by YFred » Mon Jan 12, 2009 12:46 am
After so many ‘nos’, shall we whisper ‘yes, we can’?
By Nicos A. Rolandis
WE ARE already in the year 2009. Thirty-five years separate as from 1974… forty-six years from 1963... A lot of time has gone by, which writes its own history…
Our problem is going through its winter time. Cyprus does not “sell” anymore. There is no real interest in her problem out there in the international community – not even in Greece and Cyprus herself.
We simply hear the boring, tasteless and shallow reverberating voices of some politicians: “We shall never sell out, we shall never yield”. “In the new year, we shall celebrate in Kyrenia”. In real terms we do know that, despite the sincere efforts of Christofias, our timid, foolish and spineless policies over the past years (despite the objections of some of us) have probably led to a total loss.
We are left with scandals, graft, crime, a superficial well-being and a country divided into two parts. God may have endowed Cypriots with commercial and financial acumen. He has not blessed them with political judgment and wisdom.
The famous Italian writer and astute politician of the Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli, wrote in 1513 in his book Il Principe (The Prince):
“Prudence consists in the power to recognise the nature of disadvantages and to take the less disagreeable as good”. Most people in Cyprus have never delved into or made an in-depth analysis of our problem. They limit themselves to sloganeering. They do not even care to get to know the substance of what they approve and what they reject. They simply aim at perfection, as if they were perfect themselves down the historical course.
They consider themselves as victims of injustice. As if they – and their side – have never wronged anyone. They continuously seek what they consider as better and forsake what is good or mediocre or tolerable. They chase chimaera. No wonder we have reached an almost deadlocked position. No wonder that our options become more and more limited with the lapse of time. No wonder that even moderate and patient Christofias at times wonders whether the reunification of Cyprus is feasible.
In an article of mine of January 30, 2008 I referred to 15 opportunities for a solution which were presented to us since 1948 (Consultative Assembly). We rejected them all. Not all of them were good. However they were all better than what Christofias negotiates with Talat today. When I resigned from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1983, I warned that because of our mentality and approach we would simply be left at the end of the day “with a number of resolutions and the military occupation of our country”.
This is exactly what will happen if Christofias and Talat fail to deliver.
I refer below to the main issues of the Cyprus problem and I juxtapose what we have rejected and lost in the past to what may follow. It is probably the only way to shake us up (if anything can shake us up anymore) and make us realise the degree of our fallacies in recent years:
1. Bizonal, Bicommunal Federation: from the very outset – until and including the Annan Plan – the evolution from the Republic of Cyprus to the United Federal Republic of Cyprus was undisputed. The unity of the country was secured. The notions of “virgin birth” and other partitionist elements came up recently. Our continuous rejectionism over the years has led to an undesirable and intractable outcome.
2. Territory: the Gobbi map (1981) and the Guelliar Indicators (1983) define the area of the Turkish Cypriots at 26.5%. In the Ghali map (1992) and the Annan map (2002) the Turkish Cypriots are upgraded to 28.5-29%. The Greek Cypriots were thus deprived of 184 square kilometres (60,000 acres). I fear that Christofias will now encounter new serious obstacles in the case of the Morphou area, which has been developed and will not be returned anymore, according to repeated statements of Turkish Cypriot leaders. It should be noted that when I was the competent Minister back in 1981, we managed to include Morphou on the Greek Cypriot side of the map. Furthermore, if the Cyprus problem is not resolved during the current talks we shall probably lose for good 37% of the territory of Cyprus, an area of 3,400 square kilometres (eleven times the size of Malta). In such a case the north (37%) will become purely Turkish and the south (63%) may end up as the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus.
3. Refugees: in accordance with the Plans we rejected in the past (including the Annan Plan), 90,000 Greek Cypriots would return to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration and a good number of others would be eligible for return under Turkish Cypriot administration. Today there are many uncertainties, mainly due to the issue of Morphou. On the other hand, if there is no solution not a single refugee will go back, as was the case in central Europe in regard to adjusted territories (Poland, Finland, Germany, Romania etc) after the Second World War.
4. Properties: around 25-30 years back, construction on Greek properties in the north was minimal. After 2004, thousands of buildings, villas, hotels and apartments were constructed. How will this thorny issue be regulated? And if it is not resolved, shall we not end up with a situation where properties, compensation and the possibility of exchange of properties will be gone for ever?
5. Army of occupation: in the past it would be totally withdrawn (approximately 40,000 men). On the basis of Annan 5, a Greek and a Turkish contingent (1,500 men) would remain – not an occupation force. This might be avoided through negotiations. If there is no solution, 40,000 or more Turkish soldiers will remain – a Damocles Sword over our heads.
6. Human Rights: according to the assessment of AKEL and DISY in 2004 (under the tenets of the Annan Plan), there would have been a gradual restoration of human rights. What are the chances now?
7. Guarantees: a perennially awkward issue. However if the Cyprus problem is not resolved, Turkey will continue to consider that she has the right of military intervention on the basis of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee of 1959-60.
8. Constitutional Structure: the position of the Turkish Cypriot side is very upgraded nowadays compared to the past. It claims much more on the basis of “ political equality”. It also claims a rotating presidency and more “veto” rights. This will cause more deadlocks. In the past many of these claims did not exist. However our only answer in those years was “No”.
9. Settlers: there were 15,000 Turkish settlers in 1983, who were in principle prepared to be compensated and depart (my proposal). Eventually no agreement was reached, because of some unattainable conditions of the President of the Republic. In 2004 (under the Annan Plan) the number was estimated at 130,000, out of which 80,000 would depart. Nowadays their number exceeds 200,000. If the Cyprus problem is not resolved, in a number of years, their number may exceed the combined total of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Christofias currently faces two “war” fronts. On the other side of the fence, he has the Turkish Cypriot-Turkish front. On his own side, he has his friends and allies who participate in his government, milk the cow of power, enjoy themselves and… fight him. This situation qualifies to be included in the Guinness Book of Records, much more than the recent doner-kebab of the Paphos Municipality.
Will Christofias succeed? Will the deteriorating circumstances allow it? We have said a disastrous “No” so many times in the past. Shall we manage this time to whisper the “Yes, we can” of Barack Obama?
n Nicos Rolandis was Cyprus’ Foreign Minister from 1978-1983 and the Minister of Commerce, Industry & Tourism from 1998-2003
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Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2008
Why is this man not at the talks?
Add " Yes we can" to your signature if you support a settlement please.
Last edited by
YFred on Mon Jan 12, 2009 1:05 am, edited 1 time in total.