Hi Talisker,
I too hope you had a Merry Xmas and I wish you and your a Happy New Year 2009.
(1) I fail to see how SELF-DETERMINATION = ENOSIS. Surely these are contradictory statements. Essentially you are saying Cypriots (well, the GCs at any rate) decided their future was to hand over decision-making to Athens (voluntary colonialism?).
It is very easy for those of us to sit in judgement against those that desired self determination, and fought for self determination, which to them was the ultimate dream for Union with the motherland.
The majority of Cypriots at the time saw this as the only viable scenario, and an opportunity to rid themselves of the British yoke. Cypriots do share an Ethnos with Greece. We share this ethnos as our language, culture, religion and custom are identical.
You cannot say that this is "voluntary colonialism". You cannot call it colonialism since Cyprus comprises a predominately Greek population, and is effectively the same nation of people as that of Greece. Colonialism is when a foreign power forcibly dominates and controls a foreign land at the expense of the indigenous populous, something that would not have occurred had Cyprus unified with Greece, as was desired by most Cypriots.
It is only in the late 60s or early 70s when Cypriots finally realised the possibility of having their own viable nation.
You can also note that Crete was initially an independent nation when they usnsurped the Ottomans in 1887 until 1913. In 1913 they self declared their union with Greece. Crete is no Greek colony, but is an integral part of Greece, and if you asked the Cretans, they would not have it any other way.
(3) What is the evidence for this? Lord Winster, a former Governor of Cyprus, constantly states that partition is the worst option. I'd suggest it is more likely that the TCs rebelled against the thought of Cypriot enosis with Greece, and suggested to the Guarantor powers, or at least two out of the three, that they would prefer partition. Therefore, it was the GC desire for enosis that brought this to the table (see 1).
While this astonishing political coup was underway, the last act of Eden's policy on Cyprus was played out when the constitutional proposals developed for the island by Lord Radcliffe were sabotaged in December 1956. Eden had charged Radcliffe with developing an acceptable system for purely internal self government for the Cypriots. Radcliffe proposed that the legislative assembly should allow for a Greek majority, while laws exclusively affecting the Turks would require a two thirds majority for approval. He suggested that the handover of power to Cypriot ministers on all internal affairs should immediately follow agreement on self-government. But the Foreign Office was anxious to keep Ankara "on our side", and pledges made to the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, Nuri Birgi at a private lunch in London on 30 November destroyed any chance of Radcliffe's proposals being accepted by the Greeks. Birgi and his officials insisted that the only way of ending Greek oscillation over Cyprus was to devise a solution that was practical and final - and that meant partition. Loyd asked him if the Turks would be satisfied with an arrangement that provided for eventual partition if and when self-determination were to come about. Birgis said that the sooner there was a definitive settlement the better. When Lennox-Boyd announced the Radcliffe proposals to the Commons, he raised for the first time in public the possibility of settling the Cyprus question by dividing the island. The Cyprus Conspiracy
Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig
Pages 47-48
Chapter 12 - America's Secret Option - A Limited Invasion and also Chapter 14 - The NATO Plot: Plans to split Cyprus (1964), are also important chapters, which further outline the prime objectives of partition by the US and NATO, of which Britain was also complicit, but had a more back-seat role in the scheme of things, as partition had by now become primarily an American objective.
(4) I see this slightly differently. Remember Gallipoli? The UK has had its misadventures in Turkey, with horrendous consequences for its own, and other (Australia, NZ), troops. 1950s politicians would still have an eye on the reasonably recent past, including WW1, and the humiliation experienced there. So, yes, I can understand why the UK would not want to go to war with Turkey - it would have been an unwinnable war without resorting to nuclear weaponry. So, for once, our Foreign Secretary realised the potential consequences of such an action, and indicated his relief (from the UK point of view) that the US had stopped this from happening. So, the US were heavily influencing the outcome in 1974, to the point of stopping the UK militarily intervening in 1974, which morally it could be argued as a Guarantor Power they should have done, but which would have been disastrous for the UK itself. If the UK was taken out of the equation by US 'advice', then the key players were the other two Guarantor Powers - Greece and Turkey. One took action, the other didn't.
All Australians know Galipoli quite well. It was fundamentally a massive strategic miscalculation by the British, which resulted in massive casualties, for all of us, and with no gain.
However, I can understand why The British Foreign Secretary considered 74 as the most frightening moment of his career. But, Britain already had 2 very well established bases in Cyprus. Akrotiri AB has a 3km runway and could easily station a squadron of fighter aircraft. I firmly believe that with even just 1 RAF squadron, Britain could have easily achieved air superiority over Cyprus, which would prevent Turkish Paratroopers from landing on the island. If Britain decided to uphold her Treaty of Guarantee obligations, then this alone would have been enough to prevent Turkey from invading. I seriously doubt that Turkey would have been prepared to fight both Britain and Greece. Britain as far as I am concerned would have had the strategic advantage through her bases. There were even Royal Navy Frigates and Destroyers between Kyrenia and Turkey, observing the Turkish Fleet steaming towards 5 mile beach. A few shots and RAF fighters flying overhead would have been enough for the Turkish Navy to not proceed with the invasion. However, Turkey was already given guarantees by Henry Kissinger that no one would stand in their way. The green light was given to Turkey to intervene.