DT Wrote:
Then call me Snoopy.
Can you explain how you expect No 2 to happen and why? While you're at it let me know which govt in Cyprus would ever agree to point 3 in exchange for giving up our lands?
DT,
Here's an extract from the the following:
http://www.ceps.be/wp.php?article_id=524. Although the article may be from March 2006, it's certainly worth a consideration, or two! You know what they say about issue of "True Intentions" Mr DT. Also, I know Michael Emerson personally and his views are still as strong as ever. Please separate your Feelings from reality DT, as the Cyprus situation has reached its saturation point.
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""The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?PrintSpeaker: Dr. Nicholas Whyte, Europe Programme Director, International Crisis Group
Chair: Michael Emerson, Senior Fellow, Head of the Neighbourhood Policy Unit, CEPS
Date: Tuesday 28 March 2006
The last round of Cyprus’s drawn-out peace process ended in April 2004 when the Greek Cypriot community, which had long advocated reunification of the divided island on a bicommunal and bizonal basis, overwhelmingly rejected the UN-sponsored “Annan Plan”, which provided for just that. At the same time on the northern side of the Green Line, the Turkish Cypriot community, in a major reversal of its traditional preference for secession, backed reunification. The failure of the referendum did not stop a still-divided Cyprus being admitted to membership of the EU a week later. Notwithstanding clear continuing support for the Annan Plan, or some variation of it, among all other members of the EU and the wider international community, the present situation remains stalemated.
The International Crisis Group in collaboration with the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) presented a report on “The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?” in the office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels on 28 March. The report was presented by Dr. Nicholas Whyte, International Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director joined by Michael Emerson, Senior Fellow and Head of Neighbourhood Policy Unit at CEPS, who chaired the event and commented upon the report’s findings and recommendations. The two panellists addressed an audience of more than 50 people, which included Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot government officials, European Commission staff, researchers, journalists and students.
Following Michael Emerson’s welcoming and introductory comments Nicholas Whyte took the floor by explaining that the Crisis Group approaches the Cyprus issue in the wider context of other international conflicts, applying experience gained from the analysis of similar situations. He added that this was also the reason for choosing the Northern Ireland Executive as the presentation’s venue. Nicholas Whyte then went into a brief historical overview of the problem, emphasising the fact that Nicosia is the last divided capital in Europe, outdoing Berlin in terms of time span and wondered “how much longer will this situation endure?”. After explaining in brief the provisions of the Annan Plan, he pointed out that the fundamental reason behind the failure of the twin referenda was that there was no strong political will from the governments to actually engage in the final stages of the negotiation meaning that the final version of the plan was one that had not been mutually agreed. The Annan Plan in its current form is dead as a result of the irreversible reality of the Greek Cypriot “no” in the referenda of April 2004.
The opening of the green line in 2003 was a positive development, but nevertheless the barriers are still there and the divisions essentially remain. A second important element is the opening of EU membership negotiations with Turkey, now running up against the point where Turkish policy and EU policy are in fundamental conflict. For example, while Turkey has an obligation as part of its accession process to open its ports and airports to vessels and airplanes from Cyprus, the EU is also under a moral obligation and a declared political imperative to reduce the isolation of northern Cyprus through the aid and trade regulations, the latter being blocked in the European Council.
Crisis Group’s proposes the inclusion of the north in the EU-Turkey Customs Union rather than just regularising trade. Nicholas Whyte stressed that the Turkish Cypriots are inhabitants of the EU now but they are being blocked from the benefits of being in the EU and this situation should be changed. He said that there is room for criticism of the Turkish government in the way that is trying to link the issues of the trade regulation for the Turkish Cypriots and unblocking its own ports for Cypriot carriers. However, according to him the two issues are linked, since for Turkey Cyprus is a fundamental question of national interest and as a consequence of it the EU may have to decide whether it is prepared to face a crisis in its relations with Turkey over the Customs Union issue later this year.
For the Greek Cypriot side Nicholas Whyte asked whether they are still committed to a bizonal and bicommunal solution to the problem. Nicholas Whyte said that he has no clear answer to that question since the statements of Greek Cypriot government officials as well as of President Papadopoulos are ambiguous. According to him if the Greek Cypriots are not interested in that solution the partition of the island will be cemented and stances in both Turkey and northern Cyprus are going to harden. The hopes of Greek Cypriots for a European solution where by “osmosis” somehow the north will be reabsorbed by the south are impractical. On the other Nicholas Whyte emphasized that if Turkey is forced by the circumstances to choose between its commitments to Cyprus and its aspirations to join the EU, at the moment it seems that the EU will lose out, a situation which is going to be very bad for all parties involved in the issue.
While the immediate or long term recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an independent state is unlikely partition will harden if there is no movement in the short term, leading perhaps to the Taiwanisation of the north, a situation where we might have an administration that is recognised as legitimate in its particular area without having full international standing. The beginnings of this process are apparent already. The latest decision of the European Court of Human Rights on the question of property reparations has basically legitimised the TRNC court system and its proposed property commission as being a potential remedy rather than identifying Turkey as being the only party responsible for its implementation.
With regard to Greece Nicholas Whyte said that the Greek government should take a more neutral position. There is room to explore between the current policy of unconditional support for RoC’s policies and actions, and the 1974 policy of attempted annexation which is on the other extreme.
Following Greece, Nicholas Whyte turned his attention to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, emphasising the importance of the property issue. He said that international standards have shifted in the last years and they have shifted in a way that is not “helpful” for Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot case. Crisis Group proposes a moratorium on construction on Greek Cypriot owned property even if this constitutes 80 per cent of the territory which is now under Turkish Cypriot administration. At the same time Turkey should consider a partial withdrawal of its troops from the island, as an indicator of good will. It is very difficult to see how Turkish interests could be damaged by a reduction in the number of troops.
Michael Emerson stated that the report’s recommendations are “on the right track”. He concentrated on the use of two key phrases: “Unilateral steps are the only game in town” and “Euro-Taiwanisation”. For him the current status quo is poison to the system of the EU, with chain reaction effects. It has already complicated the EU-Turkey relationship and at the same time even inhibited the completion of European Neighbourhood Policy with the south Caucasus.
Michael Emerson went back to the Annan Plan saying that the decision of the Greek Cypriot south to reject it was perfectly legitimate. The fundamental reason behind the Greek Cypriot “no” was the proposed constitution’s complex mechanisms of a Belgian-type federal model of governance which involved egalitarian multiculturalism whereas the Greek Cypriot side would have preferred a more “centralised majoritarian federal state”. According to Michael Emerson this is a legitimate point of view especially since it was backed up by such a large majority. But when the legitimacy of the status quo in northern Cyprus is taken into consideration then Michael Emerson wondered whether it is legitimate politically and morally that the status quo just remains, aggravated by the rejections of the Greek Cypriots for the establishment of trade and direct travelling. In his opinion it is not politically legitimate as well as not fair for the Turkish Cypriots to be stuck to the current status quo.
Michael Emerson posed the question of “what to do”. He followed Crisis Group’s proposal for unilateral steps being “the only game in town” suggesting also, following Montenegro’s example, the adoption of the Euro by the Turkish Cypriot north. Nevertheless, he was sceptical about “the final or the next status” as he calls it and wondered what President Tassos Papadopoulos has in mind. Michael Emerson guessed that the changes that the Greek Cypriots might wish to would probably change the formula in a way that would be unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. In his opinion there is no way on agreeing on the constitutional aspects of a solution and thus the RoC will continue to exist as is with northern Cyprus as an autonomous entity, falling within EU jurisdiction and at some point in time reaching an agreement along these lines added by a unilateral move on the part of the Turkish Cypriot side whereby they would unilaterally withdraw to the lines of the Annan Plan map and going ahead with property compensation schemes. In exchange the RoC would agree on the existence of Turkish Cypriot autonomous entity until a total and final agreement on the constitution is reached having the right to conduct trade with the rest of the world and follow the normal life of EU citizens. And this is actually what he means by the term “Euro-Taiwanisation" which he finds as a fair solution for both sides at least for the short term.
Discussion
Responding to a question about the likelihood of the report’s proposals being implemented by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, Dr. Nicholas Whyte said that everybody is rhetorically committed in principle to doing everything that the report is recommending. The RoC’s governments rhetoric is for a reunified island, the TRNC have voted for a reunified island and Turkey supports the moves for the island’s reunification, so in a sense the recommendations of the report are just practical measures for all sides to live up to the commitments they have already made. However, Dr. Whyte recognised that the reactions to the report have not been “100%” positive and especially with regard to the Greek Cypriot side. He expressed the hope that the report might at least have sparked some creative thinking.
On the same question Michael Emerson said that the report’s recommendations could make a difference if at least 23 or possibly 24 EU member states and the US could reach an agreement on why the current status quo is not sustainable and why an agreement should be reached along these lines. At this point, Nicholas Whyte interfered in order to clarify why unilateral steps are “the only game in town”. He stressed that in the history of the Cyprus conflict too much energy has been wasted on negotiating confidence building measures that then turned out to be a “blind alley”, absorbing effort without tackling the wider problem.
One participant identified a high degree of obsession with the Annan Plan both in the report and in Nicholas Whyte’s presentation and he wondered why there could be no other alternative to the Annan Plan. He stressed that the government of the RoC has never advocated an “osmosis” solution but on the contrary it has been always committed to the principles of a bizonal federation. Referring to the “Taiwanisation” of the north, he then addressed a question towards the Turkish Cypriots on how satisfactory such a solution would be for them in the long term. He then posed the questions of why the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not been legitimised by the international community and why on the other hand the government of the RoC is the only legitimate representative of the island’s affairs. In his view it is international law and the decisions of UN’s Security Council resolutions which actually vindicate the positions of the RoC. According yo him the report does not address the roots of the problem.
In reply to these concerns Nicholas Whyte said that from his observations, he cannot see any commitment on the part of the current Greek Cypriot leadership: “the fact is that since the referendum the government has not gone back to the UN with the list of things that they would like fixed in the Annan Plan as the UN has repeatedly requested it to do”. For Nicholas Whyte the recent meeting between President Tassos Papadopoulos and the Kofi Annan showed very little agreement between the two men. Nicholas Whyte pointed out that if the Greek Cypriot side was serious about reengaging in the process they would have already done it by now, and the fact that they have not done so indicates lack of serious engagement.
Another questioner asked, with reference to the EU-Turkey Customs Union question, what is likely to happen in the end of the year when Turkey’s progress will be discussed in the EU, since Turkey refuses to open its ports to RoC flagged vessels. The same questioner also asked how the Cyprus problem has affected EU’s policy with certain Caucasus states. Responding first to the latter, Dr. Whyte said that the decision of Azerbaijan to allow the flight of an airplane to northern Cyprus had implications on Azerbaijan’s European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, which then delayed the Action Plans of Georgia and Armenia. On the full implementation of the Customs Union Protocol, Nicholas Whyte expressed his hope that it will be finally implemented while the EU fulfils its promises to the Turkish Cypriots.
Asked why a divided Cyprus was allowed to enter the EU with the Greek Cypriots having voted “no” to reunification, Nicholas Whyte said that this was due to the bad negotiating strategies of the Turkish Cypriots for the last thirty years. Another participant said that the report’s recommendations were unbalanced. Nicholas Whyte responded that every theoretical or concrete recommendation for one side does not necessarily have to be balanced by another one for the other side just for the sake of keeping the balance.
Responding to a challenge by another participant on the usefulness of unilateral measures and a distinction that should be made between those that are increasing the capital of sympathy for one side and those who oblige the other part to reciprocity, Nicholas Whyte stated that the report concentrated on unilateral steps to be taken in the absence of an overreaching process which is going to address other parameters of the problem.
The final question came from a participant who asked why the report does not recommend for the complete handing over of all territory occupied by the British military bases in the island. Nicholas Whyte answered that once there is a united Cyprus this question will also come on the table and then of course this will become an issue to discuss. For Nicholas Whyte such a recommendation was simply not going to have the necessary effect at this point in time. Nicholas Whyte said that in the long run it “makes an awful lot of sense” to reconsider the presence of the UK in the island but not now.
Nicholas Whyte spoke also about the RoC’s government negotiating strategy. In his view the reasons behind the Greek Cypriot “no” are appreciated and there is no question behind the legitimate choice of the Greek Cypriot public but at the same the Greek Cypriot side has to realise that choices have consequences. Nicholas Whyte stressed that since the referendums there have been endless talks about Varosha, Famagusta etc. If the Annan Plan had passed Famagusta would have been under Greek Cypriot control since August 2004 and the rest of the Varosha region would have been returned since October 2005. In the same line Michael Emerson asked the question of how to interpret “the bargaining position of the Greek Cypriot leadership of not declaring what the position is”; was this just a diplomatic posture “covering a position that does not really exist”?
In his concluding comments Nicholas Whyte responded to a point made earlier on the Treaty of Guarantee. Nicholas Whyte recognised the demand of putting the Treaty of Guarantee on the table as not unreasonable, however as he put it “they must say it to the UN and to the other signatories of the treaty of guarantee”. In his conclusion Nicholas Whyte brought up the example of Bosnia as a country that accepted an “imposed” settlement solution in comparison to the one that was imposed on Cyprus in the 1960s. He stressed that eleven years on after the “imposition” of a constitution on Bosnia, the country has now taken off as a fully sovereign state. In his opinion everybody bears a certain degree of responsibility for the collapse of the 1960 constitutional arrangement and the division of the island in 1974, “Part of what we are doing in this report is trying wake everybody up to the extent of that responsibility and to what could be done next.” "
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