How the property problem arising from the huge gap between the pre-1974 property ownership of the two communities the post solution situation as per A-Plan-V provisions, can be solved with the introduction of an alternative scenario.
Present Situation
This is the official data of the RoC land registry as it was in 1974 after the Turkish invasion.
Table 1 -Notes:
1. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
2. One square kilometre is equal 747 donums and one donum is equal to 1338 square meters.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.
Provisions of A-Plan-V.
Below follows what would have been the most likely situation after territorial adjustments and all the other property provisions of the A-Plan-V. I include 3 tables which show what the end result would have been, based on the property ownerships of the two communities. I will continue later with another set of tables showing my approach as to how it can possibly be arranged so that both bi-zonality is not affected and also GC property owners are not victimised to such a grate extend.
Less favourable scenario.
Table 2 - Notes:
1.This is the most likely situation that will emerge after territorial adjustments as per A-Plan-V, if we assume the following:
a.) All the 1/3 of GC property within the TCCS is properly re-instated and all 1/3 of TC property within the GCCS is also re-instated.
b.) All the TC land within the buffer zone and the areas returned to the GCCS after territorial adjustments, do not abide by the 1/3 rule, as it was prescribed in A-pan.
c.) Assuming that in all the areas that are subject to territorial adjustment, the ownership ration is the following: State land is equal to 15%, Other ownership land (non GC or TC) is equal to 0.5% and that there is also only about 6% of TC ownership within these areas, which is about half the general TC ownership percentage. The remaining 78.5% of this area is assumed to be of GC ownership.
2. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.
4. Column headings such as "GC owner." or "TC owner." denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
More favourable scenario.
Table 3 -Notes:
Here please take into account all the above notes for table 2, with the exception that none of the TC properties within the current RoC control areas are re-instated (not even the 1/3,) but instead they are all used as an exchange land.
Property area and value gaps between pre-1974 ownership and the two scenarios based on A-Plan.
Table 4 -Notes:
1. Column headings such as "GC ownership" or "TC ownership" denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
2. The term "Average Gap between the two scenarios" refers to the average gap of the two scenarios in terms of area and also in terms of value, based on the assumption that the average value per donum is equal to Cy£ 28,000 /donum. This figure is based on the assumption that about 15% of the properties are of prime use both for residential and tourism development (along the coast line) and their average value is equal to about Cy£90,000 per donum, 15% of these properties are in areas of residential use and their average value is about Cy£ 50,000 per donum, and the remaining 70% are agricultural land with average value of Cy£ 10,000 per donum. [(15% x 90,000) + (15% x 50,000) + (70% x 10,000)] = 28,000 Cy£
Conclusions:
What we immediately see from this table is that based on the Annan plan formula dealing with the property situation, the value gap between the properties that the two communities had before 1974 and the properties that the two communities will be asked to settle and/or absorb after the solution, ranges from 30.84 billions US$ in the less favourable scenario to 21.89 billions US$ in the more favourable scenario. The average of the two scenarios is 26.36 billions US$. That means that this huge amount of GC properties in the north, will have to change hands and will either be absorbed only by the individual TCs, TC companies or the TC state, or sold. Sold to whom and at what prices? GCs will not be entitled to buy any of them.
It is obvious that it is beyond the economic capacity of the TC community to absorb properties of such a value, if it will have to pay the GC ex- owners the corresponding market value of these properties. Not even in the next 100 years! To give an idea of the magnitude of this amount, it is equal to the entire military and armament expenditure of the Turkish Army during all the last 3 years, it is 1.7 times bigger than the entire annual GDP of the RoC and it is 26 times more than the "TRNC" annual GDP.
Also, one needs to take a note of the following fact. In 1974, the TC community (individuals and Evkaf,) had in its possession (ownership) the 16.6% of the total private land. This is obtained by subtracting the state (public) land and then the total private land is taken as a basis of 100%.
This 16.6% was slightly less than the population ration of the TC community, which was 18%. After the Annan plan formula is applied, the TC community can potentially become the legal owner of between 23.2% and 25.9% of the Total private land, but of course without having the money to compensate the GC owners, in the expense of whom it will gain legal control of that substantially extra land.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
I propose an alternative scenario, which will alleviate this huge value gap problem, without affecting bizonality, but also without victimizing the GC property owners to such a scandalous degree. This is based on the idea of reducing the TCCS territory down to the 24.3% of the total Cyprus territory or 25% of the United Cyprus Republic (British bases are excluded from the calculation,) and also by allowing up to 50% (1 /2) of GC property reinstatement within the TCCS.
Less Favourable Alternative Scenario.
Table 5 - Notes:
1.This is the most likely situation that will emerge after territorial adjustments according to the ALTERNATIVE, if we assume the following:
a.) All the 1/2 of GC property within the TCCS is properly re-instated and all 1/2 of TC property within the GCCS is also re-instated.
b.) All the TC ownership land within the buffer zone and the areas to be returned to the GCCS after territorial adjustments, do not abide by the 1/2 rule, but they are fully re-instated, as it was also prescribed in A-pan.
c.) Assuming that in all the areas that are subject to territorial adjustment, the ownership ration is the following: State land is equal to 15%, Other ownership land (non GC or TC) is equal to 0.5% and that there is also only about 6% of TC ownership within these areas, which is about half the general TC ownership percentage. The remaining 78.5% of this area is assumed to be of GC ownership.
2. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.
4. Column headings such as "GC owner." or "TC owner." denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
More Favourable Alternative Scenario.
Table 6 -Notes:
Here take into account all the above notes for table 5, with the exception that none of the TC properties within the current RoC control areas are re-instated (not even the 1/2,) but instead they are all used as an exchange land.
Property area and value gaps between pre-1974 ownership and the two options based on the Alternative Scenario.
Table 7 -Notes:
1. Column headings such as "GC ownership" or "TC ownership" denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
2. The term "Average Gap between the two scenarios" refers to the average gap of the two scenarios in terms of area and also in terms of value, based on the assumption that the average value per donum is equal to Cy£ 28,000 /donum. This figure is based on the assumption that about 15% of the properties are of prime use both for residential and tourism development (along the coast line) and their average value is equal to about Cy£90,000 per donum, 15% of these properties are in areas of residential use and their average value is about Cy£ 50,000 per donum, and the remaining 70% are agricultural land with average value of Cy£ 10,000 per donum. [(15% x 90,000) + (15% x 50,000) + (70% x 10,000)] = 28,000 Cy£
Conclusions:
What we immediately see from this table is that based on the ALTERNATIVE scenario dealing with the property situation, the value gap between the properties that the two communities had before 1974 and the properties that the two communities will be asked to settle and/or absorb after the solution, ranges from 15.37 billions US$ in the less favourable scenario to 1.95 billions US$ in the more favourable scenario. The average of the two scenarios is 8.86 billions US$. If one compares the two average value gaps, i.e. the one arising from the A-plan-5 and the ALTERNATIVE scenario, there is a very substantial decrease from 26.36 billions US$ down to 8.86 billions US$. This new, much lower value gap, is well within the capacity of the TC to cover over a long-term period of 20-30 years, if at the same time there is a foreign assistance and equivalent guarantees.
The TC community under this alternative scenario will potentially become the legal owner of between 21.2% and 17.2% of the total private land, with an average of the two to be around 19.2%. This figure is still more than the 16.6% of ownership that it had before 1974, but it is quite close to the population percentage of the community, which was 18% before 1974.