Cyprus-Forum.com

[Bananiot]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

[insan]

Bananiot, please put everything aside and tell me; throughout many decades, what was the highest percentage of GC community supporting a consociational democracy for 2 communities for the solution of Cyprus problem. Please tell me..

During Makarios term? Kyprianou? Klerides? Vasiliou? TPap? Christofias?

If "majority rule" insistence of Makarios was a mistake; during the term of which GC government the same mistake wasn't repeated?

[YFred]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

There is another story about Inonu which shows how decent he was. Sombody asked him when Turkey will come to the TCs help and he replied" Turkey will come to protect you, but who will protect you from Turkey?".
What a man.

[insan]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

There is another storey about Inonu which shows how decent he was. Sombody asked him when Turkey will come to the TCs help and he replied" Turkey will come to protect you, but who will protect you from Turkey?".
What a man.

The letter between İnönü and Denkaş is not a stry YFred. It is true that in that letter İnönü asked Küçük to return their posts in RoC. İnönü did this under the circumstances of those days which he also was talking with then the US president to contribute solution of the problem. In those days, the conclusion of İnönü and then the president of US arrived, aimed at keeping TCs in their posts and continuing talks to solve the problem. For then the president of US and İnönü, it was too easy to tell what to do from their warm seats but in Cyprus; there had been no warm seats for the leaders of TC community from early 40s until 1963.

Could any others know what really was the situation in Cyprus from early 40s untill 1963?

Had TCs not abandoned their seats in RoC, what would have happened? Makarios and all others would have given up degrading TCs into a minority status?

As long as GC leadership insisted on making TCs a minority; sooner or later TCs would abandon their posts in RoC and look for ways to achieve Taksim one way or another. Under such circumstances, TCs were/are absolutely right to struggle for Taksim.

[YFred]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

There is another storey about Inonu which shows how decent he was. Sombody asked him when Turkey will come to the TCs help and he replied" Turkey will come to protect you, but who will protect you from Turkey?".
What a man.

The letter between İnönü and Denkaş is not a stry YFred. It is true that in that letter İnönü asked Küçük to return their posts in RoC. İnönü did this under the circumstances of those days which he also was talking with then the US president to contribute solution of the problem. In those days, the conclusion of İnönü and then the president of US arrived, aimed at keeping TCs in their posts and continuing talks to solve the problem. For then the president of US and İnönü, it was too easy to tell what to do from their warm seats but in Cyprus; there had been no warm seats for the leaders of TC community from early 40s until 1963.

Could any others know what really was the situation in Cyprus from early 40s untill 1963?

Had TCs not abandoned their seats in RoC, what would have happened? Makarios and all others would have given up degrading TCs into a minority status?

As long as GC leadership insisted on making TCs a minority; sooner or later TCs would abandon their posts in RoC and look for ways to achieve Taksim one way or another. Under such circumstances, TCs were/are absolutely right to struggle for Taksim.

Sorry Insan, I didn't mean to sound as though what was said was a story.
I am not aware of a document confirming what I heard so I refered to it as a story.

[insan]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

There is another storey about Inonu which shows how decent he was. Sombody asked him when Turkey will come to the TCs help and he replied" Turkey will come to protect you, but who will protect you from Turkey?".
What a man.

The letter between İnönü and Denkaş is not a stry YFred. It is true that in that letter İnönü asked Küçük to return their posts in RoC. İnönü did this under the circumstances of those days which he also was talking with then the US president to contribute solution of the problem. In those days, the conclusion of İnönü and then the president of US arrived, aimed at keeping TCs in their posts and continuing talks to solve the problem. For then the president of US and İnönü, it was too easy to tell what to do from their warm seats but in Cyprus; there had been no warm seats for the leaders of TC community from early 40s until 1963.

Could any others know what really was the situation in Cyprus from early 40s untill 1963?

Had TCs not abandoned their seats in RoC, what would have happened? Makarios and all others would have given up degrading TCs into a minority status?

As long as GC leadership insisted on making TCs a minority; sooner or later TCs would abandon their posts in RoC and look for ways to achieve Taksim one way or another. Under such circumstances, TCs were/are absolutely right to struggle for Taksim.

Sorry Insan, I didn't mean to sound as though what was said was a story.
I am not aware of a document confirming what I heard so I refered to it as a story.

How the Zurich agreements unravelled


MAKARIOS Droushiotis’ article “Zurich, from curse to blessing in disguise” (Cyprus Mail, October 1, 2008) gets full marks on impartiality and adherence to facts. Yet a few points need clarification:

a) Under the sub-title “After The Collapse” Droushiotis writes:

“Immediately after the collapse of the Zurich agreements in December 1963, the Turkish government under Prime Minister ?nönü urged the Turkish Cypriots to return to the Republic of Cyprus. In a letter to Vice President Faz?l Kuchuk dated March 9, 1964, ?smet ?nönü called upon him to seek an understanding with President Makarios and return to the government, with the Vice President and Ministers leading, and the Ministers, the Representatives and later, the civil servants, following.

Kuchuk replied the next day, saying that this was impossible, citing a crisis of confidence and fear, and claiming (that if he insisted, the Turkish Cypriot officials would resign their posts.”

Dr. Kuchuk’s reaction to ?nönü’s suggestion is understandable. ?nönü, rightly and wisely, wanted to prevent the collapse of the 1960 set-up (a guaranteed partnership, a functional federation, and not a unitary state as alleged), believing that it could be saved, whereas Dr Kuchuk was not even able to go to his office which was now on the Greek side and had already been taken over by the gunmen of the organisation as per the Akritas Plan.

Makarios had already declared the constitution to be “dead and buried” and Turkish inhabitants of 103 villages had already become refugees in what became known as Turkish enclaves. Schoolchildren were unable to go to their villages and Makarios, who had declared that he recognised no Vice-President, had cut off even telephone contacts with Dr Kuchuk. Omorfita had been taken over by Sampson and his gunmen, while Turkish Cypriots moving from one place to another were being “arrested” never to be seen again. Inönü’s request therefore was out of line with the realities in the island.

A few Turkish Cypriots who had taken the risk and attended their jobs were not seen again until recently, when their bones were recovered in different places. Murder was afoot for any Turk who dared to enter the areas patrolled by the Enosis patriots.

b)Another aspect of Mr Droushiotis’ piece, which needs correction is the paragraph which reads:

“The Turkish government of the day was in conflict with the Turkish Army and desired the implementation of the Zurich agreements. That is why they forced Rauf Denktash to remain exiled in Turkey from 1964 until 1968. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and the paramilitary organisation TMT were under the influence of the army, which desired the division of Cyprus.”

It was not the Turkish government which prevented me from coming to Cyprus; it was the “order of the day” issued by Makarios and his Minister of Interior, the commander of “the organisation” Yiorkadjis, who declared me, unconstitutionally, to be “persona non grata to be arrested for starting the Turkish uprising etc.” Being “arrested” in those days meant disappearing.

?nönü believed that the arrival of UNFICYP would help in my safe entering the country. This also did not work. In the end I had to try and enter the island once through Erenköy (Kokkina) and a second time through Larnaca when we were caught in November 1967 and sent back without any charge of “responsibility for the so-called non-existent uprising or any other crime”.

The aftermath of my arrest and return to Turkey was the attack on Kofinou (Geçitkale) and Bo?aziçi which resulted in a near military intervention by Turkey, which was prevented by Cyrus Vance’s efforts in sending Grivas and some of the Greek Army personnel back to Greece, Makarios promising to compensate the villagers for deaths and damage (which he never did) and agreement to start unofficial talks between me and Mr Clerides, which began in Beirut soon afterwards.

The result was a very close agreement on local autonomy, which Makarios rejected because I had not accepted minority status for my people and he had not managed to get rid of the Treaty of Guarantee. Today Mr Christofias is still trying to achieve these ends through smooth talking.

As to the finding of Mr Droushiotis that Makarios instructed Clerides to offer me a return to the 1960 set-up, this is also true but it was obvious that this was a tactical move by Makarios in order to put a swift end to Turkish intervention. Clerides came to me with this offer and I did tell him that, though I saw no merit in it, I would discuss it with the Turkish government.

In order to do so, I had to be satisfied that Clerides was really in charge of the situation. He was not. He had taken over the Sampson government and EOKA B with some or all of the Junta officers still active all over the country.

The return of Turkish refugees to their destroyed homes in 103 villages in safety could not be assured. Those who had staged the coup could not be arrested and tried. It was quite obvious that Makarios was up to his tricks again and the offer of going back to a situation which had given us no protection for eleven years could not be treated as a serious offer.

By the time I replied, the three guarantors were already discussing the situation and at the first Geneva Talks they had agreed that two separate administrations existed in the island.

The rebirth of the destroyed Partnership Republic and the treatment of its destroyers as the government of Cyprus has prolonged the settlement of the problem so far.


(Source: Cyprus Mail)
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2008 Please contact Cyprus Mail for the copyright terms of this article

[insan]

http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/80/0000615 ... INONU.html

[insan]

2. AMERICA’S ATTITUDE & THE JOHNSON LETTER.

During London Conference America realized that things were getting out of control, however it still opposed assuming an active role in solving the Cyprus crisis because U.S. leaders thought that they had heavy commitments in many parts of the world. Also United States did not have any strategic interest in Cyprus. However the continuation of violence on the island and Ankara’s continuing intervention threats, brought the U.S. to modify its policy towards Cyprus. During the 1963 crisis United States declared that it was “not a party to this issue”, but in the middle of 1964 it assumed the role of a mediator between Greece and Turkey. At the beginning America aimed at not taking sides in the dispute and was determined to stand for peace and compromise, without accepting fully the arguments of their party. However such an attitude did not please both countries. (Harris, Troubled Alliance 110)

After Makarios’s rejection of the NATO force on 4 February 1964, United States sent George Ball to Cyprus to convince Makarios that “some kind of a peacekeeping force was necessary in Cyprus to prevent Turkey’s intervention” and to convince Inönü that the U.S. was doing its best to end the crisis.

However Ball’s plan did not work, because Makarios rejected the U.S. plan. During May, things in Cyprus deteriorated and Inönü decided to intervene. U.N. peacekeeping force had proven useless and every minute people were getting killed. Inönü informed U.S. ambassador Raymond Hare about his decision and Hare asked for one day to consult the U.S. administration. One may get suspicious of Inönü’s accepting Hare’s offer because as mentioned above Turkey did not have an organization to intervene in the island. Inönü, who was remembered as a genius in diplomacy, knew from the very beginning that America would not let Turkey intervene in Cyprus, and he also thought of Soviet support of Greek Cypriots. American leaders were so concerned, at that time, that a Turkish move against Cyprus, would lead to a war between Turkey and Greece. So Johnson’s letter came to Inönü on 5 June 1964. As Paul B. Henze stated in his book, Khrushev threatened retaliation if Washington let Turkey intervene in Cyprus and prepared a trap. Lyndon Johnson leaped into it in June by sending a warning letter to İnönü. According to Henze during these years both countries, Greece and Turkey were bluffing in order to gain greater American backing. (14-15) “The Johnson letter forgotten in the United States is still a live memory in Turkey” (Henze 14). Johnson letter reminded the Turkish republic in a rather undiplomatic and blunt style, that Turkey should think twice before intervening in Cyprus. Harris in his book Troubled Alliance confesses that a more conciliatory and less categorical approach probably would have accomplished Johnson’s aim without abrading Turkish feelings so severely and that delivery of a formal written communication was unnecessary under the circumstances. (115)

3. TURKEY RECONSIDERS ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

Johnson’s letter opened a new page in the evolution of Turkish-American relations. When it became public, a strong reaction occurred. Johnson in order to form a balance between the two countries, made several attempts to influence Greek officials, not to tempt Turkish people and appointed Secretary of State Dean Acheson as a mediator.

Acheson started “mediation” on 11 July 1964 in Geneva and offered the union of Cyprus with Greece and some modifications favoring the position of Turks in the island. While the negotiations were continuing Greek Cypriots made attempts to control the island. In the beginning of August the National Guard carried out a coordinated sea and land assault against Erenköy (Kokkina) on the northwest coast in an effort to cut off the major Turkish Cypriot supply line to Turkey. (Solsten 217). Turkish Government due to this attack favored an aerial bombing and the attack took place on the 8 August. Meanwhile Inönü warned Makarios that the bombing would continue until the withdrawal of Greek forces to the pre-6 August 1964 positions. On 10 August Ýnönü’s proposal to cease bombing met with disapproval from all commanders and several ministers. However he feared that events might develop in an unexpected way and there was still the possibility of Soviet Union’s intervention. So he ignored all objections and ordered a cessation of aircraft attacks. (Bölükbaþý 84)

The second Acheson plan continued after Greek and Turkish representatives returned to Geneva on 15 August 1964 and Acheson made an attempt to reconcile the Turkish and Greek positions. Turkey insisted on having full sovereignty over the Karpas peninsula but the compromise plan offered a smaller base to be leased to Turkey for 50 years. (Bölükbaþý 86)

According to Ýnönü, Turkey was unsuccessful in solving the Cyprus problem in 1964 because of “the regional and international conditions that were unfavorable to Turkey.” Soviet Union was ready to defend the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cyprus against a foreign invasion. During those times, Turkish public accused the American Government of not supporting Turkey when it wanted. Turks condemned U.S. for being “false friends” and blamed them of betraying Turks over Cyprus. Daily demonstrations took place in front of the American Embassy in Ankara and for the first time, crowds of thousands chanted “Yankee Go Home” and threw stones at the building. (Harris 118)

Furthermore to make matters worse “distorted and tendentious versions of the Johnson message leaked into the Turkish press almost immediately, generating profound popular reaction” (Harris, Troubled Alliance 115). The Turkish press criticized the U.S. embassy for misleading Washington and not reporting properly Turkey’s needs in Cyprus. An opinion occurred that Turkey should not depend on America to protect its rights and NATO alliance was an instrument to protect U.S. interests. Also it was commonly assumed by the Turks that “United States was at heart in the Greek camp....and that Washington would stop at nothing in opposing Turkish desires” (Harris, Troubled Alliance 120).

United States, in order to mitigate the fears provoked by the Johnson letter, assured the Turkish Government that United States would come to the help of Turkey in case of an attack from U.S.S.R., while using its treaty rights in Cyprus. (Milliyet, Sep. 24, 1964) Towards the end of 1964 United States Administration decided to delay its reconciliatary role. The 1964 crisis in Cyprus effected Turkish-American relations and the failure of the Acheson mission contributed to this. However, during the fall of 1964, armed clashes between the communities weakened. The lowering of the tension in the island is interpreted by Harris in his book Troubled Alliance as the settling down of Turkish and Greek communities to their own “cold war” confrontation. (121).

During 1964 Greek American associations, Greek Americans and Greek Orthodox Church worked hard in order to impress American leaders to establish a “Greek-dominated unitary state in Cyprus” (Bölükbaþý 90). However when compared to Greek lobbying in 1974, this one was less effective. Especially after the air strikes in August they tried to influence the Congress and the President.

http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html

[DT.]

DT, before continuing with my remarks on your interesting post, I should like to point out that Makarios was instrumental in keeping the TC’s in enclaves. It also appears that invasion did not constitute plan A for Turkey. This is inferred from the way Inonu tried to discourage Makarios from proceeding with his plans to change the constitution and later on from the letter that was sent to Kucuk, asking the TC’s to return to the RoC. It is very simplistic and thus totally wrong to point an accusing finger to Turkey and put all the blame on this, until 1974, invisible enemy as the scourge of Cyprus. Of course there were forces within Turkey that looked towards partition, but at the same time there were forces of sanity and reason. Inonu and the Turkish government tried hard to instil some sense into Makarios, but all to no avail. These are historical facts that cannot be denied. The forces of reason within Turkey should have been reinforced by our proper actions not exposed to the hawks within Turkey by the butchers in our side. The government of Cyprus, which was left in the sole hands of the GC’s, was seen as organising the attacks on the enclaves and orchestrating the campaign of fear against the ordinary TC’s. The warlords were accountable to Makarios and even held a large scale military exercise at the summer holiday home of Makarios at Troodos. Actions such as these could only weaken the hand of the moderate forces within Turkey (and the TC community) and at the same time strengthen the extremists who saw partition as the only solution. Makarios, in my opinion, was not guilty of “pardoning these bastards” for he knew what these bastards were doing, but he was just as guilty as these bastards. It is about time we stopped looking at Makarios as a sacred cow and look at him in a serious, critical context, if we care to get to the bottom of things. The same of course holds true for all persons that shaped the recent history of Cyprus, dead ones and living ones.

The invasion now. It was a huge shock to us, no doubt. By shear luck we managed to avoid invasion in 1964 and 1967 and one would have thought that we would learn from our past mistakes. However, having this knack of not admitting our mistakes and always pointing an accusing finger at the others for all our calamities, we were bound to keep repeating the mistakes until catastrophe would strike. The extremists on the Turkish side banked heavily on this attribute of ours. And they were rewarded, eventually. It was a third time unlucky for us. Never mind DT what grown men with families say. This is life. Remember in 1919? Grown Greek men with families told a similar story. The Greek army went in to save the Greeks of Asia Minor. Only, that campaign did not succeed but proved an ill conceived one, for our side. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his excellent book “War and ethnic cleansing” describes the scene when a Greek company of soldiers entered a Turkish village and looked for loot. To their dismay, another Greek company beat them to it and they found nothing. A group of soldiers knocked down a door and came face to face with an old woman crutching a hungry, skinny child. The child looked at the soldiers and asked “ekmek istyor effendi”. Such is the monstrosity of war DT. Of course the Turkish army went wild, and many TC’s jumped to the opportunity to settle old scores. There is no excuse for it but here you are.

Thanks for the reply bananiot. Just a note to say I haven't strayed from this thread and I'll reply in full.

[Sotos]

Traitor Bananiot is trying to excuse the Turks again The problem in Cyprus are the Turks. They invaded Cyprus 2 times. One in 1570 and one in 1974. After each time they invade they bring to Cyprus their Settlers, who they later call Turkish "Cypriots", steal our lands and give them to their Settlers. How is it so easy for the Turks to invade Cyprus and bring Turks in Cyprus, and not easy to just take their Turks and take them back out of Cyprus so the Cyprus problem will be solved? Is the ticket coming to Cyprus cheaper than going out of Cyprus? No! Turks just want to bring their Settlers in Cyprus to expand against us and take our island from us. The Turkish Generals admitted many times that Cyprus is of strategic importance to them. The TCs are just their excuse to occupy Cyprus. This is the big picture. What you are doing is looking at some tree instead of the forest and trying to excuse the Turks for their expansionism against Cyprus.