[quote]For the total area of privately owned land in 1974, the Turkish Cypriot data (Table 1.3) are exactly the same as the Greek Cypriot data (Table 1.1): 5,067,572 donumsor 73.3% of the total land of Cyprus. However, when it comes to the Greek Cypriotand Turkish Cypriot shares of private ownership, the Greek Cypriot and TurkishCypriot estimates (in Tables 1.2 and 1.4, respectively) are considerably different.According to the Turkish Cypriot data (Table 1.4), of the total privately owned land in 1974, only 71.5% belonged to Greek Cypriots (considerably lower than the GreekCypriot estimate) and as much as 26.7% belonged to Turkish Cypriots (considerablyhigher than the Greek Cypriot estimate). The discrepancy between the GreekCypriot (Table 1.2) and Turkish Cypriot (Table 1.4) data with regard to the two communities’ shares of private ownership amounts to about 500,000 donums, or10% of all private lands in 1974. Before ending this review of the contested facts and figures, it will be useful to lookat the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot estimates of land ownership for the areasdelineated after 1974, that is, on the two sides of and within the Buffer Zone. Table 1.5 shows the estimates of the Greek Cypriot Department of Lands and Surveys and the Planning Bureau based on 1964 data.20Note that these figures do notinclude the land in the SBAs. The shaded areas refer to the privately owned landsaffected by the property dispute, that is, lands outside the control of the communityfrom which the owners (including the Church in the case of the Greek Cypriot community or the Evkaf in the case of the Turkish Cypriot community) come. Basedon the data in Table 1.5, we can derive the Greek Cypriot estimates for the three current zones of the island (Table 1.6). 19To obtain the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot private ownership figures in Table 1.4, Giray’s estimated figure of 322,109 donums for the area of the allegedly ‘usurped’ miri lands was subtracted from his figure for Turkish Cypriot private ownership and added to his figure forGreek Cypriot private ownership.20See Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 175. The discrepancy between the figures of Table 1.5 and those of Tables 1.1 and 1.2 is largely due to the fact that the SBAs are not considered in Table 1.5.
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8 The Politics of Property in CyprusTable 1.5 Land ownership in donums for the post-1974 territories based on 1964 figures by the Greek Cypriot Department of Lands and Surveys and the Planning Bureau. (Land in the SBAs not included. ‘Greek Cypriot’ includes Armenian Cypriots and Maronite Cypriots.) Area Greek Cypriot Turkish Cypriot Non-Cypriot Public Total North 1,463,382 (60.60%) 393,791 (16.31%) 6,767 (0.28%) 551,150 (22.82%) 2,415,090 (100%)Buffer Zone112,326 (62.21%)25,362 (14.05%) 2,494 (1.38%) 40,384 (22.37%) 180,566 (100%)South2,543,021 (61.56%) 413,177 (10.00%) 10,011 (0.24%) 1,165,029 (28.2%) 4,131,238 (100%)Whole island 4,118,729 (61.23%)832,330 (12.37%)19,272 (0.29%)1,756,563 (26.11%)6,726,894 (100%)Table 1.6 Percentages of privately owned land in the post-1974 territories based on 1964 figures bythe Greek Cypriot Department of Lands and Surveys and the Planning Bureau. (Land in the SBAsnot included. ‘Greek Cypriot’ includes Armenian Cypriots and Maronite Cypriots.) Area Greek Cypriot (%) Turkish Cypriot (%) Non-Cypriot (%) Total North 78.5 21.1 0.4 100 Buffer Zone80.1 18.1 1.8 100 South 85.7 13.9 0.3 100 Whole island 82.9 16.7 0.4 100 According to Greek Cypriot estimates (Tables 1.5 and 1.6), 1,463,382 donums of land in the north belong to Greek Cypriots. This corresponds to 60.6% of the total landand 78.5% of all privately owned land in the north. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 below give the same type of data as in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, but onthe basis of Turkish Cypriot estimates, and include the properties claimed to have been ‘snatched’ from the Evkaf. Here the figures include the SBAs. As above, the shaded areas represent the privately owned lands affected by the property dispute, that is,lands outside the control of the community from which the owners (including theChurch in the case of the Greek Cypriot community and the Evkaf in the case of the Turkish Cypriot community) come.
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9Facts and FiguresTable 1.7 Land ownership in donums for the post-1974 territories based on 1974 records by the Turkish Cypriot Cartography Department (‘south’ includes the SBAs)Area Greek Cypriot Turkish Cypriot Other Public Total North 1,228,838 (50.71%) 637,912 (26.33%) 59,406 (2.45%) 497,000 (20.51%) 2,423,156 (100%)Buffer Zone126,230 (69.20%)35,823 (19.64%) 2,500 (1.37%) 17,867 (9.79%) 182,420 (100%)South2,269,686 (52.66%) 679,057 (15.76%) 28,120 (0.65%) 1,333,065 (30.93%) 4,309,928 (100%)Whole island 3,624,754 (52.41%)1,352,792 (19.56%)90,026 (1,30%)1,847,932 (26.72 %)6,915,504 (100%)Table 1.8 Percentages of privately owned land in the post-1974 territories based on 1974 records bythe Turkish Cypriot Mapping Department (‘south’ includes the SBAs). Area Greek Cypriot (%) Turkish Cypriot (%) Other (%) Total North 63.8 33.1 4.1 100 Buffer Zone76.7 21.8 1.5 100 South 76.2 22.8 0.9 100 Whole island 71.5 26.7 1.8 100 Again, as one would expect, the Turkish Cypriot estimates of Turkish Cypriot-owned land on either side of the island are much higher than the Greek Cypriotestimates: 33.1% of privately owned land in the north, and 22.8% of privately owned land in the south (corresponding Greek Cypriot figures are 21.1% and 13.9%, respectively). What is more important is the percentage of Greek Cypriot private property in the north. The Turkish Cypriot side estimates this at 1,228,838 donums, which is equivalent to 63.8% of all privately owned land in the north. Althoughsignificantly lower than the corresponding Greek Cypriot estimate (1,463,382 donumsor 78.5%), this is still a remarkably high percentage.
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Chapter 2 THE TWO SIDES’ OPPOSING DEMANDS: REASONS AND MOTIVES N ORDER TO UNDERSTAND the complexities of the official positions and how far and why they diverge on the property issue, it is useful to study the essential elements of what might be described as the standard ‘maximalist’ demands of thetwo sides: demands with no concession to the concerns of the other side and solelybased on pursuing what is perceived by one side as fair, just and in accordance with itsown ‘national interests’. I The parties’ maximalist demands on the issue of property were summarized in April 2003 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as follows: The Greek Cypriot side advocated a solution based on full respect for property rights so that all displaced persons, from either community, wouldhave the right to have their properties reinstated. The Turkish Cypriot side argued that property claims should be settled through liquidation by means of a global exchange and compensation scheme, meaning that no displaced persons, from either side, would have the right to have their properties reinstated.1The property issue has always been viewed by the two sides (of course with differentconcerns) as inseparable from the equally contentious question of ‘return of displacedpersons to their former homes’. On the other hand, the question of ‘return’ itself isobviously closely connected with the issue taken up at the 2002–04 UN-sponsoredintercommunal talks on Cyprus under the heading of ‘residence rights’. The latter is along-term notion that concerns not just those displaced but anyone from either community wishing to establish residency on the ‘other side’. On this issue, the UN Secretary-General outlined the parties’ maximalist demands as follows:the Turkish Cypriot side wanted the constituent states to have the unfetteredright to decide who could establish residency therein – this was their concept 1Report of the Secretary-General, para 107; emphasis added.
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12 The Politics of Property in Cyprusof ‘bi-zonality’. The Greek Cypriots argued that ... basic human rights and the principles of the [EU] acquis communautaire should allow any Cypriotcitizen to settle anywhere on the island, any limitations being acceptable only in the first few years – for them ‘bi-zonality’ meant only two distinct zonesadministered by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively.2Now, ‘bizonality’ is a principle that has long been an accepted basis for reunifying Cyprus under a federal state. The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two Cypriot sides laid down that the proposed federal Cyprus would be bizonal. In fact, bizonality formally became a UN-endorsed parameter for a prospective Cyprussolution under UN Security Council Resolution 649 (1990), which referred to ‘afederation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonalas regards the territorial aspects in line with ... [the] 1977 and 1979 high-levelagreements’. However, as we can see from the Secretary-General’s report above, there has beendisagreement between the two sides over the meaning of this crucial term. Indeed,their irreconcilable demands on the issue of property, together with their approaches tothe question of ‘residency rights’ (particularly in the context of return by displaced persons), show that the two sides’ notions of bizonality have been quite different all along. In addition, these stances suggest that the two sides’ positions on the issue ofthe restoration of human rights have been not only incompatible but highly debatable.This is largely because of their very different understandings of the Cyprus problem ingeneral, as well as their problematic interpretations of the concept of respect for individual human rights. A closer examination of the positions may help us clarify these disparities. The Turkish Cypriot Position The generally held opinion among Turkish Cypriots is that the property questionshould be resolved according to what they call ‘the established principle of bizonality’. By implication, this means that it should be resolved through ‘global exchange andcompensation’, a model considered as ideal by most Turkish Cypriots – even now.3This is because, to say the least, it is seen as the most practical and sustainable way to resolve the problem posed by the awkward fact that a huge proportion (somewherebetween 63.8% and 78.5%) of private property in the Turkish Cypriot-administerednorth actually belongs to Greek Cypriots. 2Ibid., paragraph 98. 3Whether ‘global exchange and compensation’ is still preferred by the Turkish Cypriots has not been systematically investigated. However, a number of things suggest that Turkish Cypriots may still have this preference. For example, development and/or trading of Greek Cypriot properties in the north have continued unabated since the April 2004 referenda. Another indication is the public’s generally sceptical response to the legislation (TRNC Law 67/2005 passed in December 2005) concerning Greek Cypriot properties in the north, which provides forcompensation and exchange, as well as restitution.
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13The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and MotivesThe global exchange and compensation formula was put forward as early as February 1976 in a paper Rauf Denktaş4presented at the fifth round of the ViennaTalks.5It translates as a kind of ‘lump-sum agreement’ between the two Cypriotadministrations, entailing an exchange of all Turkish Cypriot properties in the south for all Greek Cypriot properties in the north, with compensation to be paid, if necessary, for any difference in the value of the properties, taking into account the Turkish Cypriot losses before 1974.6Until 2003, this was a firmly held doctrine of the TRNC7government; it was a stance promoted by both the authorities and the mainstream media, and it had theoverwhelming support of the public and the major political parties. One should bear in mind that, until the publication in November 2002 of the UN proposal for thecomprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem (the so-called Annan Plan), globalexchange and compensation was the property solution adopted by almost every Turkish Cypriot political party, certainly by the mainstream National Unity Party(UBP), the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the Communal Liberation Party (TKP)and the Democratic Party (DP). In the TRNC constitution that came into effect in 1985, a provision was included that declared ‘abandoned’ Greek Cypriot properties in the north as ‘the property of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus notwithstanding the fact that they are not soregistered in the books of the Land Registry Office’.8Following this, the legislation known as the Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value (İskan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası [İTEM law], No. 41/1977) wasamended numerous times, eventually to allow the granting of title deeds to variouscategories of TRNC citizens who had been allocated such properties (1995amendment to the İTEM law). 4Rauf Denktaş represented the Turkish Cypriot community at the intercommunal talks between 1968 and 2004. He became the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in 1973 and was president of every Turkish Cypriot administration from 1974 until 2005. 5See Necati Münir Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks and the Cyprus Problem (Nicosia: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus State Printing Office, 1977), pp. 29–32. 6Ibid.7‘TRNC’ is the acronym for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community has had its own separate administration since the bicommunal government of the Republic of Cyprus broke down as a result of violent intercommunal conflict that started in 1963 (three years after the establishment of the Republic). The Cyprus government then became a solely Greek Cypriot administration, but has since claimed to be – and has gradually come to be accepted by the international community as – the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, the only internationally recognized state on the island (remarkably enough, without anyformalities, such as a renegotiation of the internationally approved 1960 Accords, having takenplace). Following the de facto division of the island in 1974, the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration of 1964–74 became the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, which was afterwards transformed into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (13 February 1975). In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence and the establishment of the TRNC. This declaration was declared by the UN Security Council to be ‘legally invalid’ (Resolution 541), and no countryother than Turkey has since recognized the TRNC. 8Article 159 of the constitution; see Appendix II.
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14 The Politics of Property in CyprusUnder this law, titles to ‘abandoned’ Greek Cypriot properties, allocated on the basis of properties of ‘equal value’ left in the south, were issued after all rights relating tothe latter were transferred to the state (TRNC). This arrangement, adopted inaccordance with the above-mentioned article of the constitution, clearly reflected theassumption that a global exchange of properties would be part of an eventual solution.In addition, there are provisions in the İTEM law under which certain groups of TRNCcitizens who did not necessarily leave any property in the south were given ownershipof Greek Cypriot properties,9this time the assumption no doubt being that what wouldnot come under global exchange would be dealt with under a scheme of globalcompensation.This approach in dealing with so-called abandoned properties stems from what theterm bizonality has come to mean to most Turkish Cypriots, a meaning that remains strongly linked with their experience of the 1963–74 period as well as with their interpretation of the events of 1974 and their aftermath. Turkish Cypriots view the Turkish military operation as a legitimate intervention that brought an end to the suffering of the years between 1963 and 1974, and – disregarding the vastly different and traumatic Greek Cypriot experience of whathappened in and after 1974 – that brought peace to the entire island. For them, 20 July 1974 was a turning point, and the Turkish military operation was deemed a ‘peace action’ that:a. halted the anticipated annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots, which theybelieved would have occurred if the Greek/Greek Cypriot coup of 15 July1974 – which ‘constituted, in fact, the final step towards the materialization of ENOSIS’10– had succeeded. b. Put an end to Turkish Cypriot suppression by ‘the Greek Cypriots who, forthe last twelve years [1963–74], have managed to deprive the Turkishcommunity [in Cyprus] of the economic, administrative and financial resources of the State [of the Republic of Cyprus]; have rendered 1/3 of theTurkish community unemployed and destitute refugees; have tried to reduce9The İTEM law established an exchange system of ‘points’ within which values of properties (Greek Cypriot properties in the north and Turkish Cypriot properties in the south) and compensation were stipulated. These ‘points’ can be exchanged for equal value (expressed in points) Greek Cypriot property in the north. They can also be traded (bought or sold) anddonated. ‘Points’ as compensation are awarded to: persons who left properties in the south; mücahits (fighters in the Turkish Cypriot resistance struggle); closest relatives of martyrs orvictims of the events of 1963–74 (martyr being a person killed during the resistance); members of the Turkish forces who fought in the 1974 war and, having received citizenship, settled on the island; veteran soldiers disabled during fighting. Also, immigrants from Turkey who were settled in northern Cyprus as an agricultural labour force in 1975–81 were allowed to purchase ‘points’ at a nominal rate from the government. (On this latter category, see Mete Hatay, Beyond Numbers: Inquiry into the Political Integration of Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus, PRIO Report 4/2005, pp. 13–14.) 10Necati Münir Ertekün, In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement (Nicosia: Ulus Matabaacılık,1981, p. 29.
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15The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and Motivesall the Turkish Cypriots of the island to the status of second class citizensthrough economic blockades and other oppressive measures; and have usedthe title of “Cyprus Government” as an instrument of attrition for bringingabout the complete capitulation of the Turkish Community, by usurping itthrough the use of force, violence and terror’.11c. Brought about a de facto bizonal situation, with a safe Turkish zone in thenorth into which all of the Turkish Cypriot population could move and live asmasters of their own destiny away from Greek hegemony. Bizonality and Turkish Cypriots The Turkish Cypriot side interprets the principle of bizonality as ‘the manifestation [albeit after the return of some territory to the Greek Cypriot side] of the de factosituation on the Island’ that ‘will form the basis of a future settlement’.12Moreover, it is thought to be a solution that was ‘not dictated by force of arms (as alleged by the Greek side)’,13but one that came about as the inevitable consequence of theprogressive process of separation of the two communities that had in fact been going on long before 1974.14For Turkish Cypriots, the principle of bizonality is the key parameter of a settlement on which there can be no bargaining. Given the fact that their population is much smaller than that of the Greek Cypriots,15they see this as the only way to guaranteetheir security and freedom against the perceived danger of Greek/Greek Cypriot aggression and in the face of what they regard as the Greek Cypriot determination todominate the island. This principle lies at the core of the Turkish Cypriot side’sapproach to the ‘territory issue’, which, as Denktaş put it in February 1976, requiresthat ‘the Turkish zone must be such that all Turks, who wish to do so, live in it as onewhole part’.16Denktaş also clearly outlined the Turkish Cypriot stance regarding theterms upon which the area of this ‘Turkish zone’ should be decided: 11Quoted from Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Resolution No. 1 of the Legislative Assembly,adopted unanimously on 5 November 1976. 12Zaim Necatigil, The Loizidou Case: A Critical Examination (Ankara: SAM Papers No 8/99, 1999), p. 46. 13Rauf Denktaş, paper presented at the fifth round of the Vienna Talks on 18 February 1976, in Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks, pp. 29–32. 14The Turkish Cypriots claim that they had to abandon 33 villages between 1955 and 1958, and 103between 1963 and 1967. According to Patrick, while in 1960 the breakdown of populationcentres was 392 Greek Cypriot, 117 Turkish Cypriot and 114 mixed, in 1970 it changed to 444 Greek Cypriot, 114 Turkish Cypriot and 48 mixed. He also remarked that ‘this classification ismisleading since mixed centres were invariably divided into distinct ethnic quarters betweenwhich there was little social and economic contact’ (Patrick, pp. 8–12). 15Throughout the 20th century, Turkish Cypriots have comprised roughly one-fifth of the island’s population and Greek Cypriots four-fifths. 16Rauf Denktaş, paper presented at the fifth round of the Vienna Talks on 18 February 1976, in Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks, pp. 29–32.
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16 The Politics of Property in Cyprusin measuring up the land needed for the Turkish population the area should not be less than their legitimate rights especially having regard to all kinds ofusurpations of Turkish land over the years, of illegal acquisition of Turkish land and of preventing – since 1963 – the registration of land in the names of the Turks.17Here, there is a clear presumption regarding the property problems: they are part and parcel of the so-called question of territory and should be handled on the basis of: (a) comparison between what ‘the Turks were forced to abandon over the years’ and what‘we [the Turks] have now occupied in our own indivisible area’ (i.e. global exchange); and (b) reciprocal compensation.18In the years that followed, the Turkish side rigorously maintained this position,which was entrenched and enhanced in the minds of Turkish Cypriots through frequently repeated public statements such as: They have no right over the north. In the south, we left them lands far more valuable than the ones they are claiming. Bizonality is an accepted future for Cyprus. As such, the problem would be solved through an exchange of lands and property. This has been put down on paper by the UN Secretary-General and it has been an accepted fact at the negotiating table for years.19The Turkish Cypriot Interpretation of the 1975 Vienna III Agreement There is another crucial factor that has influenced – and underpinned – the Turkish Cypriot understanding of what the principle of bizonality means with respect to howthe property dispute should be resolved. This is the particular way in which the Turkish Cypriot side has come to interpret the so-called Vienna III Agreement reached between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides in 1975. Before discussing this, it is important to recall the events that led to that Agreement. Towards the end of June 1975, a crisis erupted when some Turkish Cypriots tryingto cross to the Turkish-controlled area in the north were stopped and beaten up by Greek Cypriot security forces. The Turkish side reacted to this incident by expellingsome 800 Greek Cypriots from the north, warning that: the Turkish side would have no alternative but to transfer all the Greeks innorthern Cyprus to the Greek part of the island, if the ill-treatment of Turks 17Ibid.18Ibid.19Statement made by Rauf Denktaş on the Turkish Cypriot Genç TV, 17 November 1998; reported by the Public Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, ‘Turkish Cypriot Press and Other Media’, 18 November 1998; emphasis added.
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17The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and Motivesin the south continued and if the Greek authorities continued to prevent theseTurks from crossing to the Turkish-controlled part of the island.20According to an account by Glafkos Clerides,21Archbishop Makarios,22the Greek Cypriot president at the time, was of the opinion that ‘it was more important to keep Greek Cypriots in the north, and particularly in the Karpass area, than Turkish Cypriots in the south’.23Makarios was apparently also concerned that ‘should aserious incident take place against Turkish Cypriots in the south, Turkey may use it asan excuse to mount a military operation in the south’.24The issue was subsequentlytaken up by Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş during the third round of ViennaTalks, resulting in the Vienna III Agreement of 2 August 1975. This Agreement stipulated that Turkish Cypriots then residing in the south (some10,700 in number) were free to move to the north, if they wished to do so, with theassistance of UNFICYP; and Greek Cypriots then remaining in the north (about10,000 in number) were free to stay there and were to be provided with access to thefacilities they needed to lead a normal life. The Greek Cypriots in the north would also be permitted to move to the south ‘at their own request and without having beensubjected to any kind of pressure’. In addition, it was agreed that ‘priority would begiven to reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Cypriots at present in the south to the north’.25The results of the Agreement are well known. Within the space of a few months, thenumber of Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south was reduced to 130. The Greek 20Statement made by Rauf Denktaş, The Times (London), 1 July 1975. 21Glafkos Clerides represented the Greek Cypriot community at various stages of the intercommunal talks, both before and after 1974. He was the acting president during a briefperiod following the coup and the subsequent Turkish operation in 1974 (between July andDecember of that year). He was elected (twice) and served as president between 1993 and 2003. 22Makarios was archbishop and primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (1950–77). In 1960, he was elected the first president of the ROC. He kept both posts until his death in 1977. He remains the most venerated Greek Cypriot leader to this day. 23Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1992), pp. 295–299. 24Ibid.25For the full text of Vienna III Agreement, see Appendix I. It is worth noting here that this was a kind of gentlemen’s agreement between the interlocutors, and was drafted in a way that enabled each side to include what really was significant from its own political perspective. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot side, what mattered was to enable Turkish Cypriots to safely move to the north; in the case of the Greek Cypriot side, what mattered was freedom for Greek Cypriots to stay and live under decent conditions in the north. For example, while the Agreement provided for the safe passage of Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north, it contained no provision forTurkish Cypriots wishing to remain in the south. This could be construed as being due to a tacit assumption that the latter would be an exceptional situation, and no doubt reflected the Turkish Cypriot side’s desire for that to be the case. On the other hand, the provisions for Greek Cypriots wishing to remain in the north were very clearly expressed, and it was stated that they would begiven every assistance necessary to lead a normal life. Here again, in an e contrario interpretation, one could argue that the Turkish Cypriots choosing to remain in the south would not benefit from such help.
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18 The Politics of Property in CyprusCypriot population in the north also shrank, but more gradually, such that it was only around 500 by the early 1990s. Given the two sides’ very different experiences of the context and their more or less conflicting concerns, it is perhaps not surprising that their interpretations of the Vienna Agreement have always diverged. The Turkish Cypriot side refers to the Agreement as the ‘1975 Vienna Population Exchange Agreement’ or the ‘Voluntary Re-grouping of Population Agreement’, and has come to see it as simply meaning that‘the Turkish Cypriots living in the south would be allowed to move to the north, if they wished to do so, and the Greek Cypriots living in the north would be allowed tomove to the south, if they desired so’.26The Greek Cypriots, in contrast, talk about itas the ‘Vienna III (Humanitarian) Agreement’, which, if implemented properly, ‘would have allowed 20,000 Greek Cypriots and Maronites to stay and live a normal life in the occupied Karpasia Peninsula and the Maronite villages’.27It is important to emphasize that the Greek Cypriots accepted this agreement under the pressure of circumstances and despite their general unease at the time that it mighthelp the Turkish Cypriot aim of ‘partition’. They agreed because they decided it was the only way to stop the Turks from ‘expelling’ the remaining 10,000 Greek Cypriotsin the north. They also wanted to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots trying to cross to the Turkish-controlled north would not be attacked by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries, as they feared such attacks might trigger further southward incursion by the Turkisharmy.28One Greek Cypriot leader who opposed the Agreement was Dr Vassos Lyssarides,then leader of the Greek Cypriot political party EDEK (United Central Democratic Union). According to Clerides, his objection was that ‘by allowing the TurkishCypriots to go north we impliedly accepted that the solution would be based on a bizonal federation, and that it would constitute an impediment to the return of allrefugees to their homes’.29In fact, as it turned out, this is exactly how the Turkish Cypriots have come tointerpret the Agreement. The following statement (co-authored by a prominentTurkish law professor and a Turkish Cypriot former Supreme Court judge) sums up the Turkish Cypriot side’s attitude on this matter: This Agreement, reached under the auspices of the UN Secretary-Generaland implemented in September 1975 under UN supervision, consolidated the peace reached as the result of the Turkish Peace Operation. The voluntaryregrouping of populations made it feasible for the two peoples of Cyprus to26TRNC Public Information Office, Cyprus Issue, Main Negotiations; available
athttp://www.trncpio.com/ingilizce/ ingilizcesayfa.htm (accessed 11 December 2005). See also Kenan Atakol, Turkish & Greek Cypriots: Is Their Separation Permanent? (Ankara: METU Press, 2002), pp. 100–101. 27ROC Embassy in the USA, ‘The Cyprus Problem in Perspective’; available at
www.kypros.org/ Embassy/ (accessed 11 December 2005). 28Clerides, Cyprus, pp. 295–299. 29Ibid.
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19The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and Motiveslive in complete security in their respective zones. No intercommunalfighting or acts of violence took place in Cyprus since the implementation of the Agreement.... The peace achieved by the Turkish Peace Operation became a permanent feature in the island.30The suggestion made here – in a way that can only be perceived as offensive byGreek Cypriots – is that not only had peace been achieved through the Turkishmilitary operation, but the division of the island itself was voluntarily ‘finalised’ withthe approval of the UN. According to this view of things, the Agreement ‘was reached for an exchange ofpopulations as a first step towards the establishment of a bi-zonal federal Republic.’31‘The juridical and bi-zonal status of the two communities was established’ by this Agreement whereby ‘the freedom of movement to the North of the Turks enclaved inthe South and freedom of movement of Greeks living in the North to the South wasaccepted by the intercommunal negotiators’.32Therefore, it ‘is the very foundation ofa bi-zonal solution for the two communities accepted both by Clerides [in 1975] and Makarios [in 1977]’ and later in 1979 by Kyprianou.33Coming back to the issue of property, the implication of all this was clear to the Turkish Cypriots: naturally the two sides would negotiate the respective compensationdue to either community arising from this exchange.34Indeed, the Agreement‘presupposes the settlement of reciprocal property claims through global exchange and/or compensation’.3530Turhan Feyzioğlu & Necati Münir Ertekün, The Crux of the Cyprus Question (Nicosia, 1987), p. 39; emphasis added. (Ertekün is a former judge of the pre-1964 ROC Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, former president of the Turkish Cypriot Supreme Court, and former Turkish Cypriot minister of foreign affairs.) On this Turkish Cypriot claim that after 1974 Greek Cypriots moved to the south on a voluntary basis, a June 2006 judgment of the TRNC Constitutional Court isworth noting. In its ruling as to the constitutionality of the TRNC law for ‘compensation,exchange and restitution of immovable properties’ of displaced Greek Cypriots, the Court adopts an interpretation of the TRNC constitution that is consistent with international law. However,when discussing the question of displaced Greek Cypriots’ property rights in the north, it stillmaintained that ‘many Greek Cypriots abandoned their movable and immovable properties andon their own volition migrated to the South in accordance with the 1975 Exchange of Populations Agreement’ (emphasis added). 31Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks, p. 17. 32Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Resolution No. 1 of the Legislative Assembly, adoptedunanimously on 5 November 1976. 33See statement by Rauf Denktaş on 21 March 1981, in Ertekün, In Search of..., pp. 40–41. 34Ibid.35Rauf Denktaş, letter to the UN Secretary-General (A/55/986–S/2001/575), 31 May 2001. Examples of ‘political reality constructing’ that include these kinds of one-sided, self-servinginterpretations with undue disregard for the central concerns of the other community exist onboth sides. For a perceptive discussion of this, see Michael Moran, ed., Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1997), pp. 93–100. Here, the author gives an analysis of the antithetical interpretations by the two Cypriot sides of the ViennaIII Agreement and their similarly antithetical views on whether or not there existed ‘two separate and distinct administrations’ in Cyprus in July 1975.
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20 The Politics of Property in CyprusNow, this Turkish Cypriot reading of the Agreement as providing ‘juridical’ basis for what Turkish Cypriots think constitutes the established principle of bizonality, andtherefore for what should happen as regards property arrangements, is obviously andtroublingly misguided. It seems that the Turkish Cypriot side preferred to understandthe Agreement as something like the 1923 Lausanne Exchange Treaty between Turkey and Greece, and probably partly for this reason actually called it the ‘PopulationExchange Agreement’. And, since the Greek Cypriots agreed to this exchange, it wasperfectly reasonable for the Turkish Cypriots to regard the properties of the Greek Cypriots who moved to the south as ‘abandoned’ (as was the case with the properties left behind after the exchange between Greece and Turkey some eighty or so years ago). Yet, it is clear that there is little sense, if any, in making a comparison betweenthe deal in the August 1975 Vienna Agreement (in which there was no mention of anyproperty arrangement) and the 1923 Lausanne Exchange Treaty. In fact, one need notbe a legal expert to realize that the Turkish Cypriot reading of this agreement has beenfar-fetched. The Greek Cypriot Position The Greek Cypriots regard the property issue – which for them is linked inseparably tothe issue of return – as a problem of ‘respect for basic human rights’. The fact that so many Cypriots are displaced and dispossessed of their properties is first and foremost a consequence of human rights violations inflicted by Turkey in 1974. Therefore, theproblem can only be resolved by removing these violations, which means giving alldisplaced persons – Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike – the unqualified rightto repossess and return to their former homes and properties. This is considered by most Greek Cypriots as not just a legal imperative but the sole morally acceptablesolution to the problem.The Greek Cypriot formula for property settlement, as expressed in the various Greek Cypriot proposals for a solution, stipulates two conditions:36(a) substantial territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriot side, which will allow a considerablenumber of displaced Greek Cypriots to be resettled in their original homes and properties under Greek Cypriot administration; and (b) the application throughout the island of the so-called three freedoms, that is, freedom of movement, freedom ofsettlement and the right to property. The ‘three freedoms’ element is understood toinclude the right of all still-displaced persons (after territorial adjustment) to return to36See, for example, ‘Statement by Mr Tassos Papadopulos on the Territorial Proposals of the GreekCypriot Side on 31 March 1977’, in Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks, pp. 137–139. See also Greek Cypriot Proposals, 1989; available at
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/ All/CFA4FC4421DF27A4C2256D6D0033FE51?OpenDocument (accessed 21 July 2006).
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21The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and Motivestheir homes and native land,37as well as the unqualified restitution of their propertyrights.38In line with this stand, the Greek Cypriot policy concerning Turkish Cypriotproperties in the south differs from the Turkish Cypriot policy vis-à-vis Greek Cypriot properties in the north in one important respect: here, dispossessed Turkish Cypriots inprinciple continue to be regarded as the owners of the properties. For the first 15 years following the 1974–75 displacement, a couple of administrative orders applied toTurkish Cypriot properties.39In 1991, however, a law was passed to regulate their useand management.40The law describes these properties as ‘abandoned as a result of themassive removal of the Turkish Cypriot population, due to Turkish invasion, to theareas under the occupation of the Turkish invasion forces and the fact that this population is banned from moving to the areas of the Republic of Cyprus’.41According to the legislation, the Minister of the Interior is appointed as ‘custodian’ of all Turkish Cypriot properties (in the south). His function is ‘to protect theseproperties and also to allocate them on a rational basis in order to serve the basichousing needs and reactivate [sic] the thousands of Greek-Cypriot Refugees’.42Due compensation resulting from these operations is to be paid to the owners after anoverall settlement, and until that time will be kept in the ‘Turkish Cypriot Properties Fund’, also managed by the custodian. The position that displaced persons’ rights to repossess their properties and to returnto their original areas must be uncompromisingly defended generally receives vastsupport among the Greek Cypriot community, for adopting any other position, theybelieve, would amount to condoning Turkey for its ‘crimes’ in Cyprus. Moreover, it would also mean endorsing the Turkish Cypriot idea of bizonality, and accepting the de facto situation on the island, which was brought about by ‘illegal use of armed force’. 37Andreas Theophanous, The Political Economy of Cyprus (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1996), p. 42. 38Report of the Secretary-General, para 107. 39Issued under ROC Laws of 1962 and 1966 on Requisition of Property: ROC Official Gazette, August 1975 and September 1975. 40ROC Law of 1991/139. 41ROC Ministry of the Interior, ‘Charter Of Citizens' Rights To Use of T/C Properties’ (Nicosia, 2001), Preface. Needless tosay, the word ‘abandoned’here isused just as euphemistically as in the TRNC constitution in relation to Greek Cypriot properties in the north. 42Ibid. Most of these properties have been allocated (on the basis of a rent that is 80% of the market rent) to Greek Cypriot displaced persons. The rest are rented out (according to the legislation, on the basis of the principle of public benefit) at market rate to the government of the Republic ofCyprus, authorities of local administrations and organizations working for public benefit. The legislation stipulates that, in exceptional cases, such properties can be rented out to persons who were not displaced but whose agricultural land in the border villages was damaged or became inaccessible owing to the occupation, or to persons either parent of whom was displaced. The legislation in question also provides for compulsory acquisition and compulsory distribution or sale of Turkish Cypriot properties under certain conditions (ROC Law 1991/139 and consecutive amendments; see Appendix III.)
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22 The Politics of Property in CyprusA crucial factor sustaining this position is that Greek Cypriots generally think of the Cyprus problem as having started in July 1974. This, of course, is very different from the Turkish Cypriots’ understanding of the problem, which they regard as havingstarted in earnest in 1963 with the breakdown of the bicommunal ROC government. The Greek Cypriot side tends to overlook the conflict that existed between the twocommunities and the dire situation of the Turkish Cypriots before 1974, as well as the Greek/Greek Cypriot coup and enosis bid that preceded and precipitated the Turkish military operation. Ignoring all this, Greek Cypriots cast the problem as one of anarbitrary ‘invasion and occupation by the Turkish forces of substantial territory of the Republic of Cyprus’. On this point, it is worth quoting an assessment by Clerides:There are others on the Greek Cypriot side who advocate the idea of ... presenting internationally the Cyprus problem as one of invasion andoccupation.... The advocates of this theory forget that the international community is well aware of the following facts: (a) The Cyprus problemstarted in 1963 and the Turkish invasion occurred in 1974, i.e. 10 years later.... (c) During the same period between 1963–1974 there were no Turkish occupation forces in the island. On the contrary there was a Greek division from the mainland.43When speaking to the UN General Assembly in September 2004, TassosPapadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot president, stated the official Greek Cypriot view asfollows: ‘The Cyprus problem is not always perceived in its correct parameters. Thefact remains that this problem is the result of a military invasion and continuedoccupation of part of the territory of a sovereign state’.44The Greek Cypriot idea of a correct or just solution of the Cyprus problem primarily entails reversing the ‘present faits accomplis of the invasion, which were caused byTurkey’s expansionist strategy’, and thus securing ‘the natural and national survival of Cypriot Hellenism in its ancestral land’.45This is a continuous theme in Greek Cypriotofficial pronouncements, as seen in the following statement Papadopoulos made on 20July 2005: ‘31 years are far too many, but the time factor will not make us accept a solution which will not secure the natural and national survival of Hellenism inCyprus.’ Greek Cypriots find it difficult to accept what the Turkish Cypriots view as the essential aspect of bizonality, namely the creation of a Turkish zone in the northernpart of the island. This is unbearable to Greek Cypriots, because it implies theeradication of all that is historically ‘Greek’ in that part of the island, including Greek 43Clerides, Cyprus, p. 469. 44Statement by Tassos Papadopoulos at the general debate of the UN General Assembly, 23 September 2004; available at
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/stateme ... 040923.pdf (accessed 8 September 2006). 45Message by Glafkos Clerides, President of the Republic of Cyprus, on the occasion of Cyprus Independence Day, 1 October 2000; available at
www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2000/00-10-02.ana.html (accessed 8 September 2006).
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23The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and MotivesCypriots being ‘ethnically cleansed from their ancient ancestral lands’46and thesettlement in Greek Cypriot properties of ‘Anatolian settlers and Turkish Cypriotsfrom the free area’.47They fear that ‘the Greek Cypriot refugees will be prevented from returning to their homes and properties and that, due to the colonisation of northern Cyprus by settlers from Turkey, the Greek Cypriots will be graduallysqueezed out of Cyprus’.48Accordingly, Greek Cypriots interpret bizonality to mean ‘two zones eachadministered by one community’, subject to the application throughout the island ofthe basic prerequisites of freedoms of movement, settlement and right to property.49This, as argued in the Greek Cypriot Proposals of 1989, was ‘accepted by both sides inGuideline 3 of the Makarios–Denktash High Level Agreement [of 1977]’ and‘reaffirmed in the Kyprianou–Denktash Agreement [of 1979]’. It is conceded that theTurkish Cypriots should constitute the majority of the population in the TurkishCypriot-administered zone that, in their opinion, should be achieved through ‘equitably drawn’ territorial arrangements. In other words, territorial arrangements should be such as to enable a considerable proportion of displaced Greek Cypriots toreturn to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration. Then, ‘provided that mostTurkish Cypriots choose to reside in the Turkish Cypriot administered Province, theTurkish Cypriots will constitute a majority there, even if all Greek Cypriot refugeeswere to return to that Province’.50Human Rights and Greek Cypriots As explained above, central to the Greek Cypriot formula for resolving the propertyissue is ‘the principle of respect for human rights’.51The Greek Cypriot side considers this to be the fundamental parameter of a settlement; a parameter on which there can be no bargaining. Moreover, the principle must apply to all displaced persons andwithout restrictions. This requirement is vital not only to restore and protect the rights of individuals, but because it is the only way to ensure the reversal (as much as 46American Hellenic Media Project (AHMP), ‘Letter to Rand McNally’, 21 October 1995; available at
http://www.ahmp.org/mcnally2.html (accessed 2 April 2006). 47‘An Overview of Turkey's Aims in Cyprus, Turkey’s Violations of Human Rights in Cyprus’; available at
http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/hr/hr_12.htm (accessed 2 April 2006). 48See Greek Cypriot Proposals, 1989. 49For a useful discussion contrasting the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot views on bizonality, see Palley, p. 155. 50Greek Cypriot Proposals, 1989. 51In fact, ‘the principle of respect for human rights’ was also included in the Turkish Cypriotproposals, but with the emphasis on restrictions. For example, in the 1977 ‘Constitutional Proposals of the Turkish Cypriot Side’, ensuring ‘respect for human rights’ is put down as a general principle informing the establishment of the ‘Federal Republic of Cyprus’. However, the application of this principle is made ‘subject to the fundamental requirement of a bi-zonal federation and viability and security of each federated state’. See Ertekün, Inter-Communal Talks, p. 120.
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24 The Politics of Property in Cypruspossible) of the consequences of the de facto division created in 1974. It is a sine qua non for the aim of achieving a ‘reunited’ Cyprus. Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos described this aim in a speech he gave to the Foreign PolicyAssociation in New York on 15 September 2005: When I speak about reunification, I mean reunification of the territory, thesociety, the economy and the institutions.... [W]hen the Greek Cypriotsrejected the Annan Plan, they did not reject a solution of the Cyprus problem. They rejected that particular Plan, because it did not provide for thereunification of which I have spoken of before. There was not a reunification of the territory, of the economy, of the society, of the institutions – on thecontrary it contained division and arrangements which would haveperpetuated division. This, Greek Cypriots will never accept.52As such, reunification of the island constitutes ‘the first national priority of theGreeks of Cyprus’ because it is, among other things, ‘the only settlement of theCyprus conflict that can safeguard the survival of Cypriot Hellenism in its ancestral lands and thus restore the unity of its historical space’.53Indeed, in the eyes of many Greek Cypriots, the struggle for ‘the principle of respectfor human rights’, in connection with the right of displaced persons to repossess theirproperties as well as to return to original areas, involves a far more complex issue than simply individual rights. It also crucially entails defending a collective right, namelythe ‘right of Cypriot Hellenism to the ancestral lands’. And the foundation for this is a belief in the historical ‘Greekness of Cyprus’, which is ingrained in the Greek Cypriot‘collective consciousness’.54Consider, for example, this extract from an article entitled ‘Refugees Must Reclaim,Rebuild and Return’, published in the Lobby for Cyprus Newsletter: The refugees, both in Cyprus and the diaspora, must ... make the persistent call that they intend to reclaim what is theirs.... We cannot overstate theimportance of the refugees exercising the right to use their title-deeds andreclaim what is theirs. In order to preserve the Greek Cypriot identitythroughout the island it is preferable that as many Greek Cypriots as possible52Available at
http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topi ... _id=305998 (accessed8 September 2006). 53Caesar V. Mavratsas, ‘The Ideological Contest Between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (October 1997); available at
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Nationalism.htm (last accessed 20 January 2006). 54Ibid. See also Yiannis Papadakis, ‘The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in Cyprus’, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 139–154; available at
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Nationalism.htm (last accessed 20 January 2006); and Takis Hadjidemetriou, ‘A School with New Freedoms’, in Cyprus – Greece – Turkey: Different Interpretations of the Same History (printed bilingually in Greek and Turkish) (Nicosia: OPEK, 2005).
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25The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and Motivesresettle on a permanent or temporary basis in the liberated area of the north.55This regularly stressed and deep-seated sentiment on the Greek Cypriot side is whatlargely sustains the idea that a ‘correct’ solution to the Cyprus problem should repudiate ‘an ethnically cleansed division of the homeland’ through enforced bizonalformulas and restore the ‘Greekness’ of (what are significantly and emotively referred to as) the ancestral lands in the north, lost since 1974. In accordance with this conviction, the Greek Cypriot side has sought internationallyenforceable means (outside the UN framework of intercommunal talks) to restore these Greek Cypriot rights in the north. It thus became a party in various applicationsto the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), either directly through government appeals (e.g. the case of Cyprus v. Turkey lodged in 1994) or by supporting individualappeals to the Court (notably the cases of Loizidou v. Turkey referred to the Court in 1993 and Arestis v. Turkey lodged in 1998). The expectation here has been that the Court would: (a) confirm that, as alleged by the Greek Cypriots, ‘Turkey’s occupationof Cyprus is unlawful’; and (b) uphold Greek Cypriots’ rights to repossess and returnto their properties in the north. The Greek Cypriot Interpretation of ECHR Judgments The defining moment of the Greek Cypriot efforts at the ECHR came when – in thenow famous case of Loizidou v. Turkey – the Court found Turkey in breach of theHuman Rights Convention and ruled to maintain Greek Cypriot applicant Ms Loizidou’s right to her property.56This was described by Clerides, the Greek Cypriotpresident at the time, as a ‘great success’ that ‘will have immense effects on theCyprus problem’.57The Court decision was hailed by many Greek Cypriots as a solid affirmation oftheir view that the property issue was a matter of rectifying an ‘illegal situation’ (rather than a political matter), and that it was entirely a question of human rightsviolations in the north brought about by the division in 1974. Since the judgment, the idea that through enforcement of existing international law the property issue can beresolved in a way compatible with Greek Cypriot concerns and expectations hasgained ground on the Greek Cypriot side. This is the way that will ensure ‘proper’ reunification of the island – by guaranteeing, without qualification or prescription, displaced persons’ right to return to and regain their properties. 55Issue no. 14 (28 September 2001), emphasis added. Lobby for Cyprus is an influential Cypriot group that describes itself as ‘the voice of the Greek Cypriot refugees’ and ‘a non-party-political organisation with the aim of reuniting Cyprus’. 56Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), ECHR judgment, 18 December 1996. 57Statement by Glafkos Clerides on 18 December 1996; available at
http://www.hri.org/news/ cyprus/cna/1996/96-12-18.cna. html (accessed 9 October 2006).
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26 The Politics of Property in CyprusFor example, note how a later Court judgment ruling on compensation to be paid toMs Loizidou by Turkey was depicted by Lobby for Cyprus: The significance of this case is not so much in its financial impact but in the political repercussions. The idea of offering Greek Cypriot refugees exchange of properties or compensation in order to surrender ownership of their land is dead. The stunning victory by Titina Loizidou against Turkey is likely to impact ina major fashion on the UN brokered talks aimed at reuniting Cyprus.... Norefugee and/or land owner will surrender their land to facilitate a bizonal bicommunal settlement which will lead to the permanent division of Cyprus.58Similar views were echoed by a Greek Cypriot human rights activist who described the judgment as follows: [It addresses] the effects and implications of Europeanisation on Cyprus andthe Cyprus conflict, the political implications for European Unionmembership for Cyprus and indeed for Turkey and the effects of such an outcome on the internal dynamics of the Cypriot conflict.... [The] Loizidou v. Turkey judgment serves as a firm legal stronghold in attempts to solve theCyprus problem: whatever the political solution may be, the rightful owners of land in the northern part of Cyprus can only be absolved of their property rights when they themselves decide to surrender that land.... [It] is the re-affirmation that this court ruling has offered to the numerous UN SecurityCouncil resolutions, calling for Turkey to withdraw its illegal military presence in northern Cyprus and allow for the return of the forcibly expelled population, that is the refugees.59Especially since December 2003, when Turkey eventually paid Ms Loizidou theCourt-ordered compensation, the idea that the property issue should be resolved on the premise of ‘international legality’ has become a matter of almost unshakable faith.Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side believes that Cyprus’s recent accession to the EU and Turkey’s current negotiations for membership serve to strengthen its position even further. Indeed, it is now standard in Greek Cypriot official statements to refer to ‘the just resolution of land and property issues in accordance with the decisions of the ECHR’ as an essential element of any solution to reunify the island. As Papadopoulos put it inhis speech at a seminar on international law and human rights held in Limassol on 9October 2004: 58‘The Case of Loizidou v. Turkey: The Political Fallout’, 10 August 1998. The Lobby statement is available at
http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org (accessed 16 December 2005). 59Eleni Apeyitou, ‘The Case of Loizidou vs. Turkey’, Human Rights Action, 24 September 1998, emphasis added; available at
http://www.hr-action.org/action/ (last accessed 16 December 2005).
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27The Two Sides’ Opposing Demands: Reasons and MotivesWe will not abandon the rights of the Cypriot citizens, as they wereconfirmed by the European Court, and we will not accept any settlementwhich will not be in line with the respect of the human rights of all Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the fair solution of property issues,according to the ECHR’s decision, and the respect of the refugees’ right to return to their properties.60This attitude can be compared to the Turkish Cypriot unilateral approach in relationto the Vienna III Agreement, which has been interpreted in a manner that goes far beyond the purpose it was intended to serve. Similarly, the Court’s judgment in theLoizidou v. Turkey case is widely believed by the Greek Cypriots to be a ruling onissues that, in fact, are outside the scope of protection of individual human rights as laid out in international law. The judgment is generally taken as a definitiverecognition by the Court that displaced persons’ right to repossess and return to their properties cannot be restricted in any way. In other words, this is a right that is notnegotiable. Having thus chosen to attach a broader meaning to the decision of the Court, the Greek Cypriot side appears to take little notice of views expressed by international lawexperts, such as: ‘when actually made part of a lasting legal agreement to settle the Cyprus situation, the property regime for a bizonal Cyprus, including a regulated rightto return could well receive the Court’s approval’.61Accordingly, the Greek Cypriotside tends to ignore various alternative solutions to property disputes in conflictcircumstances, which often qualify the exercise of property rights either to allow forprotection of other rights, or to accommodate other important concerns such as public benefit or civil and international peace.60Available at
http://www.greeknewsonline.com/modules. ... e&sid=2070 (accessed 8 September 2006). 61See Hoffmeister; emphasis added.
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Chapter 3 THE ANNAN PLAN PROPERTY PROPOSALS HE ANNAN PLAN included detailed provisions for a territorial adjustment and a property regime to resolve the claims of dispossessed persons ‘in acomprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for theindividual rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bi-zonality’.1The Plan proposed the reduction of Turkish Cypriot-administered territoryfrom around 36% to around 29% (of the territory of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus). Properties in the area of territorial adjustment were to be reinstated to dispossessedowners. The UN estimated that this would allow 54% of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return to their original homes and properties under Greek Cypriotadministration, and that, as a result, approximately a quarter of the population of thenorth would have to be relocated.2T Table 3.9 (constructed on the basis of Greek Cypriot estimations) illustrates the landdistribution in the two would-be ‘constituent states’ (namely, the Greek Cypriot stateand the Turkish Cypriot state) after the Plan’s territorial adjustment (but prior to theimplementation of the property provisions in areas outside the territorial adjustmentarea). The shaded areas in the table represent the privately owned land to which the Plan’s property provisions would apply.In the areas outside territorial adjustment (both north and south), property rights were to be exercised partly by way of reinstatement and partly through compensation. Subject to certain exceptions and special rules, dispossessed owners would generally receive back one-third of their property while being compensated for the remaining two-thirds. Turkish Cypriot Reactions Although Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan in the April 2004 referendum bya majority of two-thirds, they were distinctly ambivalent about the Plan’s property1Article 10 in the Main Articles of The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (AnnanPlan), 31 March 2004 (fifth version). 2Report of the Secretary-General, para. 118.
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30 The Politics of Property in CyprusTable 3.9 Estimated land ownership in the ‘constituent state’ territories as envisaged in the Annan Plan territorial adjustment but before the implementation of the property provisions outside the territorial adjustment area (based on 1964 figures by the Greek Cypriot Department of Lands and Surveys and the Planning Bureau). Turkish Cypriot State Greek Cypriot State Ownership Area in donums % Area in donums % Greek Cypriot (including Church) 1,088,793 56.04 3,029,935 63.34 Turkish Cypriot (including Evkaf) 365,368 18.79 466,960 9.76 Public484,605 24.95 1,271,958 26.59 Other 4,153 0.21 15,119 0.32 Total 1,942,919 100.00 4,783,974 100.00 regime. There were worries within the community about the potential social andeconomic impact of this regime, not least because a large number of Turkish Cypriots(around 70,000 or one-third of the Turkish Cypriot community) would have had to berelocated owing either to territorial adjustment or to reinstatement of properties to dispossessed Greek Cypriot owners.3More crucially, many Turkish Cypriots wereopposed to the Plan because it contained arrangements (e.g. reinstatement) that wereincompatible with their preferred global exchange and compensation scheme and,hence, their idea of bizonality. The Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ vote cannot be seen to indicate a change in the Turkish Cypriot stance on the property issue. Rather, one might say that – in the light of a number of other important factors, including the prospect of EU membership, thegeneral Turkish Cypriot desire to join the system of international law, and not leastTurkey’s explicit support for the Plan – the Turkish Cypriots accepted the proposed settlement as a compromise, especially as regards property. Also, at that time Turkish Cypriots had another serious concern: the matter of ECHR judgments in property-related cases brought by Greek Cypriots against Turkey.4It wasfeared that, without an overall solution, the implementation of these judgments wouldlead to a complete reversal of the property situation back to what it was before 1974.The Plan’s provisions for both property and residency – restricting restitution andallowing permanent settlement by persons from the other community to be limited tothe extent that the majority status of Turkish Cypriots in their own zone would not bethreatened – clearly represented a better alternative to such an eventuality. This wasundoubtedly a significant factor that persuaded a great number of Turkish Cypriots to3Ibid.4Particularly in Loizidou v. Turkey, and after Turkey’s payment to Ms Loizidou of the compensationruled by the Court.
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31The Annan Plan Property Proposalsview the Plan’s property regime as a ‘lesser evil’ and accept it as a necessarycompromise.5Greek Cypriot Reactions The Greek Cypriots were also unhappy with the Annan Plan property regime, but ofcourse for different reasons. Economics were also a concern for this side, and manyGreek Cypriots warned that the impact of the regime on the island’s property marketwould be disastrous.6However, a more critical
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