaining yourself.

So what if it was written by a GC?

It wasn't.

then pigs fly in his world. The credebility of the piece is very relevent to the writter and their objectivity.

Just shoot down the message. You can dismantle it bit by bit... and forget the messenger.

[Viewpoint]

I am not at liberty to say. But not knowing the source doesn't preclude you from commenting and explaining yourself.

So what if it was written by a GC?

It wasn't.

then pigs fly in his world. The credebility of the piece is very relevent to the writter and their objectivity.

Just shoot down the message. You can dismantle it bit by bit... and forget the messenger.

Not worthy of my attention sorry.

[The Cypriot]

"AKP realises ...continued presence of Turkish troops and 1960 guarantees... is incompatible with attaining a settlement..."

"Ankara may ... move on security, if assured EU accession was to progress. Behind the scenes horse-trading to convince EU hard-liners on Turkey's accession, Austria, France and Germany is needed. That will be down to Britain, Greece and Cyprus itself."

"the views of the Turkish government is critical for the Turkish Cypriots... If the Turkish government endorses solution, the electorate in the north is likely to accept."

The above three, to my mind fairly plausable statements, are not worthy of attention? Not worthy of rebuttal?

You disappoint me.

[Nikitas]

Greece not taking the problem seriously is probably the main part of the problem. Greece, as one of the tree guarantor powers, should have insisted from the start on a territorial settlement, regardless of the internal constitutional structure, that reflected the 82-18 population ratios. This and this only would have been a simple, straightforward demand easily understood and agreeable to most foreign powers.

The rest can be handled by the Gypriots themselves, but the territory aspect is a matter that apparently goes beyond the locals.