Who Encircles Whom? Israeli–Turkish Flanking of Syria Warms Relations Between Greece and Iran
By John P. Nordin
On June 28, 1999, the Greek defense minister visited Tehran. While he was there he claimed, and his hosts confirmed, that a defense agreement was going to be finalized between the two countries.1 Immediately there was a curious reaction from the U.S. State Department. The spokesperson denied such a pact existed, and cited as his source the U.S. Embassy in Greece. However, official Greek sources never confirmed this denial.2
At first glance an alliance of Greece and Iran seems like an odd coupling that is without connection to larger strategic issues. On second thought, however, it makes sense, and so does the U.S. government’s wish that it would go away.
Greece and the Middle East
The meeting in Tehran was neither the beginning nor the end of Greek engagement with Iran. Two weeks later on July 12, the deputy foreign ministers of Greece and Iran met in Athens with their counterpart from Armenia for one in a series of annual meetings. In early September, the three foreign ministers met in Athens to sign agreements on a number of economic topics including, perhaps, Greek participation in an Armenian-Iran pipeline.3
Now that would make sense. Armenia and Turkey are certainly not allies. Since Armenia is supported by Russia, that brings the Russians into the equation. And Russia, remember, was going to provide missiles to Cyprus—missiles over which the Turks threatened to go to war.
So it could appear that the Greek outreach to Iran is motivated primarily by an aggressive desire to encircle Turkey. However, that conclusion omits too much of the context. Greek foreign policy is often driven by a search for allies to protect itself against its much larger Turkish neighbor.
Greeks have long hoped that its—and Turkey’s—membership in Western European institutions would do that, bringing publicity to bear on the Cyprus issue and also on what Greece views as Turkish claims against its territory. This hope has generally not been realized, leading to tension in Greece.
Then came Kosovo. In the West, Greek support for the Serbs is usually portrayed as little more than a semi-rational identification with their Christian Orthodox co-religionists. This is of a piece with Western views of Greek relations to the Middle East, which still assume the context of the socialist government of Andreas Papandreaou in the ’80s, when extreme Greek rhetoric and casualness about terrorism and security were upsetting Europe and the U.S.4
Those policies have long since been abandoned, and this view trivializes Greek concern with NATO. Memories of U.S. manipulation of Greek politics leads to Greeks being edgy about an extensive intervention into the Balkans by a U.S.-led NATO.
Greeks are upset that years of Turkish ethnic cleansing of its Kurdish population has produced little reaction from Europe or the U.S., even though the casualties may have been 10 times the number of victims of the atrocities that NATO used to justify intervention in Kosovo.5 Nor did it help that NATO bombed a Greek column bringing relief supplies to refugees.6 Opposition in Greece was extensive and angry, leading in one comic incident to a rearrangement of road signs in Thessaloniki, causing a NATO convoy to beach itself in the local vegetable market.7
Prime Minister Costas Simitis conducted a careful balancing act, avoiding active Greek participation in the NATO war that would have jeopardized his government, yet keeping the United States content with the level of cooperation it was receiving. Perhaps a more aggressive outreach to the Middle East only seems a prudent expansion of Greek options.
Iran’s Perspective
In welcoming Greek diplomacy, Iran was not acting merely out of hospitality, nor out of mutual admiration of their ancient cultures (a theme of much diplomatic banter when Greek President Constantinos Stephanopoulos visited Tehran last October). Again, Turkey is a key factor.
Turkey is regularly described as crucial because it is the “only Western Muslim democracy,” providing a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. This, however, ignores the reality that Turkey’s relations with the Muslim world are difficult.
Turkey is officially secular and its military has limited Islamic political influence. In fact, the Iranian press regularly expresses concern about the suppression of Islamic expression in Turkey, where even wearing a woman’s headscarf in a school or government office can be controversial. Thus Iran is attracted politically to countries that are not enamored of Turkey.
Other Iranian concerns are dictated by its interests in Syria, with which there is growing cooperation. By contrast, Turkey and Syria have nearly gone to war over the Kurds, and Turkey’s plans to build dams on the Euphrates and restrict the flow of river water to Syria.
Economics also is a factor. Greece’s imports from Iran are almost entirely oil. President Stephanopolous brought a delegation of business people with him to Iran, signaling a desire for expanded business connections8—welcome to Iranian officials given the economic struggles the country is undergoing.
Encircling Syria
However important these issues, the key factor in Greek-Iranian relations is the defense agreement signed by Turkey and Israel in 1996. Contents of this pact have been only partially revealed. The public provisions include access to port facilities, exchange of military personnel and information, and allowing the Israeli air force to train in Turkey’s large airspace.
The common U. S. weapons systems of the two countries have also led to contracts for upgrades and training between the two countries.9 Additionally, Turkey has benefited from enlisting Israel’s politically potent U.S. lobby to advocate its interests in Washington.10
The existence of this level of military cooperation contributes, on the one hand, to Middle Eastern countries looking to connect with countries less sympathetic to Turkey (i.e., Greece) and, on the other, to Greece looking to Arab countries and Iran for support against Turkey.
A direct target of the Israeli–Turkish axis is Syria, as the defense agreement gives Israel a way of flanking, if not encircling its Syrian neighbor. The treaty apparently also created joint Turkish-Israeli listening posts on Turkey’s borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran that send intelligence directly to the Israeli armed forces.11
The military agreement increases Israeli power in dealing with Syrian proxies in south Lebanon, and in negotiating with Syria for return of the Golan Heights. Israel might not be willing to risk the international consequences of an aggressive war on Syria, but Turkey, covertly aided by Israel, could likely do so (it nearly did last year) with fewer consequences.
Circling Back
However, all these nations are, from time to time, playing one country off against another. Immediately after the Greek president’s successful trip to Iran, Iran turned around and had a positive exchange of ideas with Turkish officials on a variety of economic topics.
Equally quickly after Greece’s alleged efforts to encircle Turkey, Greece and Turkey launched the most wide-ranging talks they have had in years. This is popularly considered to be the spontaneous result of human sympathy in the wake of the earthquakes. However much that added impetus to the effort, the new Greek foreign minister had laid the groundwork for this development before the disasters occurred, a development to which his Turkish opposite number was receptive.
Thus, it would not be the least bit surprising if Greece’s overtures to Iran were aimed in part at provoking some concession from NATO. Likewise, Iranian overtures to Greece may be designed to increase U.S. motivation to court Iran.
Thus U.S. reluctance to acknowledge warming relations between Greece and Iran springs both from a State Department choice to ignore another crack in its crumbling containment policy, and not to call attention to the consequences of the military cooperation agreement between Israel and Turkey.
Dr. John P. Nordin is a free-lance writer living in the Denver area.
Footnotes
1Stratfor, “Greece Announces Pending Defense Pact with Iran and Armenia,” July 1, 1999.
www.stratfor.com 2Stratfor, “Greece Assures U.S.—No Military Accord with Iran,” July 3, 1999. “Greece, Iran discuss defense sector cooperation,” Embassy of Greece (in the U. S.) Press Office, June 29, 1999.
3“Greece, Armenia and Iran sign cooperation memorandum,” Embassy of Greece (in the U. S.) Press Office, Sept. 9, 1999.
4Spiros Kaminaris, “Greece and the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3:2, June 1999.
5Jennifer Washburn, “Turkey and Israel Lock Arms,” The Progressive Magazine, December 1998.
6Athens News Agency, “Greek humanitarian convoy in Kosovo bombed,” May 6, 1999.
7Associated Press, “Turn left at the tomatoes,” April 29, 1999.
8“Stephanopoulos arrives in Tehran,” Kathimerini English Edition, Oct. 13, 1999.
9Alain Gresh, “Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and their Impact on the Middle East,” The Middle East Journal, into the Balkans vol.52:2, Spring 1998. Alan Makovksy, “Turkish/Israeli Cooperation, the Peace Process, and the Region,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch No. 195, April 26, 1996. Middle East Realities, “New U.S./Turkey/Israel Alliance Circumvents and Bottles up the Arabs,” July 1998.
10Robert Fisk, “Jerusalem Draws in the Turks to Spy on Arab Forces,” The Independent, Feb. 24, 1999. Washburn, op. cit.
11Gresh, op. cit. Fisk, op. cit. Michael Eisenstadt, “Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch No. 262, July 24, 1997.
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Home > Archives > March_2000 > Two Views: Consequences of the Israel--Turkey Alliance
as far as the article shows nothing but repeated hypocritical comments by Turkey on many levels.
