Cyprus-Forum.com

[YFred]

AKRITAS PLAN

The AKRITAS PLAN was drawn up in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot leadership and set out the guidelines towards achieving ENOSIS (annexation of Cyprus to Greece) through extermination of the Turkish Cypriot population on the island. A Greek Cypriot newspaper, ''Patris'', published the details of this plan for genocide in April 1966 until which time the document had remained a well-kept secret.
Soon after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, President Makarios had begun setting up an organisation responsible for achieving the 'final solution' i.e union with Greece. The organisation was to be led by the Interior Minister, the chief of EOKA, Policarpos Yorgadjis, whose code name was AKRITAS. The Minister of Labor Thassos Papadopoulos was appointed deputy chief. The leader of the House of Representatives Glafcos Clerides (who is currently the so-called 'president' of the illegal regime in South Cyprus) was given the position of Chief of Operations, his code name was Hiperides.
Makarios and his team drew up the document, which was signed ''The Chief, Akritas'' and distributed it amongst the ranks of EOKA as a top secret circular several months prior to December 1963 when the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces launched an all out attack on the Turkish Cypriot population.
THE AKRITAS PLAN TOP SECRET HEADQUARTERS
Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take in near future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to time, and measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination. As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and handling of our cause within and outside the country are different.
A. METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE
In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to the world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. But the question of Turkish minority had been introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties.
(a) Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
(b) The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:
(i) that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just
(ii) that the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties.
(iii) that the demand for the revision for the agreements is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonour their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival of them.
(iv) that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
(v) that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong elements on which foreigners must rely.
(c) Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect, our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.
(d) Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives we must materialise the second stage on an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:
(i) that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism;
(ii) that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
(iii) Omitted
(iv) that this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
(v) that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self- determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must first get rid of the Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions in the Constitution which will inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of people and which they carry dangers of external intervention. For this reason, our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognised by the Greek Cypriots. When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite. It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialise, our future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences.
Actions to be taken are as follows:
(a) The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (passage omitted) whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.
(b) Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
(c) Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express and apply its will.
(d) It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then be completely independent. It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (a) to (d) to be carried out in the order indicated. It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (a) if stage (d) is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements. The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in the international field.
B. THE INTERNAL ASPECT
Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.
1. The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention, even if legally excusable, has the attacker been removed by either the United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack on Suez Canal by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eliat in the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus. If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e. at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose. The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed: (Omitted)
2. It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be: (a) The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c) (b) Serious inter-communal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks. The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn up for the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of inter-communal strife. We do not intend to engage, without provocation, in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section omitted) the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret; we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.
3. (Omitted)
4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is impossible for us to proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more general Plan as described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason, the existence and the strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:
(a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among the Greeks, in towns particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.
(b) In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.
(c) The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their Community.
(d) In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.
5. In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally essential for our success and survival. This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must no however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing to the fact that, for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public. Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities we need a strong and stable government, up to the last minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are good for nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. A typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated and kept at a distance. We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives ONLY VERBALLY.
Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the Organisation to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to enlighten others. NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY SORT IS ALLOWED.
LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE IS EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON. There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition. Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who will control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or statement MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION.
The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten our members and the public VERBALLY. Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.
NOTE: The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibilities of the Chief of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office of sub-headquarters.
The Chief AKRITAS

[Oracle]

I see you start the day as you mean to go on ... Posting crap again!

[YFred]

Are you saying this document has nothing of value at all. No truths in it. Total lies. Did it not even appear in the newspaper it says it did?
Its time to stop accusing people of being liars and seriously debate which points are not true.
However I do not expect this from the usual suspects. But I do hope that the more serious minded and with knowledge will guide us to enlightenment my dear, dear, dear sweet greekness.

Are you so delusional that you are going to claim that Akritas does not exist and is only in the imagination of Yfronts. It is certainly a load of cock and bull. That, there is no doubt.

[Piratis]

YFred, it is you who wrote the above, or some other uneducated Turkish propagandist who doesn't even know the most basic facts? Cyprus never even had a Minister of Labor called Thassos Papadopoulos!

Here is the so called "Akritas plan":

The recent public statements of His Beatitude have outlined the course which our national issue will follow. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it possible to fix time limits for the achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must always be examined and judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the moment, and the measures which will be taken, the tactics, and the time of implementing each measure must be determined by the conditions existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must necessarily pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final result are many and varied. It is sufficient, however, that all should understand that themeasures which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national objective, i.e., to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-determination of the people.

Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains is to examine the subject of tactics. It is necessary to divide the subject of tactics under two headings, that is: internal tactics and external, since in each case both the presentation and the handling of our cause will be different.

A. External tactics (international).

During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been presented to diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Cyprus. In securing the right of self-determination obstacles have been created by the well-known conditions, the existence of a Turkish minority, by the inter-communal conflict and the attempts to show that co-existence of both communities under one government was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the two sides.

a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved an the solution requires revision.

b) Our first objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression that:

(i) The solution given is neither satisfactory not fair;

(ii) The agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting views;

(iii) That the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;

(iv) That the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and

(v) That the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turkish Cypriots.

c) All the above has required very difficult effort, and has been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the foreign representatives have been convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. It is significant argument that the solution achieved has not been ratified by the people, because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to ratify it by a plebiscite, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have done if called upon.

Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks have confined themselves to a negative role.

d) Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we mus programme the second stage of our activities and objectives on the international level. These objectives in general can be outlined as follows:

(i) The Greek efforts are directed towards removing unreasonable and unfair provisions of administration and not to oppress the Turkish Cypriots;

(ii) The removal of these oppressive provisions must take place now because tomorrow it will be too late;

(iii) The removal of these provisions, despite the fact that this is reasonable and necessary, because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks is not possible bv agreement, and therefore unilateral action is justified;

(iv) The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of military or other intervention;

(v) The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

e) Today it has been generally demonstrated that the international climate is against every type of oppression and, more specifically, against the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is estimated that we have better chances of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for union with Greece (Enosis). In order, however, to secure the exercise of complete and free self-determination, we must get free of all those provisions of the constitution and of the agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance) which prevent the free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people and which create dangers of external intervention. It is for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When this is achieved no legal or moral power can prevent us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.

From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of actions is needed, each of which is necessary, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically unachieved, while at the same time we will expose our people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be summed up as follows:

a) Amendment of the negative elements of the agreements and parallel abandonment of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time intervention from outside to prevent us amending them is unjustified and inapplicable;

b) As a result of our above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (right of unilateral intervention) becomes legally and substantively inapplicable;

c) The people, once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, will be able to give expression to and implement their desire.

d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State of every internal or external intervention.

It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any chance of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages are necessary, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments in stage (a) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the negative aspects of the constitution by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning of the State if stage (d) is revealed?

The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the internal front:

B. Internal Front.

1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention, by force, not so much because of the material damage, nor because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. Intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both internationally and in the United Nations.

From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of intervention, whether legally justified or not, has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the invader without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations, and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received as a concession the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Naturally, more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.

If, on the other hand, we consider and justify our action under (a) above well, on the one hand, intervention is not justified and, on the other, it cannot be carried out before consultations between the guarantors Greece, Turkey and the UK. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention) that we need international support. We shall have it if the proposed amendments by us appear reasonable and justifiable.

Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we would request in the first stage.

Tactics: We shall attempt to justify unilateral action for constitutional amendments once the efforts for a common agreement are excluded. As this stage the provisions in (ii) and (in) are applicable in parallel.

2. It is obvious that in order to justify intervention, a more serious reason must exist and a more immediate danger than a simple constitutional amendment.

Such a reason could be an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a) - (c) or serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacres of the Turks.

Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, it remains only to consider the danger of inter-communal violence. Since we do not intend, without provocation, to attack or kill Turks, the possibility remains that the Turkish Cypriots, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution,

will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage, under orders, killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be justified, for their protection.

Tactics. Our actions for constitutional amendments will be in the open and we will always appear ready for peaceful negotiations. Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature.

Should clashes occur, they will be dealt with in the initial stages legally by the legally established security forces, in accordance with a plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.

3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts, such as, for example, the use of force to unify the separate municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react violently. On the contrary, it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio in the public service, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but to refusal to act (to implement).

The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regard to taxation legislation.

These measures have already been considered and a series of similar measures have been chosen for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established de facto by such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more decidedly.

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been described above, without the Turks at tempting to create or to stage violent clashes. For this reason, the existence of our organisation is an imperative necessity because:

a) In the event of instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the towns and thus losing substantial vital areas, while, on the other hand, an immediate show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant acts, and

b) In the event of a planned or staged Turkish attack, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation (in one or two days), no outside, intervention would be either justified or possible.

c) In either of the above cases, effective use of force in dealing with the Turks will facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will now that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community, and

d) In the event of the clashes becoming more general or general we must be ready to proceed with the actions described in (a) to (b), including the immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.

5. At no stage should we neglect the need to enlighten, and to face the propaganda and the reactions of those who cannot or should not know our plans. It has been shown that our struggle must pass through four stages and that we must not reveal publicly and at improper times our plans and intentions. Complete secrecy is more than a national duty.

IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY FOR SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS.

This will not prevent the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagogy nor to bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before the next elections, for obvious reasons, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool.

At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. This can only be done by the necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.

In the first instance, we must uncover what the reactionaries stand for. Some of them are opportunist and irresponsible, as their recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but without at the same time offering a substantive and practical solution. We need a steady and strong government in order to promote our plans up to the last moment. These opponents are verbalists and sloganists, but unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves. They must, therefore, be isolated.

In parallel, we shall brief our members only ORALLY about our intentions. Our sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others.

NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OF ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO TREASON AGAINST THE NATION.

No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document or its publication by our opponents. With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing, all our other actions, i.e., publications in the Press, resolutions, etc., must be very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of the Leader or Deputy Leaders, references in general terms to the plan. They must also have the authorisation of either the Leader or the Deputy Leader who must approve the text. ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION PERMITTED.

Tactics. Complete briefing of our people and of the public by word of mouth. Publicly we shall endeavour to appear as moderates. Projection of or reference to our plans in the Press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will continue to brief and to raise the morale and the desire for the struggle of our people, but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the Press or otherwise.

NOTES: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the Leader and the Deputy Leader in the presence of all the members of the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies or part copies are prohibited: members of the staff of the Office of the Deputy Leader may have copies on the personal responsibility of the Leader, but may not remove them from the Office of the Deputy Leader.

The Leader AKRITAS

First of all this is just an anonymous document, nothing more.

Secondly, where does it talk about any "TC genocide"???

Genocides and ethnic cleansing my friend are what the Turks do, not just in theory of some anonymous document, but as historical fact.

What the document talks is very simple:

How we would gain our rights and unite our island with the rest of Greece, something which has been the desire of the vast majority of the Cypriot people and was denied to us by foreigners. Nothing more than that.

[YFred]

Can you confirm at least that such a plan exists and that the aforementioned people were involved or is it a total fabrication?

[DT.]

Oh goodie this was taken from TCN. Tim's most favourite website in the world.

http://www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/Akritas.htm


The website that brings you statements such as this

I am not saying that Greeks are a more cruel or violent people than any other. What I am saying is that their nationalism, because of its religious overtones, has promoted intolerance, aggressiveness and extreme ethnocentrism, and that it has, in areas occupied by Greece, inevitably led to what we today call "ethnic cleansing."

[YFred]

Oh goodie this was taken from TCN. Tim's most favourite website in the world.

http://www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/Akritas.htm


The website that brings you statements such as this

I am not saying that Greeks are a more cruel or violent people than any other. What I am saying is that their nationalism, because of its religious overtones, has promoted intolerance, aggressiveness and extreme ethnocentrism, and that it has, in areas occupied by Greece, inevitably led to what we today call "ethnic cleansing."

DT, stop clowning. I appreciate that it is not the original. I also appreciate that it is from the biased view of TC's, however, take your time and tell me which bits ar not true.

[Piratis]

Can you confirm at least that such a plan exists and that the aforementioned people were involved or is it a total fabrication?

The document exists, if it didn't exist how would you copy and paste it here?

Beyond that, who wrote it and when is something we don't know.

What we know is that in 1957 (long before any "Akritas plan"), the TC leader Fazil Kuchuk published "The Cyprus Question: A Permanent Solution", a document where he advocated the extermination of Greek Cypriots from the north part of Cyprus, in order to artificially create some Turkish state on the land stolen from us.

The fact is that although Cypriots had suffered a lot under the Turks for centuries, after the Ottoman rule ended, we forgave the Turks and we lived together in peace.

However in the 1950s while the Cypriot people had revolted against the new foreign ruler, the British, the Turks decided to attack us again in an attempt to deny again the self-determination rights from the Cypriot people.

This is what happened. The British and Turks collaborated and attacked the Cypriot people, and later forced on them the 1960 "agreements", and as the "Akrtitas plan" says, those agreements: "it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. "

The "Akritas plan" had only one aim: for the Cypriot people to gain back their self-determination rights which have been denied to them by the foreign invaders. There is nothing about "genocide" or anything else, and this is purely Turkish imagination and propaganda.

So we don't know who wrote the "Akritas Plan" but it could be just about any Cypriot, because all of us felt the injustice that our self-determination right was denied to us, and then we were forced and blackmailed to accept a constitution that was written by foreigners, and served the interests of those foreigners, and not the interests of the Cypriot people.

[DT.]

Oh goodie this was taken from TCN. Tim's most favourite website in the world.

http://www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/Akritas.htm


The website that brings you statements such as this

I am not saying that Greeks are a more cruel or violent people than any other. What I am saying is that their nationalism, because of its religious overtones, has promoted intolerance, aggressiveness and extreme ethnocentrism, and that it has, in areas occupied by Greece, inevitably led to what we today call "ethnic cleansing."

DT, stop clowning. I appreciate that it is not the original. I also appreciate that it is from the biased view of TC's, however, take your time and tell me which bits ar not true.

Sorry Yfred... SOon as I get 10 minutes I'll go through it.

[YFred]

I wish it was me that had such talent to write such documents.

My question was, has akritas plan (not the above document) ever existed and were the personalities mentioned involved. At least we agree that it existed. Were the personalities mentioned correct even if the roles mentioned may not have been correct. Can you tell me what was the role of Papadobullos in government at the time?
Surely the document says that it was published in a greek newspaper in 1966. Is even that fact not true?

If you wish to start a thread on Kucuk then we can discuss him too.