Cyprus-Forum.com

[Bananiot]

Petros Γαρουφαλιάς. It would be Garoufalias in English.

[Tim Drayton]

This is the spelling used in Wikipedia:

http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:wP ... =clnk&cd=6

[Paphitis]

Paphitis, I am sorry to say but you are exhibiting total ignorance of historical events that happened only recently. Officially, we abandoned enosis only after the events of Kophinou in 1967. Till then there are numerous resolutions of the Cyprus Parliament that reiterate our burning aspiration for enosis and of course countless speeches by party (all parties) and government officials hailing enosis as the only logical conclusion of our struggle.

Earlier I wrote about Dervis Ali Kavazoglu and the book his close friend Christakis Vanezos wrote about this tragic giant of Greek – Turkish friendship. I think we should now read what Niyazi Kizilyurek wrote in April 2008 on this issue. It illustrates clearly that even AKEL, staunchly supported enosis, let alone the nationalist parties of the Greek Cypriots.

AKEL’s Enosis Policy and the Kavazoglu Tragedy

Although Dervis Ali Kavazoglu fought with all his might for ‘the cause’ despite difficulties, he was deeply sorry for the events that took place in 1964. The reason was not just the bloodshed between the two communities but also that AKEL, the party that he was a proud member of, had decided to return to their Enosis policy, which drove him to take a stand of political solidarity. AKEL had indeed returned to their Enosis policy in 1964, leaving their 1960 “completion of Independence” policy. Kavazoglu had objected to division all his life and he even put his life at stake in order to defend his cause. Now, especially after the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus, it was unacceptable to him that the Party had once again gone back to Enosis. His disappointment is obvious in the lines written by Vanezos. In a speech about the fighting in Erenkoy/Mansura made by Hambis Michaelides, a member of the Central Committee, he said “The blood of the Greek Cypriots and their Greek brethren got mixed up in Mansura,” which caused Kavazoglu deep sorrow. When talking about this incident with Vanezos, Kavazoglu, with his head between his hands, could not help but ask: “Then why am I fighting this war?”

He held the leaders of the two communities responsible for the events of 1963-64 and he knew very well that it was difficult to live in peace on an island where blood had been shed. He also knew well that the Enosis policy of the Greek Cypriot Leadership was nothing more than supporting the idea of division. His expectations from AKEL were deep regarding this very issue. Tell the Greek Cypriot community the truth and drive them away from the Enosis policy! Otherwise he felt that the future of the Republic of Cyprus would be very dark.

Unfortunately AKEL’s attitude did not meet Kavazoglu’s expectations as the Party insisted on its own self-determination/Enosis decision and whilst doing so left Dervis Ali in a difficult situation. What Kavazoglu said to Vanezos makes clear the tragic situation that he had been dragged into: “Vanezos, I will carry on with this fight as I have been doing so up until this moment. (...) However AKEL’s Enosis policy is not helping me the least bit and puts me in a difficult situation. (...) How can I help build a Turkish-Greek Cypriot friendship as a member of AKEL? What can I say to the Turkish Cypriots that have cooperated with me about the AKEL Enosis policy, what will I say?” These lines clearly explain the tragic situation that Kavazoglu found himself trapped in.

AKEL Enosis self-criticism

Kavazoglu’s predictions were verified by political events in the days to follow when his party AKEL finally had to accept his prophecy regarding the issue, but, unfortunately their ‘apology’ came 25 years too late. AKEL made an announcement of self-criticism on January 27, 1990 - exactly 25 years after the Kavazoglu assassination – when it admitted that pursuing their Enosis policy during the years 1964-1967 was a “mistake”.

So, you see AKEL officially accepted Dervis Ali Kavazoglu’s words said in the beginning of the 60s twenty-five years later in 1990.

Read the whole article at:

http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/ ... px?id=2771

Bananiot, see my reply to Insan.

Thanks also for the official policy of a political party (AKEL) in 1964. Not quite what I was after though. I am more interested in any evidence of RoC official policy that the Cypriot Government tended towards ENOSIS right up to 1974. I have posted a lot of evidence that suggests that ENOSIS was not the prime objective or the official policy of the Cyprus Government and now I am awaiting any serious credible evidence that proves me wrong.

You do state that there were numerous resolutions of the Cyprus Parliament that endorse ENOSIS as an objective. Please post evidence of the last resolution so that we can properly ascertain the correct point in time where ENOSIS ceased as an objective and compare it to the TC objectives of TAKSIM which continued right up to the 1974 invasion.

Thanks all the same.

[Paphitis]

Insan Wrote:

It is too hard even impossible to believe that the matter was purely a GC issue while the leader of the Coup was one of the most ferocious(maybe dangerous than Grivas) , pro-enosis man Sampson. There was only one matter that was purely GC issue; left wing- right wing clashes. Even though that wasn't a purely GC issue too; it was an universal issue. What evidences u have that it was purely a GC issue? And what was the issue and it's reasons, btw?

Hello Insan.

The sole purpose of the Coup was to remove President Makarios and even assassinate him altogether as he was proving to be a rather big obstacle to US and NATO interests in the East Mediterranean. The US had fully backed the Coup and were informed and even involved in the plot against The Cypriot Government from the very beginning. The coerced the Greek Generals and gave them the final go ahead to proceed, giving them guarantees that Turkey would not intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee. Shortly afterwards. the US then gave Turkey the green light to proceed with the invasion and claim their prize of annexing Cyprus above the 35th parallel.

The Greek Generals, feeling confident with their US backing went ahead with the Coup, believing that Turkey would not retaliate. Turkey was even informed by the US that the purpose of the Coup was to remove Makarios from power and to destabilise the leftist power base in Cyprus. They also informed Turkey that the Coup will not result in any TC bloodshed and that it was solely a GC affair.

4. General stated that Greece also believed in non-interference and
in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus; Greece would abide
by the decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom
were nationalists, and these nationalists were the ones who had moved
against Makarios. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists
moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or
whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. At this point he
went off on a tangent stating that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots
had asked for enosis, that GOT had obviously accepted these developments
in Cyprus, that Turks understood that the matter was an
internal Greek Cypriot affair.

8. In reply to question whether Greeks were in direct touch with
Turks, General stated we have not bothered the Turks; we have not declared enosis. Turks agree that “the principal thorn” (i.e., Makarios) is
gone and, “I am not in touch with the Turks.” He expressed view that
Greece and Turkey could now proceed at some future time to sit down,
talk and solve their differences. Indeed, according to Ioannides Greeks might even be willing to share profits of petroleum finds in a joint exploration
company; however, Greece would never surrender Aegean
continental shelf because this would mean Turkish control of Greek islands.
He also expressed belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could
probably solve their difficulties peacefully, quietly and amicably. He
even joked that in a year or perhaps more realistically ten, the Turks
might want to sell their share of Cyprus for increased percentage of
petroleum rights. Again in reply to direct question, General Ioannides
stated that he was not in contact with any Turkish official; however, he
added that Turks were “officially aware” that enosis was not the objective
at this point and that Greek Cypriots did not intend any bloody
action against Turk Cypriots.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf

Insan Wrote:

On the other hand, Turkey informed whole world that it would be a peace operation to restore the constitutional order. However; the coupists, Greece and pro-coupists didn't believe Turkey and combated against Turkish forces. Then we all faced the inevitable consequences.

The above statement disappoints me Insan. You are insinuating that the Turkish intervention was to restore constitutional order and hence not to claim the long awaited Turkish dream of claiming her PRIZE.

The fact that this was not the case is also in contravention to Turkey's obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Well, Henry Kissinger disagrees with you:

Unwilling to countenance a middle ground between total victory and total defeat, Greece and Turkey had worked themselves into dead-lock. Turkey was in possession of the PRIZE but lacked international recognition of its legitimacy.

HENRY KISSINGER - YEARS OF RENEWAL (THE CONCLUDING VOLUME OF HIS MEMOIRS >Pg231

Seems like Henry Kissinger knew exactly what the purpose of the intervention was. The prize for Turkey was annexing the northern part of Cyprus - the long sought after partition of Cyprus.

Insan Wrote:

I wonder ur opinios regarding the intention of Sampson and his backing crew. What could had happen if Turkey didn't intervene? What should Turkey and TCs do under those circumstances? He would politically cleanse all Left-winger GCs? Then all left-winger TCs? Then all right-winger TCs? Then suicide himself?

My opinion is that the Nicos Sampson Government would have fallen within days, or weeks. Opposition to the Coup was significant, and the GCs were resisting the coupists all over Cyprus. The Coupists had their hands full with Makarios loyalists and leftist forces. The TCs were not even a factor.

I doubt very much that he would have "cleansed" all leftists. However, there were some prominent leftists and Makarios supporters that would have been in significant jeopardy. My Uncle would have been amongst those due to his involvement setting up the HAM radio broadcast in Paphos where Makarios announced that he was still alive.

[denizaksulu]

Paphitis, I am sorry to say but you are exhibiting total ignorance of historical events that happened only recently. Officially, we abandoned enosis only after the events of Kophinou in 1967. Till then there are numerous resolutions of the Cyprus Parliament that reiterate our burning aspiration for enosis and of course countless speeches by party (all parties) and government officials hailing enosis as the only logical conclusion of our struggle.

Earlier I wrote about Dervis Ali Kavazoglu and the book his close friend Christakis Vanezos wrote about this tragic giant of Greek – Turkish friendship. I think we should now read what Niyazi Kizilyurek wrote in April 2008 on this issue. It illustrates clearly that even AKEL, staunchly supported enosis, let alone the nationalist parties of the Greek Cypriots.

AKEL’s Enosis Policy and the Kavazoglu Tragedy

Although Dervis Ali Kavazoglu fought with all his might for ‘the cause’ despite difficulties, he was deeply sorry for the events that took place in 1964. The reason was not just the bloodshed between the two communities but also that AKEL, the party that he was a proud member of, had decided to return to their Enosis policy, which drove him to take a stand of political solidarity. AKEL had indeed returned to their Enosis policy in 1964, leaving their 1960 “completion of Independence” policy. Kavazoglu had objected to division all his life and he even put his life at stake in order to defend his cause. Now, especially after the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus, it was unacceptable to him that the Party had once again gone back to Enosis. His disappointment is obvious in the lines written by Vanezos. In a speech about the fighting in Erenkoy/Mansura made by Hambis Michaelides, a member of the Central Committee, he said “The blood of the Greek Cypriots and their Greek brethren got mixed up in Mansura,” which caused Kavazoglu deep sorrow. When talking about this incident with Vanezos, Kavazoglu, with his head between his hands, could not help but ask: “Then why am I fighting this war?”

He held the leaders of the two communities responsible for the events of 1963-64 and he knew very well that it was difficult to live in peace on an island where blood had been shed. He also knew well that the Enosis policy of the Greek Cypriot Leadership was nothing more than supporting the idea of division. His expectations from AKEL were deep regarding this very issue. Tell the Greek Cypriot community the truth and drive them away from the Enosis policy! Otherwise he felt that the future of the Republic of Cyprus would be very dark.

Unfortunately AKEL’s attitude did not meet Kavazoglu’s expectations as the Party insisted on its own self-determination/Enosis decision and whilst doing so left Dervis Ali in a difficult situation. What Kavazoglu said to Vanezos makes clear the tragic situation that he had been dragged into: “Vanezos, I will carry on with this fight as I have been doing so up until this moment. (...) However AKEL’s Enosis policy is not helping me the least bit and puts me in a difficult situation. (...) How can I help build a Turkish-Greek Cypriot friendship as a member of AKEL? What can I say to the Turkish Cypriots that have cooperated with me about the AKEL Enosis policy, what will I say?” These lines clearly explain the tragic situation that Kavazoglu found himself trapped in.

AKEL Enosis self-criticism

Kavazoglu’s predictions were verified by political events in the days to follow when his party AKEL finally had to accept his prophecy regarding the issue, but, unfortunately their ‘apology’ came 25 years too late. AKEL made an announcement of self-criticism on January 27, 1990 - exactly 25 years after the Kavazoglu assassination – when it admitted that pursuing their Enosis policy during the years 1964-1967 was a “mistake”.

So, you see AKEL officially accepted Dervis Ali Kavazoglu’s words said in the beginning of the 60s twenty-five years later in 1990.

Read the whole article at:

http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/ ... px?id=2771

Bananiot, see my reply to Insan.

Thanks also for the official policy of a political party (AKEL) in 1964. Not quite what I was after though. I am more interested in any evidence of RoC official policy that the Cypriot Government tended towards ENOSIS right up to 1974. I have posted a lot of evidence that suggests that ENOSIS was not the prime objective or the official policy of the Cyprus Government and now I am awaiting any serious credible evidence that proves me wrong.

You do state that there were numerous resolutions of the Cyprus Parliament that endorse ENOSIS as an objective. Please post evidence of the last resolution so that we can properly ascertain the correct point in time where ENOSIS ceased as an objective and compare it to the TC objectives of TAKSIM which continued right up to the 1974 invasion.

Thanks all the same.

Hi Bafidis,

After the events of 1963/4 and the clashes in Kofinou in 1967, it would be natural for the TCs to mistrust the GCs further. Like the Akritas Plan (for what its worth), which was supposed to be secret, the TCs would seriously believe that eventual Enosis would would be on the cards. The TCs would always believe in the 'hidden agenda's' (real/imaginary who knows?). If it did not take place, you would say 'imaginary'. The TCs would never wait for it to be 'fact'. (Enosis, that is). Please dont ask for 'credible evidence' .
This is my opinion.

[Bananiot]

Paphitis, I will not try to convince you of anything. You are well entrenched into your nationalist thinking and god himself, if he/she ever came to earth wouldn't be able to convince you. However, let me give an insight of how the situation was on the ground in 1969, six years after the intercommunal strife started.

The Turkish Cypriots were running short of staying power within the enclaves. Turkey was spending 20 million dollars per year to sustain the enclaves. Klerides and Denktash were talking solution and came up with an agreement that was extremely favourable to our side. In fact, Denktash had accepted most of the 13 points that Makarios tried to push on in 1963. Many of the so called privileges the TC community enjoyed with the 1959 Constitution were taken back.

Makarios did not accept the agreement reached by Klerides and Denktash. One can naturally wonder: Why didn't him? What was his agenda?

Would you like to make an effort to explain this to the bewildered observers of the Cyprob Paphitis? We were on top in 1969. We had the TC's in our pockets and the deal that was brokered by the two negotiators was very appealing, on the surface, at least. It galvanised our independent country and gave the Greek Cypriot community more leeway. However, Makarios rejected it!

Come on Paphitis, think hard, think creatively and independently. Shed your biases for a second and you will get it.

[Paphitis]

Paphitis, I will not try to convince you of anything. You are well entrenched into your nationalist thinking and god himself, if he/she ever came to earth wouldn't be able to convince you. However, let me give an insight of how the situation was on the ground in 1969, six years after the intercommunal strife started.

You really do like labelling people.

What makes you think I am a Cypriot Nationalist? It wouldn't have anything to do with being anti Annan, would it?

I have been told that I am not even Cypriot, and perhaps they are right, as I do not live in Cyprus and hence am out of touch with Cypriotness or Cypriot realities. It really does not concern me anymore.

I am not asking you to convince me of anything. All I am asking is for you to just post some evidence that supports what you claim.

The Turkish Cypriots were running short of staying power within the enclaves. Turkey was spending 20 million dollars per year to sustain the enclaves. Klerides and Denktash were talking solution and came up with an agreement that was extremely favourable to our side. In fact, Denktash had accepted most of the 13 points that Makarios tried to push on in 1963. Many of the so called privileges the TC community enjoyed with the 1959 Constitution were taken back.

Makarios did not accept the agreement reached by Klerides and Denktash. One can naturally wonder: Why didn't him? What was his agenda?

Would you like to make an effort to explain this to the bewildered observers of the Cyprob Paphitis? We were on top in 1969. We had the TC's in our pockets and the deal that was brokered by the two negotiators was very appealing, on the surface, at least. It galvanised our independent country and gave the Greek Cypriot community more leeway. However, Makarios rejected it!

Come on Paphitis, think hard, think creatively and independently. Shed your biases for a second and you will get it.

Earlier you stated that ENOSIS was officially abandoned in 1967. Now you insinuate that ENOSIS was still on the agenda in 1969.

You insinuate that Makarios rejected the Turkish concessions because ENOSIS was his goal. You need to provide a link, because my understanding was that Makarios wanted to remove all disproportionate powers at Local Government level, whilst accepting autonomy on such matters as religion, education, culture, personal status.

[BirKibrisli]

Paphitis, I will not try to convince you of anything. You are well entrenched into your nationalist thinking and god himself, if he/she ever came to earth wouldn't be able to convince you. However, let me give an insight of how the situation was on the ground in 1969, six years after the intercommunal strife started.

The Turkish Cypriots were running short of staying power within the enclaves. Turkey was spending 20 million dollars per year to sustain the enclaves. Klerides and Denktash were talking solution and came up with an agreement that was extremely favourable to our side. In fact, Denktash had accepted most of the 13 points that Makarios tried to push on in 1963. Many of the so called privileges the TC community enjoyed with the 1959 Constitution were taken back.

Makarios did not accept the agreement reached by Klerides and Denktash. One can naturally wonder: Why didn't him? What was his agenda?

Would you like to make an effort to explain this to the bewildered observers of the Cyprob Paphitis? We were on top in 1969. We had the TC's in our pockets and the deal that was brokered by the two negotiators was very appealing, on the surface, at least. It galvanised our independent country and gave the Greek Cypriot community more leeway. However, Makarios rejected it!

Come on Paphitis, think hard, think creatively and independently. Shed your biases for a second and you will get it.

1969 was the year I left Cyprus,Bananiot.....
Is there any way we can get our hands on the agreement worked out by Klerides and Denktash???
And did Makarios ever gave a reason for rejecting it>>>????

[Paphitis]

Paphitis, I will not try to convince you of anything. You are well entrenched into your nationalist thinking and god himself, if he/she ever came to earth wouldn't be able to convince you. However, let me give an insight of how the situation was on the ground in 1969, six years after the intercommunal strife started.

The Turkish Cypriots were running short of staying power within the enclaves. Turkey was spending 20 million dollars per year to sustain the enclaves. Klerides and Denktash were talking solution and came up with an agreement that was extremely favourable to our side. In fact, Denktash had accepted most of the 13 points that Makarios tried to push on in 1963. Many of the so called privileges the TC community enjoyed with the 1959 Constitution were taken back.

Makarios did not accept the agreement reached by Klerides and Denktash. One can naturally wonder: Why didn't him? What was his agenda?

Would you like to make an effort to explain this to the bewildered observers of the Cyprob Paphitis? We were on top in 1969. We had the TC's in our pockets and the deal that was brokered by the two negotiators was very appealing, on the surface, at least. It galvanised our independent country and gave the Greek Cypriot community more leeway. However, Makarios rejected it!

Come on Paphitis, think hard, think creatively and independently. Shed your biases for a second and you will get it.

1969 was the year I left Cyprus,Bananiot.....
Is there any way we can get our hands on the agreement worked out by Klerides and Denktash???
And did Makarios ever gave a reason for rejecting it>>>????

The reason Makarios gave was that he was wanting proportional democratic arrangements at Local Government level, which was representative of the size of the 2 communities.

I obtained that from a "trnc" website.

[Bananiot]

... and the real reason?