Hello friends,
As promised, I reprint below the summary of preliminary results for the bicommunal poll. More detailed tables will be available in a few days.
BICOMMUNAL POLL ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Introduction
In this poll, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were asked to evaluate the acceptability of various possible provisions for different aspects of a future Comprehensive Settlement Plan.
Poll Identity
The surveys were conducted with a sample of 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots, who were selected according to the established methodology of multi-stage random stratified sampling. All the interviews took place during the second half of May 2005.
Results
Here follow the preliminary findings of the survey:
1. The Greek Cypriots are most concerned about the Annan Plan provisions regarding the Settlers – 80% consider that the Annan Plan is inadequate in this respect. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots have serious concerns about the issues of Security, Property rights, Residence Rights and Implementation Guarantees – 60% consider that each of these aspects have been inadequately dealt with in the Annan Plan.
2. On the issues of Decision Making Mechanisms (“functionality”) and Legal Status (the “virgin birth approach”), the Greek Cypriot public is ambivalent about the Annan Plan provisions without being outright negative. These issues could easily emerge to the foreground during a future round of negotiations as critical issues, especially if at some point the more urgent issues listed above are satisfactorily resolved.
3. The Turkish Cypriots on the whole accept all aspects of the Annan Plan, though some hesitation is definitely present concerning the proposed security arrangements.
4. The Greek Cypriots are willing to consider alternative arrangements for various aspects of the Settlement Plan, within the overriding framework of a bizonal – bicommunal Federation, but they are on some issues ambivalent and on some issues very specific as to what type of amendment would be acceptable to them.
5. The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, are more firmly committed to the overall framework of a bizonal-bicommunal Federation, and within this framework they are willing to consider various different alternatives for particular aspects of a future Plan, with a substantial measure of flexibility.
6. On the issue of Security, the Greek Cypriots are unwilling to countenance an arrangement based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, even with substantial alterations. In contrast, they would accept a European Security system, with “last resort” rights for Turkey to directly protect the Turkish Cypriots only if the primary security system fails. This is a position which the Turkish Cypriots also support, by a wide margin. In fact, they would clearly prefer such arrangements to the security provisions of the fifth Annan Plan.
7. On the issue of Property Rights, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would both be willing to accept a compromise, whereby all properties are returned to original owners except those in which refugees with equivalent property to exchange live and those on which there has been significant investment - so long as refugees who are not in this way enabled to return to their original home are granted an alternative home in the same town or village as compensation. It seems that the Greek Cypriots would reject a lease-hold system if it meant that they would not be able to use their properties for two or three decades, and also they would not accept further territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots in return for a purer form of bizonality.
8. On the issue of Residence Rights, the Greek Cypriots would be willing to accept various types of arrangements, so long as the timetable restrictions to relocation are lifted. The Turkish Cypriots would be quite willing to lift all such timetable restrictions, in such a way that whatever limits were to apply in the final state of affairs, should apply from “Day One” without an interim period.
9. On the issue of Settlers, the Greek Cypriot public is quite absolute: Any type of “list of x number of settlers to remain” is viewed with much suspicion. The only type of arrangement Greek Cypriots would tolerate is one where certain people would have the right to stay based on very specific criteria – for instance having been born in Cyprus, or having come to Cyprus before the age of 18. Even with such arrangements, however, the Greek Cypriot public would still be divided over the settlers issue. The only arrangement which Greek Cypriots would accept without hesitation is if all settlers leave – except of course those who have intermarried with Turkish Cypriots and the descendants of such mixed marriages. The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to accept such an arrangement, but only if the Turkish Government undertakes to re-house these people at their place of origin, while at the same time helping them with finding new employment.
10. On the issue of Implementation Guarantees, both communities prefer that the EU offer guarantees for the implementation of the settlement, through a binding protocol which all the various involved parties will sign. The idea that the UN should pass a Security Council resolution under Chapter 7, guaranteeing the implementation of the solution with the threat of force, is seen with hesitation by both communities.
11. On the issue of functionality of the Federal Government and power-sharing arrangements, the public of both communities shows a measure of flexibility as to what the precise arrangements should be. The proposal that there should be cross-voting arrangements for the election of Senators, so as to give politicians a stronger motive to be more co-operative, seems to be particularly popular with both communities.
12. On the issue of Legal Status, it would seem that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could agree on a particular formula, recognising that after the unrest of 1963-64 the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis, during which the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis.
13. Various other improvements to strengthen the social and political cohesion of the newly re-united state were also seen in a positive light by both communities – for instance, arrangements to encourage the development of bicommunal schools, bicommunal business ventures and bicommunal political parties, a unified teaching of the recent history of Cyprus in all the schools of the island, the direct administration of archeologically and environmentally sensitive areas by the Federal Government, provisions for the closer co-ordination of the two constituent states on matters related to trade, industry and tourism, and others.
14. The European Union is the outside institution that is most trusted by the Greek Cypriots, and least mis-trusted by the Turkish Cypriots, closely followed by the United Nations. Greece is trusted only by the Greek Cypriots, Turkey is trusted only by the Turkish Cypriots, while the UK and the US are mis-trusted by majorities in both communities.
15. Concerning the possibility of an interim deal being made by the two communities on the issue of direct trade, the Greek Cypriot public strongly opposes any trade-off on this issue. Instead they would prefer to proceed immediately to Comprehensive Settlement negotiations, by-passing the issue of direct trade altogether. The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider a deal on direct trade, in return perhaps for Varosha or in return for guarantees that construction over Greek Cypriot properties will stop, but on the whole they too would prefer that the whole issue be by-passed and that Comprehensive Settlement negotiations begin immediately.
16. Finally, large majorities of both communities are looking forward to a recommencement of Comprehensive Settlement negotiations as soon as possible, certainly not later than the end of 2005.