Hello friends,
finally, my report on the most recent bicommunal survey - which took place last month with a sample of 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots - is available for download from this thread.
Please note I have not yet officially published it on my website, I am just making it available through this forum for those of you who have been expecting it.
If you wish to download THE FULL REPORT, INCLUDING TEXT AND CHARTS, use the following link (Right Click-Save Target as):
http://www.help-net.gr/OptionsForPeaceTextAndCharts.pdf
If you wish to download ONLY THE TEXT OF THE REPORT, use the following link (Right Click - Save Target as):
http://www.help-net.gr/OptionsForPeaceTextOnly.pdf
I look forward to hear your thoughts and comments.
FINAL RESULTS OF BICOMMUNAL STUDY
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FINAL RESULTS OF BICOMMUNAL STUDY
by Alexandros Lordos » Tue Jun 14, 2005 9:47 pm
- Alexandros Lordos
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by Alexandros Lordos » Tue Jun 14, 2005 9:52 pm
To make discussion of the report easier, I will copy-paste here the text of the report:
OPTIONS FOR PEACE
Mapping the possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus
Poll Identity
Method of Data Collection: Face-to-Face interview with structured questionnaire
Period of Data Collection: 15th May – 30th May 2005
Sampling Method: Multi-stage random stratified sampling
Sample Size: 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots
Primary Author: Alexandros Lordos
Co-authors: Muharrem Faiz, Costa Carras
Field-work responsibility: CYMAR Market Research Ltd. and KADEM Cyprus Social Research.
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY FINDINGS
A. Underlying Attitudes
Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots acknowledge that the two communities have much in common, and majorities of both communities make it clear that they would not mind having neighbours of the other community. An exception is evident in the case of the settlers from Turkey, who tend to oppose co-existence with the Greek Cypriots.
This willingness of the two communities to co-exist does not yet extend to the prospect of inter-marriage, or to the prospect of living under the other community’s local administration.
Both communities tend to mistrust the other, and tend to fear that in case of a comprehensive settlement the other side will not adhere to what has been agreed. Many Turkish Cypriots go a step further, and say that it would be better for the two communities to go their separate ways from now on, a sentiment which the majority of Greek Cypriots does not share.
Concerning the prospect of a comprehensive settlement, most Greek Cypriots agree that it is important to take into account the concerns of the other community as well, and they acknowledge that their own side is also to blame for the historical course of the Cyprus problem. On the same issues, the Turkish Cypriot community is ambivalent and divided, some acknowledging the need to understand the other side and to take some responsibility, while others deny such a necessity.
The Greek Cypriots strongly support the development of an over-riding Cypriot identity, that will supersede the notions of “being Greek” or “being Turkish”, while the Turkish Cypriots are on this issue ambivalent and divided, some strongly favouring the development of “Cypriot-ness”, others strongly opposing such a social development. Again, the settlers tend to be differentiated on this issue, with a strong majority amongst them opposing the development of a common identity.
B. Motives for a Solution
While both communities share the desire for peace and security, they otherwise have very different motives for a settlement.
The Greek Cypriots tend to see, as primary motives, the return of refugees to their ancestral homes, the freedom to live anywhere in Cyprus and the political re-integration of the island under one common administration, while the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Army is seen as a critical and imperative corollary demand.
The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, focus more on the possibilities for economic development after a comprehensive settlement, on the fact that they would then have a stronger voice in the international community, and on the various other benefits that European accession would bring.
The Turkish Cypriots also consider it important that they will have their own Turkish Cypriot federated state, which of course is a motive/concern that needs to be carefully balanced both with the Greek Cypriots’ desire for the political re-integration of the island, and with the Greek Cypriots’ concern that they should be free to live anywhere in Cyprus.
C. Political Trust
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend each to trust their own present leader’s handling of the Cyprus problem, and mis-trust the other community’s leader. For instance, Greek Cypriots see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to the re-unification of Cyprus and as willing and able to engage in substantive negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, while they see Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to partition and as unwilling and incapable of substantive negotiations. The exact mirror image of these opinions are encountered on the Turkish Cypriot side. They see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to partition and incapable of negotiations, and Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to re-unification and very able to negotiate.
This “credibility gap” in the public perception of the two leaders could cause serious problems if and when negotiations re-commence, since whatever is suggested by the leader of one community, will automatically be received by the public of the other community as arising out of ulterior motives and ill-will. On the other hand, both leaders currently enjoy the necessary prestige in their own community, in order to negotiate effectively.
Concerning the issue of trust towards third-party intermediaries, each community of course trusts above all its own “mother-land”: Greek Cypriots trust Greece above all, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey above all. For both communities, second-most trusted is the European Union, with the United Nations coming third. The US and the UK are mis-trusted by majorities of both communities. Furthermore, each community strongly mis-trusts the “mother-land” of the other community.
It is interesting to note that out of the three “guarantor powers” – Greece, Turkey and the UK, each community trusts only one out of the three. Greek Cypriots trust Greece but mis-trust Turkey and the UK, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey and mis-trust Greece and the UK. In what can be seen as a touch of collective unconscious humour, the Greek Cypriots have marginally greater trust in the Organisation of Islamic Countries, than they do in either the UK or the US!
The European Union seems to be the only third-party involved that simultaneously enjoys a substantial measure of trust both among the Greek Cypriots and among the Turkish Cypriots.
D. Security
On the issue of Security, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 61% and acceptable to 27% of Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 54% and unacceptable to 42% of Turkish Cypriots.
Amending the Treaty of Guarantee in various small ways, such as by limiting the intervention rights of Greece and Turkey to the respective constituent state only, or by agreeing that all Greek and Turkish troops will eventually depart, does not change the overall acceptability of the proposal on the Greek Cypriot side. It seems that the Greek Cypriots fear a potential situation whereby the island would be totally demilitarized, while Turkey would retain the right to intervene militarily, even in a limited fashion. Not having any Turkish troops on the ground is small consolation for the Greek Cypriots, since they are aware that mainland Turkey is only 50 miles to the north of Cyprus and could land troops on the island within hours.
Creating a new security system, based on the Cypriots themselves but with the support, enhancement and guidance of the European Union, is a proposal that is seen in a positive light by the public of both communities. More particularly, the proposal that was tested was for the development of a “Eurocypriot” security system: Soldiers from various European countries, as well as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who would together receive military training in other European countries, would all be part of an integrated security force that would be responsible for the defence of the island. Intervention rights by Turkey would only apply in case this primary security system, as described above, fails to protect the Turkish Cypriots from some particular threat.
This particular proposal has a 10-point lead amongst the Greek Cypriots, and a 20-point lead amongst the Turkish Cypriots. In other words, not only is it a proposal that would gather majority support among the Greek Cypriots, it would also be more acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots than the equivalent security provisions of the fifth Annan Plan.
A final security proposal that was tested, is to allow the re-united island to become a member of NATO, so that the NATO command would then be responsible to oversee and guarantee the security of the island. Responses to this particular proposal were divided, in both communities, with about half of the respondents declaring themselves to be in favour and about half declaring themselves to be against. The prevalent “anti-Americanism” of Cypriots, but also the fact that this proposal would effectively render Cyprus a protectorate of an international military organisation, meant that this proposal had significantly less support than the proposal for a Eurocypriot security system which was cited above.
E. Property Rights
On the issue of Property Rights, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 24% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 60% and unacceptable to 33% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One approach to resolving the Property issue might be exclusively territorial, by reducing the Turkish Cypriot federated state to 18% - 20% of Cyprus, instead of 29%, but in return allowing the Turkish Cypriots to keep all property that would remain within the Turkish Cypriot state, paying monetary compensation to the original owners.
While this proposal would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, by a 28-point margin, it would be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 15-point margin. While the Turkish Cypriots might like the suggestion that they would not have to deal with Greek Cypriot property claimants within the Turkish Cypriot federated state, the Greek Cypriots do not like the implications of “ethnic purity” and “partition in disguise” which this proposal appears to them to entail.
Another approach to resolving the Property issue, would be to abandon the logic of enforced exchange, and instead acknowledge both the original owner’s right to title, and the current occupant’s right to stay in the property for an agreed period of time while paying rent. In the mean time, individual original owners and individual current occupants would be encouraged to make their own private deals to exchange, purchase or sell the property in question, if they so wish.
Quite surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot public does not feel as positively about this proposal as one would have thought – in fact they are divided, half of the Greek Cypriots accepting it and half of them rejecting it. This might be explained, firstly, as fear that such provisions would not in the end be implemented, that rent would not be paid as agreed, or that the property would not be returned to its owner when the “right to stay by paying rent” had expired. On a different level, the result might be explained as unwillingness to wait another lengthy period before being allowed to personally use the property. After 30 years living as refugees, Greek Cypriots expect a right to return that would apply immediately, not be deferred for yet another decade.
As for the Turkish Cypriots, this was the least attractive of all the suggested property proposals, with much less support than the equivalent property provisions of the Annan Plan. The reasons are obvious, since with this proposal they would be asked to find the money to pay rent for a property which for many years they have been using as their own. Furthermore, they may fear that in the long term such a proposal could have devastating effects on the bizonality of the settlement, since if Greek Cypriots prove unwilling to sell their properties in the north, then the Turkish Cypriots would be hard-pressed to find land in the north on which to build their homes and expand their economy.
The following proposal appears much more attractive for both communities: Original owners would be entitled to the restitution, and immediate use, of all their properties, except those currently inhabited by refugees with property of roughly equivalent value to exchange, and those on which major investment has been made – and for such properties the original owners would be compensated. If a refugee is not entitled to the restitution of his original home, then he will be entitled to a new home built for him in the same town or village. The construction of these new residences would be partly self-financed through the compensation fund to which current occupants (who would be entitled to keep the property they are using) will contribute, and partly financed through the assistance of international donors.
This proposal is different to the Annan Plan in three key respects: Firstly, the 1/3rd restriction on property restitution, much despised by Greek Cypriots, has been removed. If a property is not being used by a Turkish Cypriot who can claim it under the above-mentioned criteria, then the original owner can have it returned to him, without quotas or qualifications. Secondly, the right to a new home has been added, something which the Annan Plan was struggling towards but did not quite achieve. And thirdly, if the Compensation fund fails in the end to balance its books, it will be international donors and not the Cypriot tax-payer who will be asked to cover the difference.
As for acceptability, this proposal is acceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 13-point margin, and to the Turkish Cypriots by a 29-point margin. This high level of acceptance amongst the Turkish Cypriots is not surprising, since on an individual level the average Turkish Cypriot would be entitled to keep exactly the same property that he would be keeping under the Annan Plan. It is the Property Board that will be getting less property with this revised scheme, not the average Turkish Cypriot.
A final alternative proposal that was put before respondents, is a variation of the “right to a new home” proposal described above, but with the order of priority reversed. In other words, the original owner would get to keep his original home, while the current occupant will be re-housed in a new home in the same town or village.
To this proposal, the Greek Cypriot response was overwhelmingly favourable, with an impressive 57-point lead. This of course was to be expected, since “all refugees to return to their homes” has been the constant Greek Cypriot demand since 1974. What is more surprising is the response of the Turkish Cypriots, who also accept this proposal with a strong 27-point lead. In other words, they see this proposal as on a par with the Annan Plan Property provisions, which also had a 27-point lead among the Turkish Cypriots.
The explanation of this surprising result is in hindsight simple: The Turkish Cypriots would be giving up 30-year old residences, which have already lost much of their value through wear-and-tear, and in their place they will be getting a brand new residence, with new plumbing, new wiring, modern construction, longer effective house life etc. In this way, this proposal becomes a “win-win” suggestion, with the Greek Cypriot original owners returning to the homes of their childhood which to them carry great emotional significance, and the Turkish Cypriot current occupants getting a brand new free-hold residence of equivalent size, in the same town or village as that in which they are currently residing.
F. Residence and Voting Rights
On the issue of Residence and Voting Rights, the proposals that were included in the Annan Plan are unacceptable to 57% and acceptable to 15% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 47% and unacceptable to 39% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on the issue of residence rights in the other constituent state, is to put aside timetable restrictions to relocation – so that any Greek Cypriots who wish to relocate to the north will be allowed to do so immediately after the settlement is agreed upon – while the permanent limit to relocation will be reduced, as a trade-off in favour of the Turkish Cypriot demand for bizonality, from the 33% of the constituent state population featured in the Annan Plan, to 29%.
Such an approach would be seen in a more positive light by the Greek Cypriot public, when compared to the Annan Plan, but would still be rejected by an 8-point margin. The Greek Cypriots would on the one hand appreciate the abolition of timetable restrictions, but on the other hand they would remain displeased with the construct of a permanent limit to residence rights based on ethnicity, something which in their eyes is an unacceptable violation of basic freedoms and human rights.
From a Turkish Cypriot point of view, this proposal is more attractive than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions – there is a 15-point lead in favour of acceptance, compared to an 8-point lead for the equivalent Annan Plan provisions. This may be explained partly as approval of the immediate personal freedom, for everyone, which this proposal entails, and partly as approval of the stricter permanent limit to the relocation of Greek Cypriots in the north, which limit would then more effectively safeguard bizonality.
Another alternative approach on this issue, is to add voting rights into the bargain, so that the permanent limit is reduced further, to 25% of the constituent state population, but with all voting restrictions also lifted, so that this 25% of Greek Cypriots will vote in all constituent state and all federal elections as full residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – unlike the situation with the Annan Plan, where Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot federated state would not have the right to vote for the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Senate.
Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal would also be rejected by an 8-point margin. On the one hand, the abolition of voting restrictions is seen as a further improvement, whereas on the other hand, the imposition of a stricter permanent limit to relocation is seen as a further deterioration.
Amongst the Turkish Cypriot public, this proposal is seen in a very positive light, with a 27-point lead in favour of its acceptance. It would seem that the imposition of even stricter limits to residence of Greek Cypriots in the north is seen as a very positive change, which satisfies their concern to maintain bizonality, while the abolition of voting restrictions does not seem to worry them, given that Greek Cypriots will never be able to have more than 25% of the constituent state’s vote.
Yet another possibility on the issue of residence and voting rights is to separate the two entirely, so that all Greek Cypriots would vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government and the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where they live, while all Turkish Cypriots would vote for the Turkish Cypriot constituent state government and the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where they live. An exception to this rule would be made for municipal elections, where each person would vote at the place where he resides. Other than this separate voting system, no limits and no quotas would be imposed on the exercise of residence rights.
Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal enjoys a strong 22-point lead. It would seem that the Greek Cypriots are unconcerned about where they would exercise their voting rights, and they wouldn’t mind not having a say in the local politics of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – in fact, it may well be the case that separate voting on the constituent state level would alleviate the sense of “being a political minority” that Greek Cypriots in the north might otherwise suffer from. Furthermore, the benefit of not having limitations to the exercise of basic freedoms makes this proposal particularly appealing to the Greek Cypriot mindset.
The Turkish Cypriots would also accept this proposal by a comfortable 15-point margin, a significantly wider margin of acceptance than that of the equivalent provisions in the Annan Plan. Separate voting at the constituent state level is an effective safeguard of bizonality, no less so than limiting residence rights through quotas and other such devices.
Of course, with such a system serious issues of political representation arise, since Greek Cypriots in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south will not be politically represented at the place where they live. If such a system as described above is instituted, it will have to be complemented with various co-operation agreements between the two constituent states, on issues that range from health to education to welfare to justice, thus ensuring that the civic rights of these individuals, as ex-territorial residents, are fully respected.
A final approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to institute a system of weighted voting, so that when Greek Cypriots in the north - or Turkish Cypriots in the south – are very few, their vote would weigh more so as to give them an effective political voice, while when they are very many their vote would weigh less in order to place a limit on their political influence. More particularly, if Greek Cypriots in the north – or Turkish Cypriots in the south - are 2% to 3% of the constituent state’s population their vote would be weighted upwards to 5%, if they are 6% or 7% their vote would be weighted up to 10%, etc., while 20% would be the maximum weight Greek Cypriot votes in the north - or Turkish Cypriot votes in the south - can have, irrespective of the number of residents. Other than the limitations imposed by this voting system, everyone would be allowed to live where he wishes and vote where he lives.
Though this proposal was meant to satisfy the Greek Cypriot concern that basic freedoms should apply, while also ensuring that those who will relocate shall have full political rights at their new place of residence, the Greek Cypriot public seems to be divided over the acceptability of the proposal, with about 30% in favour and 30% against. Perhaps the voting system is seen by them as overly complicated, or perhaps it is felt that “it is not sufficiently democratic”. It should be noted, however, that about 40% of Greek Cypriots replied that they are unsure about this proposal, so the final acceptability will very much depend on the position which the official Greek Cypriot leadership will take vis-à-vis this proposal.
The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, register a strong 20-point lead in favour of this proposal. This is not surprising, given that the proposed voting system is designed around the Turkish Cypriots’ own needs for guaranteed bizonality, and for effective political participation of the Turkish Cypriot minority that will be living in the south.
The added benefit of this approach is that it would amount to a form of cross-voting on the constituent state level, encouraging politicians - through the electoral process - to be moderate in their outlooks and to fully respect the rights of those of the other ethnic group who will be living within their constituent state’s boundary.
G. Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey
On the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan are unacceptable to 83% and acceptable to 10% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 66% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on this issue, which would in effect be a minor adjustment of the Annan Plan, is to maintain the “list of 45,000 persons”, but ensure that these are the only ones that will remain. In other words, effective mechanisms will be devised to ensure the departure of anyone who is not on the list, and legal loopholes in the Law on Citizenship that might have been exploited will be ironed out.
Such an amendment, it seems, would not be sufficient for the Greek Cypriot public: Though such provisions would be seen as “much better than the Annan Plan”, a 28-point lead in favour of rejection would remain. The Turkish Cypriot public, in contrast, registers a 30-point lead in favour of accepting this proposal.
Reducing the list of 45,000 would be unthinkable if nothing was offered in return, so the next proposal to be tested involved the devising of two lists: One list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted citizenship, and another list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted the right of emigration to other European countries, or to the USA.
To this proposal, the Turkish Cypriots respond with an equal level of enthusiasm as to the equivalent provisions of the Annan Plan, registering a 37-point lead in favour of its acceptance. This is significant, because it means that the right of emigration to Europe or the USA is seen as adequate compensation for being made to leave. The Greek Cypriots, in contrast, while seeing this proposal as marginally better than the previous one, still reject it by a 19-point margin.
What seems to be at play here is an aversion by Greek Cypriots, to any kind of arbitrary “list” that is not based on strict, specific and fair criteria. The underlying fear of Greek Cypriots is that through a list, those who have the strongest connections with the “status quo” will remain, and this might well include nationalists, criminal elements, and ex-officers of the Turkish Army. Thus, while the “list” approach might be a convenient way to bypass the lack of reliable information surrounding this issue, it is not an effective way to win over the Greek Cypriot public, however much the list is reduced.
One alternative criteria-based approach, might be to grant Cypriot citizenship to those born in Cyprus and those who arrived under the age of 18, while also granting a permanent residence permit to their parents, who will remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. The rationale behind this approach is to grant citizenship to those who have most integrated with the Turkish Cypriot community, through being brought up in Cyprus, but without separating families by forcing the older generation to leave the island.
This approach is much more attractive to the Greek Cypriot public than any of the previous “list-based” proposals, though support is still marginal: only a 4-point lead in favour of its acceptance was registered. The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, consider this proposal to be even better than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions, giving it an impressive 40-point lead. It would seem that for the Turkish Cypriots as well, a criteria-based approach would be strongly preferred.
Of course, for such an approach to be workable it is imperative that an internationally monitored census take place amongst the Turkish Cypriots, to confirm the year of birth or time of entry into Cyprus, of all the immigrants from Turkey. This census would have to take place before any criteria-based proposal is put on the table, otherwise there will be a motive to submit false evidence in order to be included within the criteria.
A final possibility on the issue of settlers from Turkey, somewhat more radical, is for the Turkish Government to provide for their relocation at their original place of origin in Turkey. The reasoning behind such an approach would be that, even if the settlers were granted citizenship of Cyprus, they would in effect be left without a home, since they mostly live in Greek Cypriot properties and use Greek Cypriot agricultural land, which would all be returned to its original owners after a comprehensive settlement given that the settlers do not have equivalent property to exchange in the south. Thus it is questionable whether it is more humane to allow the settlers to stay, if by staying they will become an under-class of disenfranchised workers. The obvious “solution”, of allowing settlers to stay in Greek Cypriot properties, would almost certainly procure a resounding “No” by the Greek Cypriots in another referendum.
On the proposal that all settlers should return to Turkey (except those married to Turkish Cypriots and their children) and be given a new home by the Turkish Government at their place of origin, Greek Cypriots register support by a 63-point lead, while Turkish Cypriots register support by an 18-point lead. This proposal could be made more attractive to the Turkish Cypriot side, by adding the possibility of emigration to other European countries or to the USA, thus giving the settlers who will be leaving a wider choice of options.
H. Decision Making Mechanisms
On the issue of Decision Making Mechanisms for the Federal Government – and more particularly, the provision that positive participation by both communities would be required for every executive or legislative decision – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 36% and acceptable to 26% of Greek Cypriots, with a further 38% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 63% and unacceptable to 23% of the Turkish Cypriots.
On this issue, there are a number of options that would be acceptable to both communities: One possibility is to limit the requirement for positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for other decisions a simple majority in favour will be sufficient. Another possibility would be to remove the requirement for positive participation, and replace it with a stronger right of appeal to a neutral adjudicating body (not necessarily the Supreme Court). A third possibility might be to institute cross-voting for the election of Federal Senators, so that politicians have an electoral motive to be more co-operative and respectful of the other community’s needs.
On all these proposals, the Greek Cypriots register a 17 to 18-point lead in favour of their acceptance, while the Turkish Cypriots register a 30 to 38-point lead in favour of their acceptance. The strongly positive attitude of Turkish Cypriots towards cross-voting contrasts with the statement in the UN Secretary-General’s 2003 Report to the Security Council that Turkish Cypriots oppose cross-voting. The opposite, in fact, is the case, at least on the level of public attitudes and concerns.
From a Turkish Cypriot viewpoint the least attractive of the three proposals – though still acceptable - is the one which would limit positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for all proposals the Greek Cypriots still register a strong measure of ambivalence: “I am not sure” is the response of 38% to 40% of Greek Cypriot respondents. This ambivalence can be interpreted to mean that the final acceptability of any proposal on this issue will largely depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.
I. Legal Status
On the issue of the Legal Status of the new State of Affairs – and more particularly, the “virgin birth approach” – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 37% and acceptable to 31% of the Greek Cypriots, with a further 32% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 32% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on this issue, might be to seek a more explicit statement of continuity, such that will not give cause for legal disputes later on. More particularly respondents were asked to evaluate a proposal whereby “a formula will be included in the preamble of the constitution as follows: First, it will be affirmed that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Bicommunal Republic, to be jointly administered by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to the Constitution. After the unrest of 1963-4, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis. During this period, and up until the present day, the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis. And now, with the acceptance of the comprehensive settlement agreement, the Republic of Cyprus is overcoming its constitutional crisis and returning to normal bicommunal control, while evolving into a Bizonal – Bicommunal Federation through the approval of a new constitution.”
This proposal, which aims to satisfy the key concerns of both communities on the issue of legal status, is found to be acceptable by the Greek Cypriots with a 17-point lead, while the Turkish Cypriots also find it acceptable, with a 25-point lead.
Another alternative on the issue of legal status might be to explicitly grant separate sovereignty to the two communities, and explicitly grant the right of secession as a corollary to separate sovereignty, but with the proviso that, before separate international recognition can be granted, any territorial obligations that arise out of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement must first have been fulfilled.
This proposal is acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot public with a 48-point lead, but it is clearly rejected by the Greek Cypriots with an 18-point lead. Furthermore, a strong measure of ambivalence is registered amongst Greek Cypriots concerning all Legal Status proposals, so their final decision to accept or reject a proposal on this issue, will very much depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.
J. Implementation Guarantees
On Implementation Guarantees, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan – in essence the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the UK - are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 19% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative on the issue of implementation guarantees is to pass a Security Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which resolution would clarify the responsibilities of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. In this way, if any side violates what has been agreed it will face the risk of very serious consequences.
While the Turkish Cypriots find this proposal acceptable by a 35-point lead, the Greek Cypriots are effectively divided over it, with a mere 2-point lead in favour of its acceptance.
Perhaps what is at work here is a lack of confidence towards the UN, whose military force in Cyprus all these years has been experienced by Greek Cypriots as incapable of enforcing earlier UN resolutions. Furthermore, the fact that Britain and the US are permanent members of the UN Security Council, with full veto powers, is another reason for the Greek Cypriots to mistrust any UN-based proposal for implementation guarantees.
Another proposal on this issue, might be for all the sides involved, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, to sign a binding protocol with the European Union, which protocol will clearly define the responsibilities of each side regarding the implementation of the solution and also define specific consequences for particular acts of non-implementation. Depending on what the breach is, the consequence might be a monetary fine or the withdrawal of some particular EU-related benefit.
This proposal is seen as much more acceptable than any other arrangement, both by Greek Cypriots and by Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots register a 40-point lead in its favour, while Turkish Cypriots register an even stronger 47-point lead.
It would seem that both communities believe in the “soft power” of the European Union to enforce agreements, through the relationship of co-operation and dependence which the EU establishes with member states. This “soft power”, it seems, is trusted much more than the admittedly blunt instrument of Chapter 7 Security Council resolutions.
K. Amendments to improve the social and political cohesion of the re-united state
Various other secondary amendments, which aimed at creating a climate and a dynamic in favour of stronger cohesion, were also tested with the public of both communities.
The proposals that a common and mutually acceptable version of the recent history of Cyprus should be taught in all the schools of the island, and that provision should be made for the development of bicommunal schools, were received with enthusiastic support by both communities. Furthermore, the proposals that there should be close coordination between the two constituent states on matters of trade, industry and tourism, and that provision should be made to encourage the development of Bicommunal business ventures, were also received with enthusiastic support by both communities.
On politically oriented proposals, such as the direct election of the Presidential Council by the people and provisions to encourage the development of bicommunal political parties, the Greek Cypriots responded with enthusiastic support while the Turkish Cypriots responded with qualified support. One concern of the Turkish Cypriots is that, if the election of the Presidential Council is taken away from the prerogatives of the Senate, any alternative system should ensure the two communities retain an equal voice in the choice of its members.
Proposals that relate to stronger geographical integration, such as that areas of environmental and archaeological significance should form part of a Federal zone, or that bizonality should be a temporary regime, until trust develops, after which time the two communities should be allowed to mix freely, were received with enthusiastic support by the Greek Cypriots, and with qualified support by the Turkish Cypriots. It should be noted, however, that Turkish Cypriots are much more positive than Settlers from Turkey regarding such possible provisions.
L. Willingness to re-commence Negotiations
Large majorities of both communities indicate a desire that comprehensive settlement negotiations should begin as soon as possible.
Amongst Greek Cypriots, 48% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 33% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 4% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.
Amongst Turkish Cypriots, 47% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 21% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 6% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.
Conclusion of the Survey
On each major area of concern – Security, Property Rights, Residence Rights, Settlers, Decision Making Mechanisms, Legal Status, Implementation Guarantees – there was at least one option that obtained majority support among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, despite differing attitudes and motivations, it is entirely conceivable for a comprehensive settlement to be reached, provided both leaderships and other involved parties play a constructive role.
Appendix A: Direct Trade
On the issue of direct trade, the Turkish Cypriot public would accept a deal being made in which they too would offer something in return for direct trade – for instance, the return of Varosha to its rightful residents, or the freezing of construction over Greek Cypriot properties, or even the repudiation of the “TRNC” and the re-definition of the governmental apparatus in the north as “the interim Turkish Cypriot authority, pending the re-unification of Cyprus as a Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation”.
The Greek Cypriots, in sharp contrast, would oppose any deal being made on the issue of direct trade, whatever else they might receive in return. The Greek Cypriots fear that direct trade may lead to the “taiwan-isation” of the north, and eventually to the partition of the island, and no trade-off can be found which will be an acceptable counter-balance to this perceived risk.
Above and beyond the possibility of such deals, both sides would strongly prefer it if the whole issue of direct trade were bypassed, and the two leaderships returned to the negotiating table for a comprehensive settlement as soon as possible. Clearly, the Turkish Cypriots perceive direct trade as a poor substitute to the much more substantial benefits that would arise if a comprehensive settlement is reached.
Appendix B: Socio-political comparison of Turkish Cypriots and Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey
Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey are quite different in their perception of Greek Cypriots and in their vision for the future of Cyprus. While Turkish Cypriots tend to acknowledge that they have much in common with Greek Cypriots, that it would not be appropriate to define Cyprus as a “Turkish Island”, that the two communities should seek to approach each other and strive for an over-riding integrated Cypriot identity – on all these issues the Settlers from Turkey tend to have an opposed view, favouring “Turkish-ness” above all, but also the distancing of the two communities.
Concerning a prospective comprehensive settlement, Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey tend to disagree on issues of security and residence rights – whereas Turkish Cypriots would accept a Cypriot-European Security system, and the gradual mixing of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations, the Settlers tend to favour a “purely Turkish” solution to the issue of Security, and an “ethnically pure” Turkish Cypriot Federated State.
On the issue of voting patterns, again the Settlers vary significantly from the Turkish Cypriot population. Settlers tend to more frequently vote for the right-wing and more nationalistic parties, UBP and DP, and much less frequently for the left-wing Cypriot-oriented parties, CTP and BDH.
In last April’s referendum, the vote of the settlers was split, about 50% voting “Yes” and 50% voting “No”.
OPTIONS FOR PEACE
Mapping the possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus
Poll Identity
Method of Data Collection: Face-to-Face interview with structured questionnaire
Period of Data Collection: 15th May – 30th May 2005
Sampling Method: Multi-stage random stratified sampling
Sample Size: 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots
Primary Author: Alexandros Lordos
Co-authors: Muharrem Faiz, Costa Carras
Field-work responsibility: CYMAR Market Research Ltd. and KADEM Cyprus Social Research.
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY FINDINGS
A. Underlying Attitudes
Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots acknowledge that the two communities have much in common, and majorities of both communities make it clear that they would not mind having neighbours of the other community. An exception is evident in the case of the settlers from Turkey, who tend to oppose co-existence with the Greek Cypriots.
This willingness of the two communities to co-exist does not yet extend to the prospect of inter-marriage, or to the prospect of living under the other community’s local administration.
Both communities tend to mistrust the other, and tend to fear that in case of a comprehensive settlement the other side will not adhere to what has been agreed. Many Turkish Cypriots go a step further, and say that it would be better for the two communities to go their separate ways from now on, a sentiment which the majority of Greek Cypriots does not share.
Concerning the prospect of a comprehensive settlement, most Greek Cypriots agree that it is important to take into account the concerns of the other community as well, and they acknowledge that their own side is also to blame for the historical course of the Cyprus problem. On the same issues, the Turkish Cypriot community is ambivalent and divided, some acknowledging the need to understand the other side and to take some responsibility, while others deny such a necessity.
The Greek Cypriots strongly support the development of an over-riding Cypriot identity, that will supersede the notions of “being Greek” or “being Turkish”, while the Turkish Cypriots are on this issue ambivalent and divided, some strongly favouring the development of “Cypriot-ness”, others strongly opposing such a social development. Again, the settlers tend to be differentiated on this issue, with a strong majority amongst them opposing the development of a common identity.
B. Motives for a Solution
While both communities share the desire for peace and security, they otherwise have very different motives for a settlement.
The Greek Cypriots tend to see, as primary motives, the return of refugees to their ancestral homes, the freedom to live anywhere in Cyprus and the political re-integration of the island under one common administration, while the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Army is seen as a critical and imperative corollary demand.
The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, focus more on the possibilities for economic development after a comprehensive settlement, on the fact that they would then have a stronger voice in the international community, and on the various other benefits that European accession would bring.
The Turkish Cypriots also consider it important that they will have their own Turkish Cypriot federated state, which of course is a motive/concern that needs to be carefully balanced both with the Greek Cypriots’ desire for the political re-integration of the island, and with the Greek Cypriots’ concern that they should be free to live anywhere in Cyprus.
C. Political Trust
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend each to trust their own present leader’s handling of the Cyprus problem, and mis-trust the other community’s leader. For instance, Greek Cypriots see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to the re-unification of Cyprus and as willing and able to engage in substantive negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, while they see Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to partition and as unwilling and incapable of substantive negotiations. The exact mirror image of these opinions are encountered on the Turkish Cypriot side. They see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to partition and incapable of negotiations, and Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to re-unification and very able to negotiate.
This “credibility gap” in the public perception of the two leaders could cause serious problems if and when negotiations re-commence, since whatever is suggested by the leader of one community, will automatically be received by the public of the other community as arising out of ulterior motives and ill-will. On the other hand, both leaders currently enjoy the necessary prestige in their own community, in order to negotiate effectively.
Concerning the issue of trust towards third-party intermediaries, each community of course trusts above all its own “mother-land”: Greek Cypriots trust Greece above all, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey above all. For both communities, second-most trusted is the European Union, with the United Nations coming third. The US and the UK are mis-trusted by majorities of both communities. Furthermore, each community strongly mis-trusts the “mother-land” of the other community.
It is interesting to note that out of the three “guarantor powers” – Greece, Turkey and the UK, each community trusts only one out of the three. Greek Cypriots trust Greece but mis-trust Turkey and the UK, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey and mis-trust Greece and the UK. In what can be seen as a touch of collective unconscious humour, the Greek Cypriots have marginally greater trust in the Organisation of Islamic Countries, than they do in either the UK or the US!
The European Union seems to be the only third-party involved that simultaneously enjoys a substantial measure of trust both among the Greek Cypriots and among the Turkish Cypriots.
D. Security
On the issue of Security, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 61% and acceptable to 27% of Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 54% and unacceptable to 42% of Turkish Cypriots.
Amending the Treaty of Guarantee in various small ways, such as by limiting the intervention rights of Greece and Turkey to the respective constituent state only, or by agreeing that all Greek and Turkish troops will eventually depart, does not change the overall acceptability of the proposal on the Greek Cypriot side. It seems that the Greek Cypriots fear a potential situation whereby the island would be totally demilitarized, while Turkey would retain the right to intervene militarily, even in a limited fashion. Not having any Turkish troops on the ground is small consolation for the Greek Cypriots, since they are aware that mainland Turkey is only 50 miles to the north of Cyprus and could land troops on the island within hours.
Creating a new security system, based on the Cypriots themselves but with the support, enhancement and guidance of the European Union, is a proposal that is seen in a positive light by the public of both communities. More particularly, the proposal that was tested was for the development of a “Eurocypriot” security system: Soldiers from various European countries, as well as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who would together receive military training in other European countries, would all be part of an integrated security force that would be responsible for the defence of the island. Intervention rights by Turkey would only apply in case this primary security system, as described above, fails to protect the Turkish Cypriots from some particular threat.
This particular proposal has a 10-point lead amongst the Greek Cypriots, and a 20-point lead amongst the Turkish Cypriots. In other words, not only is it a proposal that would gather majority support among the Greek Cypriots, it would also be more acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots than the equivalent security provisions of the fifth Annan Plan.
A final security proposal that was tested, is to allow the re-united island to become a member of NATO, so that the NATO command would then be responsible to oversee and guarantee the security of the island. Responses to this particular proposal were divided, in both communities, with about half of the respondents declaring themselves to be in favour and about half declaring themselves to be against. The prevalent “anti-Americanism” of Cypriots, but also the fact that this proposal would effectively render Cyprus a protectorate of an international military organisation, meant that this proposal had significantly less support than the proposal for a Eurocypriot security system which was cited above.
E. Property Rights
On the issue of Property Rights, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 24% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 60% and unacceptable to 33% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One approach to resolving the Property issue might be exclusively territorial, by reducing the Turkish Cypriot federated state to 18% - 20% of Cyprus, instead of 29%, but in return allowing the Turkish Cypriots to keep all property that would remain within the Turkish Cypriot state, paying monetary compensation to the original owners.
While this proposal would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, by a 28-point margin, it would be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 15-point margin. While the Turkish Cypriots might like the suggestion that they would not have to deal with Greek Cypriot property claimants within the Turkish Cypriot federated state, the Greek Cypriots do not like the implications of “ethnic purity” and “partition in disguise” which this proposal appears to them to entail.
Another approach to resolving the Property issue, would be to abandon the logic of enforced exchange, and instead acknowledge both the original owner’s right to title, and the current occupant’s right to stay in the property for an agreed period of time while paying rent. In the mean time, individual original owners and individual current occupants would be encouraged to make their own private deals to exchange, purchase or sell the property in question, if they so wish.
Quite surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot public does not feel as positively about this proposal as one would have thought – in fact they are divided, half of the Greek Cypriots accepting it and half of them rejecting it. This might be explained, firstly, as fear that such provisions would not in the end be implemented, that rent would not be paid as agreed, or that the property would not be returned to its owner when the “right to stay by paying rent” had expired. On a different level, the result might be explained as unwillingness to wait another lengthy period before being allowed to personally use the property. After 30 years living as refugees, Greek Cypriots expect a right to return that would apply immediately, not be deferred for yet another decade.
As for the Turkish Cypriots, this was the least attractive of all the suggested property proposals, with much less support than the equivalent property provisions of the Annan Plan. The reasons are obvious, since with this proposal they would be asked to find the money to pay rent for a property which for many years they have been using as their own. Furthermore, they may fear that in the long term such a proposal could have devastating effects on the bizonality of the settlement, since if Greek Cypriots prove unwilling to sell their properties in the north, then the Turkish Cypriots would be hard-pressed to find land in the north on which to build their homes and expand their economy.
The following proposal appears much more attractive for both communities: Original owners would be entitled to the restitution, and immediate use, of all their properties, except those currently inhabited by refugees with property of roughly equivalent value to exchange, and those on which major investment has been made – and for such properties the original owners would be compensated. If a refugee is not entitled to the restitution of his original home, then he will be entitled to a new home built for him in the same town or village. The construction of these new residences would be partly self-financed through the compensation fund to which current occupants (who would be entitled to keep the property they are using) will contribute, and partly financed through the assistance of international donors.
This proposal is different to the Annan Plan in three key respects: Firstly, the 1/3rd restriction on property restitution, much despised by Greek Cypriots, has been removed. If a property is not being used by a Turkish Cypriot who can claim it under the above-mentioned criteria, then the original owner can have it returned to him, without quotas or qualifications. Secondly, the right to a new home has been added, something which the Annan Plan was struggling towards but did not quite achieve. And thirdly, if the Compensation fund fails in the end to balance its books, it will be international donors and not the Cypriot tax-payer who will be asked to cover the difference.
As for acceptability, this proposal is acceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 13-point margin, and to the Turkish Cypriots by a 29-point margin. This high level of acceptance amongst the Turkish Cypriots is not surprising, since on an individual level the average Turkish Cypriot would be entitled to keep exactly the same property that he would be keeping under the Annan Plan. It is the Property Board that will be getting less property with this revised scheme, not the average Turkish Cypriot.
A final alternative proposal that was put before respondents, is a variation of the “right to a new home” proposal described above, but with the order of priority reversed. In other words, the original owner would get to keep his original home, while the current occupant will be re-housed in a new home in the same town or village.
To this proposal, the Greek Cypriot response was overwhelmingly favourable, with an impressive 57-point lead. This of course was to be expected, since “all refugees to return to their homes” has been the constant Greek Cypriot demand since 1974. What is more surprising is the response of the Turkish Cypriots, who also accept this proposal with a strong 27-point lead. In other words, they see this proposal as on a par with the Annan Plan Property provisions, which also had a 27-point lead among the Turkish Cypriots.
The explanation of this surprising result is in hindsight simple: The Turkish Cypriots would be giving up 30-year old residences, which have already lost much of their value through wear-and-tear, and in their place they will be getting a brand new residence, with new plumbing, new wiring, modern construction, longer effective house life etc. In this way, this proposal becomes a “win-win” suggestion, with the Greek Cypriot original owners returning to the homes of their childhood which to them carry great emotional significance, and the Turkish Cypriot current occupants getting a brand new free-hold residence of equivalent size, in the same town or village as that in which they are currently residing.
F. Residence and Voting Rights
On the issue of Residence and Voting Rights, the proposals that were included in the Annan Plan are unacceptable to 57% and acceptable to 15% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 47% and unacceptable to 39% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on the issue of residence rights in the other constituent state, is to put aside timetable restrictions to relocation – so that any Greek Cypriots who wish to relocate to the north will be allowed to do so immediately after the settlement is agreed upon – while the permanent limit to relocation will be reduced, as a trade-off in favour of the Turkish Cypriot demand for bizonality, from the 33% of the constituent state population featured in the Annan Plan, to 29%.
Such an approach would be seen in a more positive light by the Greek Cypriot public, when compared to the Annan Plan, but would still be rejected by an 8-point margin. The Greek Cypriots would on the one hand appreciate the abolition of timetable restrictions, but on the other hand they would remain displeased with the construct of a permanent limit to residence rights based on ethnicity, something which in their eyes is an unacceptable violation of basic freedoms and human rights.
From a Turkish Cypriot point of view, this proposal is more attractive than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions – there is a 15-point lead in favour of acceptance, compared to an 8-point lead for the equivalent Annan Plan provisions. This may be explained partly as approval of the immediate personal freedom, for everyone, which this proposal entails, and partly as approval of the stricter permanent limit to the relocation of Greek Cypriots in the north, which limit would then more effectively safeguard bizonality.
Another alternative approach on this issue, is to add voting rights into the bargain, so that the permanent limit is reduced further, to 25% of the constituent state population, but with all voting restrictions also lifted, so that this 25% of Greek Cypriots will vote in all constituent state and all federal elections as full residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – unlike the situation with the Annan Plan, where Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot federated state would not have the right to vote for the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Senate.
Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal would also be rejected by an 8-point margin. On the one hand, the abolition of voting restrictions is seen as a further improvement, whereas on the other hand, the imposition of a stricter permanent limit to relocation is seen as a further deterioration.
Amongst the Turkish Cypriot public, this proposal is seen in a very positive light, with a 27-point lead in favour of its acceptance. It would seem that the imposition of even stricter limits to residence of Greek Cypriots in the north is seen as a very positive change, which satisfies their concern to maintain bizonality, while the abolition of voting restrictions does not seem to worry them, given that Greek Cypriots will never be able to have more than 25% of the constituent state’s vote.
Yet another possibility on the issue of residence and voting rights is to separate the two entirely, so that all Greek Cypriots would vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government and the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where they live, while all Turkish Cypriots would vote for the Turkish Cypriot constituent state government and the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where they live. An exception to this rule would be made for municipal elections, where each person would vote at the place where he resides. Other than this separate voting system, no limits and no quotas would be imposed on the exercise of residence rights.
Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal enjoys a strong 22-point lead. It would seem that the Greek Cypriots are unconcerned about where they would exercise their voting rights, and they wouldn’t mind not having a say in the local politics of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – in fact, it may well be the case that separate voting on the constituent state level would alleviate the sense of “being a political minority” that Greek Cypriots in the north might otherwise suffer from. Furthermore, the benefit of not having limitations to the exercise of basic freedoms makes this proposal particularly appealing to the Greek Cypriot mindset.
The Turkish Cypriots would also accept this proposal by a comfortable 15-point margin, a significantly wider margin of acceptance than that of the equivalent provisions in the Annan Plan. Separate voting at the constituent state level is an effective safeguard of bizonality, no less so than limiting residence rights through quotas and other such devices.
Of course, with such a system serious issues of political representation arise, since Greek Cypriots in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south will not be politically represented at the place where they live. If such a system as described above is instituted, it will have to be complemented with various co-operation agreements between the two constituent states, on issues that range from health to education to welfare to justice, thus ensuring that the civic rights of these individuals, as ex-territorial residents, are fully respected.
A final approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to institute a system of weighted voting, so that when Greek Cypriots in the north - or Turkish Cypriots in the south – are very few, their vote would weigh more so as to give them an effective political voice, while when they are very many their vote would weigh less in order to place a limit on their political influence. More particularly, if Greek Cypriots in the north – or Turkish Cypriots in the south - are 2% to 3% of the constituent state’s population their vote would be weighted upwards to 5%, if they are 6% or 7% their vote would be weighted up to 10%, etc., while 20% would be the maximum weight Greek Cypriot votes in the north - or Turkish Cypriot votes in the south - can have, irrespective of the number of residents. Other than the limitations imposed by this voting system, everyone would be allowed to live where he wishes and vote where he lives.
Though this proposal was meant to satisfy the Greek Cypriot concern that basic freedoms should apply, while also ensuring that those who will relocate shall have full political rights at their new place of residence, the Greek Cypriot public seems to be divided over the acceptability of the proposal, with about 30% in favour and 30% against. Perhaps the voting system is seen by them as overly complicated, or perhaps it is felt that “it is not sufficiently democratic”. It should be noted, however, that about 40% of Greek Cypriots replied that they are unsure about this proposal, so the final acceptability will very much depend on the position which the official Greek Cypriot leadership will take vis-à-vis this proposal.
The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, register a strong 20-point lead in favour of this proposal. This is not surprising, given that the proposed voting system is designed around the Turkish Cypriots’ own needs for guaranteed bizonality, and for effective political participation of the Turkish Cypriot minority that will be living in the south.
The added benefit of this approach is that it would amount to a form of cross-voting on the constituent state level, encouraging politicians - through the electoral process - to be moderate in their outlooks and to fully respect the rights of those of the other ethnic group who will be living within their constituent state’s boundary.
G. Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey
On the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan are unacceptable to 83% and acceptable to 10% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 66% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on this issue, which would in effect be a minor adjustment of the Annan Plan, is to maintain the “list of 45,000 persons”, but ensure that these are the only ones that will remain. In other words, effective mechanisms will be devised to ensure the departure of anyone who is not on the list, and legal loopholes in the Law on Citizenship that might have been exploited will be ironed out.
Such an amendment, it seems, would not be sufficient for the Greek Cypriot public: Though such provisions would be seen as “much better than the Annan Plan”, a 28-point lead in favour of rejection would remain. The Turkish Cypriot public, in contrast, registers a 30-point lead in favour of accepting this proposal.
Reducing the list of 45,000 would be unthinkable if nothing was offered in return, so the next proposal to be tested involved the devising of two lists: One list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted citizenship, and another list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted the right of emigration to other European countries, or to the USA.
To this proposal, the Turkish Cypriots respond with an equal level of enthusiasm as to the equivalent provisions of the Annan Plan, registering a 37-point lead in favour of its acceptance. This is significant, because it means that the right of emigration to Europe or the USA is seen as adequate compensation for being made to leave. The Greek Cypriots, in contrast, while seeing this proposal as marginally better than the previous one, still reject it by a 19-point margin.
What seems to be at play here is an aversion by Greek Cypriots, to any kind of arbitrary “list” that is not based on strict, specific and fair criteria. The underlying fear of Greek Cypriots is that through a list, those who have the strongest connections with the “status quo” will remain, and this might well include nationalists, criminal elements, and ex-officers of the Turkish Army. Thus, while the “list” approach might be a convenient way to bypass the lack of reliable information surrounding this issue, it is not an effective way to win over the Greek Cypriot public, however much the list is reduced.
One alternative criteria-based approach, might be to grant Cypriot citizenship to those born in Cyprus and those who arrived under the age of 18, while also granting a permanent residence permit to their parents, who will remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. The rationale behind this approach is to grant citizenship to those who have most integrated with the Turkish Cypriot community, through being brought up in Cyprus, but without separating families by forcing the older generation to leave the island.
This approach is much more attractive to the Greek Cypriot public than any of the previous “list-based” proposals, though support is still marginal: only a 4-point lead in favour of its acceptance was registered. The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, consider this proposal to be even better than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions, giving it an impressive 40-point lead. It would seem that for the Turkish Cypriots as well, a criteria-based approach would be strongly preferred.
Of course, for such an approach to be workable it is imperative that an internationally monitored census take place amongst the Turkish Cypriots, to confirm the year of birth or time of entry into Cyprus, of all the immigrants from Turkey. This census would have to take place before any criteria-based proposal is put on the table, otherwise there will be a motive to submit false evidence in order to be included within the criteria.
A final possibility on the issue of settlers from Turkey, somewhat more radical, is for the Turkish Government to provide for their relocation at their original place of origin in Turkey. The reasoning behind such an approach would be that, even if the settlers were granted citizenship of Cyprus, they would in effect be left without a home, since they mostly live in Greek Cypriot properties and use Greek Cypriot agricultural land, which would all be returned to its original owners after a comprehensive settlement given that the settlers do not have equivalent property to exchange in the south. Thus it is questionable whether it is more humane to allow the settlers to stay, if by staying they will become an under-class of disenfranchised workers. The obvious “solution”, of allowing settlers to stay in Greek Cypriot properties, would almost certainly procure a resounding “No” by the Greek Cypriots in another referendum.
On the proposal that all settlers should return to Turkey (except those married to Turkish Cypriots and their children) and be given a new home by the Turkish Government at their place of origin, Greek Cypriots register support by a 63-point lead, while Turkish Cypriots register support by an 18-point lead. This proposal could be made more attractive to the Turkish Cypriot side, by adding the possibility of emigration to other European countries or to the USA, thus giving the settlers who will be leaving a wider choice of options.
H. Decision Making Mechanisms
On the issue of Decision Making Mechanisms for the Federal Government – and more particularly, the provision that positive participation by both communities would be required for every executive or legislative decision – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 36% and acceptable to 26% of Greek Cypriots, with a further 38% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 63% and unacceptable to 23% of the Turkish Cypriots.
On this issue, there are a number of options that would be acceptable to both communities: One possibility is to limit the requirement for positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for other decisions a simple majority in favour will be sufficient. Another possibility would be to remove the requirement for positive participation, and replace it with a stronger right of appeal to a neutral adjudicating body (not necessarily the Supreme Court). A third possibility might be to institute cross-voting for the election of Federal Senators, so that politicians have an electoral motive to be more co-operative and respectful of the other community’s needs.
On all these proposals, the Greek Cypriots register a 17 to 18-point lead in favour of their acceptance, while the Turkish Cypriots register a 30 to 38-point lead in favour of their acceptance. The strongly positive attitude of Turkish Cypriots towards cross-voting contrasts with the statement in the UN Secretary-General’s 2003 Report to the Security Council that Turkish Cypriots oppose cross-voting. The opposite, in fact, is the case, at least on the level of public attitudes and concerns.
From a Turkish Cypriot viewpoint the least attractive of the three proposals – though still acceptable - is the one which would limit positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for all proposals the Greek Cypriots still register a strong measure of ambivalence: “I am not sure” is the response of 38% to 40% of Greek Cypriot respondents. This ambivalence can be interpreted to mean that the final acceptability of any proposal on this issue will largely depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.
I. Legal Status
On the issue of the Legal Status of the new State of Affairs – and more particularly, the “virgin birth approach” – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 37% and acceptable to 31% of the Greek Cypriots, with a further 32% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 32% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative approach on this issue, might be to seek a more explicit statement of continuity, such that will not give cause for legal disputes later on. More particularly respondents were asked to evaluate a proposal whereby “a formula will be included in the preamble of the constitution as follows: First, it will be affirmed that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Bicommunal Republic, to be jointly administered by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to the Constitution. After the unrest of 1963-4, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis. During this period, and up until the present day, the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis. And now, with the acceptance of the comprehensive settlement agreement, the Republic of Cyprus is overcoming its constitutional crisis and returning to normal bicommunal control, while evolving into a Bizonal – Bicommunal Federation through the approval of a new constitution.”
This proposal, which aims to satisfy the key concerns of both communities on the issue of legal status, is found to be acceptable by the Greek Cypriots with a 17-point lead, while the Turkish Cypriots also find it acceptable, with a 25-point lead.
Another alternative on the issue of legal status might be to explicitly grant separate sovereignty to the two communities, and explicitly grant the right of secession as a corollary to separate sovereignty, but with the proviso that, before separate international recognition can be granted, any territorial obligations that arise out of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement must first have been fulfilled.
This proposal is acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot public with a 48-point lead, but it is clearly rejected by the Greek Cypriots with an 18-point lead. Furthermore, a strong measure of ambivalence is registered amongst Greek Cypriots concerning all Legal Status proposals, so their final decision to accept or reject a proposal on this issue, will very much depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.
J. Implementation Guarantees
On Implementation Guarantees, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan – in essence the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the UK - are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 19% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.
One alternative on the issue of implementation guarantees is to pass a Security Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which resolution would clarify the responsibilities of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. In this way, if any side violates what has been agreed it will face the risk of very serious consequences.
While the Turkish Cypriots find this proposal acceptable by a 35-point lead, the Greek Cypriots are effectively divided over it, with a mere 2-point lead in favour of its acceptance.
Perhaps what is at work here is a lack of confidence towards the UN, whose military force in Cyprus all these years has been experienced by Greek Cypriots as incapable of enforcing earlier UN resolutions. Furthermore, the fact that Britain and the US are permanent members of the UN Security Council, with full veto powers, is another reason for the Greek Cypriots to mistrust any UN-based proposal for implementation guarantees.
Another proposal on this issue, might be for all the sides involved, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, to sign a binding protocol with the European Union, which protocol will clearly define the responsibilities of each side regarding the implementation of the solution and also define specific consequences for particular acts of non-implementation. Depending on what the breach is, the consequence might be a monetary fine or the withdrawal of some particular EU-related benefit.
This proposal is seen as much more acceptable than any other arrangement, both by Greek Cypriots and by Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots register a 40-point lead in its favour, while Turkish Cypriots register an even stronger 47-point lead.
It would seem that both communities believe in the “soft power” of the European Union to enforce agreements, through the relationship of co-operation and dependence which the EU establishes with member states. This “soft power”, it seems, is trusted much more than the admittedly blunt instrument of Chapter 7 Security Council resolutions.
K. Amendments to improve the social and political cohesion of the re-united state
Various other secondary amendments, which aimed at creating a climate and a dynamic in favour of stronger cohesion, were also tested with the public of both communities.
The proposals that a common and mutually acceptable version of the recent history of Cyprus should be taught in all the schools of the island, and that provision should be made for the development of bicommunal schools, were received with enthusiastic support by both communities. Furthermore, the proposals that there should be close coordination between the two constituent states on matters of trade, industry and tourism, and that provision should be made to encourage the development of Bicommunal business ventures, were also received with enthusiastic support by both communities.
On politically oriented proposals, such as the direct election of the Presidential Council by the people and provisions to encourage the development of bicommunal political parties, the Greek Cypriots responded with enthusiastic support while the Turkish Cypriots responded with qualified support. One concern of the Turkish Cypriots is that, if the election of the Presidential Council is taken away from the prerogatives of the Senate, any alternative system should ensure the two communities retain an equal voice in the choice of its members.
Proposals that relate to stronger geographical integration, such as that areas of environmental and archaeological significance should form part of a Federal zone, or that bizonality should be a temporary regime, until trust develops, after which time the two communities should be allowed to mix freely, were received with enthusiastic support by the Greek Cypriots, and with qualified support by the Turkish Cypriots. It should be noted, however, that Turkish Cypriots are much more positive than Settlers from Turkey regarding such possible provisions.
L. Willingness to re-commence Negotiations
Large majorities of both communities indicate a desire that comprehensive settlement negotiations should begin as soon as possible.
Amongst Greek Cypriots, 48% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 33% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 4% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.
Amongst Turkish Cypriots, 47% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 21% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 6% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.
Conclusion of the Survey
On each major area of concern – Security, Property Rights, Residence Rights, Settlers, Decision Making Mechanisms, Legal Status, Implementation Guarantees – there was at least one option that obtained majority support among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, despite differing attitudes and motivations, it is entirely conceivable for a comprehensive settlement to be reached, provided both leaderships and other involved parties play a constructive role.
Appendix A: Direct Trade
On the issue of direct trade, the Turkish Cypriot public would accept a deal being made in which they too would offer something in return for direct trade – for instance, the return of Varosha to its rightful residents, or the freezing of construction over Greek Cypriot properties, or even the repudiation of the “TRNC” and the re-definition of the governmental apparatus in the north as “the interim Turkish Cypriot authority, pending the re-unification of Cyprus as a Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation”.
The Greek Cypriots, in sharp contrast, would oppose any deal being made on the issue of direct trade, whatever else they might receive in return. The Greek Cypriots fear that direct trade may lead to the “taiwan-isation” of the north, and eventually to the partition of the island, and no trade-off can be found which will be an acceptable counter-balance to this perceived risk.
Above and beyond the possibility of such deals, both sides would strongly prefer it if the whole issue of direct trade were bypassed, and the two leaderships returned to the negotiating table for a comprehensive settlement as soon as possible. Clearly, the Turkish Cypriots perceive direct trade as a poor substitute to the much more substantial benefits that would arise if a comprehensive settlement is reached.
Appendix B: Socio-political comparison of Turkish Cypriots and Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey
Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey are quite different in their perception of Greek Cypriots and in their vision for the future of Cyprus. While Turkish Cypriots tend to acknowledge that they have much in common with Greek Cypriots, that it would not be appropriate to define Cyprus as a “Turkish Island”, that the two communities should seek to approach each other and strive for an over-riding integrated Cypriot identity – on all these issues the Settlers from Turkey tend to have an opposed view, favouring “Turkish-ness” above all, but also the distancing of the two communities.
Concerning a prospective comprehensive settlement, Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey tend to disagree on issues of security and residence rights – whereas Turkish Cypriots would accept a Cypriot-European Security system, and the gradual mixing of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations, the Settlers tend to favour a “purely Turkish” solution to the issue of Security, and an “ethnically pure” Turkish Cypriot Federated State.
On the issue of voting patterns, again the Settlers vary significantly from the Turkish Cypriot population. Settlers tend to more frequently vote for the right-wing and more nationalistic parties, UBP and DP, and much less frequently for the left-wing Cypriot-oriented parties, CTP and BDH.
In last April’s referendum, the vote of the settlers was split, about 50% voting “Yes” and 50% voting “No”.
- Alexandros Lordos
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by Alexandros Lordos » Tue Jun 14, 2005 10:13 pm
turkcyp wrote:Well done Alex,
It was a very interesting study to read. I will have some comments send to you on e-mail when I finished analzing your data.
Take care,
Well done to you for just reaching your 1,000th post.
- Alexandros Lordos
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by cannedmoose » Tue Jun 14, 2005 10:21 pm
As usual Alex, on a quick skim through it looks like you've done yet more sterling work. I recently saw a similar bicommunal survey publicised in the Cyprus Weekly, although it was a fraction of both the size and depth of your work. Hopefully, you will receive the recognition that you deserve for your hard work in collating and analysing this information. Your work will certainly be useful to Cyprus scholars for many years to come and has already helped formulate some ideas that I have for further research.
Alex, this may be a premature request, but when available, would it be possible to email me the SPSS data file that you have this most recent dataset in? I'd like to do some further analysis on the political elements of your survey if at all possible.
Anyway, congratulations again, excellent excellent work. I look forward to reading it in detail at the weekend. I think after all these surveys, you deserve a break and a nice bottle of wine... one of you guys currently in Cyprus, buy a nice tipple and send it to Alex's house...
Alex, this may be a premature request, but when available, would it be possible to email me the SPSS data file that you have this most recent dataset in? I'd like to do some further analysis on the political elements of your survey if at all possible.
Anyway, congratulations again, excellent excellent work. I look forward to reading it in detail at the weekend. I think after all these surveys, you deserve a break and a nice bottle of wine... one of you guys currently in Cyprus, buy a nice tipple and send it to Alex's house...
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cannedmoose - Main Contributor
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by cannedmoose » Tue Jun 14, 2005 10:22 pm
Alexandros Lordos wrote:turkcyp wrote:Well done Alex,
It was a very interesting study to read. I will have some comments send to you on e-mail when I finished analzing your data.
Take care,
Well done to you for just reaching your 1,000th post.
I second that emotion, well done TC... welcome to the ranks of millennial members...
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cannedmoose - Main Contributor
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by cannedmoose » Tue Jun 14, 2005 10:48 pm
Hopefully to all of the above... it should also be sent to the European Commission and UN.
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cannedmoose - Main Contributor
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by Alexandros Lordos » Tue Jun 14, 2005 11:36 pm
boulio wrote:Alex will this survey be sent to anyone of the concerned parties involved in finding a solution?ROC,TURKEY,GREECE,"TRNC",GB?
Oh, it's been "flying through e-mail", all day today!
- Alexandros Lordos
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