Cyprus-Forum.com

[zan]

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 1-25


The Ball Missions and Meetings at Washington,
January-June 1964

1. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 24, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Nigel Trench, Counselor, British Embassy

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Henry T. Koren, SEA

The Ambassador said that the outlook both for the London conference/2/ and the situation on the island was very black. The Greeks and Turks in London were poles apart, and the Cypriot Turks were very nervous about their position. If there were a breakdown in London and a flare-up in Cyprus, very strong measures would have to be taken. He asked the Secretary's opinion on the relative merits of a UN "peace-keeping" mission and a force drawn from NATO countries. He mentioned that the Greek Foreign Minister had suggested a NATO force.

/2/Reference is to the January 15-February 5 meeting of representatives of the Government of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots, and representatives of the three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

The Secretary replied he wasn't fully advised on the question and could not give a final answer now, but he could see advantages in discussing it in NATO, which might produce some pressure on the Greeks and Turks. If the three guarantor powers plus Cyprus so requested, he could see some advantage in using troops from NATO powers. He thought it would probably be best not to have any such force under the NATO label, but it might be better to draw on the NATO nations rather than put the matter to the UN. The Secretary said he could give no answer on the question of a U.S. contingent. He pointed out we have some 17,000 troops in Turkey and if our troops were in Cyprus shooting at Turks, we might run into some serious trouble in Turkey, where they might begin shooting at us. He also mentioned our interest in the security of our important installations on Cyprus.

The Secretary continued he hoped they could keep talking in London. The Ambassador reiterated that the situation in the island was bad and the talks deadlocked. If fighting broke out Turkey might take some precipitate action. Mr. Burdett said that EUR's feeling was that the gravity of the situation and the many complications of using troops from NATO countries made it desirable that Cyprus be a first priority for UK troops. The Secretary observed that there should be a note of caution on priorities in view of the serious and spreading situation in East Africa. If the situation quickly went bad UK troops were the only and best way; but otherwise troops from some NATO countries acceptable to both the Greeks and Turks might be used. He mentioned Norway as an example.



2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m., Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

GWB:/2/ any bad news from any other part of the world, but the situation in Cyprus has been getting worse in the last few days.

/2/The recording of the conversation begins in mid-sentence.

LBJ: Yeah, I'm reading it.

GWB: The British Ambassador was in to see me this morning/3/ and he said that they're not prepared to continue alone to try to carry this because of the political problem they find themselves in--the history of the hatred of the British on both the Greeks' and Turks' side as far as the local population is concerned. And that he wanted us to agree with them on a proposal to try and internationalize the arrangement. Now, this would mean one of two things--

/3/At a noon meeting, Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported on the lack of progress at the London four-power talks and on the "disturbing" situation on Cyprus. He informed U.S. representatives that the British Government wanted to internationalize the problem either through NATO or U.N. intervention in the crisis. A memorandum of conversation of this meeting is ibid. Ball passed the substance of the meeting to President Johnson in a 2:10 p.m. telephone conversation. The President directed Ball to "try to get NATO--not the U.N." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Pre-Trip)

LBJ: NATO going in or the UN?

GWB: No. Getting a NATO force to go in or going to the UN. The UN would be very bad because it would--

LBJ: I'd try to get NATO to go in if I could.

GWB: Well.

LBJ: I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can't handle Cyprus.

GWB: Well, I've, they're--we put it to them very strong as to whether this was on the basis that they were spread too thin in which case we might relieve some of their forces from, even from Germany. But the--what Ormsby Gore says--and this checks with our own advice--is that putting additional British forces in is probably just going to make the situation worse rather than better.

Now, I'm meeting with Bob McNamara at five o'clock./4/ In the meantime, we're having this thing looked at by the Joint Chiefs--

/4/See footnote 2, Document 3.

LBJ: I'll be available and I'll talk to you--

GWB: We'll have a recommendation--

LBJ: --and I would say off-hand that I would have NATO--try to get NATO in there. And I think the UN's out, but I'd tell the British that there might as well not be a Britain anymore if they can't handle Cyprus.

GWB: Right. Well, this is--what we're taking a hard look at--

LBJ: And I'd let them relieve whatever they needed in Germany to put there rather than NATO. But they won't do it, then we go to NATO. I don't agree that it's going to make it worse, because they can--I'm ashamed of them, but go ahead and let's take NATO.

GWB: Well, we'll have a recommendation for you. Bob and I are getting together at five and [unintelligible].

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Panama.]



3. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

OTHERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Komer, Mr. Bromley Smith

Prior to the meeting with the President, the following met in the Cabinet Room from 5:00 to 6:30 PM:/2/

/2/A memorandum of this discussion is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

State: Acting Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Harriman, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Talbot, Mr. Burdett, Mr. Chayes, Mr. Jernegan

Defense: Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. William Bundy, Admiral Chew, Captain Conkey, Mr. Sloan

CIA: General Carter

White House: Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Komer

Acting Secretary Ball reviewed the current situation in Cyprus and the British request that we send U.S. troops as part of an allied force to Cyprus./3/ The discussion centered around the attached draft telegram/4/ as being the preferred course of action because of disadvantages associated with taking the question to the UN or taking it to the North Atlantic Council.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 2.

/4/Not found.

Mr. Ball reviewed for the President the planning which had been done in the State and Defense Departments since the British démarche. He recalled that the British had been told of our great reluctance to consider the use of U.S. combat troops, but that the British Prime Minister had again requested us to participate in an allied force as the only way to alter a rapidly deteriorating situation in Cyprus which the British were not prepared to continue to deal with alone.

Secretary Ball said an appeal to the UN had been ruled out as the worst possible alternative. The UN might set up a peacekeeping force which would be beyond our control and in which the Russians and the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly want to participate. A NATO solution was not possible because Cyprus is not a member of NATO even though, if the worst happened, two NATO allies would be fighting each other. The tripartite negotiations of the three guarantor powers, U.K., Greece and Turkey, have broken down in London. Prime Minister Inonu is in charge of a weak government in Ankara and may have trouble keeping civilian control of the Turkish military. In Athens, where there is a caretaker government, there may be a military coup. The prospect of such a coup would be greatly increased by serious fighting in Cyprus.

Mr. Ball recommended that we ask the British government to send a ranking military officer to Washington tomorrow in order to obtain more information about their proposed allied intervention force. He said the group would postpone until tomorrow at least making a recommendation on whether or not we should join the U.K. in seeking to establish a military force composed of troops from NATO countries. He suggested that the President might want to talk to the leaders of Congress tomorrow. He summarized the guidelines which would govern our participation in an allied force as follows:

1. The U.S. would make a token contribution--a battalion of 1200 men.

2. The bulk of the force would be British.

3. Two other NATO allies would make token contributions equal to the U.S. contribution.

4. The force would not go into Cyprus until it was large enough to be "adequate" to the need. We do not now know whether the British figure of 10,000 men would be adequate.

5. The military mission of the force would be specifically defined. The British would command the force.

Mr. Ball discussed whether General Lemnitzer should go to Ankara and later to Athens. He said the Turkish military may move in the next two or three days. The Turks have promised us that they will consult before they intervene in Cyprus. But if there were a massacre involving a large number of Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish military might jump off immediately. The civil government in Turkey is very weak and the military may force its hand.

President Makarios may on his own take the case to the UN Security Council. We doubt that any serious resolution could come out of the Security Council unless major fighting broke out or unless the Turkish government intervened militarily.

Ambassador Bruce has reported that the British consider the Cyprus situation more serious and much more important than the Malaysia crisis. They recall the agony of the last time they attempted to keep peace in Cyprus. They have two major bases in Cyprus which they intend to defend. If civil strife outside the bases becomes too great for them to handle, their present plan is to withdraw their troops within the bases and wait out the situation. If major reenforcements of British troops were sent to Cyprus, the Conservatives know that they would be severely attacked by the Labor Party in an election period. The British are also sensitive to the fact that they were the colonial power prior to their withdrawal from Cyprus and that, therefore, they are a hostage to the past.

The President said if the British had election problems, he had problems with the U.S. citizens of Greek background.

Mr. Ball replied that the Greek Government had favored the intervention of allied forces.

The President referred to the fact that our elections are coming and that the prospect of sending U.S. troops into Cyprus is one to face only as a last resort.

Secretary McNamara said that the unfortunate part of the situation was that the only solution to the problem in Cyprus was to force the Greek Cypriots to do something they did not want to do, namely, not increase their control over the Turkish Cypriots by revising the existing Constitution and agreements.

The President asked everyone to go slow on any plan to use U.S. troops in Cyprus. He said there is nothing we can do which will not end up in our losing. Mr. Ball acknowledged that there was no good solution to the problem. He said that if it were necessary to reenforce the original U.S. complement, all participants would contribute to the reenforcement in the same percentage. Secretary McNamara said that if we do go in, the percentage of our participation is the extent of our share of the operation. He thought that 6500 men would have to be put in by others and he did not know where these troops were coming from. Our share would be no more than 1200 men.

General Taylor said that if we do put in our troops, we would provide our own supplies and our own logistic backup. We would ask that each participant do the same.

The President said that perhaps we would have to go through a blood bath in Cyprus before we could take any U.S. military action. He asked whether it were not possible for someone else to go in, such as a neutral or Nasser.

Mr. Ball responded by saying that Makarios wants a neutral such as Nasser or a UN group with neutrals because he is convinced that the neutrals will favor him over the Turks in Cyprus.

The President said General Lemnitzer could tell the Turks not to go into Cyprus and the same thing to the Greeks. We have been holding up numerous situations around the world and we are not going to walk out, but we don't expect others to walk out either. General Lemnitzer should tell Inonu how we feel. Mr. Ball suggested that General Lemnitzer also talk to the military directly because Inonu may not be in full control of the Turkish military.

The President said we should give no encouragement to the U.K. to think that we would join in an allied force. He then asked what would happen if we did not go in.

Mr. Ball replied that the situation might blow up with the result that two NATO allies would be fighting each other. It was also possible that Makarios would ask the UN to come in and a UN peacekeeping force would have Communist elements in it.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that the Greeks in Cyprus outnumber the Turks four to one. He repeated his earlier statement that a political settlement would mean forcing the Greeks to do something they did not now wish to do.

The President asked what else we could do--was a conference possible? Could we get people discussing their problems around a table? Mr. Ball replied that the London tripartite conference had blown up. The U.S. had no status in that conference because it was composed of the three guarantor powers. It is difficult to talk to the Greeks and the Turks because of the weakness of these governments. The views of the Greeks and the Turks are more crystallized and farther apart as the result of the conference in London than before.

The President said it would be necessary to shove him very hard to get him to agree to send U.S. troops to Cyprus. We must do more in a diplomatic way than we have so far.

Mr. Ball said that both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers were in London and it would be possible for Ambassador Bruce to talk to them there./5/ The President agreed.

/5/Bruce reported on his talks with British officials in telegrams 3499 from London, January 25, and 3510 from London, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) Details on the talks and Bruce's views are in the Bruce Diary, January 26 and 27, 1964. (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

The President said we should ask the British to send more troops to Cyprus. We have helped them in the past and they must now continue to carry this burden in Cyprus./6/ We should hold off replying to the British until after we hear from General Lemnitzer.

/6/Ball told Ormsby Gore during a meeting at 7:15 p.m. that the United States was not prepared to commit troops to a Cyprus operation, but would provide the United Nations with logistical support. The memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



4. Editorial Note

At approximately 6:35 p.m., January 28, 1964, Acting Secretary of State George Ball called President Johnson with the outline of a "plan" for Cyprus that would involve sending to Cyprus a contingent of 1,200 U.S. soldiers as part of a 10,000-man NATO peacekeeping force designed to facilitate mediation of the crisis by separating the warring parties. Ball indicated that the plan had the approval of Secretary of Defense McNamara. The President expressed continued skepticism about the utility of sending U.S. troops to the island:

LBJ: Why do we want to put something in?

GWB: I think that, the word we've had all through the day is that there's danger of a blow up. That the situation.

LBJ: That's the danger. They're just trying to make us move and get into something we can't get out of, I think.

GWB: Well, the point of this plan is that if we move in a very limited liability manner.

LBJ: I'd like to move you or Harriman or somebody--Bobby Kennedy, or Bob McNamara or somebody--I'd like to move them over there and let them make an all out diplomatic effort. Maybe put an airplane carrier or two there, but not. That island's already overcrowded.

In response Ball stressed that the United States should avoid becoming the mediator in Cyprus: "Anyone who settles this is going to come down hard on the Greeks." The United States should stay in the background. Ball then outlined a proposal for a Western European mediator, a 3-month cease-fire to permit mediation to proceed, and the inclusion of a 1,200 man U.S. contingent in the peacekeeping force. After answering a number of questions regarding the activities of U.S. officials, the President authorized further exploration of the Ball plan. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:35 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1)

At 6:45 p.m. the President telephoned Secretary McNamara to get his views on the Ball plan. The Secretary of Defense suggested that no decision be made until "we've heard from Lem" [General Lyman Lemnitzer]. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, January 28, 1964, 6:45 p.m., Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 2)

The President telephoned Ball to relay McNamara's views at approximately 6:48 p.m. Ball responded: "Fine." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:48 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 3)



5. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Paris, January 30, 1964, 2134Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to USDOCOSouth for Admiral Russell, Athens, and Ankara and passed to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy. The Chairman of the JCS had requested that Lemnitzer visit Athens and Ankara to "calm the situation" in telegram 4559, January 27. (Ibid.)

ALO 17. 1. I arrived in Athens at 1145 local, 29 January, where I was met by General Pipilis, Chief of the Defense General Staff, and the various service chiefs. After a short press conference at the airport with a large number of press, I departed for a conference with Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos with the understanding that General Pipilis was to accompany me. When we arrived in the Prime Minister's office, Pipilis was summarily dismissed, and the conference, which lasted about an hour, consisted only of the Prime Minister with an interpreter and myself and my executive officer. As a result of his dismissal from my conference with the Prime Minister, General Pipilis later expressed the fear that the Prime Minister might be pursuing a different line than the Defense Ministry and my executive officer was specifically queried by him regarding content of the Prime Minister's remarks.

2. After lunch with Defense Minister Papanikolopoulos and the Chiefs of Staff, I had a two-hour discussion with them at the Defense Ministry, followed by a one-hour conference with the Crown Prince substituting for his father, who was ill. All parties concerned voiced views which were substantially the same.

3. In opening all my conferences, I explained the purpose of my visit along the same lines as I had the day before with the Turks,/2/ highlighting, of course, the disastrous consequences of a military clash over Cyprus between two NATO allies.

/2/Lemnitzer reported on his talks with Turkish officials in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 29. (Ibid.)

4. The common thread which the Greeks pursued in all of our conversations was that the Turks were determined to abrogate the 1955 treaty/3/ and that they would settle for nothing less than full self-determination for Turkish Cypriots and partition of the island of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Greeks maintained that the Turks were pushing things to an explosive state by their large concentration of forces at Iskenderun and by their continuing inflammatory remarks in the state-controlled press and radio. As a consequence, Greek public opinion has been greatly aroused and has now reached the fever pitch of 1940 when neither the King, nor the government, nor anyone else, could hold the Greek people in check.

/3/Apparently a reference to the 1959 agreements establishing an independent Cyprus; for texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765-775.

5. To reduce these tensions and to resolve the current crisis, the Defense Minister listed the following requirements:

a. Dispersion of the heavy concentration of forces in southern Turkey, or, failing that,

b. Introduction of an allied force to Cyprus of sufficient size to maintain peace and security.

c. Stationing of the Sixth Fleet around Cyprus to police the waters and prevent a Turkish invasion.

6. Of these requirements, the dispersal of Turkish forces at Iskenderun is regarded by the Greeks as the most imperative and the most immediate since they look upon this concentration as a Sword of Damocles which could prevent any productive steps. If however, none of the requirements is met, then the Greeks would be compelled to take prompt counter-action. The precise nature of this counter-action was not disclosed.

7. With regard to the allied force, Greece is quite willing to withdraw its forces from Cyprus if the Turks will do likewise. In response to my specific question as to whether they would object to leaving both Turkish and Greek forces there if an allied force went in, the Defense Minister responded that he would have no objection to this if it were necessary. As to command of the allied force, the Defense Minister stated that the question had not been thoroughly studied but that they would prefer to see an American commander.

8. I informed the Greeks that I had been notified through appropriate NATO Commanders of Turkish movement of forces and that I was convinced that I would continue to be kept informed. I stated that even though naval units of both Greece and Turkey were not under NATO command, I had received notification of the movement of Turkish naval units from the Black Sea to Iskenderun. With regard to the build-up of ground forces, I stated that there was not any repositioning of additional combat units in the Iskenderun area, but that any increase in combat strength there related only to the build-up to 100 percent strength of the 39th Division which was normally based at Iskenderun. I stressed the importance of Greece following the NATO procedures for reporting and consultation and was assured that such procedures would be followed and that, in no case, would Greece take any unilateral action without prior consultation.

9. In general, I did not find Greek officials as calm as the Turks. Emotion is running high, aggravated by a sense of frustration stemming from the all-too-obvious military advantages of the Turks in the Cyprus area and the feeling among the military that they cannot look to their caretaker government for decisive leadership. On the other hand, they gave every indication that they sincerely hope to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The disadvantages under which they labor are likely to militate against any precipitate, unilateral moves by Greece.

10. I departed Athens at 1830 local and arrived in Paris at 0100 30 Jan. En route I stopped at Naples for a conference with Admiral Russell to give him more detailed information regarding my visits./4/

/4/The Embassy in Athens reported in telegram 1122, January 30, that Lemnitzer had succeeded in "lowering temperature" in Athens. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2)



6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/

Washington, February 8, 1964, 8:41 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Ball, and approved by Talbot.

781. Personal for Hare from Ball. Embtel 1002./2/ I am deeply concerned by the delay in Turkish reply and indications they want to do some legalistic nitpicking. In working out revised proposals, we were particularly concerned that any rewording, or any revising of plan should not compromise Turkish interests./3/

/2/Telegram 1002, February 8, reported Turkish objections to any further concessions to the Government of Cyprus on the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)

/3/On January 31, the United States and United Kingdom made a joint proposal to the parties concerned for the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Cyprus drawn from NATO countries. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 556.

When reply is delivered, if it appears Turks are presenting their "objections" because of resentment at Sandys-Kyprianou conversation and misinterpretation of "Sandys proposals", emphasize that nitpicking at this time is disastrous course.

Their worry over getting relief supplies through can be alleviated more rapidly by getting the international force on the island immediately rather than haggling over terms of reference. We cannot understand their objection to "international force". Main point of forces from NATO countries with possibly a non-NATO country (which would have to be acceptable to GOT) is preserved. Committee of Ambassadors from first meant representatives of governments having forces stationed on the Island. It was always planned that liaison with Government of Cyprus and with two communities would take place in Cyprus. There is nothing in the proposal in our view that prejudices either Turkey's treaty rights or the position of the Vice President under the constitution.

Seek to have Turks concur in presentation to Makarios and Kutchuk and phrase their "objections" as observations or points as GOG did in first go-round. If they insist on tampering with details as conditions they must understand they are endangering whole operation.

Rusk



7. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/

Ankara, February 9, 1964, 1 p.m.



/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

1004. For Ball from Hare. Deptel 781./2/ Immediately on receipt reftel I went see Erkin and we had very down to earth talk. In essence his line was similar that of Tuluy, maintaining GOT had agreed original proposals despite sacrificing very important points. Fact that Makarios had done opposite and that adjusted proposals drafted so as take his conditions into consideration necessitates GOT present its views in order regain balance. Furthermore GOT has Parliament looking over its shoulder and already under pressure for having been too supine. Paper giving GOT response would be given me and British Ambassador at two o'clock./3/ He said most important points would be application of all treaty provisions (para numbered two of Embtel 1002)/4/ and reference to "Government of Cyprus", existence of which GOT does not recognize, should just refer to Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kucuk by name (para numbered four of Embtel). I commented along following lines:



/2/Document 6.

/3/The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 1005 from Ankara, February 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)

/4/See footnote 2, Document 6.

1) Revision of proposals made with Turkish interests in mind and represents no derogation of them.

2) GOT may have problems re proposals but so do we. Matter is urgent and if time lost discussing detailed points whole effort could collapse, including our own steps to be helpful.

3) Purpose of presenting revised proposals was to obtain GOT acquiescence in order present them to Cypriots. In so doing we of course expected GOT would make comments and observations as Greeks had done but I trusted these would not involve changes in document itself but would rather be for information and clarification.

4) Point re general validity of treaty provisions represents no substantive problem since it has been our view from beginning that proposals do not affect such provisions. We have so stated repeatedly and I could now say so again under authority of message from Ball.

5) Point re "Government of Cyprus" was quite another matter since, regardless of GOT reservations, we just could not put ourselves in position of challenging legal status of GOC. We recognize that GOC not functioning normally but that is practical, not legal, consideration. Fact that proposals had been submitted to Kucuk as well as Makarios was illustrative this point.

At end, Erkin said GOT reply would cover number of points, including proposed revisions of text but that point regarding general application of treaty provisions was most important.

Referring to my previous warning re danger of delay involved in redrafting, I asked whether these suggestions would be in the form of requirements for GOT acquiescence or as expression of what they would want if possible arrange. Erkin replied that we would be given paper and would be up to us what to do with it. I asked what this meant in terms of submission of proposals to GOC. To be specific, could paper go forward even if decided changes inadvisable? Erkin replied "What else can you do?"

This not too satisfactory but better than expected. At any rate your message afforded timely opportunity to get crack at Erkin and give him time do a little thinking before seeing him this afternoon.

Hare



8. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/

London, February 9, 1964, midnight.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to Athens for Ball. Relayed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

3824. Following is uncleared memcon of Under Sec Ball's talk with Cypriot FonMin Kyprianou:

1. Under Sec and Amb Bruce met 1730 today with Kyprianou at AmEmbassy. Kyprianou was accompanied by Cyprus HICOM in London Soteriades. Under Sec explained US concern with Cyprus problem prompted primarily by our concern with peace. We believe establishment peace-keeping force, coupled with mediator concept, offers best way to proceed. US participation in force depends on working out acceptable arrangements to avoid entangling problem in cold war and on willingness of GOC to accept and request such force. Under Sec asked for GOC's frank views re US participation.

2. Kyprianou affirmed GOC reply given earlier remains basic GOC view./2/ GOC has no objection in principle to participation by any country. It is not the force that will provide permanent peace. If it is necessary have such a force because UK not prepared assume full responsibility, GOC believes it should be under Security Council. GOC has no wish create further complications. In its view, however, such force needed primarily for external purposes. Once danger of intervention is removed, atmosphere will automatically improve. Greeks will know no need exists to prepare for invasion; Turks will know they cannot hope for intervention. Influence and interference of outsiders primarily responsible for present troubled situation. Turkey more to blame than Greece. While primary purpose of such force should be to deter outside aggression, internal peace-keeping obviously also desirable. Force should assist GOC restore normal conditions.

/2/In a February 2 statement to the London conference, Kyprianou announced that the Government of Cyprus accepted the idea of a NATO peacekeeping force in principle, but insisted that it operate under the authority of the United Nations. Subsequently, President Makarios outlined further objections to a NATO force under U.N. aegis. For text of Makarios' February 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 557.

3. If these are to be missions of force, it preferable force be under Security Council. Cyprus is small country with bitter past experience. If force under Security Council aegis, Cypriot public opinion will find it much more palatable. Kyprianou stressed GOC not trying blackmail. It remains ready discuss question before going to SC. Once agreement reached on composition of force, GOC wonders why US and UK should consider it dangerous go to Security Council.

4. Under Sec explained part of problem revolves about meaning of "under Security Council." We do not object to some connection with Security Council. We are seeking work out with other objective and competent countries establishment of force able to provide both power and a psychological framework designed to restore calm while political solution is being sought. Rather than inject question of composition of force into cold war politics at UN, we believe composition should be pre-arranged before going to Security Council. Formula by which link with Security Council is established is important. We do not wish make force subject of Soviet veto. Also, it is impractical to organize force if Security Council is going to be asked finance it because of already existing controversy revolving about Article 19. To get into this range of questions will merely delay its organization. We think it possible agree with GOC on a force where each participating govt pays its own way. We would also agree with GOC on what nations should participate. Thereafter, we see no reason why matter could not be brought to Security Council in manner where Soviet veto and cold war confrontation are avoided.

5. Kyprianou disclaimed GOC responsibility for present situation. He then alluded to various other factors which allegedly increased tension. Manner in which proposal prepared and projected in Cyprus, with other nations and press apparently apprised before GOC, increased suspicions. Under Sec noted original idea was Greek. HMG had called Greek proposal to our attention. In order to test its feasibility, we have explored it with other govts. Kyprianou insisted GOC equally interested party and should have been consulted earlier. Greeks had told GOC it was not their proposal, although GOC knows it was. With respect to force itself, Kyprianou said once agreement is reached on composition, GOC wants to go to Security Council. It would explain its desire is to place pre-arranged force under Security Council control. He wondered if Soviets would in fact veto such force since they appear to be trying assist GOC.

6. Under Sec pointed out "under Security Council" can embrace Security Council "taking note," "reporting," etc. What did GOC have in mind? Kyprianou replied Security Council should authorize SYG to have the right to control the force within the scope of agreed terms of reference. Security Council should be competent to take decisions with respect to the force if called upon to do so by SYG, GOC or the participating countries. The Security Council might also have the mission of working out terms of reference for the force. He envisaged a two-stage procedure. The Security Council should first pass a resolution asking all states to refrain from threatening independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. GOC would inform Security Council that talks are also taking place on the composition of a force about which it would report back to Security Council once agreement is reached. Such procedure would have a calming effect in Cyprus. Security Council endorsement, in GOC's view, is a deterrent. Kyprianou added he was thinking of going to New York on Wednesday or Thursday to initiate Security Council action, although his trip might be postponed until Saturday. Under Sec said we will have to examine Kyprianou's idea. Meanwhile, he hoped we might move forward on composition and terms of reference of force.

7. Kyprianou also suggested SYG might, even in absence any specific proposal, go to Cyprus himself for a day. He need have no specific mission, but would simply seek inform himself of situation. This too would have calming effect. Kyprianou said he had instructed Rossides to sound out SYG on this. Did we have any objection?

Under Sec said he would want to consider this further with his UN experts. His initial impression was that there should be no objection.

8. With respect to US participation, Kyprianou thought this would be inadvisable. GOC would not object, but US participation would adversely affect the "popularity" of the US in Cyprus and could give rise to public feelings against the US. Under Sec pointed out that we must consider if any force can in fact be organized on viable basis if US does not participate. If force could be organized without us, we would prefer it. We have been inclined to doubt that it can. Many nations who speak boldly of peace-keeping force become less so when it comes to paying for it. Some states have said they will join only if US does so. In any case, there is no intention of taking any action without full agreement of GOC.

9. Kyprianou contended that, psychologically, if force had come in context of political settlement, it might not have been viewed differently in Cyprus. Fact is, however, that it developed while London talks were taking place, thereby heightening Cypriot suspicions. He asked Under Sec if US has formed any views re political settlement.

Under Sec replied that on basis our knowledge of Cyprus situation, we have not felt able to contribute any useful suggestions at this time. Kyprianou then asked what purpose of mediator would be? Under Sec pointed out it was not proposed he try to put American ideas into effect. His task would be to sound out all interested parties and seek to persuade them come to some mutually agreeable settlement. Kyprianou was skeptical about mediator's prospects. He opined that if there were some way to get Greece and Turkey out of picture, chances of success would be greater. He recalled that ten years ago enosis might have been better arrangement. Through no fault of Greek Cypriots, it could not be worked out. Such "radical solution" probably not possible now.

10. Under Sec told Kyprianou he planned meet with Sandys again and, together with Sandys, might perhaps be able to hold second meeting with Kyprianou later. During subsequent talk with Sandys, it became clear that further discussions with Greeks desirable before saying anything more to Kyprianou. Under Sec then telephoned Kyprianou to explain his inability meet with him again today and his wish to reflect further on Kyprianou's observations. Under Sec said he hoped be in Nicosia sometime Tuesday and suggested Kyprianou might wish to consider meeting him there. Kyprianou will probably do so.

Bruce



9. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/

Athens, February 10, 1964, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

1197. For Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.

I have had useful detailed discussions today with Hare, Labouissse and Wilkins. In sum, they reinforce and support the tentative views of the overall situation I expressed yesterday. (Athens 1184)/2/

/2/Telegram 1184, February 10, reported Ball's view that the United States should not put troops in Cyprus and should avoid taking a firm public position on the issue so that the United Kingdom, Greece, or Turkey would not back off from their commitments. (Ibid.) A summary of this telegram was provided to President Johnson in a February 10 memorandum from Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Lunch with President)

1. I am now even firmer in my view that the US should not put troops in Cyprus. Wilkins (who supports wholeheartedly views contained in Athens 1184)/3/ together with his Army Attaché [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are all convinced Makarios does not want Americans. They fear US forces would be special target of hit and run tactics of Greek Cypriots. According to Wilkins, Pickard also agrees that US troops would be singled out more than other Western powers because of our position of leadership in NATO.

/3/In telegram 685 from Nicosia, February 8, Wilkins warned that the British plan would fail to win Cypriot acceptance and urged U.S. support of a peacekeeping force under U.N. aegis with the participation of forces from both Greece and Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)

We explored possible ways that US military support might be provided while minimizing exposure of US forces on assumption some form of US involvement may be useful or even necessary to keep Turks from standing down. This included possibility of putting US troops in British bases on standby basis. However, we concluded this not desirable since US unit would be thrown into breach at such time as serious fighting broke out, which would be worse than being in from beginning.

2. Today's discussion highlighted importance and delicacy of handling Turks so as to minimize adverse repercussions on our relations and to dampen any desire they may have to intervene in Cyprus unilaterally. As a result, it is more than ever important that responsibility for our non-participation be placed squarely on Makarios' back. As Hare puts it, US failure to participate in an international force would remove keystone to arch, so far as Turks are concerned.

It seems increasingly likely that Makarios will cooperate with us on this since opinion of our Nicosia [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is that Makarios could not survive acceptance of US troops. He believes Cypriot "fighters" would throw him out if he tried it.

3. What are the alternatives to plan as presently agreed by all but GOC? We concluded best alternative we can probably hope to achieve is modest international force under UK com and made up of Benelux, Scandinavian countries, Canada and possibly Ireland.

Force would be approved by SC but not put under its control. While such force not as effective militarily as original concept, it would provide political deterrent and help spread responsibility as UK desires. If Makarios wants such a force--and there is still real doubt that he wants any international force at all--a prearranged deal along these lines might be feasible. Hare is clear, however, that this fallback--while probably the best we can hope for--would cause Turks great anguish.

4. If we are to keep the Turks from feeling we have sold them down the river, we must make strongest effort to avoid any suggestion we are weakening in our decision to contribute US contingent to international force. Any leak or suggestion from any US source indicating such weakening would be catastrophic./4/

/4/In telegram 789 to Ankara, February 10, Secretary Rusk responded: "First purely personal reaction your telegram is that Turks might be saved if there is U.S. naval or air participation not involving U.S. ground troops." (Ibid.)

5. Kyprianou told me in London that GOC was planning--before dealing with question of international force--to seek Security Council confirmation of "territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus". This was confirmed by Greek FonMin this afternoon/5/ who added information that Makarios planned to go personally to New York for that purpose but had agreed to defer this junket until after Greek election next Sunday (February 16). I described to FonMin how I am tentatively planning to deal with this proposal when I meet Makarios. However, I would appreciate suggestion of Ambassador Stevenson and Department as to best tactic. I have in mind saying following to Makarios:

/5/Ball reported on his meeting with Foreign Minister Palamas in telegram 1199 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)

a. We have been the major support of the United Nations from the beginning while certain other nations that make great pretense of interest in Cypriot situation have consistently sabotaged UN and failed to provide financial support for its peacekeeping efforts.

b. We are practical nation and trust that Makarios will take a hard look at the practical consequences of his proposed action.

c. A move toward the Security Council on this issue will almost certainly result in the interjection of cold war politics. It will provide the forum for charges of genocide against Cypriots while speeches in Security Council will only serve to inflame passions that are already too high.

d. We must concentrate on first things first and that means getting agreement on international force before involving Security Council.

Obviously this ploy may not work. Makarios apparently has naive idea that Security Council is like General Assembly and filled with Afro-Asian pals. If he insists on going ahead, however, we could probably not frontally oppose kind of resolution Cypriots have in mind. We should seek to finesse it by developing formulation we could support. In that event, each member of Council would put its own interpretation on language. Net result might be resolution putting Security Council on record that all parties concerned must keep their shirts on and avoid action that would exacerbate situation.

6. We also grappled briefly and inconclusively with nature of long-term settlement. All were in full agreement we should not get into middle of mediating process. If there is a solution it is certainly not in sight in near future. Movement of population within federation seems offer some possibility but has the great draw-back of being rational and therefore not feasible. Best we can hope for in foreseeable future is to help keep lid on boiling cauldron and thus prevent southern wing of NATO from blowing up.

Tomorrow I go to Ankara to begin process of preparing Turks for turn down by Makarios and possible modest UN force alternative described above.

I plan to see Makarios Wednesday./6/ I have asked Wilkins to get categoric assurances from Makarios there will be no demonstration as condition precedent to my visit./7/

/6/In telegram 793 to Ankara, February 11, the Department of State commented that Makarios had an "exaggerated idea" of what he could get from a Security Council meeting without U.S. and British support and provided Ball with a series of talking points designed to impress on Makarios the limits and dangers of over-reliance on this approach. (Ibid.)

/7/In telegram 355 from Nicosia, February 11, Wilkins reported that he had Makarios' assurances that no demonstrations would take place during Ball's visit. (Ibid.)

Labouisse



10. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/

Ankara, February 11, 1964, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, London, USUN, and Athens. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

1017. From Under Secretary. We met this morning first with Foreign Minister Erkin and then went with him for session with PM Inonu. In both cases, I explained our interest in problem of Cyprus, our concern over its dangers and our support for peacekeeping-mediator proposals. At same time I made clear we and other non-guarantor powers could only participate if Makarios agreed, and I indicated considerable concern at what I understood to be his rather negative attitude. Said I was going to Nicosia tomorrow and intended to press hard for his agreement. They asked what could be done if he refused, to which I replied that this would depend upon nature of his refusal. We had no specific present plans in this regard.

I also discussed report that Makarios plans to appeal to UN after Greek elections are over and seek resolution warning against aggression or interference with independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Assured them I intended try to dissuade him from this and make point that there should be reference to Security Council only after full agreement reached among parties concerned. Turks agreed premature Security Council debate would be harmful and wished me well in my efforts.

I emphasized that continuing tense situation on island and Makarios' idea of rushing to UN made it imperative for us to get quick decision and that I would work hard to this end. Was prepared stay over day or two in Nicosia if satisfactory answer not forthcoming tomorrow.

Erkin asked about Greek position. I said they supported peacekeeping plan but had told me they had little influence on Makarios. Erkin questioned latter statement, but we said our own information from various sources confirmed it. He commented some Greek moves had been displeasing to Turkey, but government exercised restraint despite heavy pressures on it to act, including severe criticism by Parliamentary opposition. I said we appreciated this and told him Greek Foreign Minister Palamas had himself expressed admiration for restraint displayed by Inonu.

Erkin indicated he fully realized dangers Turkish intervention, saying British would withdraw and Greeks would intervene "not with us but against us".

He asked whether we intended answer Soviet note. I said we were studying question, thought British answer was good one./2/ Erkin commented Turkey would have something to say about note/3/ and referred to TASS articles criticizing Turkish position, which he said were particularly annoying because Soviet Ambassador had promised his government would support Turkey.

/2/For text of the Soviet note and the U.S. reply, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1964, pp. 446-448. For text of the British reply, see The New York Times, February 9, 1964.

/3/The Turkish reply was released on February 25. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus.

Both Inonu and Erkin remarked position Turkish community in Cyprus was getting worse rather than better, "massacres" still continuing. Longer international force delayed, worse situation would get, because Makarios and associates have "no scruples left". Inonu added, Turks have no confidence in guarantee enforced solely by British, although British have enough troops on island for purpose. Problem was British instructions to their troops. They were instructed not to shoot but confine themselves to giving advice which was not enough. Asked if British could not be induced to act more effectively, I said I would talk to them about it.

They asked for our suggestions for proposed mediator, and I mentioned names of van Roijen, Plimsoll, van Kleffans. Said Spaak and Lange probably out of consideration because both occupied in important full time positions. Inonu said he was not familiar with first three names but made no suggestions of his own. Expressed hope man chosen would have full opportunity to learn facts and would realize Turkish community cannot be left to mercies of Makarios.

Erkin asked our reactions to proposed Turkish changes in joint proposals. I said we had given them consideration and thought we had been able to meet most important points. Jernegan would meet later with Foreign Office officials to explain what we had done.

Hare



11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/

Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 1:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

732. Dept pass White House and Defense. For President, Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.

1. In the last few days, we have succeeded in clearing our Cyprus proposals with the British, Greek and Turkish Governments. This has required a substantial output of persuasion.

2. I spent the day today largely with Archbishop Makarios and his colleagues. I had two long meetings--one this morning and one this afternoon./2/

/2/Detailed reports of the morning discussions were transmitted in telegrams 726 and 727 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Ball presented Makarios with an "adjusted proposal." The text of this proposal was transmitted in circular telegram 1482, February 12. (Ibid.) The Embassy provided a detailed report on the afternoon discussions in telegrams 728 and 731 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Makarios presented Ball with the text of the Cypriot proposal "preconditioning" acceptance of an international peacekeeping force. This document was transmitted in telegram 742 from Nicosia, February 13. (Ibid.) Ball also met with Vice President Kuchuk in the interval between his two sessions with Makarios. The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 729 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.)

3. While we were meeting, fighting was going on at various points in the island yielding a number of dead and wounded, both Greek and Turk. This is a daily occurrence. Cyprus is a battlefield. We travel about Nicosia with police escorts, followed by RAF units with sub-machine guns. There is a pervasive atmosphere of imminent crisis.

4. Our morning meeting consisted largely of my own long and hard-boiled presentation. Makarios seemed willing to consider our proposal. This afternoon the psychotic element in the Cyprus drama fully emerged and the atmosphere chilled.

5. At the conclusion of lengthy technical discussions, Makarios indicated that in spite of my most vigorous arguments he was going ahead with his foolish plan of sending an expedition to ask the Security Council to try to undermine the Treaties of Guarantee by seeking a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. He indicated quite casually that he would deal with the creation of an international force at some later date.

6. In view of the fact that the murder rate is rising steadily and that the tempo of fighting is increasing, such conduct by Makarios is criminally foolhardy.

7. In view of this, the British High Commissioner and I told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic discourse. In an exchange which lasted 45 minutes or more, we painted a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the folly he has proposed.

8. When the discussion got past the boiling point, I proposed that we adjourn until Thursday morning, to which the Archbishop agreed.

9. I think we shook the Archbishop. Even his beard seemed pale. But the big question is whether he is really in command of the situation. The two ministers who led the discussion on the Cypriot side--Clerides and Papadopoulos--are fanatical and over the edge. They reflect the death wish that seems endemic in this wretched island. Both also have some Communist coloration in their backgrounds.

10. The question we face tonight is who is in charge? If the Archbishop is as scared as I think he is, we may be able to salvage something tomorrow morning. I plan to see him alone before the meeting. But if he is a prisoner of his own folly--which seems likely--he will commit Cyprus in the morning to a disaster course.

11. The issue that must be faced is the only simple question in this complex situation. Is the Cypriot Government prepared to work with us and other countries in organizing an international force immediately? Or does it want to throw the issues into the United Nations in the hope of attracting enough Soviet bloc and Afro-Asian support to embarrass the Turks while the island continues to fall apart?

12. As of tonight, Cyprus is very near civil disintegration. I talked with the Commander of the British Forces, General Young, this noon and he felt despondent and frustrated: A battle occurred today in a town that has heretofore been quiet; something on the order of 5,000 Turks are encircled. There have been casualties on both sides. The pace is accelerating and a general bloodbath just over the horizon.

13. Against this background, I told Makarios that if he did not proceed immediately to organize an international peace force, he would condemn his country to total anarchy. But I have little confidence that he is enough of a free man to act rationally--even if he had the will to do so.

14. I have sent him word through covert channels that if he would agree to the organization of an international force immediately, we and the British would help him achieve one. We would call on the Commonwealth countries and on some of the Western European neutrals. If he would postpone throwing his problems into the Security Council until after such a force had been agreed, order might be restored and the situation salvaged. In that event, we would talk to the Turks and try to hold up their hand while efforts were made to develop a formula for a general settlement. Such a force cld not involve US troops.

15. I hope we can agree on something but I am not too sanguine.

16. The position of Turkey in this affair is a critical one. From my talks in Ankara, I am persuaded that if Makarios is enough of a fool to go to the Security Council and try for a resolution designed to hamstring the Turks in exercising their rights of intervention, without first dealing with the internal situation through the organization of an international force, he is likely to trigger an incisive Turkish reaction. The Turks may move, and the Greeks will respond.

17. Our only hope, it seems to me, is to scare Makarios sufficiently to compel him to concentrate on the creation of an international force that will stop carnage. If he does not do so--and I will know tomorrow--we have some hard decisions to make. I have promised the Turks and Greeks to report on our meetings here.

18. One possibility of preventing a Greco-Turkish war is to persuade both governments to exercise the rights of unilateral intervention granted them under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and move into Cyprus peacefully and together in order to stop the destruction of the Greek and Turkish communities. This obviously would not be feasible until after the Greek elections which take place on Sunday.

19. For the moment, we have considerable influence with Inonu, who has made clear to me his gratitude for the US manifestations of interest in the Cyprus situation. Hopefully we may be able to establish a relation of confidence with whatever new government emerges from the Greek elections.

20. I have the impression that Britain, as the third guarantor power, would be willing to associate itself with a peaceful joint intervention by Greece and Turkey and would simultaneously increase present British troop strength in Cyprus.

21. To arrange a common action by Greece and Turkey would require considerable diplomatic skill and the maximum use of our leverage. Yet I am inclined tonight to think this may be about the only remaining hope of preventing a major collision of two of our NATO allies--if, as I fear he will, Makarios turns out to be a prisoner or a fool or both.

22. I am sending you this cable tonight not with the thought of immediate instructions, since it is hard to make a definite plan until we know the full results of tomorrow's meeting with Makarios. I must emphasize, however, that the atmosphere at this end of the Mediterranean is supercharged and that an explosion may be imminent. I shall try tomorrow to send you more considered recommendations as to the options open to us and the immediate actions we should take.

Wilkins



12. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and in the White House on February 24. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is marked "Part I of II." Prime Minister Home visited the United States February 12-14.

SUBJECT
Situation in Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

British
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of Great Britain
R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office
N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler
Tom Bridges, Second Private Secretary to Mr. Butler
Denis Greenhill, Minister, UK Embassy
M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office

US
The President
The Secretary of State
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON
M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA

Secretary Rusk reviewed the situation in Cyprus. He pointed out that Archbishop Makarios had seemed willing to see a peace-keeping force composed not of troops from NATO states (except for the UK), but from the Commonwealth and from nations like Sweden. Mr. Butler remarked that the idea of such an alternative force was hopeful. Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Ball would see Makarios again the morning of the 14th. Meanwhile, reports of heavy fighting in the southern part of the island were disturbing, however, and Secretary Rusk stated that Mr. Ball would proceed on the 14th to Ankara to counsel prudence to the Turkish government.

Mr. Butler remarked that the Cypriot government would surely bring the issue before the Security Council and the Cypriot delegate, Rossides, would introduce a resolution. If it were unreasonable, the British and the US could be negative and would have the votes. If the resolution were reasonable and two-sided, we could be reasonable about it.

Secretary Rusk remarked that the best and most likely kind of resolution which would get a majority at the Security Council was one of the "don't fight, talk" resolutions which are customary in the Security Council under circumstances such as now prevail in Cyprus. The US and UK could back such a resolution in order to head off other ones of the sort the Cypriot government would want. Namely, one to cast a shadow on the Treaty of Guarantee.

Sir Alec doubted that Makarios can control matters in Cyprus any longer. He hoped that Canada would continue to be one of the states making up the peace-keeping force.

Secretary Rusk referred to the fact that the Turks, Greeks and British have forces on the island by right; this could be a concept which could be used to keep Makarios from calling in forces from Egypt or the Soviet Bloc, for example, which have no right on the island.

Sir Alec supposed that if the Turkish army invaded Cyprus, the British government would call on it to stop at a certain line. The British forces certainly would not fight a NATO ally.

The President suggested that it would be important to have the Turkish and Greek armies agree not to fight each other, should their governments decide to send forces to occupy portions of Cyprus. It would also be desirable that each side should protect the other's minority population. He recalled that Queen Frederika of Greece had told him during her recent visit to Washington that the Greek Army would move to Cyprus if the Turkish Army did./2/

/2/Queen Frederika visited Washington on Janu

[Get Real!]

In the absence of a source link we can only assume it came out of the poster’s rear end…

[zan]

In the absence of a source link we can only assume it came out of the poster’s rear end…

When it suits you find the link yourself......When it doesn't



http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johns ... i/4755.htm

[Tim Drayton]

Any chance of a synopsis?

[Paphitis]

In the absence of a source link we can only assume it came out of the poster’s rear end…

When it suits you find the link yourself......When it doesn't



http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johns ... i/4755.htm

Zanny, go easy on the laxatives mate. You better keep your fluids up, because at this rate you are going to dehydrate...

[zan]

In the absence of a source link we can only assume it came out of the poster’s rear end…

When it suits you find the link yourself......When it doesn't



http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johns ... i/4755.htm

Zanny, go easy on the laxatives mate. You better keep your fluids up, because at this rate you are going to dehydrate...

And you will explode sweetness.....Try reading some real history for a change.......A bit between the lines as well and you will be fine.....

[Oracle]

OMG .... I thought I'd never get to the bottom of this!

[Get Real!]

Any chance of a synopsis?

That’s based on the assumption that he's actually read it...

[Get Real!]

/2/Queen Frederika visited Washington on Janu

I finally got to the interesting bit... You could've told me it was on the last line!

[doesntmatter]

Zan, it's obvious that no one has read it and is the reason why they have not commented. They are waiting for someone to make a comment so that they can argue about that instead.

Tim Drayton asks, "Any chance of a synopsis?", why don't you read it Tim and make your own "synopsis", to much for you?

The "queen" of CF just scrolled and moaned: "I thought I'd never get to the bottom of this!"

GR, just read the last line: "You could've told me it was on the last line!"

And Papitis, well, he is just being the clown that he is.

These people are not interested in a dialog, they just look for an excuse to have an argument, with anyone and they don't care who or what he/she is.

Just tell them that it was the GCs and the Greeks who started the war in Cyprus because they wanted enosis.

Or tell them that they only got themselves to blame for the mess they are in and have no right to blame anyone else for their own expansionist dream.