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[halil]

1979 Kyprianou-Denktas Communiqué

source for these series of lookings are from.
http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/59.htm



In early 1979, President Kyprianou was persuaded by his political advisers to resume talks with Denktas, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then undersecretary general of the UN, called the two to a meeting in Nicosia in June. The two intercommunal negotiators, Minister to the President George Ioannides for the Greek Cypriots and Üit Süleyman Onan for the Turkish Cypriots, pursued talks aiming at a communiqué stating the broad agenda for further talks. This process stalled temporarily when Greek Cypriots sought to give the Varosha issue priority above all other issues. On May 18 and 19, the two leaders held a second summit that led to the successful conclusion of a ten-point agreement that called for a resumption of talks on all territorial and constitutional issues; placed priority on reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha; stated the parties' commitment to abstain from actions that could jeopardize the talks; and, envisaged the demilitarization of Cyprus. The agreement also repeated past statements about guarantees against union with any other country, partition, or secession. The ten points were largely a tactical means to secure further negotiations and did not resolve any substantive issues. One more meeting was held in June 1979, but the talks were then suspended until August 1980.

The UN-established common ground on which the talks resumed was a four-part agenda addressing, on a rotating basis, the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, initial practical measures to promote good will, constitutional issues, and territorial issues. The talks, conducted in Cyprus under the chairmanship of the UN secretary general's Special Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, continued without a major breakthrough and were temporarily suspended for the spring 1981 parliamentary elections on both sides of the island. In August and October 1981, the two sides made substantive presentations, which were welcomed as signs of commitment to compromise, but which also revealed the serious gap in the two sides' concepts of a solution.

The Turkish Cypriot proposal, submitted in August 1981, named four fundamental principles: a bicommunaand bizonal federal republic shall be established, but the two federated states will not form a unitary state; the Turkish Cypriot community will be regarded as an equal cofounder with the Greek Cypriot community and all government institutions will be staffed on a fifty-fifty ratio; the federal or central government will not be so strong as to imperil the independence of its component states; and the three freedoms of movement property, and settlement, will be restricted as set out by the 1977 guidelines. The proposal identified as "federal matters" six functions, including foreign affairs; foreign financial affairs; tourism and information; posts and telecommunications; federal health and veterinarian services; and, standards of weights and measures, patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The Turkish Cypriots also submitted two maps, one defining a proposed boundary line between the two federated states and one focused on Varosha in particular. The Turkish Cypriot proposal treated the federal concept narrowly, limiting federal authority.

The Greek Cypriots submitted their proposal on October 1, 1981. It contrasted sharply with the Turkish Cypriot proposal, with a heavy emphasis on the unity of the island and the powers of the federal republic. The plan's six principles included the indivisibility of the territory of the federal republic; the federal republic as sole subject of international law, to the exclusion of the provinces; and the use of the federal legislative and executive powers to ensure Cyprus's economic reintegration. The Turkish Cypriots considered this proposal merely an elaboration of a 1977 Greek Cypriot plan.

Despite the failure to make headway on the core political issues, this phase had one notable achievement: the agreement on terms of reference for a Committee on Missing Persons, consisting of representatives of the two communities and an international participant designated by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The committee's first meeting was held on July 14, 1981. The committed met sporadically throughout the 1980s, and new proposals to invigorate its work were discussed in early 1990. The work of the committee was hampered by sensitivity about exchanges of dossiers and information. Sensitivity areas included security matters and religious questions, such as whether graves should be disturbed.

By late 1981, UN officials and other supporters of the settlement process had concluded that the talks needed new stimulus. Secretary General Waldheim issued an evaluation of the negotiations in November, in what he called a "determined effort to lend structure and substance" to the negotiating process. The evaluation identified major points of "coincidence and equidistance" in the two sides' positions and proposed that the contemplated republic's executive authority be exercised by a federal council composed of six ministerial functions, corresponding roughly to the narrow Turkish Cypriot concept. Waldheim also suggested a bicameral legislature, provincial chambers, and a territorial compromise in which the Greek Cypriot side would administer at least 70 percent of the island.

The settlement process in the early 1980s was affected by the need for President Kyprianou to establish his credibility and demonstrate his loyalty to the national cause after the death of the charismatic Makarios. To many observers, it appeared that Kyprianou had less room for maneuver and was less inclined, by political preference or capability, to put forth new strategic positions. The election of a socialist government in Athens in October 1981 may also have affected the attitudes of the parties; Greek Cypriots welcomed Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou's desire to "internationalize" the Cyprus problem, which effectively gave Greek Cypriots some breathing room in the intercommunal process. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot leaders were developing new formulas and concepts of their own, and generally disapproved of efforts to internationalize the issue.

On November 15, 1983, after months of speculation, Rauf Denkta declared Turkish Cypriot statehood, on the basis of the universal right to self-determination. His proclamation, which cited the United States Declaration of Independence, declared the establishment of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"). The move was not intended to block progress toward creating a federal republic, Denktas said. Rather, the assertion of the political identity and equality of the Turkish Cypriots would, in his view, enhance prospects for a new relationship between the two sides of the island. He also pledged that the new state would not join any other state, meaning Turkey.

The move was widely condemned by Western powers and the UN. The secretary general considered the declaration contrary to past Security Council resolutions and at odds with the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. The United States urged nonrecognition of the entity and joined a nearly unanimous Security Council resolution (541) which called for reversal of the declaration. (Jordan voted no; Pakistan abstained.)

[subfire91]

Not for the Turkish Cypriots mate - we've been there since 1571!

Thinking the same way, we ve been here since 10000BC, that way you should leave. That is not the point, the point is taking want you deserve depending on the population analogies. Thats how democracy works by analogies. 20% population that means 20% of the government and if necessary 20% of the land. Not 50% or 37%.
Greek cypriots do not want domination, TCs want that at the time being and it can be clearly shown on how talat behaves in the talks. To be perfectly clear what talat wants and it is pretty much undeniable is:

1) 50 % power share
2) Wants to transform Cyprus as Turkish as possible, trying to give Turkey as many rights as possible in order to pin down the GCs. This was clearly shown on Anan Plan and now during the talks(for example doesnt want Greece to have the right to intervene but Turkey has.)

As for the first part i dont think a community having the right to rule another community 4+ times bigger population wise is the right thing in a democracy. What if the TCs were 4+ times more that GCs will you be alright signing a 50-50 power share? I DON'T THINK SO!!! i have never heard a minority ruling the majority in any state!!! As for the second part let me remind you some other crazy demands by talat:

- The 50-50 power share as mentioned
- we all know the huge debts of "TRNC" as you call it, approximately 300 billion. YES billion you heard right. Talat claimed that this debt should be paid by GCs too(!!!!).
-Talat said that a tax must be applied to GCs in order to rise the standards of living of TCs.

Well under these circumstances and demands you should know that a deal will never be achieved. These presented by talat are not logical demands but a series of deliberate measures that have a purpose (destroying GC economy, transforming cyprus into a turkish district ) i will not tolerate being ruled by a community less than my population, i will not pay for a debt that i had no role in creating to and i will not pay tax to raise some other people standards of living.

This in not a history lesson, just an indication what are you asking and what we are. Before characterising the GCs as cruel that want domination you should see what you are demanding. Not only GCs anyone would refuse to these terms. And do not hear what talat says it feeds you BS and nationalism. Our president at least is clever enough to give us some summary after each meeting in order to judge who states what. Your leader repeats the same sentence every week after a meeting with christofias: domination-isolation-50/50.

[halil]

1985-86 Draft Framework Exercise
At the January 1985 summit, UN officials presented a draft framework agreement for the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federal republic. The parties, according to many accounts, had been briefed on its contents but not directly involved in its drafting. Denktas indicated his willingness to sign the draft, on the understanding that details would be worked out in separate talks. However, Kyprianou declined to sign, saying he considered the draft a basis for negotiations but that such a commitment was premature.

The collapse of the summit redounded to Turkish Cypriot favor, in the reactions of the news media and Cyprus's Western friends. By 1990, however, Turkish Cypriots referred to the 1985 summit as a regrettable Turkish Cypriot acquiescence to external pressure, from Turkey and the United States in particular.

The UN worked intensively with the two parties after the summit, on the assumption that a tactical misstep need not undermine the considerable achievement of drafting an outline reflecting broad areas of agreement. Yet UN efforts in the months that followed showed the near-impossibility of bridging the gaps; drafts proved acceptable to one side or the other, but never both. In April 1985, a draft framework agreement won acceptance by Greek Cypriots and was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side. After extensive consultations a new draft was promulgated; it was embraced by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots.

[halil]

1988-90 Vassiliou-Denktas Meetings
The politics of the settlement process appeared to change significantly when Greek Cypriots elected George Vassiliou president in February 1988. Vassiliou, a successful businessman with no important political party base (although his parents were founding members of the island's communist party, the Progressive Party of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou-- AKEL), campaigned on a pledge to solve the Cyprus problem with new vigor and creativity. His upset victory over Spyros Kyprianou seemed to indicate popular support for a new approach and for more rapid progress on a settlement. The UN and Cyprus's western partners welcomed Vassiliou's election and his statements about the settlement process.

The UN arranged for informal meetings between Vassiliou and Denktas at the Nicosia home of the UN special representative, Oscar Camillion. The first round of these meetings took place between August and November 1988. A second round occurred between December 1988 and April 1989, but the talks faltered when the two sides began submitting papers and drafts that began to dominate the discussions. These two rounds raised new concerns that the UN had lost control of the process, and that reaching agreement on a fixed agenda or schedule might prove difficult.

In May 1989, a more formal process began, after Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar assigned his two aides, Camillion and Gustave Feissel, to meet separately and jointly with the parties to draft an outline, which could be based on an "ideas paper" that the UN circulated on a noncommittal basis to the parties. This third round was stalled for the second half of 1989, over procedural and substantive difficulties, with the Turkish Cypriots' objecting to the "ideas paper." The parties met in New York with the secretary general to discuss their progress in February and March 1990.

The secretary general reported that the gap between the two sides remained wide and that he was not convinced there was an agreed-upon basis on which to proceed. He turned to the Security Council for clarification of his good offices mission, and the clarification was passed unanimously in Resolution 649 on March 13.

The two sides separately indicated satisfaction with the UN resolution, Greek Cypriots emphasizing the active role proposed for the UN, including the right to make suggestions, and Turkish Cypriots pleased with the resolution's references to the separate status of the two communities and to bizonality as an enshrined principle in a prospective settlement.

This eighteen-month round of settlement efforts had begun hopefully. A period of creative tension and groping to create new understandings occurred in mid-1989, when Vassiliou and his advisers privately and informally offered important concessions to the Turkish Cypriot side. That is, none of the Greek Cypriot proposals or suggestions were binding or formally entrenched in official documents, but were offered discreetly as the basis for discussion. These concessions included a willingness to phase in the three freedoms, beginning with freedom of movement and holding freedom of settlement and property in abeyance. New thinking and flexibility on the territorial issue was displayed, with a range of options presented to the Turkish Cypriot side, such as a smaller but nearly exclusively Turkish Cypriot zone, rather than various larger but more demographically mixed zones. Greek Cypriots tried to link the size of the territorial swap with the degree of communal purity. They were more flexible than in the past on the issue of the presidency, offering alternatives such as rotating the position between the two communities or having joint elections with Turkish Cypriot votes weighted. Turkish Cypriots found themselves challenged by a more flexible interlocutor and reacted with caution, expressing new legal reservations about the proposals. At that point between October 1989 and February 1990, the Greek Cypriot side seemed to withdraw some of its new ideas, and the president found his freedom of maneuver limited by new domestic resistance to further concessions.

When the talks collapsed in early 1990, both sides appeared to be turning away from the UN process. The two governments seemed able to withstand domestic criticism of the talks; opposition complaints on both sides appeared to focus on tactics, and did not challenge the fundamental government positions. Both leaders appeared to be preparing to defend their positions to outside partners. Greek Cypriots mounted a renewed effort to win international support for their position, and for the need for international pressure on Turkey to win concessions from the Turkish Cypriots. For Turkish Cypriots, the end of the talks heralded a period of active domestic politics. A push for new diplomatic recognition of the "TRNC" was under consideration.

[halil]

From all those above works later on Annan Plan came ..... We all know what happened .

New elections in Southern Cyprus brought new hopes in Cyprus both Leaders are talking on the table what they agreed at 23may 2008.

23 May Agreement
March agreement.
They reaffirmed their commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions. This partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status.

[Get Real!]

Oh sorry! My apologies.

I should of said that I do not want to see a fat hairy Choirokitian!

Keep consuming the weetbix...

[growuptcs]

halil, must you keep recycling toilet paper on this forum?

[halil]

halil, must you keep recycling toilet paper on this forum?

These toilet papers are the truth of the Cyprus problem .

what will come up for basis of talks will come from these toilet papers.

[Get Real!]

halil, must you keep recycling toilet paper on this forum?

I'm also concerned about the quality...

[Magnus]

Many of the Greek Cypriots on this forum appear to need re-explaination of the realities of the island of Cyprus, particularly those realities that are "Practical". Here's an undisbupted list from the Turkish Cypriot camp (that I am obviously expecting a huge lashing response to) of the island of Cyprus:

1) The TRNC exists - Full Stop!
2) The educational institutes of the TRNC are internationally recognised.
3) Unless a "Federal" agreement is agreed upon under the parameters of a (Founding) two state formula with a "Loose" central government, unification as WE all know it will never be achieved.
4) The TRNC may not be completely recognised, internationally, but it is a functioning state and democracy with many other countries that work very closely with it.
5) The TRNC has a host of internationally recongised institutes and businesses working within it; from the construction industry, tourism, medical and retail to its banking sector and its government - like HSBC and MPs of the parliament of the TRNC (particularly at a UN and EU level - think about the ministers from the TRNC the EU consistently liaise with!).
6) Your President of the Greek Cypriot ROC has openly (publically)admitted and apologised for the bloodshed inflicted on our people in 1963.
7) The year 1974 was a time of Conflict (recognised by the UN), a Greek Coup, and many Greek Cypriots fighting against the Ultra Nationalist EOKA B terrorist group. Turkey intervened in order to save the Turkish Cypriots and the GREEK Cypriot people. Remember, Greece was under military rule at that time, where the events in Cyprus had soon allowed Greece to return back to a Democratic government - forcefully!
7) Do you see a military armada threatening the TRNC from the international community? Obviously not. We have a right to establish our own state, just like Kosovo, Montenegro and other nations had a right to self-determination. LIVE WITH IT!
Stop trying to argue about the so-called "OCCUPATION" of Northern Cyprus, when you know CLEARLY that the only way for Turkey to agree with you is to broker an ACCEPTABLE agreement based on THE REALITIES!
9) The 18% Myth regarding the population of the Turkish Cypriots is a clear indication of your basic missunderstanding of the word "Equality" and "Partnership", which was the wish of the British government for agreeing to the establishment of the 1960 republic. What difference does the size of the population of a country mean? NOTHING! Otherwise Greece would be the size of London! Right?
10) The amount of Territory presently under the TRNC BELONGS to the TRNC, and not an inch can be returned as WE believe it is our right. Our population could be 50'000 people - so what! It still will NOT give you the right to have it reduced, not that you've succeeded since 1974 anyway!!! Wake up and understand this reality.
11) The Turkish troops currently under the command of the "Turkish Cypriot Forces" are their under our requirements and request, and do NOT occupy the TRNC! No other country in the world has brought this up besides your Hijacked Greek Cypriot Controlled ROC. It's Turkey that supports our Republic state, only, where even the most basic forms of humanitarian aide have been stopped by the GC Controlled ROC - how shameful.
12) The current engagement in UN talks by GC leader Christofias is proof that the GC controlled ROC is not as "solid" as what people may believe, and the urgency and eagerness to start UN based talks by your leader shows how scared he was that the TRNC would obviously have gained Political ground/recognition if he and rejected President Talat's call. This is undeniable as even your leader said this in so many words!
13) The so-called UN resolution 541 and 540 are ADVICE only, and NOT binding! But clearly the OIC and other nations with whom have a TRNC foriegn representative office (UK, Brussells, Italy etc) are now realising that those resolutions mean nothing, and in no way represents a realistic and up to date picture of the current state of affairs concerning the island.
14) The CIA website clearly points to a Turkish Cypriot Controlled North and a Greek Cypriot Controlled South, and in no way mentions the word "Occupation".
15) The non-Facist Greek Cypriots know that they will have to broker a reasonable TWO-STATE deal, regardless! They know the mistakes made in the past and they particularly know that we are PARTNERS on the island and not Majority over Minority!
16) The Guarantor status of Turkey will not, and can nvere be removed from the isalnd of Cyprus.
17) Finally, the GC Controlled ROC can never, and would never dare to use its so-called VETO rights in preventing Turkey from becoming a EU member state. This, as they clearly know, would legally push for the Turkish Cypriots to officially link with the Republic of Turkey as a Country state, similar to Wales and Scotland, the FALKLAND Islands of the United Kingdom!


As for myself, I believe the island should be split into the TRNC and perhap the GC-ROC (if they want), based on a reasonable territorial split with both Republic states working closely as similar to the Czech and Slovak Republic states do. Other than that, I honestly think that a Federal plan with two component states will ultimately clash. This is because Turkey is still not part of the of the European Union!

Look at it logically, how in the world Could the island of Cyprus work as a Single Soverign Federal republic state if one of its member guarantor countries is not a FULL member of European Union.

You poor sad man. I don't know what's more pitiful; the fact that you actually believe all that crap or that you took the time to write it all out and present it to a bunch of strangers on the internet in an attempt to make yourself feel clever, knowing full well they would only mock you in response.

You're the only person I've seen come on here and convince both TCs and GCs that you're a moron and I reckon that probably deserves some sort of award. On behalf of the real world I hereby present you with the Miltiades Award for Complete Plonkertude.

Congratulations, you've won a Milty!