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[insan]

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, this is what Ecevit has already told me—
that there is to be a meeting of their NSC at 4:00 p.m. and a cabinet
meeting at 6:00 p.m. The Greeks are complaining of heavy bombing in
Nicosia. Anything could happen now. I could call Ecevit and tell him
that if there is no ceasefire and there is war, this would severly jeopardize
our relations.

[insan]

[quote]Sisco says that if we get no action from the Turks we will have to
leave NATO. I’ll put in a call to Ecevit—it will give us some time in
Athens. Seems to me that Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are
doing lousy militarily. We’ve got two governments in and outside the
country. Under these conditions we may have to turn to Makarios. I’m
not sure we have any alternative now. What is going to be the balance
of forces if we get a ceasefire?
Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some
40,000 troops.
Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture
of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire.
They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and
there. That would change the whole picture.
Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks
in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What
went wrong, anyway?[/quote]

[insan]

Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough.
Mr. Ingersoll: How much ammo is on the island?
Mr. Colby: Lots of it. Every male over the age of 12 has a gun and
lots of ammunition.Amb. McCloskey: That’s right. Also, Sampson opened up all the
caches.
Mr. Lauder: They have also received weapons from the Palestinians.
Secretary Kissinger: From Fatah?
Mr. Lauder: Yes.
Mr. Colby: All the Greeks on the island are cleaving together on
this thing. They all act as one against the Turks.
Secretary Kissinger: Then once we have a ceasefire, we have a
united populace.
Mr. Colby: At least for the moment. Some cracks will begin to
show, primarily between the Makarios and Sampson forces.

[insan]

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have two separate questions here.
If we have a peaceful solution today . . .
Secretary Schlesinger: The larger question is, is NATO going to
survive in its present form? The other European countries have said
that we have gone beyond the point of no return regarding Greece.
Secretary Kissinger: You want to kick the Greeks out of NATO?
Secretary Schlesinger: No, I am thinking more along the lines of
some moves we might make to bring about a more sympathetic regime
in Greece.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a chance that will happen
anyway.
Mr. Colby: If the Greeks leave NATO, it would be very hard to
bring them back in later on.

[insan]

Secretary Schlesinger: No. [1 line not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mr. Colby: You’ve got to give Ecevit something.
Secretary Kissinger: Why?
Mr. Colby: We put him in an untenable position. We have to give
him something he can take back to his generals.

[insan]

The difference
between double enosis and the other two is that only double
enosis offers a clearcut long-term solution to the communal problem.
The trouble with double enosis is the Soviet dimension.
1. Double enosis has long been the preferred Turkish solution, and
once in control of a large chunk of Cyprus, the Turks cannot be expected
to withdraw easily and permit any other solution.
Double enosis, however, raises a host of difficulties. Because of the
intermingling of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and despite
the ingathering process of the past decade, large numbers of Greek
Cypriots would be left in the Turkish-controlled areas, and thousands
of Turkish Cypriots would find themselves living under Athens’ authority.

[insan]

But, the tension between the Greek preference
for unity and the Turkish desire for maximum communal autonomy
would create a permanent prospect for communal strife. No matter
what promises and guarantees the Turkish invaders managed to extract
from the Greeks, both sides would attempt to bend a federal solution
to their own desires. Thus federalism contains the same inherent
instability as a return to the London–Zurich arrangements and
would be no more workable over the long term. While far more acceptable
to the Soviets than double enosis, neither federation nor a return
to 1960 would meet the basic test of stable practicality.

[insan]

Gen. Brown: There are two things. One, the Turks have not made
the headway they expected. They underestimated Greek resistance and
overestimated Turkish support on the island. However, and this is the
second point, they can re-supply and they control the air. Over time
this will make a great difference. They can greatly strengthen their
forces on the beachhead, which is already strong. They have a line of
communication to the sea.

[insan]

Mr. Jordan: There is the possibility that the Turkish army might
overthrow Ecevit.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know so. He’s a strange one. He really
stalled on the ceasefire, gave me the weirdest collection of excuses
I’ve ever heard. First of all was the business about the phantom
“Greek Armada”. Secondly, he gave us this stuff about the Greek
airplanes using Turkish callsigns, and thirdly he talked about announcing
the principle of the ceasefire but leaving the details to be decided
later. We finally gave an ultimatum. The British and the French
agreed to support us with separate messages but, in the event, their
communications arrived too late, after the decision. Neither the Greeks
or the Turks trusted the other enough to announce their ceasefire
first. So we had to announce it. First the Turks accepted, then the
Greeks.

[insan]

What was the situation on the island before this thing started?
Were the Turks all in enclaves?
Gen. Walters: Yes, as you can see by this map.
Secretary Kissinger: Were they all self-governing?
Gen. Walters: Not all of them were, but a number of them did have
self-government.
Secretary Kissinger: The enclaves that were under Turkish control,
did they lose them all?
Gen. Walters: Yes, almost all.
Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?
Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor.
They (the Turks) couldn’t even take Nicosia airport.