Cyprus-Forum.com

[insan]

http://169.253.2.210/documents/kissinger/0000D679.pdf

Can someone fill in the gaps of this document and tell us what they were talking about?

[Get Real!]

So what is this thread... a guess game?

[insan]

So what is this thread... a guess game?

I'm trying to complete some small parts of Cyprus Puzzle.

[insan]

Cypriot intercommunal problems continue to elude a satisfactory
solution. Animosity between the two communities is deeply rooted in
the island’s history, and independence in 1960 did not help. Major hostilitieserupted in 1963 and again in 1967, and passions continue to
smolder. Though talks between the communities have helped to keep
the level of violence down, they have made little progress toward basic
solutions—despite the addition of “advisers” from Greece and
Turkey, as well as a UN observer. The talks remain deadlocked; the
Greek Cypriots will accept nothing less than majority rule, and the
Turkish Cypriots demand greater participation in the administration
of the island than their 20-percent minority would seem to justify.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf

[insan]

The Divided Majority
Archbishop Makarios would reject any arrangement that detracted
from the concept of a unitary state run by the Greek Cypriots. He regrets
signing the London–Zurich Agreements because they granted a
separate status to the Turkish Cypriots. His desire to achieve a unitary
state in Cyprus is evident in the intercommunal talks, where he has been
willing to cooperate on minor issues, but not on the concept of majority
rule. The Archbishop also wants Cyprus to be a totally independent state,
free from outside interference. Although he is a devoted believer in Hellenism—
the cultural identity of Greeks—he opposes enosis in the belief
that political union between Cyprus and Greece would greatly diminish
his power. His public position is, “enosis is fine, but not now.”

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf

[insan]

Some of Denktash’s goals have created tensions between the Turkish
Cypriots and Ankara. The relationship between the Turkish military
on the island and the Turkish Cypriot administration has always
been touchy. Denktash insists that the vice president must have autonomous
control of both the military and political affairs of the Turkish
community. His position challenges not only Makarios’ authority
as president, but also Ankara’s insistence that its commander of the
Turkish mainland force on Cyprus control military matters within the
Turkish community and review political decisions. Strains between
Ankara and Denktash surfaced recently when Turkish troops on the island
went on maneuvers in direct violation of an agreement between
the two communities not to hold exercises or parades that might increase
intercommunal tensions.

[insan]

N: Are there many casualties?
K: There hasn’t been much fighting.
N: The Cypriots don’t fight much.
K: The Turks fight well. They are tough. If the Greeks don’t go to
war in the a.m., I think we are all right.
N: I would think they won’t in view of what you say they said.
K: They are waiting for the answer and they may get antsy. [1 line
not declassified] We are playing the hard line and are in step with all
our allies.
N: If the Greeks did go to war, then I would come back to Washington.
K: And we would cut off all aid
N: That would stop the war.
K: They can’t fight long then.

[insan]

Secretary Kissinger: What message? (referring to Mr. Sisco’s
message).
Mr. Colby: The one Joe (Mr. Sisco) is sending back regarding the
Turks ignoring the resolution to cease fire.4
Secretary Schlesinger: They should have withdrawn by now. What
was the latest time they were to withdraw?
Mr. Colby: They have ignored them all. The first was 9:00 a.m. our
time. I think that was pushed up to 11:00 a.m.
Secretary Kissinger: Did we send that message to the President?
(Ecevit).5
Mr. Ingersoll: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, there won’t be a ceasefire until we hear
from Ecevit.
Secretary Schlesinger: The ceasefire has been extended until noon?
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know what time—there is no fixed
time.

[insan]

On the diplomatic side, I have talked at least five times with
Ecevit since last night.7 All I could really get out of it was that they are
totally confused. If their generals are as bad as their leaders, what can
their captains and majors be like! Anyway, our efforts are aimed at getting
a ceasefire. The Turks, by the way, were talking about a Greek armada
off the coast of Cyprus somewhere. Do we know what they are
talking about?
Gen. Brown: I think it was the one sighted off the southern coast.
The problem is that it is within 25 miles of the coastline, and there are
so many different types of ships in that area that we are having trouble
identifying them.
Mr. Colby: They’re off Paphos.
Secretary Kissinger: Can the Greeks land on that end of the island?
Mr. Colby: Yes, it’s a safe area. They could at least introduce troops
there.

[insan]

Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we
thought they would.
Mr. Colby: Yes, they are doing well.
Amb. McCloskey: What is their strength on the island?
Mr. Colby: About 9,000 National Guard troops, and plus 30,000
Reserves. The Turks have about 6,000.
Secretary Kissinger: Are the Greeks reinforcing?
Mr. Colby: Yes, today.