My experience in Aviation is somewhat limited and I would not consider myself as being a pilot, even though I have done some flying in the past on single engines as a hobby. I have been interested in Aviation since childhood however, and spend a lot of time at municipal and major airports as a "plane junkie" or “plane spotter”, as well as attended many air shows.! I have also spent a lot of time in the past with people in Aviation, from pilots to flight attendants to ground crew as well as took part in operating a small air tours company with others. I also spent many times in the cockpit, as a jump seat passenger with FedEx pilots flying mostly "Red Eye" around the country in Boeing 727's, DC-10'S and Boeing 747's. The FedEx pilots were great to share information during these flights. Granted, this was many years ago, therefore many new gadgets have since been introduced to new aircrafts, but the basic operating principles were the same. I have not done any flying for a long time (in command), but follow the industry as much as possible, and I take great interest in air crashes to learn as much as possible as to what may have happened. To me, from what I saw of the wreckage, I had pretty good idea what may have happened to TK 1951, and was very close to the truth than not.
Well, it was very obvious to me that you had received some form of pilot training. The biggest difference between flying a light single engine aircraft is Asymmetric Flight and the more advance Avionics and Navigation Systems. Everything else is pretty much the same.
I have been doing a lot of sailing instead of flying, and people may be very surprise to know, that the basic principles of aerodynamics of low/high air pressures on an aircraft wings are the same as they are on the sails on a sail boat, specially when going “close to the wind”. Is just that one wing is horizontal and the other “wing” is vertical. If you can sail, you can fly, or vice versa, at least knowing what makes the plane to “float” in air and what makes a sail boat to move forward without engine power. I had the pleasure of both and still continue with sailing when ever possible these days. But flying is magical, and when ever I book my seat on a commercial plane these days, I get the window seat towards the back of the plane, so that I can follow the settings of the flaps with speed and altitude on the GPS map in front of me when ever possible, or look up to the sky when ever I hear a plane noise to try and identify what type of an aircraft it is, no matter how high it is flying. I’m just a “big kid” really.!
You are absolutely correct!
The Basic Principles of Aerodynamics are also applicable to sailing. Also, Maritime Navigation principles and Aircraft Navigation are also very similar. We both speak the same nautical language and off course you would be aware and familiar with calculating and adding Drift to your heading to make good your track.
You can say that the whole Pilot and Boating community is full of grown up kids having fun with their toys. Aviation and Boating is a passion as you know, and it requires dedication and a lot of hard work to become proficient
Now, let me clear the air on my referring to the young pilot as a "student pilot". I did use the quotation marks, which was to mean, that he was not an inexperienced pilot. In the US, one needs to have minimum of 1500 flying hours ( combination, single, multi engines) to even sit for their ATP ( Airline Transport Pilot), therefore, anyone being trained as a first officer, more than likely have their ATP already. I'm sure so did this young pilot. However, as you know, each equipment then requires that one is trained to get their ratings on specific aircraft, and this was the purpose why the young pilot was in the cockpit I believe. Too bad his career ended so short in doing what he loved.
It is not a requirement to reach 1500 hours to sit the ATPL. You are allowed to sit these exams even before you obtain The Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) but not before you sit the CPL exams. If you pass the ATPL, then the licence is frozen or suspended until you obtain 1500 hours total time, 750 of which must be in command and 100 in command at night.
It is also not a requirement to have an ATPL to be an FO on a commercial airliner. It is a requirement to have the ATP in order to have a Command Upgrade. Some companies however, still require that FOs have an ATP before being recruited, but some other companies have abandoned this requirement as a result of the impending pilot shortage due to the economic boom, which is now a thing of the past.
But a pilot with a mere 1500 hours flying bug smashers around is still inexperienced with or without an ATP, even though the meet the requirements of becoming an FO on an advance high performance aircraft.
Now, about the turbulence effect that was claimed by the Turkish pilots group that may have effected the flight, which they claimed that the ATC did not warn TK 1951 of the B-757 landing 2 minutes earlier. This is a very embarrassing statement by a professional organisation. First of all, the crew of the TK 1951 listen in to all conversations from the Control Tower to all planes who are on holding pattern before landing, because they are all on the same radio frequency, therefore, everyone knows where everyone is, and the fact that 2 minutes were used to separate aircraft on the final approach, standard landing rules were carried out by the ATC.
This was a very embarrassing statement from the Turkish Pilot Group. If there was 2 minutes of separation between the THY B737 and the preceding B757, then this would translate to a longitudinal separation of 5NMS if the B737 was doing 150 knots. The B737 and B757 are CAT D aircraft which means that their velocity at the threshold (Vat) is between 141 and 165 knots.
The THY would have been aware of the B757 as they were transferred from Area Control, to Approach, then Arrival for sequencing for assigned Runway 18R and then Tower.
It is important to note that there are 2 Approach Frequencies, 2 Arrival Frequencies and 3 Tower Frequencies.
Since there were no storm in the area, wind sheer was the least likely reason for causing the flight to lose altitude so sudden. The only time this can be a problem, and few planes did crash on take off and landing in the states, due to wind sheer, is when the wind sheer becomes a "down draft" which the wind goes towards the ground at high speed and force, which slams the landing aircraft to the ground short of the runway while trying to land or forces the aircraft about to take off to the ground as soon as it takes off, because it does not have enough speed to counter the "down draft" effects of the wind sheer. Airport around the world are now stalling/have installed equipment to measure wind sheers, which can come and go very suddenly, so that the ATC can warn pilot on final approach and those who are cleared for take off.
As you say, wind shear was not a factor. Wind Shear by definition is a rapid change in wind speed and/or wind direction. It is primarily caused by big thunder storm anvils or Cumulonimbus Storm Clouds in the mature stage. However, milder forms of wind shear can also occur in situations where there is no storm. These changes in wind speed or gusts are usually not enough to cause a large aircraft a loss of lift to such an extent that it is unable to maintain its altitude.
http://weathereye.kgan.com/expert/tstorms/stages.htmlDuring the Mature Stage, you have a violent updraft of air and a violent downdraft immediately adjacent to that, resulting in friction, lightning and wind shear. The down draft is powerful enough to push ANY aircraft onto the ground. This was not the case in Schiphol. Aircraft would avoid these storms at all costs and fly to their alternate aerodrome.
If as you say, that the landing check-list was being done when they were on final approach, does seem to indicate that they were too busy with other talk and not really being very vigilant giving the fact, they were flying “blind”. What I want to know is, when was the Auto-Pilot engaged. Was it only on the final approach or before, on base, or downwind leg, or were they on Auto from being in the holding pattern.? I ask this question, because when anything is on auto, we tend to get little too complacent in paying attention to details, because we believe in “GEORGE” to take us to the correct runway and land us safely. Might explain why the landing check-list was delayed or that the new pilot was a distraction in a way, that the captain was willing to spend too much time in teaching him.
As I said, it all points towards a total loss of Situational Awareness and a break down of Standard Operating Procedures. The crew were pre-occupied with other tasks and were not flying the aircraft. They were not scanning their instruments for attitude, altitude, airspeed, localizer and glideslope.
The AP is normally armed on departure by entering the route A to B in the Flight Management Computer. The FMC stores all route waypoints from A to B. The data base is updated 13 times a year as required to reflect Standard Instrument Departures (SIDs), approach changes, Standard Arrival (STAR) changes and waypoint and transition fix changes. Every Waypoint, Holding Pattern, Transition Fix and approach is stored into the FMC.
http://www.b737.org.uk/fmc.htm#FMC_DatabasesThe FMC route is entered by selecting the pre-stored route A to B before departing. The AP is armed immediately after departure, sometimes as low as 500FT. The AP will then fly the route A to B via waypoints B, C, D, E, F...and then to the Transition Fix X.
Transition Fix X is the final waypoint where Area Control will clear you for descent to an assigned altitude and transfer the aircraft to the appropriate Approach Controller. The assigned altitude is entered into the ALT window. The aircraft is still on AP whilst descending.
When the aircraft contacts Approach, it is assigned a Standard Arrival (STAR) and ILS Approach Runway (Rwy 18R). A STAR is a prescribed Standard Arrival and includes a new set of waypoints right up to the Final Approach Fix or the beginning of the Runway 18R ILS. The FAF is a distance of 6.2NMS from Runway 18R threshold and at this point the aircraft must be at 2000FT and configured for landing (Gear Down and Landing Flap set). All pre-landing checks, Emergency Briefings, and Missed Approach Briefing must be completed by this pint.
The Approach Controller will either allow the aircraft to proceed with the STAR or stack the aircraft into the Holding Pattern. Each STAR has 3 holding patterns at 3 separate waypoints. Runway 18R aircraft are usually stacked in one Holding Pattern whilst Runway 18C and Runway 18L aircraft are stacked into the other Holding Patterns. These Holding Patterns are stored in the FMC and when selected, the AP will fly the aircraft to that waypoint and complete the appropriate sector entry (a, b, c) into the Holding Pattern. The AP will just fly the Holding Pattern until the HOLD is canceled by the pilot.
The aircraft would then be transferred to Arrival, where it is sequenced, cleared to descend to 2000FT and cleared for final. Here, the THY would be informed that it is number ... behind the B757.
The AP will then fly the aircraft to the FAF via any necessary waypoint/s. The pilots should now be preparing the aircraft for landing prior to arriving at the FAF. The Localizer and Glideslope(GS) must be armed and identified as well. All pre-landing checks and briefings must be complete. Gear and Flaps are set at the FAF. The Localizer will be intercepted by the AP. At the FAF the GS becomes live and moves up as it is intercepted by the AP. The AT adjusts power as required. The aircraft should now be ready and configured for landing. A 3.0 degree descent profile is achieved as the AP follows the GS to the Ground which is a rate of 862 Feet Per Minute at 160 knots. One pilot should have one hand on the throttles and another on the yoke and continuously scan all instruments for attitude, airspeed, altitude, localizer and GS. Radar Altimeter should be cross checked with the pressure altimeters. Pressure Altimeter checks should be done at 4.0NMS and read 1310FT for the Runway 18R ILS at Schiphol.
So to answer your question, the AP was probably engaged throughout the flight.
I don’t know the answer to this, but I wonder what is the general attitude with the Turkish airlines flight deck crews in questioning the actions of the captain. It is well known, that some captains do not like to be questioned on the operation in the cockpit which tends to create the situation that the first officer to keep his mouth shut rather than be belittled by the captain for questioning his authority. This would have been normal in the old days where the captain was “GOD” and that one would not dare to question his decision. This was one main reason as to why the two Boeing 747 crashed on a foggy runway in Tenerife in the 70’s, because the Dutch captain, who also happened to be the Test Pilot for KLM, over ruled the first officer’s claim, that PanAm was still on the runway, when the captain gave orders to start rolling for take off. Well, half way down the runway, they broad sided the PanAm plane, and since they heard the KLM calling the tower that they were ready for take off, PanAm “gunned” the engines to get of the runway and onto the grass as much as possible, and since the airports ground radar was not working, the tower assumed that the runway was clear and gave clearance for take off for KLM. Well, all on the KLM died and most on PanAm. Since then, the “rule of engagement” in the cockpit was changed by many airlines, and that when things are not what they should be, the first officer had the responsibility to take action if the captain refused to re examine the concerns of the first officer, that no disciplinary actions can be brought against the first officer for standing his/her ground. As I said, I don’t know how the crew on Turkish planes operate. For sure, the junior pilot did not dare to say anything as to why the captain kept on ignoring the altimeter reading for 100 seconds showing altitude at –8ft.!
Here you touch upon a very critical area. You are referring to Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) principles. This is the study of how crew interact with each other on the flight deck. These days, there is a narrow command gradient between the Captain and FO.
In the old days, the Captain was looked upon as "GOD" and the Captain himself usually believed he was "GOD" as well. These Captains usually intimidated their FO and believed that all FOs are there just to operate the Gear and Flap lever. They would not take too kindly in having their authority or ability questioned by a Green FO. They were arrogant and dominated the flight deck. The problem here is that the Captain basically cuts off a very valuable resource and reduces the Multi Crew environment to effectively a Single Pilot operation. There have been a number of accidents where inadequate CRM was a factor such as the Tenerife disaster.
Usually these types of pilots come from an Air Force or Military background and this has much to do with the training they received whilst in the Military. Also, some very senior Management Pilots, Check and Training Pilots have been known to be the main culprits. This does not mean that Air Force or Military pilots will not make good Airline Multi Crew pilots. It just means that Military Pilots need to be managed in a different manner to other pilots, and this is achieved by teaching proper CRM as part of the Ground School. Most Airlines have a CRM program, and THY should be no different if it is JAA compliant. However, the THY Captain of the B737 might be one of the old guard within his airline. We do know that he was a former TAF pilot and his command style might have been as aggressive as that of the KLM Captain in Tenerife. This might be another factor as you quite rightly insinuate and this will come out when investigators analyse the Cockpit Voice Recordings.
The Tenerife accident is used by our company as a case study within our CRM program BTW.
CRM does improve things somewhat. But it does not solve the issue altogether. The company's culture is also a factor. In my company, most pilots are recruited from the Air Force. Most Checkers and Senior Pilots are also from a Military background. It is amazing to analyse how pilots have separated themselves within different cliques (Military and the rest). Ex military pilots are also upgraded twice as fast and are a very protected species. Although we do apply CRM, we also have a couple of Captains that are renowned for being arseholes and no FO likes to fly with them. FOs however, are allowed to relieve the Captain of his command under certain circumstances and in accordance with the Operations Manual if the Captain is deemed to deviate from prescribed SOPs, which jeopardises safety.
Just one more bad thing happened to TK 1951. As the captain tried to save his plane from hitting the ground and by pulling on the controls to raise the nose at such a low speed and at a rapid change in the “angle of attack”, not only the engines would not have had enough time to generate enough trust in such a short time, but an aircraft trying to do a rapid “V” shape manoeuvre by first descending and then trying to make a sharp ascend, would have added certain amount of G-Forces on the aircraft, which would have increased the “apparent” weight of the aircraft to a point, just this action alone would have stalled the aircraft, even if the plane did have more power than it did. Over all, it was a no win situation for the crew at the moment the Auto Pilot tried to make a rapid landing a mile short of the runway, due to the faulty altimeter that confused the Auto Pilot. Hind sight, had the pilots did not intervened in the last few remaining seconds, the plane would have made a landing on the field , with the landing gear collapsing upon touchdown, no doubt, as the case was with British airways Boeing 777 at Heathrow last year. But if the plane did not collide with anything, it is possible, all could have walked away from this crash with less injury and death. Having said that, I would have done the same thing what the captain tried to do but failed, and that was to save his plane and all those aboard. It is only human nature to try and survive.
The information I have through the grapevine is that the aircraft had lost about 40knots from the Vref, which practically means the aircraft was almost stalled and not able to initiate a climb. By raising the nose, even more speed would have been washed off resulting which resulted in stalling the aircraft onto the ground.
) or Auto Throttle disengaging etc etc...........
It may have been overridden by the pilots.
