US connived to facilitate Turkey
US gave full backing to Turkish invasion
THE United States gave full blessing to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, even assuring Turkey that it would "get them a solution involving one third of the island.''
This cynical US involvement is revealed in the latest batch of secret official State Department documents released for publication under the 30-year rule.
The American stand has long been known, but this is the first time that it has been confirmed so completely by an official State Department document.
This is clarified in the very first paragraph of the document which is stamped ``SECRET/EYES ONLY.''
It declares that the only conceivable settlement of the Cyprus problem "will have to rest on a de facto division of the island, whatever the form."
While admitting that the United States ``has the clout'' to prevent the invasion, the document nevertheless advises against doing so "before the fighting stops."
The document is dated August 14, 1974, the exact date of the second massive wave of the Turkish invasion of the island. It is headed: ``Memorandum for the Secretary - Cyprus Actions'' from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of the top State Department officials dealing with Greco-Turkish affairs.
The document even includes a map detailing the plan of action of the Turkish invasion force. This is headed ``Map done by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research projecting Turkish moves on Cyprus, August 13, 1974.''
It is worth noting that this plan was the one followed exactly by the Turkish troops, a further proof of the close American involvement in the Turkish invasion planning.
Here is the full text of the document:
THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1974
SECRET/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Cyprus Actions
You wanted some brief ideas on what we do next.
Nothing I can think of will stop the Turks now from trying to secure by force what they demanded in their ultimata. In fact, as has always been true, the only coneivable modus vivendi will have to rest on a de facto division of the island, whatever the form.
If the Turks move fast and can then be gotten to stand down, it may pre-empt Greek counteraction and then give us a chance to try for a deal. (It may also save Karamanlis).
While the Soviets can serve as a bogey, we must keep them at arms length. They cannot become the arbiter between US allies. Their interests differ drastically from ours: we want a modus vivendi between Greece and Turkey, they want a non-aligned Cyprus, preferably with Greece or Turkey or both disaffected from NATO.
Thus, we should
- urgently try to contain Greek reaction; 24 hours at a time;
- bluntly tell the Turks they must stop, today, tomorrow at the latest;
- warn the Turks that Greece is rapidly moving leftward;
- send high-level US man to Athens to exert continuing direct influence on Karamanlis;
- assuming the Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks we will get them solution involving one third of island, within some kind of federal arrangement;
- assure Greeks we will contain Turk demands and allow no additional enclaves, etc.
You should not get involved directly till the fighting stops; then you must since there is no alternative and only we have the clout.
I do not think Brussels/NATO is the place to use when the time comes. The Greeks are probably too sore at NATO and the vehicle of a ministerial meeting is awkward. Anyway, you need Ecevit and Karamanlis.
London may be unacceptable to the Turks because of Callaghan’s blast at them.
You should not shuttle.
This may mean Geneva. Washington, at the President’s initiative, would be all right but hard to get the parties to come to. Also provocative of the Russians. New York would make it difficult to keep the Russians away.
You could also try Rome.
Cyprus Weekly
10 August 2007
Good readings... Knowledge is power! Get it!..Part 2
36 posts
• Page 2 of 4 • 1, 2, 3, 4
by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:50 pm
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT A GUARANTOR POWER ALLOWS TURKEY TO INVADE, ETHNICALLY CLEANSE AND PARTITION CYPRUS
Newly released British Documents for the year 1974 at the Public Records Office.
The British Government gives tacit clearance to Turkey to proceed with invasion and agrees to blockade the Greeks from helping Cyprus.
Following the coup in Cyprus Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit visited London for negotiations with the British Government.
According to the record of conversation on July 17, 1974, between the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary James Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit the latter bluntly asked for the British Government's cooperation to invade Cyprus through the British Sovereign Bases.
Ecevit clearly stated at the time that such the objective of the operation would be to restore the constitutional order overthrown by the coup of the Greek junta that forced President Makarios to flee the island.
Although the British Government refused to join Turkey in such an operation they promised Ecevit to 'help' by agreeing to prevent Greece from sending assistance to Cyprus. However, the revealing factor in this case is the concealed intention of Turkey to invade and occupy the whole of the island if one considers the location of the British Bases in Cyprus.
The relevant extracts are as follows:
Mr Ecevit, beginning the discussion at the dinner table, said that the events in Cyprus amounted to no ordinary coup d’ etat but constituted a violation of international treaties.
Britain and Turkey, jointly or separately, should state that they did not recognise the new regime and that the old administration must be restored. If Makarios could not return, the Constitutional provisions should apply. As the two guarantors under the 1960 Treaty Britain and Turkey and the United States should warn Greece of the violation of the independence of Cyprus which had taken place, and should ask for the withdrawal of Greek forces under effective UN supervision. There should also be international agreement about effective control in the situation thereafter.
"...There should also be sanctions: a more effective Turkish presence on the island was essential, and Turkey wished to bring this about in co-operation with the British Government as the other guarantor, in order to safeguard both communities. The Turkish Government did not wish to exploit the situation in Cyprus, not did they wish to act alone and create anxieties thereby. The British Government was in a position to help Turkey to achieve this result, and to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey. This could be done by allowing Turkey to send her forces to Cyprus through the British SBAs. He felt that this was a historic moment to use the bases to ensure the independence of Cyprus. Everyone, including the United States and the Soviet Union, would welcome such action which would justify the British military presence. He felt that action of this kind, coupled with a joint statement of British and Turkish objectives, would be a relief to the whole population of Cyprus and also to the population of Greece...The alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he felt would be inevitable later if not sooner - later would be worse and bloodier. If Britain were prepared to accept action on these lines, the Turkish authorities would be careful to avoid any embarrassment, by agreement on the deployment of Turkish forces...".
"...The Prime Minister said that he thought that he understood the meaning of Mr. Ecevit's remarks. If the situation of the Turkish community on the island, deteriorated, Turkey would feel it necessary to intervene. But he did not think that the SBAs could be used for that kind of intervention. Mr. Ecevit replied that he could not insist on the point. The bases were not essential for his purpose...The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr. Ecevit's remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible...".
Wilson rejects Caramanlis peace offer
Britain turns down Constantine Caramanlis in line with promise given to Ecevit
After the restoration of democracy in Greece the new Prime Minister K. Karamanlis asked Britain to intervene militarily and to condemn publicly the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The released documents reveal that the British Government had no intention of going as far as a public statement condemning the Turks and that it was still necessary for them to maintain a degree of even-handidness. On the 28 July 1974 a suggested text of reply from Prime Minister Wilson to Karamanlis was prepared which included the following: " You refer to our right and our power to intervene in order to prevent the generalisation of the conflict. If I am right in interpreting this as a suggestion that HMG should use military force I am bound to say that I cannot believe that this would do otherwise than exacerbate and complicate the situation...I am sure you will agree there can be no question of unilateral British military intervention under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution No.353, which we have all accepted. In the light of your message, I am sending a personal appeal to Mr. Ecevit to ensure that violations of the ceasefire are effectively brought to an end. I am sure that I can look to you to do the same.".
On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office informed the Private Secretary at No.10 Downing Street that together with the Americans they had warned the Karamanlis Government that they would not support any Greek military assistance to Cyprus. The Foreign Office document relating to the relevant message given to Mr. Karamanlis reads as follows:
"...There is a real risk that the Greeks will try to send a division by convoy from Crete to Cyprus. We and the Americans have told them that we would not support such action and would not be prepared to guarantee them air protection against the Turkish air force..."
The Turkish Air Force sunk their own destroyer
According to a progress report prepared for the Prime Minister, and whilst the Geneva Conference opened, the Turks were continuing to fan out from Kyrenia, particularly towards the South East. Turkish ships were still arriving in the port but they seemed to contain supplies rather than troop reinforcements. The British estimated that the Turks had by then 10,000 men, 44 tanks and 88 helicopters in Cyprus - they were the strongest land force there. The British in Cyprus were monitoring every movement and knew everything in full detail. The note to the Prime Minister said: "...the Turks are sensitive about our continuing reconnaissance flights over Kyrenia, but we have a legal right to conduct these and have told them so. Meanwhile, Ecevit has thanked us warmly for rescuing 72 Turks from the sea, who were part of the complement of a Turkish destroyer sunk by the Turkish Air Force."
HMS Hermes and company
HMS Hermes with 41 Commando Group embarked was warned off for operations in Cyprus at approximately 2215 16 July 1974. 41 Commando's Advance Party landed in Dhekelia at 1600 20 July 1974. The unit was given the task of securing the ESBA and receiving refugees.
According to various maps in recently released files HMS Hermes was not the only military ship cruising around Cyprus at the time of the Turkish invasion but one of many that actually had Cyprus 'under siege'. The position of some was only known to the United Kingdom and United States Governments.
Callaghan was informed in advance of the second invasion
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan whilst in Geneva was fully informed of the Turkish intentions and mounting preparations for the second invasion. On the 26 July the British Ambassador in Ankara alerted Callaghan for the preparation. On the10 August Air Vice Marshall F. R. L. Mellersh informed Callaghan of the likely Turkish plans. " Military aspects of the present situation - Likely Turkish plans. 1. The Turkish army is looking for an excuse to continue operations. The likely objective is to increase the size of their area to take in the entire East of Cyprus, bounded by a line from five miles east of Morphou, through southern suburbs of Nicosia and along the old Famagusta road to Famagusta. They consider that to achieve this they would launch a ground attack from their present position in the West and in Nicosia, combined with a parachute landing by two battalions in the Chatos enclave and possibly a beach landing in the northern of Famagusta Bay...".
Callaghan in Geneva sought to extract acceptance of geographical federation
Therefore, and although Callaghan knew full well that the Turks in Geneva had no genuine intentions of reaching an agreement, he was working earnestly towards extracting as many concessions as he could from the Greek and Greek Cypriot side on behalf of the Turks. Primarily their acceptance to the principle of geographical federation. Flash telegram from UK Mission in Geneva to Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 12 August read: "... The Turkish Government have tabled ambitious proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34% per cent of the island and have demanded a constructive reply by midnight. There is evidence, that, unless they receive such a reply, they will walk out of the Geneva conference and take military action in Cyprus early tomorrow morning. Slight prospect of a compromise and we are working on Clerides to table a counter draft which would at least concede the principle of geographical separation..."
On the 13 August Callaghan sent the following telegram to London. It read: " This morning Clerides handed Denktash a counter-proposal which, while it conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages, excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. I told Clerides and Mavros that this would not, in my judgement, satisfy the Turks. They had to face the reality that there would be no United States military pressure, that UNFICYP would not oppose the Turkish forces and that, as a result, there was no prospect of external help against Turkish aggression. I urged them to produce a counter-proposal which at least conceded the principle of geographical separation. Clerides said that he could not do so from Geneva: Greek Cypriot opinion was not ready and Makarios, with whom he spoke yesterday, would certainly disavow it. They agreed to fly to Athens and Nicosia to discuss the principle with their colleagues and to return tomorrow night a clear answer..."
However, as Callaghan knew very well, the Turks were not interested in agreeing to anything. They intended to attack and occupy more territory leaving the negotiating for later...
Draft Agreement
On the 13 August Callaghan read to Gl. Clerides and G. Mavros a draft agreement he had prepared for signature by Clerides and Denktash in the event of compromise. His draft referred to a fundamental revision of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, to a federal government with a bi-communal nature of two autonomous administrations operating in appropriately defined geographical areas.
R. Denktash surprised them by producing his own proposal for a clear bizonal bicommunal federation.
According to the British released documents Turkish Foreign Secretary Gunes' plan for six cantons presented at the Geneva conference on the 12 August was the result of pressure by Dr. H. Kissinger who originally disagreed with the bi-regional federation, or bi-zonal federation and which London was promoting together with the Turks. Therefore Denktash's move to follow the next day 'with his own plan' for bizonal bicommunal federation reflected much better the real Turkish objectives. The talks broke down on the 14 August followed by the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The geographical solution of "biregional federation"
On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office official Mr. A. C. Goodison, noted the following:
" It is important that we should avoid any suggestion that in favouring the geographical separation of the two communities as the most viable solution of the Cyprus problem, we are working for the partition of the island. Partition has a bad name internationally. It would also be contrary to our obligations, both under the 1960 Settlement and as a fellow-member with Cyprus of the Commonwealth and the United Nations. I recommend that we should use the term "bioregional federation". We should reserve the term 'cantonal federation' for Mr. Gunes's proposal involving more than one area for each community..."
The British policy at 'stage III' (after both Turkish invasions)
Clerides was 'their man'
On the same day in a separate note the Foreign Office records the following:
" Building up Mr. Clerides. The chances of a radical settlement in Cyprus depend on having Clerides rather than Makarios at Stage III. The Secretary of State has already embarrassed Makarios by moving him towards stating his terms before we resume in Geneva' this line could perhaps be developed to Clerides' benefit. But there is not much we can do about this. The danger of a declaration of enosis was greatest on 14 August; we should take no preventive action against this unless we have some indication that it is contemplated. We do not want to suggest that ideas of this kind are current, given the assurances of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots at Geneva. We must also encourage the Greeks to continue to help Clerides by removing undesirable Greek influences from Cyprus. We must do what we can to discourage reprisals against the Turkish Cypriot community outside the Turkish zone... We should stick to the Secretary of State's line that the Turks have a case even though their methods are regrettable.
Constraining the Turks. It would suit our strategy if the Turkish armed forces ended up with 25/30 per cent rather than 40 per cent of the island. But they cannot be negotiated with in their present self-confident mood. We should therefore do what we can to make them more amenable by stage III. The particularly difficult problem will be the possible enforced transfer of the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish occupied zone. In one sense this could facilitate the bi-regional federal solution; on the other hand it would increase the danger of reprisals against Turkish Cypriots...".
23 September 1974. During a meeting between Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and his Greek counterpart G. Mavros the former said that it was clear that Turkey would insist on the division of Cyprus into two zones and asked whether the Greek Government and President Makarios would accept such a solution so long as there was a central federal Government. Asked (by Mr. Tsounis) as to why the Archbishop should commit himself at that stage Mr. Callaghan said it was desirable in order to achieve a sense of realism and to give support to Mr. Clerides".
Between the period of September and end of November 1974 the British Government went out of its way in order to secure support for Mr. Gl. Clerides at the forthcoming Athens meeting set to take place end of November beginning of December between Makarios, Karamanlis, Clerides and others. The meeting was crucial for the pursued policy by London and Clerides. Archbishop Makarios was to be pressured into giving written consent for Clerides to negotiate on a basis of geographical federation. Otherwise Clerides threatened with resignation. The Turks insisted on a public acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of a solution based on geographical federation.
The 'Argo' speech
And it was in this context that Gl. Clerides on the 6 November 1974 dared to support publicly at the 'Argo' gallery in Nicosia the concept of a solution based on geographical federation. He said in his speech: "... What are the prospects of a solution to the Cyprus problems through negotiations without any illusions? First. Any thought that it is now possible for any solution to emerge on the basis of a unitary state is outside reality because Turkey would certainly not agree to discuss such a solution. If in the past there had been a possibility of finding a solution based on a unitary state/local autonomy for the Turks there is not such a possibility now. Second. Since the state cannot be unitary, the only solution that can now merge is that of a federal state. Such a solution can take various forms. It can be a cantonal solution through the creation of a number of cantons in which the Turks will be in the majority. This will be the best solution for us. The only solution can also be geographical federation based on two regions corresponding to the population ratio...".
On the 15 November 1974 James Callaghan sent the following oral message to Clerides.
" I understand that you will be going to Athens soon for a meeting with Karamanlis and Makarios. I realise how important this will be for your own political future and for the future of the Clerides/Denktash talks. I also appreciate how sensitive an issue the Archbishop's return is and, for your own information only, I shall be advising the Archbishop to consider postponing it. I sincerely hope that you will be able to secure the support of Karamanlis and of the Archbishop for your own pragmatic approach to a long term solution. You should know that I hope to see the Archbishop on 21 November and that, if Karamanlis is successful in the lections, we shall be sending a message to him, stressing the importance we both attach to giving support and substance to your talks with Denktash. I greatly welcomed your recent observation that some form of geographical federation is inevitable. As you know, my own firm conviction is that the Turks will insist on a bi-regional geographical solution. While I fully appreciate the difficulty about accepting this publicly, I am sure that you are right at the very least not to exclude it...We shall be doing our best to impress this on Archbishop Makarios...".
Glafkos Clerides according to numerous British documents was an ardent supporter of the bi-zonal federation from the early stages knowing full well that that was the desired Turkish goal. That was the reason the British Government was standing by him and doing everything possible in terms of influence and persuasion to secure the Archbishop's agreement. Such an agreement would give Clerides a free hand to proceed on the desired basis.
The following extract from a telegram sent to FCO by the British High Commissioner in Nicosia is indicative enough:
" Neither my American colleague nor I have the slightest indication of any Turkish wavering on bi-zonal federation as the basis for a Cyprus settlement. This has been reaffirmed to me recently by both Denktash and the Turkish charge here. Crawford denies having suggested to Christophides that the Americans had information to the contrary: He has indeed been doing his best to bring Christohides round to a realistic acceptance of bi-zonal federation as the only solution likely to be accepted by the Turks. He has, however, had discussions with both Christophides and Clerides ( as have I also) about the possibility of a multi-cantonal variant of bi-zonal federation. This would not be the functional federalism which I believe the Archbishop to favour...it would instead be essentially bi-zonal with Turkish retention of a northern zone stretching notionally from Panagra and Myrtou in the east to Famagusta in the east...as a negotiating gambit this would, for the Greeks, have the advantage of softening the stark outlines of bi-zonality, and it would have a marginally better chance of acceptance by the Turks than straight functional federalism...I understand that Clerides still hopes that Makarios can be persuaded by himself and Karamanlis at the Athens meeting not to return to Cyprus for the present. But if this attempt fails, as seems likely, Clerides would concentrate on getting the Archbishop's signature to a formula which might include an agreement that Clerides should initially negotiate with Denktash for a brief period on the basis of a multi-cantonal solution, but if this made no progress, should then be free to switch to a full bi-zonal federation. An essential feature would be the Archbishop's signed agreement to back a Clerides negotiation on this basis...A major objective at the present stage must however be to keep Clerides in play...".
On another telegram dated 26 November Olver wrote: "... On the form of a settlement, Clerides agreed that a bi-zonal federation was still the Turkish aim:..He proposed to work in Athens for a protocol in which this was the first negotiating gambit, but it was agreed to revert to a bi-zonal solution if this got nowhere".
Lord Caradon launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and consults the Foreign Office
Early in September 1974 Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon) launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and the same day has a meeting with the Foreign Office. They told him that they believed " the right solution is a bi-regional federal Cyprus. If we were to come out with this publicly and formally, it would, at this stage at any rate, risk others (particularly Makarios) stating their opposition to it equally publicly and formally. Clerides and Denktash both accept such an approach. It is premature to return to a Geneva-type conference...to do all we can in terms of quiet diplomacy to facilitate it. We hope to avoid other initiatives which will distract from it.".
The Kissinger factor
Dr. Kissinger originally preferred a solution based on the 1960 treaty
According to a telegram the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan sent to Prime Minister Wilson from New York, Kissinger (before the invasion) is recorded to support a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. It reads as follows:
" Kissinger stressed that he did not want to see a resolution to day at all. He was quite happy to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow at which Makarios could make a statement. But before any substantive move in the Council he hoped you would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London perhaps on Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support and would join us in presenting a proposal on which a security council resolution could then be based. I asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind. He though we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon, for instance, Clerides. In fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson, and ourselves and the Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice as they had never trusted him... Kissinger was clearly troubled that we might be committing ourselves too far without being able to calculate the longer-term consequences. He asked me to convey these further reflections to you at once, emphasising his deep concern...".
According to the British newly released documents a new picture is emerging vis-a-vis the role of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The documents reveal that contrary to what had been promoted since 1974 the real driving force behind the events and policies was indeed the British Government all along and not the Americans. Dr. Kissinger in many ways followed the British. The documents show disagreements over the Cyprus issue and particularly the solution. For instance before the Turkish invasion Kissinger supported a solution based on the 1960 Treaty but preferred Clerides to Makarios or Sampson. And it was only after the invasion that he showed preference to cantons but yet not to bi-zonal federation. The documents reveal that bi-zonal federation had been accepted by Kissinger on the strong insistence of the British Government.
On the 16 November 1974 Henry Kissinger wrote a letter to James Callaghan informing him of his talk with Makarios on the 13th and assured Callaghan that they (USA) supported the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable. It read:
"...In our discussion of the future of Cyprus, I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. He is reluctantly beginning to accept the idea of a federation, but he insists that there must be a multiplicity of cantons under a strong central government. I understand that since our meeting, Makarios has let it be known that the US still holds open the idea of a multi-cantonal arrangement. I want to assure you that we support the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable arrangement and on this I think we are in complete agreement.
The clouds however, over what actually Kissinger told Makarios did not go away. The British came to the conclusion that Makarios could not have invented everything. Another extract from a minute by the South East European Department of the Foreign Office read as follows:
" There is clearly some confusion over the views of the American Government. Makarios, mistakenly or mischievously, believes that Kissinger accepts and indeed wishes to promote a multi-cantonal solution, and has convinced the Greeks of this interpretation of the American position. Dr. Kissinger in his letter of 16 November to the Secretary of State says specifically " I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. However Mr. Ramsbotham's telegram 3729 (British Ambassador in Washington) of 16 November reporting his conversation with Dr. Kissinger puts the point a little more ambiguously. For example " he (Dr. Kissinger) had been careful not to say flatly (to Makarios) that the bi-regional solution was the preferred American one". We hope to clarify the American position in a further conversation...".
In Brussels in December 1974 Dr. Kissinger with the consent of the British Government promoted the restart of political talks between Clerides and Denktash but without preconditions as to the solution...
The diary of events
15 July 1974 - Military coup in Cyprus
17 July 1974 - President Makarios and Mr. Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, arrive in London. The former is received as President of Cyprus. They both have meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Callaghan asks Makarios if he wanted to see B. Ecevit. Makarios declined saying that there were so many Greek Cypriots in London he preferred to see them. Press reports speak of massive Turkish Army build-up. According a high NATO official, members of NATO at a Council meeting voiced 'broad support for the elected regime of President Makarios and the territorial integrity of the island of Cyprus.
18 July 1974 - President Makarios flies to New York to address UN. The Security Council acknowledges him as President. Mr. Sisco, U.S. under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, arrives in London. He meets Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit, who later leaves for Ankara. Mr. Kissinger flies to California.
19 July 1974 - President Makarios speaks to the Security Council alleging the Coup was organised by the Greek Military Regime,. U.S. ambassador Scali says this is an issue still to be determined, and warns against a power vacuum in Cyprus if Greek Officers are permanently removed. The Security Council adjourns without a decision.
The Turkish fleet sails from Mersin. Mr. Sisco goes from London to Athens to Ankara.
20 July 1974 - Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The UN Security Council unanimously calls for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and the opening of negotiations.
21 July 1974 - Mr. Kissinger in Washington. Mr. Sisco returns to Athens. Negotiations for a ceasefire.
22 July 1974 - Turkey and Greece accept ceasefire from 1400 GMT. After the fall of Kyrenia Mr. Ecevit is reported as stating it will now remain "forever Turkish".
23 July 1974 - Collapse of Junta in Greece. Mr. Constantine Karamanlis is called on to return and become Prime Minister. Nicos Sampson resigns, Mr. Glafkos Clerides is sworn in as President.
24 July 1974 - Mr. Karamanlis is sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece.
25 July 1974 - First Geneva Conference opens. Turks continue to build-up in Cyprus.
26 July 1974 - Turkish army continues to advance, captured Bellapais and had doubled area under its control since the cease fire.
28 July 1974 - Mr. George Mavros Greek F. Minister states that there was no question of Enosis and Greek Government requests special meetings of the Security Council and NATO Council in view of ceasefire violations.
29 July 1974 - Turkish Commanders ordered UN out of Kyrenia area. Continued reports of landing of Turkish tanks and troops.
30 July 1974 - Geneva Declaration signed, reaffirming ceasefire and establishing UN buffer zone. Ceasefire liens to be identified by 4-man military commission. Second Geneva Conference called for 8th August to consider constitutional issues.
31 July 1974 - UN confirms Turkish Army broken Geneva ceasefire by shelling Karavas and Lapithos.
4 August 1974 - A Turkish advance continues with daily fighting.
6 August 1974 - Lapithos, Karavas and Vasilia finally captured. Colonel Chakar, Turkish member of 4-man commission says that the attack does not violate the ceasefire because it is "mopping up small pockets of resistance".
8 August 1974 - Second round of Geneva talks begin.
9 August 1974 - Agreement on ceasefire lines is signed in Nicosia. At Geneva Turkey demands regional federation with more territory for Turkish Cypriots up to 34%. More than the Turkish Army already had captured.
13 August 1974 - Mr. Ecevit gave 24 hours to Greece to accept the Turkish proposals at Geneva.
14 August 1974 - 0200. Geneval talks break down. Mr. Callaghan requests meeting of UN and blames Turkey for not permitting 36 hours adjournment for consultation. 0500 major attack by Turkish army on a broad front.
15 August 1974 - State Department spokesman criticizes Turkey for invasion and says US will cut off arms to both Greece and Turkey if they go to war. Karamanlis announces Greece will not go to war but is withdrawing from military side of NATO.
16 August 1974 - Turkish army completes capture of Famagusta, and consolidates along 'Attila Line'. The British Foreign Office in co-operation with Gl. Clerides starts its adamant campaign in favour of the Turkish demand for bi-regional federation i.e. the bi-zonal bi-communal federation.
These are the most important revelations of the newly released documents. It should be noted that the most important documents relating to the coup (reports and FCO minutes) have been carefully retained as well as other documents. Also the Prime Minister's office was very unusually removing documents from selected files as late as days before their release.
Cyprus Weekly January 7-13 2005
Newly released British Documents for the year 1974 at the Public Records Office.
The British Government gives tacit clearance to Turkey to proceed with invasion and agrees to blockade the Greeks from helping Cyprus.
Following the coup in Cyprus Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit visited London for negotiations with the British Government.
According to the record of conversation on July 17, 1974, between the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary James Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit the latter bluntly asked for the British Government's cooperation to invade Cyprus through the British Sovereign Bases.
Ecevit clearly stated at the time that such the objective of the operation would be to restore the constitutional order overthrown by the coup of the Greek junta that forced President Makarios to flee the island.
Although the British Government refused to join Turkey in such an operation they promised Ecevit to 'help' by agreeing to prevent Greece from sending assistance to Cyprus. However, the revealing factor in this case is the concealed intention of Turkey to invade and occupy the whole of the island if one considers the location of the British Bases in Cyprus.
The relevant extracts are as follows:
Mr Ecevit, beginning the discussion at the dinner table, said that the events in Cyprus amounted to no ordinary coup d’ etat but constituted a violation of international treaties.
Britain and Turkey, jointly or separately, should state that they did not recognise the new regime and that the old administration must be restored. If Makarios could not return, the Constitutional provisions should apply. As the two guarantors under the 1960 Treaty Britain and Turkey and the United States should warn Greece of the violation of the independence of Cyprus which had taken place, and should ask for the withdrawal of Greek forces under effective UN supervision. There should also be international agreement about effective control in the situation thereafter.
"...There should also be sanctions: a more effective Turkish presence on the island was essential, and Turkey wished to bring this about in co-operation with the British Government as the other guarantor, in order to safeguard both communities. The Turkish Government did not wish to exploit the situation in Cyprus, not did they wish to act alone and create anxieties thereby. The British Government was in a position to help Turkey to achieve this result, and to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey. This could be done by allowing Turkey to send her forces to Cyprus through the British SBAs. He felt that this was a historic moment to use the bases to ensure the independence of Cyprus. Everyone, including the United States and the Soviet Union, would welcome such action which would justify the British military presence. He felt that action of this kind, coupled with a joint statement of British and Turkish objectives, would be a relief to the whole population of Cyprus and also to the population of Greece...The alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he felt would be inevitable later if not sooner - later would be worse and bloodier. If Britain were prepared to accept action on these lines, the Turkish authorities would be careful to avoid any embarrassment, by agreement on the deployment of Turkish forces...".
"...The Prime Minister said that he thought that he understood the meaning of Mr. Ecevit's remarks. If the situation of the Turkish community on the island, deteriorated, Turkey would feel it necessary to intervene. But he did not think that the SBAs could be used for that kind of intervention. Mr. Ecevit replied that he could not insist on the point. The bases were not essential for his purpose...The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr. Ecevit's remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible...".
Wilson rejects Caramanlis peace offer
Britain turns down Constantine Caramanlis in line with promise given to Ecevit
After the restoration of democracy in Greece the new Prime Minister K. Karamanlis asked Britain to intervene militarily and to condemn publicly the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The released documents reveal that the British Government had no intention of going as far as a public statement condemning the Turks and that it was still necessary for them to maintain a degree of even-handidness. On the 28 July 1974 a suggested text of reply from Prime Minister Wilson to Karamanlis was prepared which included the following: " You refer to our right and our power to intervene in order to prevent the generalisation of the conflict. If I am right in interpreting this as a suggestion that HMG should use military force I am bound to say that I cannot believe that this would do otherwise than exacerbate and complicate the situation...I am sure you will agree there can be no question of unilateral British military intervention under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution No.353, which we have all accepted. In the light of your message, I am sending a personal appeal to Mr. Ecevit to ensure that violations of the ceasefire are effectively brought to an end. I am sure that I can look to you to do the same.".
On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office informed the Private Secretary at No.10 Downing Street that together with the Americans they had warned the Karamanlis Government that they would not support any Greek military assistance to Cyprus. The Foreign Office document relating to the relevant message given to Mr. Karamanlis reads as follows:
"...There is a real risk that the Greeks will try to send a division by convoy from Crete to Cyprus. We and the Americans have told them that we would not support such action and would not be prepared to guarantee them air protection against the Turkish air force..."
The Turkish Air Force sunk their own destroyer
According to a progress report prepared for the Prime Minister, and whilst the Geneva Conference opened, the Turks were continuing to fan out from Kyrenia, particularly towards the South East. Turkish ships were still arriving in the port but they seemed to contain supplies rather than troop reinforcements. The British estimated that the Turks had by then 10,000 men, 44 tanks and 88 helicopters in Cyprus - they were the strongest land force there. The British in Cyprus were monitoring every movement and knew everything in full detail. The note to the Prime Minister said: "...the Turks are sensitive about our continuing reconnaissance flights over Kyrenia, but we have a legal right to conduct these and have told them so. Meanwhile, Ecevit has thanked us warmly for rescuing 72 Turks from the sea, who were part of the complement of a Turkish destroyer sunk by the Turkish Air Force."
HMS Hermes and company
HMS Hermes with 41 Commando Group embarked was warned off for operations in Cyprus at approximately 2215 16 July 1974. 41 Commando's Advance Party landed in Dhekelia at 1600 20 July 1974. The unit was given the task of securing the ESBA and receiving refugees.
According to various maps in recently released files HMS Hermes was not the only military ship cruising around Cyprus at the time of the Turkish invasion but one of many that actually had Cyprus 'under siege'. The position of some was only known to the United Kingdom and United States Governments.
Callaghan was informed in advance of the second invasion
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan whilst in Geneva was fully informed of the Turkish intentions and mounting preparations for the second invasion. On the 26 July the British Ambassador in Ankara alerted Callaghan for the preparation. On the10 August Air Vice Marshall F. R. L. Mellersh informed Callaghan of the likely Turkish plans. " Military aspects of the present situation - Likely Turkish plans. 1. The Turkish army is looking for an excuse to continue operations. The likely objective is to increase the size of their area to take in the entire East of Cyprus, bounded by a line from five miles east of Morphou, through southern suburbs of Nicosia and along the old Famagusta road to Famagusta. They consider that to achieve this they would launch a ground attack from their present position in the West and in Nicosia, combined with a parachute landing by two battalions in the Chatos enclave and possibly a beach landing in the northern of Famagusta Bay...".
Callaghan in Geneva sought to extract acceptance of geographical federation
Therefore, and although Callaghan knew full well that the Turks in Geneva had no genuine intentions of reaching an agreement, he was working earnestly towards extracting as many concessions as he could from the Greek and Greek Cypriot side on behalf of the Turks. Primarily their acceptance to the principle of geographical federation. Flash telegram from UK Mission in Geneva to Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 12 August read: "... The Turkish Government have tabled ambitious proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34% per cent of the island and have demanded a constructive reply by midnight. There is evidence, that, unless they receive such a reply, they will walk out of the Geneva conference and take military action in Cyprus early tomorrow morning. Slight prospect of a compromise and we are working on Clerides to table a counter draft which would at least concede the principle of geographical separation..."
On the 13 August Callaghan sent the following telegram to London. It read: " This morning Clerides handed Denktash a counter-proposal which, while it conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages, excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. I told Clerides and Mavros that this would not, in my judgement, satisfy the Turks. They had to face the reality that there would be no United States military pressure, that UNFICYP would not oppose the Turkish forces and that, as a result, there was no prospect of external help against Turkish aggression. I urged them to produce a counter-proposal which at least conceded the principle of geographical separation. Clerides said that he could not do so from Geneva: Greek Cypriot opinion was not ready and Makarios, with whom he spoke yesterday, would certainly disavow it. They agreed to fly to Athens and Nicosia to discuss the principle with their colleagues and to return tomorrow night a clear answer..."
However, as Callaghan knew very well, the Turks were not interested in agreeing to anything. They intended to attack and occupy more territory leaving the negotiating for later...
Draft Agreement
On the 13 August Callaghan read to Gl. Clerides and G. Mavros a draft agreement he had prepared for signature by Clerides and Denktash in the event of compromise. His draft referred to a fundamental revision of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, to a federal government with a bi-communal nature of two autonomous administrations operating in appropriately defined geographical areas.
R. Denktash surprised them by producing his own proposal for a clear bizonal bicommunal federation.
According to the British released documents Turkish Foreign Secretary Gunes' plan for six cantons presented at the Geneva conference on the 12 August was the result of pressure by Dr. H. Kissinger who originally disagreed with the bi-regional federation, or bi-zonal federation and which London was promoting together with the Turks. Therefore Denktash's move to follow the next day 'with his own plan' for bizonal bicommunal federation reflected much better the real Turkish objectives. The talks broke down on the 14 August followed by the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The geographical solution of "biregional federation"
On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office official Mr. A. C. Goodison, noted the following:
" It is important that we should avoid any suggestion that in favouring the geographical separation of the two communities as the most viable solution of the Cyprus problem, we are working for the partition of the island. Partition has a bad name internationally. It would also be contrary to our obligations, both under the 1960 Settlement and as a fellow-member with Cyprus of the Commonwealth and the United Nations. I recommend that we should use the term "bioregional federation". We should reserve the term 'cantonal federation' for Mr. Gunes's proposal involving more than one area for each community..."
The British policy at 'stage III' (after both Turkish invasions)
Clerides was 'their man'
On the same day in a separate note the Foreign Office records the following:
" Building up Mr. Clerides. The chances of a radical settlement in Cyprus depend on having Clerides rather than Makarios at Stage III. The Secretary of State has already embarrassed Makarios by moving him towards stating his terms before we resume in Geneva' this line could perhaps be developed to Clerides' benefit. But there is not much we can do about this. The danger of a declaration of enosis was greatest on 14 August; we should take no preventive action against this unless we have some indication that it is contemplated. We do not want to suggest that ideas of this kind are current, given the assurances of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots at Geneva. We must also encourage the Greeks to continue to help Clerides by removing undesirable Greek influences from Cyprus. We must do what we can to discourage reprisals against the Turkish Cypriot community outside the Turkish zone... We should stick to the Secretary of State's line that the Turks have a case even though their methods are regrettable.
Constraining the Turks. It would suit our strategy if the Turkish armed forces ended up with 25/30 per cent rather than 40 per cent of the island. But they cannot be negotiated with in their present self-confident mood. We should therefore do what we can to make them more amenable by stage III. The particularly difficult problem will be the possible enforced transfer of the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish occupied zone. In one sense this could facilitate the bi-regional federal solution; on the other hand it would increase the danger of reprisals against Turkish Cypriots...".
23 September 1974. During a meeting between Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and his Greek counterpart G. Mavros the former said that it was clear that Turkey would insist on the division of Cyprus into two zones and asked whether the Greek Government and President Makarios would accept such a solution so long as there was a central federal Government. Asked (by Mr. Tsounis) as to why the Archbishop should commit himself at that stage Mr. Callaghan said it was desirable in order to achieve a sense of realism and to give support to Mr. Clerides".
Between the period of September and end of November 1974 the British Government went out of its way in order to secure support for Mr. Gl. Clerides at the forthcoming Athens meeting set to take place end of November beginning of December between Makarios, Karamanlis, Clerides and others. The meeting was crucial for the pursued policy by London and Clerides. Archbishop Makarios was to be pressured into giving written consent for Clerides to negotiate on a basis of geographical federation. Otherwise Clerides threatened with resignation. The Turks insisted on a public acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of a solution based on geographical federation.
The 'Argo' speech
And it was in this context that Gl. Clerides on the 6 November 1974 dared to support publicly at the 'Argo' gallery in Nicosia the concept of a solution based on geographical federation. He said in his speech: "... What are the prospects of a solution to the Cyprus problems through negotiations without any illusions? First. Any thought that it is now possible for any solution to emerge on the basis of a unitary state is outside reality because Turkey would certainly not agree to discuss such a solution. If in the past there had been a possibility of finding a solution based on a unitary state/local autonomy for the Turks there is not such a possibility now. Second. Since the state cannot be unitary, the only solution that can now merge is that of a federal state. Such a solution can take various forms. It can be a cantonal solution through the creation of a number of cantons in which the Turks will be in the majority. This will be the best solution for us. The only solution can also be geographical federation based on two regions corresponding to the population ratio...".
On the 15 November 1974 James Callaghan sent the following oral message to Clerides.
" I understand that you will be going to Athens soon for a meeting with Karamanlis and Makarios. I realise how important this will be for your own political future and for the future of the Clerides/Denktash talks. I also appreciate how sensitive an issue the Archbishop's return is and, for your own information only, I shall be advising the Archbishop to consider postponing it. I sincerely hope that you will be able to secure the support of Karamanlis and of the Archbishop for your own pragmatic approach to a long term solution. You should know that I hope to see the Archbishop on 21 November and that, if Karamanlis is successful in the lections, we shall be sending a message to him, stressing the importance we both attach to giving support and substance to your talks with Denktash. I greatly welcomed your recent observation that some form of geographical federation is inevitable. As you know, my own firm conviction is that the Turks will insist on a bi-regional geographical solution. While I fully appreciate the difficulty about accepting this publicly, I am sure that you are right at the very least not to exclude it...We shall be doing our best to impress this on Archbishop Makarios...".
Glafkos Clerides according to numerous British documents was an ardent supporter of the bi-zonal federation from the early stages knowing full well that that was the desired Turkish goal. That was the reason the British Government was standing by him and doing everything possible in terms of influence and persuasion to secure the Archbishop's agreement. Such an agreement would give Clerides a free hand to proceed on the desired basis.
The following extract from a telegram sent to FCO by the British High Commissioner in Nicosia is indicative enough:
" Neither my American colleague nor I have the slightest indication of any Turkish wavering on bi-zonal federation as the basis for a Cyprus settlement. This has been reaffirmed to me recently by both Denktash and the Turkish charge here. Crawford denies having suggested to Christophides that the Americans had information to the contrary: He has indeed been doing his best to bring Christohides round to a realistic acceptance of bi-zonal federation as the only solution likely to be accepted by the Turks. He has, however, had discussions with both Christophides and Clerides ( as have I also) about the possibility of a multi-cantonal variant of bi-zonal federation. This would not be the functional federalism which I believe the Archbishop to favour...it would instead be essentially bi-zonal with Turkish retention of a northern zone stretching notionally from Panagra and Myrtou in the east to Famagusta in the east...as a negotiating gambit this would, for the Greeks, have the advantage of softening the stark outlines of bi-zonality, and it would have a marginally better chance of acceptance by the Turks than straight functional federalism...I understand that Clerides still hopes that Makarios can be persuaded by himself and Karamanlis at the Athens meeting not to return to Cyprus for the present. But if this attempt fails, as seems likely, Clerides would concentrate on getting the Archbishop's signature to a formula which might include an agreement that Clerides should initially negotiate with Denktash for a brief period on the basis of a multi-cantonal solution, but if this made no progress, should then be free to switch to a full bi-zonal federation. An essential feature would be the Archbishop's signed agreement to back a Clerides negotiation on this basis...A major objective at the present stage must however be to keep Clerides in play...".
On another telegram dated 26 November Olver wrote: "... On the form of a settlement, Clerides agreed that a bi-zonal federation was still the Turkish aim:..He proposed to work in Athens for a protocol in which this was the first negotiating gambit, but it was agreed to revert to a bi-zonal solution if this got nowhere".
Lord Caradon launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and consults the Foreign Office
Early in September 1974 Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon) launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and the same day has a meeting with the Foreign Office. They told him that they believed " the right solution is a bi-regional federal Cyprus. If we were to come out with this publicly and formally, it would, at this stage at any rate, risk others (particularly Makarios) stating their opposition to it equally publicly and formally. Clerides and Denktash both accept such an approach. It is premature to return to a Geneva-type conference...to do all we can in terms of quiet diplomacy to facilitate it. We hope to avoid other initiatives which will distract from it.".
The Kissinger factor
Dr. Kissinger originally preferred a solution based on the 1960 treaty
According to a telegram the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan sent to Prime Minister Wilson from New York, Kissinger (before the invasion) is recorded to support a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. It reads as follows:
" Kissinger stressed that he did not want to see a resolution to day at all. He was quite happy to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow at which Makarios could make a statement. But before any substantive move in the Council he hoped you would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London perhaps on Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support and would join us in presenting a proposal on which a security council resolution could then be based. I asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind. He though we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon, for instance, Clerides. In fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson, and ourselves and the Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice as they had never trusted him... Kissinger was clearly troubled that we might be committing ourselves too far without being able to calculate the longer-term consequences. He asked me to convey these further reflections to you at once, emphasising his deep concern...".
According to the British newly released documents a new picture is emerging vis-a-vis the role of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The documents reveal that contrary to what had been promoted since 1974 the real driving force behind the events and policies was indeed the British Government all along and not the Americans. Dr. Kissinger in many ways followed the British. The documents show disagreements over the Cyprus issue and particularly the solution. For instance before the Turkish invasion Kissinger supported a solution based on the 1960 Treaty but preferred Clerides to Makarios or Sampson. And it was only after the invasion that he showed preference to cantons but yet not to bi-zonal federation. The documents reveal that bi-zonal federation had been accepted by Kissinger on the strong insistence of the British Government.
On the 16 November 1974 Henry Kissinger wrote a letter to James Callaghan informing him of his talk with Makarios on the 13th and assured Callaghan that they (USA) supported the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable. It read:
"...In our discussion of the future of Cyprus, I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. He is reluctantly beginning to accept the idea of a federation, but he insists that there must be a multiplicity of cantons under a strong central government. I understand that since our meeting, Makarios has let it be known that the US still holds open the idea of a multi-cantonal arrangement. I want to assure you that we support the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable arrangement and on this I think we are in complete agreement.
The clouds however, over what actually Kissinger told Makarios did not go away. The British came to the conclusion that Makarios could not have invented everything. Another extract from a minute by the South East European Department of the Foreign Office read as follows:
" There is clearly some confusion over the views of the American Government. Makarios, mistakenly or mischievously, believes that Kissinger accepts and indeed wishes to promote a multi-cantonal solution, and has convinced the Greeks of this interpretation of the American position. Dr. Kissinger in his letter of 16 November to the Secretary of State says specifically " I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. However Mr. Ramsbotham's telegram 3729 (British Ambassador in Washington) of 16 November reporting his conversation with Dr. Kissinger puts the point a little more ambiguously. For example " he (Dr. Kissinger) had been careful not to say flatly (to Makarios) that the bi-regional solution was the preferred American one". We hope to clarify the American position in a further conversation...".
In Brussels in December 1974 Dr. Kissinger with the consent of the British Government promoted the restart of political talks between Clerides and Denktash but without preconditions as to the solution...
The diary of events
15 July 1974 - Military coup in Cyprus
17 July 1974 - President Makarios and Mr. Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, arrive in London. The former is received as President of Cyprus. They both have meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Callaghan asks Makarios if he wanted to see B. Ecevit. Makarios declined saying that there were so many Greek Cypriots in London he preferred to see them. Press reports speak of massive Turkish Army build-up. According a high NATO official, members of NATO at a Council meeting voiced 'broad support for the elected regime of President Makarios and the territorial integrity of the island of Cyprus.
18 July 1974 - President Makarios flies to New York to address UN. The Security Council acknowledges him as President. Mr. Sisco, U.S. under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, arrives in London. He meets Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit, who later leaves for Ankara. Mr. Kissinger flies to California.
19 July 1974 - President Makarios speaks to the Security Council alleging the Coup was organised by the Greek Military Regime,. U.S. ambassador Scali says this is an issue still to be determined, and warns against a power vacuum in Cyprus if Greek Officers are permanently removed. The Security Council adjourns without a decision.
The Turkish fleet sails from Mersin. Mr. Sisco goes from London to Athens to Ankara.
20 July 1974 - Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The UN Security Council unanimously calls for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and the opening of negotiations.
21 July 1974 - Mr. Kissinger in Washington. Mr. Sisco returns to Athens. Negotiations for a ceasefire.
22 July 1974 - Turkey and Greece accept ceasefire from 1400 GMT. After the fall of Kyrenia Mr. Ecevit is reported as stating it will now remain "forever Turkish".
23 July 1974 - Collapse of Junta in Greece. Mr. Constantine Karamanlis is called on to return and become Prime Minister. Nicos Sampson resigns, Mr. Glafkos Clerides is sworn in as President.
24 July 1974 - Mr. Karamanlis is sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece.
25 July 1974 - First Geneva Conference opens. Turks continue to build-up in Cyprus.
26 July 1974 - Turkish army continues to advance, captured Bellapais and had doubled area under its control since the cease fire.
28 July 1974 - Mr. George Mavros Greek F. Minister states that there was no question of Enosis and Greek Government requests special meetings of the Security Council and NATO Council in view of ceasefire violations.
29 July 1974 - Turkish Commanders ordered UN out of Kyrenia area. Continued reports of landing of Turkish tanks and troops.
30 July 1974 - Geneva Declaration signed, reaffirming ceasefire and establishing UN buffer zone. Ceasefire liens to be identified by 4-man military commission. Second Geneva Conference called for 8th August to consider constitutional issues.
31 July 1974 - UN confirms Turkish Army broken Geneva ceasefire by shelling Karavas and Lapithos.
4 August 1974 - A Turkish advance continues with daily fighting.
6 August 1974 - Lapithos, Karavas and Vasilia finally captured. Colonel Chakar, Turkish member of 4-man commission says that the attack does not violate the ceasefire because it is "mopping up small pockets of resistance".
8 August 1974 - Second round of Geneva talks begin.
9 August 1974 - Agreement on ceasefire lines is signed in Nicosia. At Geneva Turkey demands regional federation with more territory for Turkish Cypriots up to 34%. More than the Turkish Army already had captured.
13 August 1974 - Mr. Ecevit gave 24 hours to Greece to accept the Turkish proposals at Geneva.
14 August 1974 - 0200. Geneval talks break down. Mr. Callaghan requests meeting of UN and blames Turkey for not permitting 36 hours adjournment for consultation. 0500 major attack by Turkish army on a broad front.
15 August 1974 - State Department spokesman criticizes Turkey for invasion and says US will cut off arms to both Greece and Turkey if they go to war. Karamanlis announces Greece will not go to war but is withdrawing from military side of NATO.
16 August 1974 - Turkish army completes capture of Famagusta, and consolidates along 'Attila Line'. The British Foreign Office in co-operation with Gl. Clerides starts its adamant campaign in favour of the Turkish demand for bi-regional federation i.e. the bi-zonal bi-communal federation.
These are the most important revelations of the newly released documents. It should be noted that the most important documents relating to the coup (reports and FCO minutes) have been carefully retained as well as other documents. Also the Prime Minister's office was very unusually removing documents from selected files as late as days before their release.
Cyprus Weekly January 7-13 2005
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boomerang - Main Contributor
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by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:51 pm
BRITAIN SABOTAGES BI-COMMUNAL AGREEMENT
What was Papadopoulos’ role in 1960s bicommunal talks?
Accussed of being both a Brit basher and schmoozing up to the government, MARTIN PACKARD attempts to put the record straight
First, honoured as I am to be referred to as a 'spook', I have never in fact been a spy or an 'intelligence agent'. While serving as a Royal Navy officer, I did have a three-year stint as intelligence adviser to NATO's Comedsoueast and to the UK's C-in-C Mediterranean, but I was acting simply as an analyst and the job didn't make me a member of the professional intelligence community. What it did do was give me access to diplomatic and intelligence reporting from throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, much of which I found to be either biased or inaccurate when it referred to areas of which I had personal knowledge.
Nor have I ever worked for the British Foreign Office, which will have been a matter of relief to that establishment.
I was sent by the Navy to Cyprus on January 6, 1964, solely because General Peter Young, who had just taken command of Joint Force (the original peacekeeping operation), had asked for the secondment of officers qualified as Greek-language interpreters, of whom I was one.
By General Young, I was mandated to lead, with officers from ELOYK and TUROYK, a I tripartite mediating initiative for the northern areas of Cyprus. I was assured by the general that I could consider my loyalties to be wholly committed to the Cypriot people, rather than to any ulterior British agenda, and I received very strong support from President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk and from most of the other key leaders in both communities. The initiative was bottom-up, starting at village coffee-shop level, whereby we acquired an intimate knowledge of all of the real problems of rural Cyprus. We worked our way through every instance of confrontation, finding solutions sometimes through local understandings and sometimes through negotiation with leadership figures in Nicosia.
The tripartite mediating process had remarkable success. It, rather than regular British army units, was principally responsible for turning back the anarchy that had momentarily enveloped rural Cyprus and for re-establishing working partnerships in every mixed area of the island. From there it moved on to island-wide projects.
The success of the initiative derived from the fact that it was wholly answerable to the Cypriot people (but could call on military support if needed), that it talked to people in their own language, that it was strongly supported by (and had private access to) the leaderships and key figures in both communities, that it had intimate knowledge of the real causes of dispute in every case, that it recognised the traumas, the insecurities and emotional ingredients of each situation that it faced. We were also able to feel out the limits to which re-engagement was possible and to establish quiet progress away from the glare of publicity or the interference of foreign interventionists.
The momentum that was created through the tripartite initiative could, if properly fostered, have led to a new bi-communal partnership under more realistic terms than were possible under the 1960 constitution. There were compromises available that could have been ring-fenced against extremism and foreign intervention and that would have satisfied the need of both communities for real security.
In early June 1964 agreement was achieved, with approval from the Organisation, the Secret Army, TMT and all relevant political and local leaders, for a return of the Turkish Cypriots to some of the mixed villages they had abandoned. This was not a solving of the Cyprus problem but it was a vital step forward. The plan required the provision by UNFICYP of escort and policing arrangements, for which I already had the go-ahead from the UN's mediating directorate.
General Young had been replaced in February (accused in London of being 'too pro- Cypriot') by the hard-line General Carver. As soon as Carver learned of the agreement, I was told to consider myself under open arrest: the following day I was removed unceremoniously from Cyprus (despite pleas from Makarios, Kutchuk and the UN that I stay) and my mediating operation was dismantled. Movement stopped in all those areas of communal re-engagement for which my unit had provided the interface and the glue.
I was told at the time by both UK and US ministers that I had exceeded my role and failed to understand that the NATO target was for communal separation.
My key Greek Cypriot contacts were not starry-eyed idealists but pragmatic men who were prepared to go forward from the disaster of Christmas ’63 and accept that the future well-being of Cyprus would depend on a workable bi-communal partnership in which their Turkish Cypriot co-islanders would feel wholly secure. My key Turkish Cypriot contacts believed that their culture and history could be preserved and their security and rights of equality safeguarded within an achievable arrangement that would build on a common attachment to a shared Cypriot future.
I hope that I am not, as you suggest, a traditional 'Brit-basher', nor am I a conspiracy-theorist. I do believe that Britain, like every other nation, will always seek to pursue its own interests. Unhappily for Cyprus, Britain considers that it has a special relationship with the Turkish army and one aspect of its policies in the eastern Mediterranean has frequently been the promotion of communal separateness in order to provide counter-balances or influence. I believe that since the 1960s there have been opportunities for Britain to promote a regional convergence between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus that were neglected in favour of traditional 'divide-and-rule' theory. I believe this neglect has been very damaging to Turkey and Greece as well as to the Cypriots and that Britain has failed to garner huge benefits that could have accrued from an alternative route. I also believe that it would not hurt the British government to apologise to the Cypriot people for its past contribution to communal division.
The British intelligence and military establishments wanted to hang on to the whole of Cyprus in perpetuity. Since the 1950s Ankara has repeatedly involved itself in the internal affairs of the island, claiming that its national security was at risk. The Greek-initiated coup d'etat of 1974 was run from a blueprint prepared, with US prompting, in Athens in 1964, when Greece was under democratic government. Cyprus has been subject to consistent interference and subversion from abroad. This is not to absolve Cypriot politicians of responsibility for their mistakes but it suggests that they should be careful of putting much faith in foreign planning for their future.
The events of early 1964 have never been clearly explained to the Cypriot public and have been grossly distorted by foreign commentators. The truth about them is essentially unifying rather than divisive.
The mediating process then, which came close to success, depended on two men, Tassos Papadopoulos and Fazil Kutchuk. Each was a Cypriot nationalist, rather than a Greek or Turkish one; but each was prepared to seek a new and workable partnership. Maybe it was a recoil from the abyss but no snide belittlement can alter the fact of what. they achieved, or sought to achieve, during the period that I was working with them. The conquering of violence and the survival of a great number of Turkish Cypriots stemmed from that co-operation and from the conciliatory efforts that were spearheaded by Papadopoulos: I say this not because of friendship or respect but as a witness to events in which I was involved.
I was asked some time ago by the Clerides government to create a record of the mediating process in 1964 and was helped with the expenses of doing so. The Turkish Cypriots also offered financial support. I hope the finished work will be a useful contribution to the national archive of Cyprus.
I was unhappy with the Annan Plan and with the Wilton Park conference because they seemed to me rooted in the concept of a permanence of communal separation rather than being helpful to the creation a framework for an 'organic' process of evolving re-engagement. Equally I am saddened to see such mudslinging between 'Yes' voters and 'No' voters, at a time when tolerance, mutual understanding and objectivity could pay real dividends. Annan 5 clearly had very serious shortcomings: the division between those who thought its faults made it unacceptable and those who thought that nothing better might become available needs to be bridged for the common good. The mutual demonising, eminently exploitable from abroad, surely needs to end otherwise Cypriots will lose another opportunity to be the deciders of their own future.
The events of early 1964 made me an optimist. They also made me a profound believer in the ability of Cypriots to resolve their own problems when given a suitable framework within which to do so.
Two weeks ago, Packard appeared on a CyBC interview programme where he was presented as a former member of the British Secret Services
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 6 March 2005
What was Papadopoulos’ role in 1960s bicommunal talks?
Accussed of being both a Brit basher and schmoozing up to the government, MARTIN PACKARD attempts to put the record straight
First, honoured as I am to be referred to as a 'spook', I have never in fact been a spy or an 'intelligence agent'. While serving as a Royal Navy officer, I did have a three-year stint as intelligence adviser to NATO's Comedsoueast and to the UK's C-in-C Mediterranean, but I was acting simply as an analyst and the job didn't make me a member of the professional intelligence community. What it did do was give me access to diplomatic and intelligence reporting from throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, much of which I found to be either biased or inaccurate when it referred to areas of which I had personal knowledge.
Nor have I ever worked for the British Foreign Office, which will have been a matter of relief to that establishment.
I was sent by the Navy to Cyprus on January 6, 1964, solely because General Peter Young, who had just taken command of Joint Force (the original peacekeeping operation), had asked for the secondment of officers qualified as Greek-language interpreters, of whom I was one.
By General Young, I was mandated to lead, with officers from ELOYK and TUROYK, a I tripartite mediating initiative for the northern areas of Cyprus. I was assured by the general that I could consider my loyalties to be wholly committed to the Cypriot people, rather than to any ulterior British agenda, and I received very strong support from President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk and from most of the other key leaders in both communities. The initiative was bottom-up, starting at village coffee-shop level, whereby we acquired an intimate knowledge of all of the real problems of rural Cyprus. We worked our way through every instance of confrontation, finding solutions sometimes through local understandings and sometimes through negotiation with leadership figures in Nicosia.
The tripartite mediating process had remarkable success. It, rather than regular British army units, was principally responsible for turning back the anarchy that had momentarily enveloped rural Cyprus and for re-establishing working partnerships in every mixed area of the island. From there it moved on to island-wide projects.
The success of the initiative derived from the fact that it was wholly answerable to the Cypriot people (but could call on military support if needed), that it talked to people in their own language, that it was strongly supported by (and had private access to) the leaderships and key figures in both communities, that it had intimate knowledge of the real causes of dispute in every case, that it recognised the traumas, the insecurities and emotional ingredients of each situation that it faced. We were also able to feel out the limits to which re-engagement was possible and to establish quiet progress away from the glare of publicity or the interference of foreign interventionists.
The momentum that was created through the tripartite initiative could, if properly fostered, have led to a new bi-communal partnership under more realistic terms than were possible under the 1960 constitution. There were compromises available that could have been ring-fenced against extremism and foreign intervention and that would have satisfied the need of both communities for real security.
In early June 1964 agreement was achieved, with approval from the Organisation, the Secret Army, TMT and all relevant political and local leaders, for a return of the Turkish Cypriots to some of the mixed villages they had abandoned. This was not a solving of the Cyprus problem but it was a vital step forward. The plan required the provision by UNFICYP of escort and policing arrangements, for which I already had the go-ahead from the UN's mediating directorate.
General Young had been replaced in February (accused in London of being 'too pro- Cypriot') by the hard-line General Carver. As soon as Carver learned of the agreement, I was told to consider myself under open arrest: the following day I was removed unceremoniously from Cyprus (despite pleas from Makarios, Kutchuk and the UN that I stay) and my mediating operation was dismantled. Movement stopped in all those areas of communal re-engagement for which my unit had provided the interface and the glue.
I was told at the time by both UK and US ministers that I had exceeded my role and failed to understand that the NATO target was for communal separation.
My key Greek Cypriot contacts were not starry-eyed idealists but pragmatic men who were prepared to go forward from the disaster of Christmas ’63 and accept that the future well-being of Cyprus would depend on a workable bi-communal partnership in which their Turkish Cypriot co-islanders would feel wholly secure. My key Turkish Cypriot contacts believed that their culture and history could be preserved and their security and rights of equality safeguarded within an achievable arrangement that would build on a common attachment to a shared Cypriot future.
I hope that I am not, as you suggest, a traditional 'Brit-basher', nor am I a conspiracy-theorist. I do believe that Britain, like every other nation, will always seek to pursue its own interests. Unhappily for Cyprus, Britain considers that it has a special relationship with the Turkish army and one aspect of its policies in the eastern Mediterranean has frequently been the promotion of communal separateness in order to provide counter-balances or influence. I believe that since the 1960s there have been opportunities for Britain to promote a regional convergence between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus that were neglected in favour of traditional 'divide-and-rule' theory. I believe this neglect has been very damaging to Turkey and Greece as well as to the Cypriots and that Britain has failed to garner huge benefits that could have accrued from an alternative route. I also believe that it would not hurt the British government to apologise to the Cypriot people for its past contribution to communal division.
The British intelligence and military establishments wanted to hang on to the whole of Cyprus in perpetuity. Since the 1950s Ankara has repeatedly involved itself in the internal affairs of the island, claiming that its national security was at risk. The Greek-initiated coup d'etat of 1974 was run from a blueprint prepared, with US prompting, in Athens in 1964, when Greece was under democratic government. Cyprus has been subject to consistent interference and subversion from abroad. This is not to absolve Cypriot politicians of responsibility for their mistakes but it suggests that they should be careful of putting much faith in foreign planning for their future.
The events of early 1964 have never been clearly explained to the Cypriot public and have been grossly distorted by foreign commentators. The truth about them is essentially unifying rather than divisive.
The mediating process then, which came close to success, depended on two men, Tassos Papadopoulos and Fazil Kutchuk. Each was a Cypriot nationalist, rather than a Greek or Turkish one; but each was prepared to seek a new and workable partnership. Maybe it was a recoil from the abyss but no snide belittlement can alter the fact of what. they achieved, or sought to achieve, during the period that I was working with them. The conquering of violence and the survival of a great number of Turkish Cypriots stemmed from that co-operation and from the conciliatory efforts that were spearheaded by Papadopoulos: I say this not because of friendship or respect but as a witness to events in which I was involved.
I was asked some time ago by the Clerides government to create a record of the mediating process in 1964 and was helped with the expenses of doing so. The Turkish Cypriots also offered financial support. I hope the finished work will be a useful contribution to the national archive of Cyprus.
I was unhappy with the Annan Plan and with the Wilton Park conference because they seemed to me rooted in the concept of a permanence of communal separation rather than being helpful to the creation a framework for an 'organic' process of evolving re-engagement. Equally I am saddened to see such mudslinging between 'Yes' voters and 'No' voters, at a time when tolerance, mutual understanding and objectivity could pay real dividends. Annan 5 clearly had very serious shortcomings: the division between those who thought its faults made it unacceptable and those who thought that nothing better might become available needs to be bridged for the common good. The mutual demonising, eminently exploitable from abroad, surely needs to end otherwise Cypriots will lose another opportunity to be the deciders of their own future.
The events of early 1964 made me an optimist. They also made me a profound believer in the ability of Cypriots to resolve their own problems when given a suitable framework within which to do so.
Two weeks ago, Packard appeared on a CyBC interview programme where he was presented as a former member of the British Secret Services
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 6 March 2005
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boomerang - Main Contributor
- Posts: 7337
- Joined: Sat May 14, 2005 5:56 am
by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:52 pm
BRITAIN ARMS TURKISH TERRORISTS
UK's murky role in Cyprus crisis
Evidence has emerged that British undercover forces were involved in fomenting the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots ten years before the 1974 partition of Cyprus.
The new evidence found by BBC Radio 4's programme Document centres on the mystery of Ted Macey, a British army major who was abducted, presumed killed by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries.
I had no strong expectation that we would find the Turkish Cypriot village. We had a 40-year-old British army map, bearing only the old Greek names. Our guide, Martin Packard, had not been here for decades. The countryside was deserted, no one spoke English, and night had fallen.
In 1964, Martin was a naval intelligence officer, sent to Cyprus to do an extraordinary job. Fighting had broken out in the capital, Nicosia, between Greeks and Turks.
Unrest spread, and the British troops in Cyprus stepped in to keep the peace. But the British General, Peter Young, thought that peace meant more than keeping the two sides apart. He believed the communities could live side by side, sometimes in mixed villages, as they had for centuries.
But that meant small disputes had to be prevented from turning into big ones. Gen Young appointed Martin, a fluent Greek speaker, as a roving trouble-shooter and negotiator. With two officers from the mainland Greek and Turkish armies, he roamed the north of Cyprus by helicopter, settling disputes.
Diplomacy
We eventually found the village, and even an interpreter. Here, in Easter 1964, Martin had resolved a conflict over a flock of sheep, stolen from the Turkish villages by their Greek Cypriots neighbours. Martin tracked down the flock in a Greek village.
But none of the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to come with him to get them. So he went himself. He took the youngest lamb and flung it across his shoulder. The mother followed, and so did the rest of the flock.
"I walked a very long way, I was very tired, leading this flock of sheep," he said. "We arrived at the village and all of the villagers rushed out as if I were Moses coming back with some great message."
The old men of the village remembered the incident, but were not conspicuously grateful. It was a good thing Martin had got their sheep back, they said, grudgingly, because otherwise they were planning to steal a Greek flock in retaliation.
Martin believes such small episodes were the key to preventing the island drifting towards ethnic separation. But, he says, this was not what the Americans and British had in mind.
He recalls being asked to take a visiting US politician, acting secretary of state George Ball, around the island. Arriving back in Nicosia, says Martin, "Ball patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: That was a fantastic show son, but you've got it all wrong, hasn't anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?"
Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they had fled. But just as the first resettlement was about to take place, British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island - in an unmarked CIA plane.
The ostensible reason was that Cyprus had become too dangerous for Martin to operate in; the evidence given was that a British liaison officer, Major Ted Macey, had been abducted and presumed murdered just a few days before.
All the evidence points to the murder having been carried out by Greek Cypriot extremists.
In the Public Record Office in London, I found files showing that British military commanders in Cyprus had received "very reliable information" that Major Macey's abduction was planned "by Greek security forces with approval of high government circles and connivance of the police to extract information about Turkish invasion plans".
The Greek Cypriots were convinced that Major Macey was aiding the Turks.
Listening bases
Could it be true? I spoke to a former Para who accompanied Major Macey on expeditions to Turkish Cypriot villages. There, says the Para, he demonstrated the use of British ammunition and sub-machine guns to the Turkish Cypriot irregular forces.
I also tracked down one of Major Macey's former drivers, who showed me a curious note, in the major's handwriting. It is a list of arms and explosives being stored in civilian premises in Nicosia: arms, says the driver, which Major Macey had supplied, under British orders, to the Turkish fighters.
So did the peacekeeping forces, and the big powers, really want Cyprus to remain an independent, unitary state? Or was it more important to head off the threat of a "Mediterranean Cuba" by keeping the island within Turkey's - and hence Nato's - sphere of influence?
Britain had, and has, electronic listening bases on the island - important parts of the Nato intelligence effort.
Nicos Koshis, a former justice minister, thinks that it was those bases that determined the fate of the island: "It is my feeling they wanted to have fighting between the two sides. They didn't want us to get together. If the communities come together maybe in the future we say no bases in Cyprus."
By Jolyon Jenkins
Producer, BBC Radio 4's Document
You can hear Radio 4's investigation into Britain's role in the 1964 Cyprus conflict in Document on Monday 23 January at 2000GMT or afterwards at the Listen again page.
UK's murky role in Cyprus crisis
Evidence has emerged that British undercover forces were involved in fomenting the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots ten years before the 1974 partition of Cyprus.
The new evidence found by BBC Radio 4's programme Document centres on the mystery of Ted Macey, a British army major who was abducted, presumed killed by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries.
I had no strong expectation that we would find the Turkish Cypriot village. We had a 40-year-old British army map, bearing only the old Greek names. Our guide, Martin Packard, had not been here for decades. The countryside was deserted, no one spoke English, and night had fallen.
In 1964, Martin was a naval intelligence officer, sent to Cyprus to do an extraordinary job. Fighting had broken out in the capital, Nicosia, between Greeks and Turks.
Unrest spread, and the British troops in Cyprus stepped in to keep the peace. But the British General, Peter Young, thought that peace meant more than keeping the two sides apart. He believed the communities could live side by side, sometimes in mixed villages, as they had for centuries.
But that meant small disputes had to be prevented from turning into big ones. Gen Young appointed Martin, a fluent Greek speaker, as a roving trouble-shooter and negotiator. With two officers from the mainland Greek and Turkish armies, he roamed the north of Cyprus by helicopter, settling disputes.
Diplomacy
We eventually found the village, and even an interpreter. Here, in Easter 1964, Martin had resolved a conflict over a flock of sheep, stolen from the Turkish villages by their Greek Cypriots neighbours. Martin tracked down the flock in a Greek village.
But none of the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to come with him to get them. So he went himself. He took the youngest lamb and flung it across his shoulder. The mother followed, and so did the rest of the flock.
"I walked a very long way, I was very tired, leading this flock of sheep," he said. "We arrived at the village and all of the villagers rushed out as if I were Moses coming back with some great message."
The old men of the village remembered the incident, but were not conspicuously grateful. It was a good thing Martin had got their sheep back, they said, grudgingly, because otherwise they were planning to steal a Greek flock in retaliation.
Martin believes such small episodes were the key to preventing the island drifting towards ethnic separation. But, he says, this was not what the Americans and British had in mind.
He recalls being asked to take a visiting US politician, acting secretary of state George Ball, around the island. Arriving back in Nicosia, says Martin, "Ball patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: That was a fantastic show son, but you've got it all wrong, hasn't anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?"
Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they had fled. But just as the first resettlement was about to take place, British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island - in an unmarked CIA plane.
The ostensible reason was that Cyprus had become too dangerous for Martin to operate in; the evidence given was that a British liaison officer, Major Ted Macey, had been abducted and presumed murdered just a few days before.
All the evidence points to the murder having been carried out by Greek Cypriot extremists.
In the Public Record Office in London, I found files showing that British military commanders in Cyprus had received "very reliable information" that Major Macey's abduction was planned "by Greek security forces with approval of high government circles and connivance of the police to extract information about Turkish invasion plans".
The Greek Cypriots were convinced that Major Macey was aiding the Turks.
Listening bases
Could it be true? I spoke to a former Para who accompanied Major Macey on expeditions to Turkish Cypriot villages. There, says the Para, he demonstrated the use of British ammunition and sub-machine guns to the Turkish Cypriot irregular forces.
I also tracked down one of Major Macey's former drivers, who showed me a curious note, in the major's handwriting. It is a list of arms and explosives being stored in civilian premises in Nicosia: arms, says the driver, which Major Macey had supplied, under British orders, to the Turkish fighters.
So did the peacekeeping forces, and the big powers, really want Cyprus to remain an independent, unitary state? Or was it more important to head off the threat of a "Mediterranean Cuba" by keeping the island within Turkey's - and hence Nato's - sphere of influence?
Britain had, and has, electronic listening bases on the island - important parts of the Nato intelligence effort.
Nicos Koshis, a former justice minister, thinks that it was those bases that determined the fate of the island: "It is my feeling they wanted to have fighting between the two sides. They didn't want us to get together. If the communities come together maybe in the future we say no bases in Cyprus."
By Jolyon Jenkins
Producer, BBC Radio 4's Document
You can hear Radio 4's investigation into Britain's role in the 1964 Cyprus conflict in Document on Monday 23 January at 2000GMT or afterwards at the Listen again page.
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boomerang - Main Contributor
- Posts: 7337
- Joined: Sat May 14, 2005 5:56 am
by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:53 pm
The real truth about British spy ring in Cyprus
FANOULA ARGYROU, a professional researcher, looks at allegations made this week in a BBC Radio programme about a British spy ring operating to support the Turkish Cypriots in 1964 and finds that the truth is even more amazing…THE murky side of Britain’s role in Cyprus was highlighted this week by a BBC Radio 4 programme that claimed a British spy ring cooperated with the Turkish Cypriots during the troubled days of 1964.
The following summary of the documentary was also available on the same day on the BBC 4’s website:
" Ever since the Turkish army invaded and occupied Northern Cyprus in 1974, the partition of the island between ethnic Greeks and Turks has seemed set in stone.
"But the first Green Line, through the capital, was drawn ten years earlier, by a British general (Young) using a green chinagraph pencil that happened to be at hand. Throughout 1964, British troops were on the island, supposedly for peace-keeping. But were they really bringing peace?
"In this programme, Mike Thomson examined new documents that suggest that the real motives of some of the peacekeepers were less than honourable."
The documents reveal the existence of a spy ring of British troops who were materially aiding Turkish insurgents by gun-running and spying on Greek Cypriot military installations.
Although one of the men was caught by the Greek Cypriots, the rest were spirited off the island by the British authorities before the Cypriot police could interrogate them.
The programme also investigated the long-standing mystery of a British army major, who was abducted, presumed murdered, by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries. New documentary evidence uncovered by the programme shows that he, too, was aware of illicit gun-running on behalf of the Turks and that, although the British authorities had good intelligence about the identities of his murderers, they chose not to press the Greek Cypriot authorities to investigate the case.
Intelligence officer
Many Greek Cypriots have long believed that the Nato powers, notably Britain and America, were opposed to the idea of an independent Cyprus because of fears that it could fall into communist hands and become a "Mediterranean Cuba" - a scenario that would have put at risk British electronic spying bases on the island.
The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974."
The most striking part of the BBC documentary was the story of Martin Packard, a British naval intelligence officer who was sent to Cyprus from Malta on account of being a fluent speaker of Greek, to help prevent small incidents between Greek and Turks from escalating into serious ones.
It seems, though, that he was taking his mission very seriously, for just as he was being very successful in stopping bloodshed, he was virtually abducted by his superiors, put on a plane and flown out of the island.
Packard related his experience to the BBC that, after mediating successfully between a Greek and a Turkish village over some stolen sheep: "The US Acting Secretary of State George Ball, visiting the island at the time, patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: ‘That was a fantastic show son, but you’ve got it all wrong, hasn’t anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?’ "
Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they fled. But as the first settlement was about to take place, British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island in an unmarked CIA plane.
Not new documents
I listened to the programme very carefully and as a researcher I have the following comments to make.
It is necessary from the offset to set the record straight by underlining that these documents are not new releases but documents that were released ten years ago and ever since have available for research at the Public Records Office (PRO) in London.
As a regular researcher at the PRO myself, I have seen and researched thoroughly these documents long ago and refer to them in length in two of my books - ‘Conspiracy or Blunder?’ published in Nicosia in 2000, and ‘Top Secret,’ also published in Nicosia in 2004.
I have no doubt that the Radio 4 programme, although well intentioned, gave half the truth around the existence of the ‘spy ring’ in Cyprus that was aiding the Turkish Cypriots.British ‘conciliators’
Both Lt Commander Martin Packard and Major Ted Macey were, in fact, working in Cyprus under the instructions of the Foreign Office, specifically under the instructions of high-ranking official Sir Cyril Pickard.
Sir Cyril was at the time an Assistant Under Secretary directly involved with the Cyprus problem.
Their secondment to UNFICYP -†Martin Packard as Conciliator for the Greek Cypriot side and Ted Macey as special Liaison Officer attached to Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Kutchuk’s office - had a hidden agenda.
In 1963, Lt Commander Martin Packard was rushed to Cyprus from Malta, where he was serving as a naval intelligence officer.
He mastered the Greek language perfectly.
After his peacekeeping in Cyprus he was awarded an MBE.
Invasion preparations
The same went for Major T. Macey. He mastered both the Greek and Turkish languages and had served in Greece for a number of years.
He had a rough ‘Rambo’ image and his ‘terms of reference’ were quite different from those of Packard for obvious reasons if one studies the British documents analytically vis-a-vis the Foreign Office policy of the period (which has hardly changed at all!).
Macey, indeed, provided the Turkish Cypriots with arms and ammunition, offered them training and, in general, he headed the preparation for an eventual Turkish invasion.
Packard, on the other hand, was working on a different level; that of a friendly conciliator, as the British policy needed the Greek Cypriots to be kept in check, quiet, unarmed, restrained and behaving themselves.
The knowledge of the local languages in these cases was a definite must and the best way to gain the confidence of the people.
According to PRO documents (which refer to a statement made by the then President Archbishop Makarios) Major Macey and his driver were murdered by a ringleader of a gang active in the Famagusta-Larnaca area.
Macey and his driver were accused of spying and working for the Turks.
In another document, it is revealed that two Greek Cypriot informants gave the British authorities information as to the place where the bodies lay.
The informants were helped by the British authorities to take asylum in England and also received the £2,000 reward offered.
Macey was also employed to make visits to Greek and Turkish villages throughout Cyprus (just like Martin Packard) reporting on the state of feeling in the countryside. In other words, both were engaged in collecting intelligence in a manner undetected by the locals and keeping things in check for their superiors.
The Foreign Office also regarded the positioning of British officers within the UN a necessity, in order to be privy to all information received by the UN. " His special experience (Macey’s) enabled him to play a unique role in efforts to maintain peace and save lives through his personal contacts with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots," it was noted in a report in the PRO files.
The British documents reveal the true ‘unique’ role of T. Macey as a British ‘spy ring leader’ aiding the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots.
Martin Packard’s superiors, fearing for his life, days after Macey’s murder, rushed him out of Cyprus via a CIA plane that took him to an American base in Greece.British subversion
As it was correctly stated in the BBC programme, British officers were directly involved in subversive activities on the island: the manufacture of bombs, bombing Turkish properties to blame the Greek Cypriots, espionage and so on.
Their main objective was to de-stabilise Cyprus, bring chaos and confusion and assist the Turks in the execution of their long-term plans.
As Nicos Koshis stated, the British policy was to keep the two communities separated. But with an enlarged hidden agenda.
In February 1964, Archbishop Makarios handed a document to the British High Commissioner regarding those activities.
He referred to the case of Colonel Thursby who, on January 20, 1964, went to the Manager of the Cyprus Asbestos Mines Co Ltd and, under false pretences, demanded to be allowed to collect all the explosives in the stores.
Makarios also wrote to General Gyani (UN force) complaining and listing instances when British troops with the UN contingent did nothing to stop Turks from firing at Greek Cypriots. Marley (mentioned in the programme), Bachelor, Bass (mentioned), Heron, Tyft, Offard and Jones are among those accused of aiding and providing the Turks with arms, ammunition and other military equipment.
Some of those arrested had given sensational information but the Cypriot authorities were totally ignorant of the even more damning information they could have extracted.
But they did not have the chance. The British authorities, who knew full well the extent of the consequences in such a case, quickly arranged for them to be flown out of Cyprus. Marley, who was arrested (as stated in the programme) and gave vital information under interrogation, was tried and condemned to 15 years imprisonment.
However, the British authorities again ‘arranged’ with the then Attorney General (ex Colonial employee) Tornaritis (and not the Cypriot Government) to get him out of for health reasons.
Partition plans
Although Martin Packard refers to George Ball’s statement regarding "their policy being partition," he and the programmers make no mention whatsoever of the policy of the Foreign Office, which is clearly demonstrated in no uncertain terms through the PRO files.
In fact, George Ball was at the time referring to the British plans to which he and his department were privy.
In February, 1964, the Planning Department of the Foreign Office (Packard’s superiors) devised a comprehensive plan named ‘ The Future of Cyprus’ which stated: "It is now clear that any long term solution in Cyprus must involve geographical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities.
"This could of, course, be achieved by wholesale removal of the Turkish community elsewhere. Less drastic alternatives following some redeployment of the population in the island are:
"a Partition so that a predominantly Greek area is united with Greece and a predominantly Turkish area is united with Turkey.
"b Partition so that one or both areas are independent, perhaps with special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively, or
"c A Federal Constitution, in which the island would be divided into cantons, one or two of which were Turkish.
"It would already be difficult for the Greeks to intervene successfully in Cyprus. The Turks would have completed their intervention before they could prevent it.
"The obvious Greek counter-move would be to invade Turkish Thrace. One way of preventing this would be for a small force drawn from all NATO countries to police the frontier.
"We could make much greater use of United States and British naval power to deter Greek naval assault across the Aegean. The ability of the Greeks to mount an airborne intervention is strictly limited…".
(A month before, in London, where representatives of both communities were summoned for a conference, Rauf Denktash had placed on the table in the presence of Glafcos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, Stella Soulioti and others his and Turkey’s demands i.e. geographical federation...).†
From the masses of the PRO documents released so far, one can build upon the theory that it was in fact the British and not the Americans who thought of, prepared and instigated the Greek Junta takeover in Greece in 1967, in order to achieve their planning objectives over Cyprus.
The Americans were used as and when it suited the British, always retaining a secondary and assisting role to date.
†False accusations
Upon leaving Cyprus, Martin Packard prepared a report, which he handed to his superiors, in which he accused the Greek Cypriots of slaughtering 27 Turkish Cypriots in the Nicosia General Hospital.
His accusations appeared on April 2, 1988 in the ‘Guardian’ newspaper through his friend at the time Chief Editor of the paper Peter Preston, who, in 1964, was also working in Cyprus.
On February 10, 1994 Channel 4 Television showed a documentary called ‘Secret History – Dead or Alive’ which in a way addressed the drama of the 1,619 missing Greek Cypriots since the brutal Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974.
Martin Packard made an unexpected appearance to say that in 1963/64 he had prepared a report in which he included that: "The largest single element of these missing people were the Turkish Cypriot patients at the General Hospital. Nothing had been heard of any of them. It was assumed that they were being held in custody somewhere. The outcome of my investigation suggested that they had all of them been killed in the General Hospital. They had been removed at night, the bodies from there had been taken out to outlying farms up in the region of Skilloura and out there they had been dismembered and passed through farm dicing machines and they had then been seeded into the ploughed land."
I found these accusations too horrific to be true. Immediately, I wrote to the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Heathcoat-Amory and demanded to be allowed to view Packard’s report.
As he spoke about this report having definitely not been released, I found Mr Packard’s liberty to disclose such damning secret information, with no evidence at all to substantiate it, extraordinarily questionable.
Five-year fight
I raised the issue that he either had breached the Official Secrets Act as he spoke from knowledge of a report still retained or he spoke in his capacity of a British conciliator with the Department’s permission. Whatever the case, we had a right to see the evidence of what he was so freely accusing us.
My fight with the Foreign Office and other government departments lasted five years (1994-1999) until he was finally ‘ordered’ to close the matter by withdrawing the accusations.
Peter Preston, with an article in the ‘Guardian’ (which was equally guilty and responsible for printing unsubstantiated allegations), on May 3, 1999, wrote that Martin Packard revisited the island and found out that he was given wrong information, no evidence at all, and that in fact no Turkish Cypriot had been harmed.
I wrote an article in Simerini on May 18, 1999 and another one was written by Charalambos Charalambides on May 19, 1999, finally revealing the truth.
Packard was wrong and had no evidence whatsoever for those horrific allegations against us.
The damage, however, to the Greek side was immeasurable. The Turks had used Packard’s allegations to the full and in all international forums, as admitted by Peter Preston.
Packard was obliged to write to Kofi Annan withdrawing the allegations and restoring the truth, which is that no Turkish Cypriot had been killed.
They were all protected under Makarios’s orders.
And that was the result of Packard’s role in Cyprus in 1964 which had nothing to do with petty conflicts over….sheep between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
†Finally: "The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974", is stated on the BBC 4’s website.
This is totally wrong.
The British documents reveal exactly the opposite. I find it extraordinary after such a broadcast to reach such a ridiculous assumption!
It was not the so called pro-American elements on the island in 1964 who actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island, but the very British intelligence men - the ‘spy ring’ - as they chose to name them under direct orders of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.
They were the ones who were aided on the island by their pro-British elements within both communities who in their own way assisted the British and Turkish partitionist policy to gain ground.
This was an assistance they enjoy to this very day with disastrous results for our national cause.
Fanoulla Argyrou
Researcher/author
London 24.1.2006.
FANOULA ARGYROU, a professional researcher, looks at allegations made this week in a BBC Radio programme about a British spy ring operating to support the Turkish Cypriots in 1964 and finds that the truth is even more amazing…THE murky side of Britain’s role in Cyprus was highlighted this week by a BBC Radio 4 programme that claimed a British spy ring cooperated with the Turkish Cypriots during the troubled days of 1964.
The following summary of the documentary was also available on the same day on the BBC 4’s website:
" Ever since the Turkish army invaded and occupied Northern Cyprus in 1974, the partition of the island between ethnic Greeks and Turks has seemed set in stone.
"But the first Green Line, through the capital, was drawn ten years earlier, by a British general (Young) using a green chinagraph pencil that happened to be at hand. Throughout 1964, British troops were on the island, supposedly for peace-keeping. But were they really bringing peace?
"In this programme, Mike Thomson examined new documents that suggest that the real motives of some of the peacekeepers were less than honourable."
The documents reveal the existence of a spy ring of British troops who were materially aiding Turkish insurgents by gun-running and spying on Greek Cypriot military installations.
Although one of the men was caught by the Greek Cypriots, the rest were spirited off the island by the British authorities before the Cypriot police could interrogate them.
The programme also investigated the long-standing mystery of a British army major, who was abducted, presumed murdered, by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries. New documentary evidence uncovered by the programme shows that he, too, was aware of illicit gun-running on behalf of the Turks and that, although the British authorities had good intelligence about the identities of his murderers, they chose not to press the Greek Cypriot authorities to investigate the case.
Intelligence officer
Many Greek Cypriots have long believed that the Nato powers, notably Britain and America, were opposed to the idea of an independent Cyprus because of fears that it could fall into communist hands and become a "Mediterranean Cuba" - a scenario that would have put at risk British electronic spying bases on the island.
The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974."
The most striking part of the BBC documentary was the story of Martin Packard, a British naval intelligence officer who was sent to Cyprus from Malta on account of being a fluent speaker of Greek, to help prevent small incidents between Greek and Turks from escalating into serious ones.
It seems, though, that he was taking his mission very seriously, for just as he was being very successful in stopping bloodshed, he was virtually abducted by his superiors, put on a plane and flown out of the island.
Packard related his experience to the BBC that, after mediating successfully between a Greek and a Turkish village over some stolen sheep: "The US Acting Secretary of State George Ball, visiting the island at the time, patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: ‘That was a fantastic show son, but you’ve got it all wrong, hasn’t anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?’ "
Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they fled. But as the first settlement was about to take place, British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island in an unmarked CIA plane.
Not new documents
I listened to the programme very carefully and as a researcher I have the following comments to make.
It is necessary from the offset to set the record straight by underlining that these documents are not new releases but documents that were released ten years ago and ever since have available for research at the Public Records Office (PRO) in London.
As a regular researcher at the PRO myself, I have seen and researched thoroughly these documents long ago and refer to them in length in two of my books - ‘Conspiracy or Blunder?’ published in Nicosia in 2000, and ‘Top Secret,’ also published in Nicosia in 2004.
I have no doubt that the Radio 4 programme, although well intentioned, gave half the truth around the existence of the ‘spy ring’ in Cyprus that was aiding the Turkish Cypriots.British ‘conciliators’
Both Lt Commander Martin Packard and Major Ted Macey were, in fact, working in Cyprus under the instructions of the Foreign Office, specifically under the instructions of high-ranking official Sir Cyril Pickard.
Sir Cyril was at the time an Assistant Under Secretary directly involved with the Cyprus problem.
Their secondment to UNFICYP -†Martin Packard as Conciliator for the Greek Cypriot side and Ted Macey as special Liaison Officer attached to Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Kutchuk’s office - had a hidden agenda.
In 1963, Lt Commander Martin Packard was rushed to Cyprus from Malta, where he was serving as a naval intelligence officer.
He mastered the Greek language perfectly.
After his peacekeeping in Cyprus he was awarded an MBE.
Invasion preparations
The same went for Major T. Macey. He mastered both the Greek and Turkish languages and had served in Greece for a number of years.
He had a rough ‘Rambo’ image and his ‘terms of reference’ were quite different from those of Packard for obvious reasons if one studies the British documents analytically vis-a-vis the Foreign Office policy of the period (which has hardly changed at all!).
Macey, indeed, provided the Turkish Cypriots with arms and ammunition, offered them training and, in general, he headed the preparation for an eventual Turkish invasion.
Packard, on the other hand, was working on a different level; that of a friendly conciliator, as the British policy needed the Greek Cypriots to be kept in check, quiet, unarmed, restrained and behaving themselves.
The knowledge of the local languages in these cases was a definite must and the best way to gain the confidence of the people.
According to PRO documents (which refer to a statement made by the then President Archbishop Makarios) Major Macey and his driver were murdered by a ringleader of a gang active in the Famagusta-Larnaca area.
Macey and his driver were accused of spying and working for the Turks.
In another document, it is revealed that two Greek Cypriot informants gave the British authorities information as to the place where the bodies lay.
The informants were helped by the British authorities to take asylum in England and also received the £2,000 reward offered.
Macey was also employed to make visits to Greek and Turkish villages throughout Cyprus (just like Martin Packard) reporting on the state of feeling in the countryside. In other words, both were engaged in collecting intelligence in a manner undetected by the locals and keeping things in check for their superiors.
The Foreign Office also regarded the positioning of British officers within the UN a necessity, in order to be privy to all information received by the UN. " His special experience (Macey’s) enabled him to play a unique role in efforts to maintain peace and save lives through his personal contacts with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots," it was noted in a report in the PRO files.
The British documents reveal the true ‘unique’ role of T. Macey as a British ‘spy ring leader’ aiding the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots.
Martin Packard’s superiors, fearing for his life, days after Macey’s murder, rushed him out of Cyprus via a CIA plane that took him to an American base in Greece.British subversion
As it was correctly stated in the BBC programme, British officers were directly involved in subversive activities on the island: the manufacture of bombs, bombing Turkish properties to blame the Greek Cypriots, espionage and so on.
Their main objective was to de-stabilise Cyprus, bring chaos and confusion and assist the Turks in the execution of their long-term plans.
As Nicos Koshis stated, the British policy was to keep the two communities separated. But with an enlarged hidden agenda.
In February 1964, Archbishop Makarios handed a document to the British High Commissioner regarding those activities.
He referred to the case of Colonel Thursby who, on January 20, 1964, went to the Manager of the Cyprus Asbestos Mines Co Ltd and, under false pretences, demanded to be allowed to collect all the explosives in the stores.
Makarios also wrote to General Gyani (UN force) complaining and listing instances when British troops with the UN contingent did nothing to stop Turks from firing at Greek Cypriots. Marley (mentioned in the programme), Bachelor, Bass (mentioned), Heron, Tyft, Offard and Jones are among those accused of aiding and providing the Turks with arms, ammunition and other military equipment.
Some of those arrested had given sensational information but the Cypriot authorities were totally ignorant of the even more damning information they could have extracted.
But they did not have the chance. The British authorities, who knew full well the extent of the consequences in such a case, quickly arranged for them to be flown out of Cyprus. Marley, who was arrested (as stated in the programme) and gave vital information under interrogation, was tried and condemned to 15 years imprisonment.
However, the British authorities again ‘arranged’ with the then Attorney General (ex Colonial employee) Tornaritis (and not the Cypriot Government) to get him out of for health reasons.
Partition plans
Although Martin Packard refers to George Ball’s statement regarding "their policy being partition," he and the programmers make no mention whatsoever of the policy of the Foreign Office, which is clearly demonstrated in no uncertain terms through the PRO files.
In fact, George Ball was at the time referring to the British plans to which he and his department were privy.
In February, 1964, the Planning Department of the Foreign Office (Packard’s superiors) devised a comprehensive plan named ‘ The Future of Cyprus’ which stated: "It is now clear that any long term solution in Cyprus must involve geographical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities.
"This could of, course, be achieved by wholesale removal of the Turkish community elsewhere. Less drastic alternatives following some redeployment of the population in the island are:
"a Partition so that a predominantly Greek area is united with Greece and a predominantly Turkish area is united with Turkey.
"b Partition so that one or both areas are independent, perhaps with special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively, or
"c A Federal Constitution, in which the island would be divided into cantons, one or two of which were Turkish.
"It would already be difficult for the Greeks to intervene successfully in Cyprus. The Turks would have completed their intervention before they could prevent it.
"The obvious Greek counter-move would be to invade Turkish Thrace. One way of preventing this would be for a small force drawn from all NATO countries to police the frontier.
"We could make much greater use of United States and British naval power to deter Greek naval assault across the Aegean. The ability of the Greeks to mount an airborne intervention is strictly limited…".
(A month before, in London, where representatives of both communities were summoned for a conference, Rauf Denktash had placed on the table in the presence of Glafcos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, Stella Soulioti and others his and Turkey’s demands i.e. geographical federation...).†
From the masses of the PRO documents released so far, one can build upon the theory that it was in fact the British and not the Americans who thought of, prepared and instigated the Greek Junta takeover in Greece in 1967, in order to achieve their planning objectives over Cyprus.
The Americans were used as and when it suited the British, always retaining a secondary and assisting role to date.
†False accusations
Upon leaving Cyprus, Martin Packard prepared a report, which he handed to his superiors, in which he accused the Greek Cypriots of slaughtering 27 Turkish Cypriots in the Nicosia General Hospital.
His accusations appeared on April 2, 1988 in the ‘Guardian’ newspaper through his friend at the time Chief Editor of the paper Peter Preston, who, in 1964, was also working in Cyprus.
On February 10, 1994 Channel 4 Television showed a documentary called ‘Secret History – Dead or Alive’ which in a way addressed the drama of the 1,619 missing Greek Cypriots since the brutal Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974.
Martin Packard made an unexpected appearance to say that in 1963/64 he had prepared a report in which he included that: "The largest single element of these missing people were the Turkish Cypriot patients at the General Hospital. Nothing had been heard of any of them. It was assumed that they were being held in custody somewhere. The outcome of my investigation suggested that they had all of them been killed in the General Hospital. They had been removed at night, the bodies from there had been taken out to outlying farms up in the region of Skilloura and out there they had been dismembered and passed through farm dicing machines and they had then been seeded into the ploughed land."
I found these accusations too horrific to be true. Immediately, I wrote to the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Heathcoat-Amory and demanded to be allowed to view Packard’s report.
As he spoke about this report having definitely not been released, I found Mr Packard’s liberty to disclose such damning secret information, with no evidence at all to substantiate it, extraordinarily questionable.
Five-year fight
I raised the issue that he either had breached the Official Secrets Act as he spoke from knowledge of a report still retained or he spoke in his capacity of a British conciliator with the Department’s permission. Whatever the case, we had a right to see the evidence of what he was so freely accusing us.
My fight with the Foreign Office and other government departments lasted five years (1994-1999) until he was finally ‘ordered’ to close the matter by withdrawing the accusations.
Peter Preston, with an article in the ‘Guardian’ (which was equally guilty and responsible for printing unsubstantiated allegations), on May 3, 1999, wrote that Martin Packard revisited the island and found out that he was given wrong information, no evidence at all, and that in fact no Turkish Cypriot had been harmed.
I wrote an article in Simerini on May 18, 1999 and another one was written by Charalambos Charalambides on May 19, 1999, finally revealing the truth.
Packard was wrong and had no evidence whatsoever for those horrific allegations against us.
The damage, however, to the Greek side was immeasurable. The Turks had used Packard’s allegations to the full and in all international forums, as admitted by Peter Preston.
Packard was obliged to write to Kofi Annan withdrawing the allegations and restoring the truth, which is that no Turkish Cypriot had been killed.
They were all protected under Makarios’s orders.
And that was the result of Packard’s role in Cyprus in 1964 which had nothing to do with petty conflicts over….sheep between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
†Finally: "The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974", is stated on the BBC 4’s website.
This is totally wrong.
The British documents reveal exactly the opposite. I find it extraordinary after such a broadcast to reach such a ridiculous assumption!
It was not the so called pro-American elements on the island in 1964 who actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island, but the very British intelligence men - the ‘spy ring’ - as they chose to name them under direct orders of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.
They were the ones who were aided on the island by their pro-British elements within both communities who in their own way assisted the British and Turkish partitionist policy to gain ground.
This was an assistance they enjoy to this very day with disastrous results for our national cause.
Fanoulla Argyrou
Researcher/author
London 24.1.2006.
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boomerang - Main Contributor
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by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:54 pm
THE MI6 FILES
UK behind Turkish terrorism in Cyprus
According to the BBC Radio 4 documentary programme “Document” transmitted on Monday 23 January 2006 evidence exists which shows that the UK was directly behind Turkish terrorism in Cyprus after it gained its independence in 1960 in order to bring about the partition of the island.
In a handwritten note written by British Army Major Ted Macey details were given of the locations of various arms and explosives that were being stored in civilian premises in Nicosia. According to one of Macey's former drivers who found the note after Macey’s execution, which British intelligence believes was carried out by Cypriot security forces, ammunition was smuggled in their car disguised to the Turks in State Express cartons of cigarettes and explosives were stored in the cellar of Androulas cabaret bar.
By the drivers admission Turkish terrorist militias out in the villages were being assisted by Major Macey under instructions of the British government or British forces since he would have had to obtain the ammunition from somewhere and account for it not coming back.
Other documents show that other members of British armed forces were up to their necks in gun running and espionage for the Turks and Turkish Cypriot terrorist militias.
In May 1964 senior RAF aircraftsman Keith Marley was arrested by Cypriot police after they discovered two mortars in the boot of his car along with incriminating letters from senior member of Turkeys civilian militias.
Documents from the national archives in London show that three other airmen were involved, the ringleader being corporal Sam Bass.
A Telegram from HQ British Forces Cyprus, states
“Bass has been deeply involved in gunrunning for the Turks. He has agreed to assist as a frogman at which he is proficient to meet Turkish submarines arriving over a period of 7 days for the landing of Turkish mainland volunteers at the rate of 200 to 300 a day. He professed to know many details of Turkish plans, including scope and method of landing operations, aimed at effecting partition of the island.”
A spy ring operated with members stationed in different parts of Cyprus. They had expensive diving equipment far beyond the needs or capabilities of most amateurs and were probably all members of a diving club in Cyprus called Omerous, an Anglo-American club, predominately American. Most of the meetings were held at the American embassy. Keith Marley, Sam Bass and Bill Brown were the only members from the British forces and the rest were Americans from the US Navy, Marines and Marine Embassy Guards. The men were never court-martialled but secretly flown out of the country as part of a cover-up.
UK behind Turkish terrorism in Cyprus
According to the BBC Radio 4 documentary programme “Document” transmitted on Monday 23 January 2006 evidence exists which shows that the UK was directly behind Turkish terrorism in Cyprus after it gained its independence in 1960 in order to bring about the partition of the island.
In a handwritten note written by British Army Major Ted Macey details were given of the locations of various arms and explosives that were being stored in civilian premises in Nicosia. According to one of Macey's former drivers who found the note after Macey’s execution, which British intelligence believes was carried out by Cypriot security forces, ammunition was smuggled in their car disguised to the Turks in State Express cartons of cigarettes and explosives were stored in the cellar of Androulas cabaret bar.
By the drivers admission Turkish terrorist militias out in the villages were being assisted by Major Macey under instructions of the British government or British forces since he would have had to obtain the ammunition from somewhere and account for it not coming back.
Other documents show that other members of British armed forces were up to their necks in gun running and espionage for the Turks and Turkish Cypriot terrorist militias.
In May 1964 senior RAF aircraftsman Keith Marley was arrested by Cypriot police after they discovered two mortars in the boot of his car along with incriminating letters from senior member of Turkeys civilian militias.
Documents from the national archives in London show that three other airmen were involved, the ringleader being corporal Sam Bass.
A Telegram from HQ British Forces Cyprus, states
“Bass has been deeply involved in gunrunning for the Turks. He has agreed to assist as a frogman at which he is proficient to meet Turkish submarines arriving over a period of 7 days for the landing of Turkish mainland volunteers at the rate of 200 to 300 a day. He professed to know many details of Turkish plans, including scope and method of landing operations, aimed at effecting partition of the island.”
A spy ring operated with members stationed in different parts of Cyprus. They had expensive diving equipment far beyond the needs or capabilities of most amateurs and were probably all members of a diving club in Cyprus called Omerous, an Anglo-American club, predominately American. Most of the meetings were held at the American embassy. Keith Marley, Sam Bass and Bill Brown were the only members from the British forces and the rest were Americans from the US Navy, Marines and Marine Embassy Guards. The men were never court-martialled but secretly flown out of the country as part of a cover-up.
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boomerang - Main Contributor
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by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:55 pm
United Nations Resolutions
The Security Council
Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)
-Condemns the Turkish aggression and state sponsored terrorism against Cyprus that began in December 1963 which the Security council states is in violation of Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and orders Tureky to refrain from further use or threat of any such action.
-Gives a mandate to the Cypriot National Guard to put an end to the bloodshed and restore the rule of law using all necessary means. This is the same mandate given to the NATO lad alliance that fought against Saddam Hussein.
-Sanctions the creation of a UN peace keeping force.
Security Council Resolution 193 (1964)
-In the wake of continued Turkish aggression against Cyprus, including hostage taking by the Turkish government sponsored TMT terrorist group and the parachuting in of Turkish commandos, and its escalation to the bombing and napalming of civilians by the Turkish Air-Force the UN demands the Turkey cease instantly its bombardment and use of military force of any kind against Cyprus.
Security Council Resolution 353 (1974)
-Condemns the illegal Turkish invasion of Cyprus which is contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter.
-Demands the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus soil of all illegal Turkish invasion forces and the supporters of Nikos Sampson who the CIA and Henry Kissinger had ordered to assassinate President Makarios with NATO's blessing.
Security Council Resolutions 357-360 (1974)
-Condemns Turkeys violation of the UN ceasefire in-order to begin a second wave of invasion 3 weeks after democracy had been restored
-Condemns Turkeys deadly attacks against the UN Peacekeeping force.
-Demands that Turkey stop its invasion and withdraw its troops from Cyprus soil
Security Council Resolution 367 (1975)
-Condemns the creation of a "Federated Turkish State" out of the areas of Cyprus which Turkey illegally seized and ethnically cleansed.
-Condemns Turkeys deliberate ethnic cleansing and violation of the UN's previous resolutions and demands that Turkey implement General Assembly Resolution 3212(XXIX) immediately.
Security Council Resolution 541 (1983)
-Condemns the secessionist declaration of the so-called "TRNC", deemes it legally invalid and calls for the declaration to be withdrawn and on all nations not to recognise the illegal secessionist entity.
Security Council Resolution 550 (1984)
-Condemns Turkey's exchange of ambassadors with the illegal secessionist entity and its failure to retract its unilateral declaration.
-Calls once more on on all nations not to recognise the illegal secessionist entity and not to facilitate or in any way assist it.
-Condemns Turkish threats to settle the Famagousta suburb of Varosha and demands that it be handed over to the United Nations.
The Security Council
Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)
-Condemns the Turkish aggression and state sponsored terrorism against Cyprus that began in December 1963 which the Security council states is in violation of Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and orders Tureky to refrain from further use or threat of any such action.
-Gives a mandate to the Cypriot National Guard to put an end to the bloodshed and restore the rule of law using all necessary means. This is the same mandate given to the NATO lad alliance that fought against Saddam Hussein.
-Sanctions the creation of a UN peace keeping force.
Security Council Resolution 193 (1964)
-In the wake of continued Turkish aggression against Cyprus, including hostage taking by the Turkish government sponsored TMT terrorist group and the parachuting in of Turkish commandos, and its escalation to the bombing and napalming of civilians by the Turkish Air-Force the UN demands the Turkey cease instantly its bombardment and use of military force of any kind against Cyprus.
Security Council Resolution 353 (1974)
-Condemns the illegal Turkish invasion of Cyprus which is contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter.
-Demands the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus soil of all illegal Turkish invasion forces and the supporters of Nikos Sampson who the CIA and Henry Kissinger had ordered to assassinate President Makarios with NATO's blessing.
Security Council Resolutions 357-360 (1974)
-Condemns Turkeys violation of the UN ceasefire in-order to begin a second wave of invasion 3 weeks after democracy had been restored
-Condemns Turkeys deadly attacks against the UN Peacekeeping force.
-Demands that Turkey stop its invasion and withdraw its troops from Cyprus soil
Security Council Resolution 367 (1975)
-Condemns the creation of a "Federated Turkish State" out of the areas of Cyprus which Turkey illegally seized and ethnically cleansed.
-Condemns Turkeys deliberate ethnic cleansing and violation of the UN's previous resolutions and demands that Turkey implement General Assembly Resolution 3212(XXIX) immediately.
Security Council Resolution 541 (1983)
-Condemns the secessionist declaration of the so-called "TRNC", deemes it legally invalid and calls for the declaration to be withdrawn and on all nations not to recognise the illegal secessionist entity.
Security Council Resolution 550 (1984)
-Condemns Turkey's exchange of ambassadors with the illegal secessionist entity and its failure to retract its unilateral declaration.
-Calls once more on on all nations not to recognise the illegal secessionist entity and not to facilitate or in any way assist it.
-Condemns Turkish threats to settle the Famagousta suburb of Varosha and demands that it be handed over to the United Nations.
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boomerang - Main Contributor
- Posts: 7337
- Joined: Sat May 14, 2005 5:56 am
by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:56 pm
United Nations Resolutions
The General Assembly
General Assembly Resolution 3212(XXIX) (1974)
-Demands the withdrawal of all Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus and an end of all Turkish interference in it's affairs.
-Demands that the Refugees which Turkey ethnically cleansed be allowed to return to their homes.
General Assembly Resolution 37/253 (1983)
-Condemns Turkeys continuing violation of the UN's Resolutions and its illegal occupation ethnic cleansing and colonisation of Cyprus and calls for these resolutions of be implemented immediately.
-Demands the withdrawal of all Turkish occupation forces and the end of Turkish interference in Cyprus affairs.
-Demands that Turkey respect the human rights of all Cypriots including the three basic freedoms and the right of the Refugees to the homes in safety and to take immediate measures to that effect
-Considers that situation resulting from Turkeys use of force can not be allowed to influence or affect to solution of the Cyprus Problem.
Human Rights Sub-Commission Resolution 1987/19 (1987)
-Condemns the gross and systematic violation of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey and the lack of progress to ascertain the fate of the people missing form Turkeys concentration camps.
-Demands that the rights of the refugees to freedom of movement, settlement, and property in the occupied areas be restored.
-Condemns Turkeys illegal colonisation of the occupied areas and equates it with Genocide (as defined by the international convention).
The General Assembly
General Assembly Resolution 3212(XXIX) (1974)
-Demands the withdrawal of all Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus and an end of all Turkish interference in it's affairs.
-Demands that the Refugees which Turkey ethnically cleansed be allowed to return to their homes.
General Assembly Resolution 37/253 (1983)
-Condemns Turkeys continuing violation of the UN's Resolutions and its illegal occupation ethnic cleansing and colonisation of Cyprus and calls for these resolutions of be implemented immediately.
-Demands the withdrawal of all Turkish occupation forces and the end of Turkish interference in Cyprus affairs.
-Demands that Turkey respect the human rights of all Cypriots including the three basic freedoms and the right of the Refugees to the homes in safety and to take immediate measures to that effect
-Considers that situation resulting from Turkeys use of force can not be allowed to influence or affect to solution of the Cyprus Problem.
Human Rights Sub-Commission Resolution 1987/19 (1987)
-Condemns the gross and systematic violation of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey and the lack of progress to ascertain the fate of the people missing form Turkeys concentration camps.
-Demands that the rights of the refugees to freedom of movement, settlement, and property in the occupied areas be restored.
-Condemns Turkeys illegal colonisation of the occupied areas and equates it with Genocide (as defined by the international convention).
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boomerang - Main Contributor
- Posts: 7337
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by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:57 pm
European Union
The European Court of Human Rights
Cyprus v. Turkey (1974-1976)
-The European Commission of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of violating 14 Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights and its first protocol, including killings, displacement of persons, deprivation of liberty, mass rapes, torture and inhuman treatment, deprivation of possessions, looting and wonton destruction, discrimination and no remedy.
Cyprus v. Turkey (1976-1983)
-The European Commission of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of repeated violation of 14 Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights and its first protocol including missing persons, displacement of persons and separation of families, deprivation of possessions, discrimination, no remedies, deprivation of liberty, deprivation of life, ill-treatment and forced labour.
Cyprus v. Turkey (application no. 25781/94)
-Finds Turkey guilty of 14 violations of the European Convention of Human Rights in occupied Cyprus, including the continuing violations of the right to life, protection of property, and right to effective remedy, and violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and region, and freedom of expression of the Greek Cypriots and the violation of the right to a fair trial of the Turkish Cypriots.
The European Court of Human Rights
Cyprus v. Turkey (1974-1976)
-The European Commission of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of violating 14 Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights and its first protocol, including killings, displacement of persons, deprivation of liberty, mass rapes, torture and inhuman treatment, deprivation of possessions, looting and wonton destruction, discrimination and no remedy.
Cyprus v. Turkey (1976-1983)
-The European Commission of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of repeated violation of 14 Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights and its first protocol including missing persons, displacement of persons and separation of families, deprivation of possessions, discrimination, no remedies, deprivation of liberty, deprivation of life, ill-treatment and forced labour.
Cyprus v. Turkey (application no. 25781/94)
-Finds Turkey guilty of 14 violations of the European Convention of Human Rights in occupied Cyprus, including the continuing violations of the right to life, protection of property, and right to effective remedy, and violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and region, and freedom of expression of the Greek Cypriots and the violation of the right to a fair trial of the Turkish Cypriots.
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boomerang - Main Contributor
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by boomerang » Mon Mar 09, 2009 12:58 pm
European Union
The European Parliament
European Parliament Resolution (19/09/96)
-"deeply shocked by the killings that took place in August during a peaceful demonstration for the reunification of the island, where two Greek Cypriots were killed and several wounded, including two UN peacekeepers, by the security forces of the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus"
European Parliament Resolution (24/10/96)
-"shocked by the latest cold-blooded murder in Cyprus of yet another Greek Cypriot, Petros Kakoulis, in Cyprus by the Turkish occupation army"
European Parliament Resolution (17/09/97)
-"appalled at all statements by Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, that there will be war in Cyprus if its application to join the EU is successful"
The European Parliament
European Parliament Resolution (19/09/96)
-"deeply shocked by the killings that took place in August during a peaceful demonstration for the reunification of the island, where two Greek Cypriots were killed and several wounded, including two UN peacekeepers, by the security forces of the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus"
European Parliament Resolution (24/10/96)
-"shocked by the latest cold-blooded murder in Cyprus of yet another Greek Cypriot, Petros Kakoulis, in Cyprus by the Turkish occupation army"
European Parliament Resolution (17/09/97)
-"appalled at all statements by Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, that there will be war in Cyprus if its application to join the EU is successful"
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