Cyprus-Forum.com

[humanist]

great post Murataga also Nikitas

I believe it all ties up nicely ..... Turkey calling for new ellection in the "trnc" now Talat saying what Turkey wants him to say ........ do I see a sabotage in the Talks brewing?????? hmm we're watching you Turkey

[Kikapu]

I think Talat slowly but surely wants to move back to the 1960 Unitary state and hell with the Federation and Confederation, because the cost is getting bigger and bigger for these things to happen, whereas, in a 1960 Unitary state, he will become Vice President right away, Turkey keeps her guarantor rights plus 650 troops, the TC's get 30% of government jobs, no taxes, and a veto power vote, and be in the EU and a lot more.!

Is just like what happens when you play a Country & Western song backwards. You get your lover back, your dog back, your car back, your home back, .............back,.................back, ..................back, ..............back!!

How long before the GCs produce Akritas 2? and try to get the EU to back them and therefore force it upon the TCs.

You better ask Talat, because he has backtrack from wanting a Confederation ( along with Soyer) to backtracking in wanting a Federation, so therefore, it only leaves a Unitary State with the GC's. If he wants partition, it is going to be very very very expensive for the TC's and Turkey in the long run, so I don't think that's where his head is.

You have it all wrong yet again, that's how well you know the TC stance. Read today's Kibris and find out why President Talat does not want a unitary state.

Does anyone know the TC stands at all, because it seems to change with the weather, otherwise Talat and the Gang would not be making contradictory comments as to what the settlement should look like. BBF Federation is what was agreed on years ago and that's what Talat should stick to and stop trying to define what a Federation is, because nothing else will be offered to him by the GC's, except perhaps a Unitary state, but slightly different from the 1960 Constitution. If Talat and the Gang stopped trying to find ways to get around Democracy, Human Rights and International Laws, a settlement will not be difficult to achieve, specially now that Cyprus is in the EU which Talat wants to be part of, along with Turkey. Play by the rules and the rest will come easy. You see VP, when Denktash agreed to BBF Federation, he let the GC's off the hook from keeping the 1960 Constitution in the future, and the new BBF constitution will not look anything like the 1960 one as a result. This is what Talat and the Gang is struggling with, and Cyprus being in the EU, just makes it much worse for Talat to get around the problem.

1960 Constitution had most of the goodies offered by 2004 Annan Plan (AP had more), and since AP is dead, the only way to get most of the goodies from the AP, would be to go back to the 1960 Constitution. Common sense really.!

In any case, tell us what Talat wants today, from what you read in "Kibris", because tomorrow the weather will chance again.!!

[Kifeas]

I would be delighted to engage into a long discussion on why and how the historical and social premise for the legal structuring of governments was and should be different in Cyprus in comparison to countries like Turkey, Greece, Germany or the U.S. But first, you have to let me in on your secret as to how you manage to spend so much time writing on this forum and simultaneously lead a responsible life in the real world. Until than, I will try to briefly address your dilemma in regards to Cyprus having a unitary state, and leave it at that for now…

In a unitary state, sub-governmental units and governmental positions can be created or abolished, and have their powers varied, by the central government. A unitary state can broaden and narrow the functions of sub-governmental institutions or governmental positions without formal agreement from the affected bodies (e.g. Greece`s curtailment of the President`s duties in 1986). In federal systems, by contrast, assemblies in those states composing the federation have a constitutional existence and a set of constitutional functions which cannot be unilaterally changed by the central government.

The 1960 RoC was not a federated state (mainly because it did not have separate zones for sub-governmental bodies - the communities in this case), but it was definitely NOT a unitary state either. The government had no right to curtail/abolish any of the (a) rights given to (b) positions/institutions established by/for/of the TC community (e.g. removal of the veto rights of the TC vice-president) nor did it have the constitutional authority to execute the responsibilities of the communal assemblies towards the associated community (i.e. law enforcement, judiciary, education, municipality taks, religious affairs and etc.). The GC wing of the government attempted to alter this funadamental principle of the constitution and ultimately prevented the TC MPs from attending the government for their refusal to accept the alterations imposed by the GC wing regarding TC rights. What the GC wing had done was illegal by any stretch of the RoC constitution. Following is an excerpt from the U.N. records that I posted earlier which describes this unfortunate but factual criminal violation – something for which no GC has ever been legally charged let alone indicted.


From UN Doc. S/6569, Paras. 7-10

7. The Turkish Cypriot members requested UNIFCYP to extend its good offices to enable them to receive information about time of meeting of the House, and to make arrangements for the Turkish Cypriot members to attend such meetings in safety. They specified that, if officially invited and notified about matters to be concerned, as required by the constitution, they would be prepared to attendParliament on all questions, not only the two bills now pending.

8. The special Representative conveyed this position to Mr. Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives, who stated that the Turkish Cypriot members could attend provided agreement were reached beforehand on the following points:

(a) the Turkish Cypriot members would resume permanently rather than only for the purpose of the present debate;

(b) The Turkish Cypriot members would accept that the laws enacted by the House of Representatives would be applied to the whole of Cyprus, including the Turkish areas, by the Government using the normal authorized administrative organs;

(c) While the Greek Cypriot members would regard attendance at the House by the Turkish Cypriot members as implying recognition by them of the present Cyprus Government, the Turkish Cypriot members would not be called upon to make a statement to that effect, and the Greek Cypriots would likewise refrain from making any such statements on the record of the House;

(d) It must be understood that the provision in Article article 78 of the constitution concerning separate majorities had been abolished and every member of the House would have one vote for all decisions.

9. Mr. Clerides informed UNIFCYP that he was prepared to discuss the situation during the afternoon of 22 July with a group of Turkish Cypriot members of the House. He subsequently indicated, however, that he would not receive this delegation if they came escorted by UIFCYP soldiers, though he would not object to their being brought to his office in an UNIFCYP automobile driven by an UNIFCYP employee. Finally, Mr. Clerides stated that unless the Turkish Cypriot members accepted the conditions laid down by him, he found it pointless to supply them copies of the pending bills.

10. The Special Representative transmitted the position of the President of the House to Vice-President Kuchuk and to certain Turkish Cypriot members of the House. The Turkish Cypriots considered that the conditions laid down by Mr. Clerides would eliminate the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot members and of their community. They emphasized in particular that, under the constitution, only the President and Vice-President jointly challenge the constitutionality of a law (article 140). In the case of legislation designed contrary to the interests of his community, the Vice-President was entitled to institute action (article 141). However, since the government had stated that it no longer recognized Dr. Kuchuk in his capacity as Vice-President, this latter provision of the constitution was inapplicable in practice.

11. During the afternoon, the Turkish Cypriot members visited the President of the House, who reiterated the substance of the points set forth in paragraph 8 above. He made it plain that, unless agreement was reached on these matters, he would not permit the Turkish Cypriot members to attend the House. Mr. Clerides also stated that the constitutional provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President and the Vice-President were no longer applicable. He subsequently stated that in his opinion the Turkish Cypriot members had no legal standing any more in the House.

Murat

1. I assure you my engagement in this forum has nothing to do with my professional duties, which relate only with the tourism industry. My engagement in this forum has only to do with my personal duty as a citizen to discuss the future of my country and to help establish the true facts of its past, and in view of the fact that -along with most other Cypriots, I have and am being a victim of what has and is being continuing to happen.
2. It is true I spend quite a lot of my private time in this forum, but hopefully not to the extent of infringing my leading of a responsible life.
3. I hope in the future things will turn in a way in which I may be able to give you more information around myself, should it be of any further interest to you.


On the issue of what constitutes a “unitary state,” I beg to differ with your interpretation of the term. The 1960 established state of affairs in Cyprus fits quite well with the conventional interpretation of the term, at least as it appears in the following link from this reputable source: http://www.answers.com/unitary%20state
The critical test of what constitutes a unitary state is whether the state has only one constitution, one legislating and one judicial body, and whose powers and effect are equally applicable in their fullness to the entire territory of the country, and to the whole of its citizens. Certainly, in the case of the RoC, the government (executive branch) could not withdraw the powers vested by the constitution to either the legislating body or to the separate communal champers, but still the single legislating body (parliament,) with the application and /or consent of the executive officer(s) (president and vice president,) could do so by amending the one and single constitution.

You only took and prescribed a tangent (from the above link) of what might be an ingredient of a unitary state, taken in isolation of the entire text. If you read carefully the entire text of the above link, you will be able to realize that there is another, broader critical test (the one I described in the previous paragraph) which determines the distinction between a unitary state and a federal one. A federal state has territorial divisions (federative states) which have their own separate constitutions and separate executive, legislating and judicial bodies; which are able to function autonomously within their competencies and without the federal (central) constitution or federal government and /or legislating body having the power or the means to limit or alter them without their (federative states) consent. The best definition one may possibly give to the 1960 emerged state of affairs in Cyprus, is that it was a “suis-generis” (prototypal) type of a Unitary State, impregnated with certain non-territorial (but racial or ethnic) federative elements, however not sufficient enough to alter its overall essentially unitary nature.
For those interested in knowing why all of suddenly it has become an issue on the part of the TC side, whether RoC was a unitary state or not, the answer is found to the fact that the Greek Cypriot side (rightfully) maintains that the 1977 high level agreements in which it agreed for the transformation of the RoC into a bi-zonal and a bi-communal federation, constitute a major and unprecedented concession of its part towards the TC side, which has yet to be reciprocated. The TC side refuses to acknowledge that this was in fact a major and unprecedented concession, providing as it major argument the outrageous claim that Cyprus was never a unitary state but a federal one in the first place.

If the fact that a community making up the 81% of the people, historically spread all across the island in equal patterns, accepts to grand to a minority of 18.6% of the inhabitants the right to form into a substantial part of their country’s territory, and in which for thousands of years they existed as the overwhelming majority, a separate self administrated federative state; disadvantaging and even disenfranchising in this way a major portion of their (larger community’s) inherent historical and cultural rights in that (substantial) area in which the smaller community has existed only as a numerical minority and for a relatively shorter period of time; cannot be regarded a major and unprecedented concession towards the TC community, and for this they provide arguments against the very notion of it being a compromise –more so on the basis of hilarious and unsubstantiated issues such as the claim that Cyprus was never a unitary state; then one wonders how more further the arrogance of the Turkish side may possibly go. If such is the case, and the move of the GC side does not constitute a major and unprecedented concession, i.e. one that has no major cost in itself for the interests of the majority; then why doesn’t Turkey proceed with the same move towards its population of Kurdish origin? If it is such a cheap concession, or a non concession based on the TC thesis, then why is Turkey hesitating to do the same and spare itself from the PKK troubles?

Murat, for the rest of your post regarding the 1965 request of the TC leadership to participate and vote in the House of parliament, I will elaborate in a later post and do keep reminding me as I have a few things to say. However, I will ask you in the meantime a simple question, and I hope you will be able to address it seriously. If the intent of the TC leadership was to stay in line with the 1960 constitution and fully participate in the RoC organs; and the GC side, using its status as the sole handlers at the time of the RoC institutions, was refusing to accommodate such a right; why hasn’t Turkey as a guarantor power and co-signer of the 1959 treaty of establishment, together with the UK, did not raise the issue to the ICJ of The Hague, opening a case against the RoC for violating the treaty of establishment and the constitution for which they were quarantors? And even if the RoC would have refused to attend, they could have easily forced it to accept ICJ arbitration, by obtaining a UN SC resolution ordering the RoC to follow. Why didn’t Turkey take such a step, and instead it left the issue pending while at the same time allowing the TC leadership to keep taking further actions amounting to an increased level of mutiny within the territory of the RoC, which it supposedly wanted to safeguard? Was it because the real objectives (“hidden” agendas) of both Turkey and the TC leadership were not the normalized, continued and harmonious functioning of the RoC, but instead the partition of the island? Why, since there were further, supposedly legitimate and lawful steps to take within the parameters of international law, Turkey and the TC leadership “neglected” to even attempt making use of them?