Cyprus-Forum.com

[YFred]

Comment - The bankrupt policy of ‘all or nothing’
By Makarios Droushiotis
(archive article - Sunday, August 7, 2005)
As Cyprus marks yet another summer of tragic anniversaries, Makarios Droushiotis looks at how successive leaders have turned down one opportunity after another over the past 50 years

THE SUMMER in Cyprus is a time for sad anniversaries. This year, when the Cyprus issue completes 50 years as an issue of Greco-Turkish contention, the annual debates could transcend 1974 and attempt a deeper approach to the causes of this great national tragedy.

However, the political conditions prevailing on the island, as a consequence of the developments during 2004, maintain the debate in the stereotypical framework: the traitorous coup d'état, the barbaric invasion, and Makarios as the absolute victim of the conspiracy.

The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted, as is the apathy, and even the encouragement, of the US, but without the dramatic Greek mistakes we would have never come to 1974. In the 50 years of the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriots have never admitted to any of their mistakes having contributed to the disaster of 1974. They even blame the coup exclusively on the Junta, as if the previous three years of EOKA B activity had never happened.

The first lost opportunity

The new era in the Cyprus issue started with EOKA. According to historical sources, the initial purpose of the armed movement of 1955 was not to defeat the colonial power by guerrilla warfare, but to sensitise the international community, by means of limited action, to the Cypriot demand for self-determination, and to force Great Britain to compromise by diplomatic means, and certainly not by military ones.

The founding of EOKA coincided – by pure chance – with the challenge to the role of Great Britain as a regional superpower in the Middle East. In their attempts to maintain a hold on the area, the British sought to close their front in Cyprus. That is, factors beyond the political planning of the Greek Cypriots created circumstances favourable to a positive settlement on the Cyprus issue by diplomatic means.

During the talks between the then Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, and Archbishop Makarios (1955-1956), the British offered the Cypriots a regime of self-administration, leaving even the prospect of Enosis (union with Greece) open in the future. The EOKA struggle, before it began in earnest, brought about the maximum possible result under the circumstances. Makarios, politically inexperienced, and blinded by the fanaticism of the era, was not in a position to see, let alone exploit, the circumstances. He rejected the British proposal and adopted the dogma of "all or nothing".

Four years of armed struggle later, and after the Turks became part of the issue, after much blood was spilt and after the barriers in the relations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus rose, Makarios found himself before the dilemma of partition or bound independence, in a common state with the Turks. Before the spectre of partition, he made the compromise of Zurich.

Independence was never a choice of the Greek Cypriots. But, under those circumstances, it was a good solution. As soon as they felt that the danger of partition was past, the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to revise the Zurich agreements. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, who were betting on their mistakes, did all they could to push them in this direction.

Makarios' attempt unilaterally to revise the constitution brought Cyprus to the brink of disaster and caused the first form of partition, with the secession of the Turkish Cypriots from the Republic of Cyprus and their concentration into geographical enclaves, with an autonomous administration under the guidance of Turkey.

The second great opportunity

History gave Cyprus another great opportunity to shake off the weight of the national problem. Six years after the collapse of Zurich, the Turkish policy of partition for Cyprus was at a dead end. The Turkish Cypriots were becoming more and more dependent on the strong Greek Cypriot economy. The enclaves began to dissolve and the young began to emigrate, while the cost of $20 million a year to Turkey for maintaining the Turkish Cypriot administration was hard to bear for the economic circumstances of the era.

At that point when the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to make a series of compromises. Within the framework of intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash, they were obliged to accept a solution improving on the Zurich agreements, and abolishing many of the privileges they secured with the 1959 agreements. Makarios did not dare to compromise while he was in a position of advantage and postponed the solution to an indeterminate future, expecting fully to absorb the Turkish Cypriots and adhering to the logic of "all or nothing".

In life as in politics, no-one knows what the next day will bring. The monster of nationalism, which had its roots in the policies of conflict of the 50s and 60s, caused chaos inside Cyprus which climaxed in the coup of July 15, 1974.

20-20 hindsight

Had the Cyprus issue been solved, there would never have been a coup, for the simple reason that there would be no army on Cyprus. And if the Junta dared a coup to prevent a solution that was an improvement on Zurich, the Cyprus crisis would have been handled completely differently by the international community, including the US.

Only after the dramatic consequences of the Turkish invasion, on July 29, 1974, did Makarios submit, via Henry Kissinger, a memo to the Turkish government, suggesting the immediate return to the status outlined by Zurich! But Zurich had already been rendered obsolete by the facts. The circumstances had changed. The rules of the game were now determined by the strong party, which under those circumstances was Turkey.

At the end of July 1974, while the Turks occupied less than 20 per cent of the land area of Cyprus, the US was pressing the Greek side hard to accept a solution of geographic federation as the only antidote to the completion of partition. Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides were in agreement, but Makarios, despite the national disaster caused by the invasion, remained attached to "all or nothing": "The Archbishop will never attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey, even if the Turks occupy the whole of Cyprus," he wrote to Karamanlis on August 2, 1974. Two years later, the faits accomplis of the invasion forced him to "attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey", by accepting a federal solution to the Cyprus issue.

Shortly before he died, Makarios publicly instituted the policy of the long-term struggle. While in the '60s the search for a solution in some indeterminate future favoured the interests of the Greek Cypriots, in this particular instance the approach to the time factor was clearly defensive. Makarios considered, correctly, that only a change in the international circumstances would make a just solution to the Cyprus issue possible. At the same time, the postponement of the solution also favoured the Turkish policy of gradual establishment of the faits accomplis as permanent.

The last wasted coincidence

It took three decades for the international circumstances to change. After the 1974 drama, Cyprus had another rendezvous with History in 2004. For the first time in its history, Cyprus gained a determining role in the future of Turkey. The induction of the country in the EU and the desire on the part of Turkey to move in the direction of Europe annulled the Turkish dogma established by Ecevit, which stated that the Cyprus issue had been solved in 1974.

At this unique historic juncture, the Cyprus issue was found to be administered by two politicians of the EOKA era and the 1960s: Glafcos Clerides at first, and, later, Tassos Papadopoulos. Both have admitted that the political choices of the past were disastrous:

l Papadopoulos (Vima, Athens, May 2004) called the Makarios - Harding talks a real lost opportunity. Also, at a public speech in Nicosia
(January 13, 2005) he called the Zurich solution a "blessing".

l Clerides thinks of the non-completion of the 1973 agreement as a lost opportunity, while he believes that if Makarios accepted federation in 1974 instead of 1976, the Cyprus issue could have been solved. (E, July 15, 2004).

Clerides is thought of as the spokesman for the realistic school, and Papadopoulos as the one for the rejectionist school on the Cyprus issue. However, they both share the common characteristic of never having learnt from the mistakes of the past:

l Clerides, though he was President for 10 years, never prepared society for a solution, but only for non-solution and conflict: he was elected President in 1993 to bury the ideas proposed by UN Secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Gali, which had been accepted by his predecessor George Vassiliou, and in 1998 on the platform of the S-300 missiles.
l It took Papadopoulos 45 years to realise that independence was, under the circumstances of the time, a good solution in 1959. "The Cypriot people had become possessed by emotion, and had not been able to temper emotion with logic," he said about Zurich.

Forty-five years after Zurich, by stirring the same emotions, Papadopoulos led the people, who were unprepared for a solution, to repeat the same mistake. He himself - like Makarios in 1955 - did not see, let alone exploit, the historic confluence of 2004, to negotiate assertively, but also constructively, the solution of the Cyprus issue, at a time when the US, Turkey and the EU were eager to rid themselves of the problem. Having wasted the opportunity with decisions which have excused Turkey of her criminal responsibilities for 1974, he is now applying a policy of seeking a solution in some indeterminate future, based on the bankrupt policy of "all or nothing", with the expectation of absorbing the Turkish Cypriots.



Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2009

[Bananiot]

Stop rubbing salt, YFred.

[YFred]

Stop rubbing salt, YFred.

Sorry Bananiat, its meant to be for our ultra blue heros on this forum.
They just don't get it.

[Bananiot]

Now you know why Makarios Drousiotis was banned from RIK, for 17 whole years. The truth hurts (if you are a bloody nationalist).

[utu]

Stop rubbing salt, YFred.

Bananiot, sometimes, a little "salt-rubbing" is needed to stop people from continuing to delude themselves. Greek Cypriots cannot continue to be inb denial about their own mistakes regarding the Cyprus Problem. Turkey has more than its fair share of blame, but as long as the Greek Cypriots blame solely Turkey and the Greek military Junta, there is not going to be any real solution.

[insan]

[From The Times (London), Dec. 6, 1974]
EoKA Ready To Accept Makarios Return to Restricted Church Role

(From Paul Martin)

Nicosia, Dec. 5. — The Eoka guerrilla movement has declared that it will accept the return of Archbishop Makarios if he gives up the presidency and restricts himself to church affairs. The Eoka declaration came as thousands of Greek Cypriots began to arrive in the capital to hear the archbishop speak on his return from the exile forced upon him by the July coup.

There is a growing air of excitement among the archbishop's supporters as the hour of his return approaches. Originally he was to have flown in from Athens on Friday. However, at the last minute, it was announced by his supporters that "technical reasons" had caused a delay of 24 hours.

The Eoka movement, which remains bitterly opposed to the archbishop, made its stand clear in a 10-point manifesto circulated in Nicosia overnight. Although it takes a strong line against the archbishop it is the first time it has agreed to his return.

Calling for national unity among Greek Cypriots, the manifesto sets out the conditions under which the Eoka movement would accept his return. It accused the archbishop of deliberately ignoring advice from "friends and foes" about the possible adverse consequences of his decision.

"Makarios has declared that on his return he will succeed in securing a return of Greek CjqDriot refugees to their homes", the manifesto said. He also declared that he would lead the struggle to end the Turkish occupation. We believe that both are illusions. However, we shall not block his way in order to prove once more that he conscientiously deceives his people."

The manifesto declared that the task facing the Greek Cypriot people allowed "room for everybody to take part in the national struggle". However, it added: "It is necessary for him to realize that his presence in the political arena will result in division and conflict." This rendered his "speedy withdrawal from politics" a necessity.

It went on to reiterate the Eoka stand that any attempt to reestablish the
Makarios order, ousted by the coup, would result in continued confhct in the Greek Cypriot community, "If Makarios does not heed this then his return will constitute an epilogue to the Cyprus tragedy."

Opening the way for the Archbishop's return as head of the Cyprus church, the manifesto said: If he comes to give a solution to the ecclesiastical problem in accordance with the church heirarchy, then we shall contribute. The solution of the chiirch problem is a basic ingredient for national unity among the Greek Cypriots. It is a question of great urgency."

The manifesto then went on to warn the Archbishop that even if he does restrict himself to the church, he must heed the factions inside the church who opposed him. "If Makarios does not take a responsible hue he will find us a strong and unyielding opponent."

The Eoka movement, the manifesto added, did not try to prevent Archbishop Makarios's return by using force. "However the national centre must know that if Makarios is to repeat the recent past, Cyprus viH inevitably be led to a bloody civil strife."

Though it's not clear whether this manifesto declared by EOKA or EOKA-B; it reveals a lot about then what he would be able/allowed to do's of Makarios.

It sounds like the manifesto declared for the name of both EOKAs since EOKA-B was still active during this declaration.

From 1960 until 1964 there was no strife between Makarios and National Front(puppets of Athens) even they were in perfect harmony with their actions based on Akritas Plan. AKEL which supposedly struggling for the completion of independence of RoC from 1960 till 64; felt forced to join National front and pursue Enosis policy. From 1964 till 1967 GC community had a total unity regarding Enosis policy.

In 1967 when Junta came into power in Greece; circumstances changed. Makarios together with AKEL had to suspend their Enosis policy and switch back to so-called independence struggle while they were nothing else than the puppets of Moscow.

However there's no much difference between Enosists and so-called democracy fighters because both Enosis and a so-called democracy based on "majority rule" were not acceptable for TCs. There were 2 options for TCs to struggle for: Either a demcracy based on consociationalism or Taksim.

From TC perspective, Makarios had 2 mistakes:

1- Pursueing Enosis policy from 1960 until 1967.

2- Having had to suspend Enosis policy because of Junta and supposedly struggling for "democracy" which would have led a GC tyranny over TCs. Wasn't he aware of this? He was, but who cares whether Ottoman remnant "invaders" would suffer or not in Cyprus.

We can sum up the above 2 points as Makarios and his supporters had always considered TCs as a minority and any political status for TCs other than minority rights; detrimental for future of Hellenism in Cyprus.

From the perspective of National front of GCs which was backed by Athens deep state both prior to 1967 besides onwards; the mistakes of Makarios were different. One of the mistake of Makarios, I'm sure of it was "dividing" GC community into 2 opposing poles and breaking the National Unity of GC community, commanded by Greek junta. What were the other mistakes of Makarios?

[DT.]

The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted,

which part of this statement makes you feel justified YFred?

[YFred]

The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted,

which part of this statement makes you feel justified YFred?

DT, if protecting my family is a criminal offence, then Turkey is guilty as charged. You take the plight of the TCs very lightly, but I know how close 4000 people in Lurucina came to beeing wiped out.

[DT.]

The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted,

which part of this statement makes you feel justified YFred?

DT, if protecting my family is a criminal offence, then Turkey is guilty as charged. You take the plight of the TCs very lightly, but I know how close 4000 people in Lurucina came to beeing wiped out.

If you believe Turkey invaded this country to protect your family then I've got a bridge over Pithkias I can sell you.

[Bananiot]

DT, what do you find offensive in utu´s comment?

Turkey has more than its fair share of blame, but as long as the Greek Cypriots blame solely Turkey and the Greek military Junta, there is not going to be any real solution.

I think it is very fair and balanced. Can we agree on this?