Editorial, Friends of Cyprus report, Summer 2009
From the section commenting on security issues as highlighted by CEPS survey
As anticipated by the Friends of Cyprus, the security and guarantee provisions of any plan were judged by 85 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 66 per cent of Turkish Cypriots, to be the most decisive for their vote in a future referendum. In both instances this was 15 per cent more than any other issue mentioned as among respondents’ five greatest concerns.
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Overwhelming majorities of Greek Cypriots, from 61 per cent to 90 per cent, would find entirely unacceptable the continued presence of Greek and Turkish soldiers under Greek and Turkish command, or the creation of a Turkish military base on Cyprus.
Large majorities of Turkish Cypriots (55 and 59 per cent) would find entirely unacceptable the 1960 arrangement by which 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers were stationed in the Republic. A similar majority of Greek Cypriots (56 per cent) would find a NATO force unacceptable. Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, with majorities of 74 and 57 per cent respectively, would not rely on British troops in the Sovereign Base Areas. So what alternatives remain?
Fortunately there are some options only minorities in both communities find unacceptable after a settlement. All but 18 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 32 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would find at least tolerable the existence of a unified bicommunal security force, composed equally of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Indeed the existence of such a force could as well be justified by the ever-present danger of a natural calamity as by security considerations in the stricter sense of the term.
All but 22 per cent of Greek Cypriots and, again, 32 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would find at least tolerable such a bicommunal security force taking part in UN peace-keeping missions abroad, a most appropriate response to the UN’s constructive presence in Cyprus since 1964.
All but 37 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 26 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would find at least tolerable the existence of a joint Cypriot-Greek-Turkish security force serving outside Cyprus within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore only 9 per cent of Greek and 29 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would oppose a UN force replacing UNFICYP to oversee implementation until all parties agree it is no longer required. These four points represent significant common ground.
More difficult for Turkish Cypriots – 44 per cent judging them unacceptable in both instances – and clearly possible for Greek Cypriots – 25 per cent and 35 per cent finding them unacceptable respectively – are the important proposals for an European Security force in Cyprus, including Greek and Turkish soldiers, and an International Force with full intervention rights and a Chapter 7 Security Council mandate.
Clearly these proposals need careful formulation and reconsideration but are by no means to be excluded since, once reformulated, they might obtain clear and not just marginal majority acceptance in both communities.
There remains therefore a great deal to be done in working through the various security options and the appropriate responses to each identifiable threat. Yet these polling figures provide a clearly positive sign.
Inevitably some of those resisting a settlement will do their level best first to discredit and then to ignore them. Fortunately however the EU, and with it the British government, have every reason to be interested in a settlement along the lines pioneered by ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots in response to the CEPS survey. Second, from the moment the secret is out that there is a great deal on which ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots do in fact agree, even in the most sensitive fields, it becomes far harder for professional powerbrokers to pretend we should all forget these areas of agreement and continue to think of Cyprus as a zero-sum game where divisions are so absolute there can be no hope of a settlement.
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