Cyprus-Forum.com

[boulio]

please stop erolz,extremly vulnerable to who?turkey in the first phase was completly correct in the second phase copmpletly wrong and thats why there has been international condemttion of the turkish invasion and everything else that has followed including the embargoes against the t/c.please dont try to justify it.turkey was there for here own strategic reasons first ,second to help the t/c.hell i think dektash actually said it a few weeks ago at a speech in anatolia.

[erolz]

please stop erolz,extremly vulnerable to who?

They were vulnerable to the GC national guard that was digging in around them from the moment that the ceasfire between phase one and phase two started. The fact is in miltary terms there are defendable piostions and undefendable postions. The area that Turkish troops controlled after phase one was not defendable.

turkey in the first phase was completly correct in the second phase copmpletly wrong and thats why there has been international condemttion of the turkish invasion and everything else that has followed including the embargoes against the t/c.please dont try to justify it.turkey was there for here own strategic reasons first ,second to help the t/c.hell i think dektash actually said it a few weeks ago at a speech in anatolia.

You misunderstand me. All I was saying was that after phase one of the 74 action there was no simple clear cut choice between

1 - leagl way forward that would definately secure TC security and rights in Cyprus into the future

and

2- illeagl way forward.

This is the idea that was being suggested and I refute this simplistic interpretation that there was such a simple choice for Turkey - between legal and illegal, between a peacful harmonious Cyprus state where TC and their rights would be safe and partition. To suggest there was such a simple choice is to ignore the realities of the situtaion then and prior to the action itself.

[boulio]

erolz,how many days inbetween the first and second phase?and at that time period turkey ,who had more than adequate troops on the ground what were the doing?

[erolz]

erolz,how many days inbetween the first and second phase?and at that time period turkey ,who had more than adequate troops on the ground what were the doing?

Really you should get hold of a copy of '30 hot days' but the bulk of it is here.

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/30%20Hot%20Days.htm

If you like I will mail (real physical mail) you my copy of this book if you promise to mail it back to me when you have read it. PM if you want.

[turkcyp]

deleted by the author...

[Saint Jimmy]

This is my 5 cents on the subject

More like a hundred-dollar bill
Only kidding, no time to read now, big night out. Will read it tomorrow, though.
You all have a nice night, now

[PEACE]

So here comes the Turkey’s third option. Advance further so that she can first ease pressure on its military and get enough land for the TCs to accumulate under Turkish army protection, so that if the talks continue between communities, TCs would not be under continuous GC harassment. Especially because it was that angered by the presence of Turkish army the GC militia would turn its attacks on TCs to unprecedented levels. (e.g. Akincilar, Sandallar, etc.)

Yeah,you may be right.I heard after GC milita entered to Lefke/Lefka they collected females and children to cinema and males to another place "Karadağ".After Turkish soldiers come they found big holes digged to a place out of village.

[brother]

lots of bad thıngs happened but goıng to the past helps noone.

[insan]

Alexandros wrote:

Mikkie2,

I like the distinction you are making ... I never heard it before but it makes sense.

The fact is, even though the first invasion was compelled by the coup, after the 21st July Turkey had two different options:

Under what circumstances was Cyprus after the 21st of July? Sampson was still in power, National Guard and Eldik under command of fascist Greek officers were strongly believing that they would make Enosis a fait a'ccompli in Cyprus by US preventiing Turkey to intervene militarily.


It is a fact that except some groups of bold leftists noone resisted against coupists. To the contrary of this, more than %50 of GCs encouraged, support and applauded coupists behind their pro- coupist/Enosist leadership; either in 1968-74 period until the coup and after the coup.

Before Turkey intervene; warned Greek Junta to withdraw her troops from Cyprus and Sampson to resign. Why didn't Greek Junta withdraw her troops and Sampson resign? They were decisive to make Enosis a fait a'ccompli.

The national guard(so-called or Greek National guard) and all the reserved military power of GCs together with Eldik held their guns and weapons towards Turkish troops when Turkey intervened. What could be the consequences of such a combat?

a) To insist on the reinstatement of order as per the 1960 constitution (GC president, TC vice president etc.), and then remain on the island until everything was back in order - in fact, invite newly democratic Greece also to bring in more troops in order to oversee the safe return to constitutional order.

How would Turkey be sure of that fall of Junta wasn't just another dirty trick of Junta just in order to create impressions that "Junta fell, Greece became democratic just in several days."? Moreover, Enosis and "majority rule" claims, besides fascist attacks towards TCs had been started so long before the Junta came in Power. There's nothing to do with the "democratic" Greece. Turkey insisted on the reinstatement of order as per the 1960 constitution (GC president, TC vice president etc.), for 6 consequtive years... Had the coup d'etat not been done, the fruit of 6 years lasted negotiations would have been a much improved constitution and a peaceful settlement.

If Turkey had chosen that path, the legal path, perhaps we wouldn't have a Cyprus Problem today.

What about if Greece and Greeks had chosen a path to acknowledge "political equality" of TC community during the period 1940-1974 and afterwards? Would there have been a Cyprus problem at all?

Then she would have been a real guarantor power, and everyone would have respected the role she had to play.

Turkey always has been the most real guarantor power among the 3. She showed great forbearance in dealing with the Enosists. The fact is that, except Britain, US and some other countries statesmen and researchers; most of the other countries statesmen and researchers don't know the essentials and details of Turkish intervention and occupation.

b) To push ahead and partition the island, totally ignoring the need for a return to constitutional order.

Turkey couldn't waste her time anymore just for nothing. Turkey gave that chance to the Hellenic side excessive times.

This is what Turkey actually did -

This is not what actually Turkey did.

and this is why no other country in the world accepts the invasion as legal, however much Turkey protests that she was acting according to the Treaty of Guarantee.

Only the countries which are not well aware and informed about the essentials and details of Turkish intervention and occupation, plus the Hellenic propaganda machine don't accept the intervention as legal. Every hope and effort of TCs and Turkey to a lasting, just, sincere peace based upon "political equality" of two communities have been destroyed by Greeks and GCs but you still denying the facts. Even the most enlightened and wisest Greeks and GCs behave like this, there's no hope for a solution anytime in the future. Altough, thanks Zenon Stavrinides, Yiannis Papadakis and some few others for their sincerity and understanding the Cyprus problem.


Anyways! I hope to meet you at Greek Kalendes!



Some special notes:

Saturday, July 27th 1974

The Geneva meeting continues The Saturday morning editions of the international press voiced the opinion that the Greeks had secured an advantage. Banner headlines, in almost all papers, quoted the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, as saying: If the Turks don't halt, I shall quit the conference.' By such clever manoeuvering, Athens was exerting every effort to procure international pressure on Ankara. I went to see our delegates. They were pretending to be not in the least worried over the possibility of Greece's withdrawal from the conference. Then GüneÕ looked in on us. Not the old GüneÕ who was wont to emerge from meetings in a humorous, and indeed hilarious, mood but a different GüneÕ, one that was grim and surly. He told us that he was going to see Mavros, and hurried away. I learned later that the telephone exchanges of the previous night had had their effect. Kissinger had been assured by Turkey that there would be no more advances and, by the Greeks, that they would not enter the Turkish Cypriot villages. Greece, having found a imddle course at last, abandoned the idea of quitting the conference. The meeting between GüneÕ and Mavros was intended to give the impression that the two Foreign Ministers had reached an understanding. Callaghan later joined them and it was decided that the experts should get together and hammer out a joint communique. At the experts' meeting, the main delegates were Wiggin for Britain, Kirca for Turkey and Bitsios for Greece; and there were many heated arguments particularly on the cease-fire and the role of the U.N. Peace-keeping force, UNFICYP.

Wiggin: 'Mr. Kirca, can you give us an assurance that your forces will halt their advance if the other side stops firing?'

Kirca: Immediately!'

Bitsios: 'But, at the moment, there are various bands of irregular soldiers about who will not take orders from us. Would the Turks feel justified in further advances if one of these groups acted in an irresponsible manner?'

Kirca: 'I'm afraid I do not understand. You send Greek officers to command them and now plead that "you cannot control them." This, I cannot accept. I speak for the whole of our forces, including the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters, and I expect the Greek delegation to be in a similar position. Mr. Mavros is asking for an undertaking that Turkish units will not advance even if fired on or if Turkish villagers are subjected to massacre. Is this reasonable?'

------------------

'Nuff said!

I hope you all know how many TCs massacred and tortured by irregular bands, National Guard and Eldik soldiers even by their sympathizer fascist minded GCs between the dates 27th of July and August 15th.



Kirca further rejected Bitsios's proposal that there should be a security zone of about 600 m controlled by UNFICYP. He wanted the zone to be increased so that the Turkish units should be out of rifle range. He also objected to the presence of UNFICYP within the zone. He next took up the question of the Turkish villages. He proposed that the Greeks should withdraw from the villages that they had occupied and should also lift the blockade round them. This was more than Bitsios could swallow. He said: 'Let me put it bluntly. I cannot accept this. Since we are here to restore peace, everyone must feel that the outcome is acceptable. We are being asked to agree to the occupation of our land by Turkish troops while withdrawing our own troops from Turkish areas which we occupied during the fighting. What sort of logic is this? How can you expect the Greeks to withdraw? I ask you, do you really want them to pull out?'

Kirca: 'Yes!'

Now, raising his voice a little more, he went on: 'Let me, too, make myself clear. The Greek soldiers and the Greek National Guard must leave the Turkish-Cypriot villages AT ONCE. They must pull out and leave the Turkish- Cypriots to manage their own affairs once more. That is what we demand.' In the utter silence which followed, the British delegates simply stared at both the Greek and Turkish delegations.

Bitsios: 'What does this mean? The Turkish delegation is talking in the harsh manner of an army of occupation. When on earth has an occupying power remained where it was while the other side withdrew? Can you give me one single instance? These talks have at least exposed Turkey's true intentions. No one can sign such a document. Are you trying to get us to sign an admission of defeat? You stand to gain nothing by humiliating Greece.' A real argument was going on.

Kirca: 'Mr. Bitsios, it is high time you adjusted yourself to the realities. You seem to have consolidated your hold on the Aegean whereas Turkey is now in Cyprus merely to safeguard the security of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This mission has not yet been completed. There are people still suffering on the other side. We cannot make any concessions regarding our motives and objectives. Sampson's forces, who overthrew Makarios, must leave the Turkish villages. There is no alternative.'

Bitsios and Cunis tried not to be provoked, but there was no stopping Kirca. '. . . I said that the Turkish troops would not advance unless fired on. I now wish to amend that. So long as a single Turkish village is occupied by Junta officers who are collaborating with a man who boasts in his paper of having organised massacres of Turks and who prides himself on the number of Turks he has killed, the advances will continue.' And having said this, he banged his fist on the table. The British delegates suggested that it was time for a cup of coffee.
It was now 00.45. The Turkish delegates had not imagined that the meeting would last so long, but Callaghan is reported to have told his group to work until they secured a positive result -- till morning, if necessary. Over coffee, Wiggin drew Kirca aside and asked: 'Why are you taking such a hard line on this section of the communique?' Kirca explained: 'Mr. Wiggin, in Turkey we have both democracy and public opinion. Only one-tenth of the Turkish-Cypriots live in the area now held by the Turkish armed forces; nine-tenths can be annihilated by the Greek army any time it wishes. If the Turkish Foreign Minister goes back to Ankara without ensuring their safety, he will be hanged upside down. I can't, therefore, ask GüneÕ to sign this.' Turning to Bitsios, Kirca said: 'Mr. Bitsios, I quite understand your feelings as a man . . . But you are not in a position to demand further concessions. By halting where it now is, the Turkish army is already making a big concession. I am afraid you will have to accept defeat.'

As the sun rose over Lake Leman, nine men, utterly exhausted and with tempers frayed, were still trying to get their views across to one another. Their hair dishevelled, their ties awry, their eyes red with fatigue, they were making a superhuman effort to put in the final touches. The diplomats were as completely exhausted as the soldiers in Cyprus, irrespective of nationality. A strange comparison, especially when one takes into consideration the time wasted and the lives lost. As one felt the warmth of the silently rising sun, one was tempted to ask: 'Why can't people come to an understanding?' The streets were completely empty. The diplomats came out of the conference hall and went their several ways, just like soldiers returning from sentry duty, dragging their weapons behind them. The cock-fight would soon be resumed.

Sunday, July 28th 1974

The wrangling continues

The experts' all-night meeting ended at 07.00 with no noticeable change of attitude on either side. That same morning, GüneÕ informed a group of journalists: 'In our view, unless Turkey's proposals are accepted, this conference can serve no further purpose, and in that case, I have been authorised by Prime Minister Ecevit to withdraw from it . . .' At a tense press conference on security matters in Ankara, Ecevit too was insisting that the Turkish proposals must be considered in toto, not just the cease-fire.

Greece had asked for urgent meetings of both NATO and U.N. as tension between her and Turkey again increased. At the U.N. war was once more in the air, and over 300 radio and T.V. correspondents had gathered, realising that a break-down of the conference would mean war between the two countries. Ecevit felt that, with one more effort, he could achieve his objectives. It was now Turkey's turn to use the threat to withdraw as a means of forcing Greece into a corner. Kissinger, with Callaghan keeping him fully informed of developments, resumed his telephone diplomacy.

About 09.30 GüneÕ, Mavros and Callaghan met yet again. Like GüneÕ, Mavros was anxious for an agreement -- but not 'at any price.' Mavros: 'Mr. GüneÕ, OUR aim is to resolve our differences at this conference table and to establish far-reaching co-operation between our two countries. YOU, however, are pushing us into a very difficult position; you seem to be demanding our complete capitulation. I cannot sign an agreement that would humiliate my country.' GüneÕ: 'My Government is firmly opposed to signing an agreement that would give world public opinion the impression that we are trying to hide something. Ecevit has disclosed our proposals to the press. I believe it will be helpful for the world to know just how reasonable those proposals are. If I can't secure agreement even to these moderate demands, it will be impossible for me to return to Turkey.'

While the three foreign ministers were arranging to meet again early in the evening, Ecevit was on the phone to Kissinger, after which he announced his desire to add another dimension to Turco-Greek relations by having a personal meeting with Karamanlis. He was quoted as saying: '. . . It is much better to meet and discuss all the issues, face to face, rather than work through an intermediary. I believe that I could explain Turkey's aims, in a much more satisfactory manner, to the Rt. Hon. Mr. Karamanlis. I offered to meet him wherever he wished, even on a ship in the Aegean. In my message, I pointed out that Greece and Turkey are two neighbouring and responsible nations; they must prove that they are mature enough to meet and resolve their differences without the help of other people. Unfortunately, my offer was not accepted. I think this was a golden opportunity missed.'

It was indeed, a great opportunity, and Karamanlis realised it but, at that time, with the Junta lying in ambush, waiting for a chance to return to power, he could not afford to absent himself from Athens even for a few hours. Moreover, the Greek press was already calling Ecevit 'an imperialist war- monger' and it was clear that even the minutest concession made to Turkey would be magnified and used against him. Mavros, too, did not favour the idea.

In his opinion: 'A summit conference, without adequate preparation, could produce no positive result.'

When the three foreign ministers and their experts re-assembled at 16.00 hrs, Callaghan urged both delegations to come to some agreement. He said, 'I can't stay here much longer. If we are going to issue a statement, let us do it as soon as possible.'

Referring to the fresh movement of troops from Turkey to Cyprus, Mavros said: 'How can any agreement have meaning if it is concluded while one side is continually massing its troops. No agreement can be signed under the threat of arms.' GüneÕ assured him that Turkey was merely providing its army with normal routine supplies.

From the point of view of the Greek delegation the most important section of the proposed agreement was the demand that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the island. Britain took the same view. But the Turkish expert, Kirca, had drafted a formula which envisaged the withdrawal of the Turkish units only when all political problems, including the constitutional issue, had been settled and when mutual confidence had been restored. The Greek delegation tried to insist on the fixing of a dead-line for the withdrawal, but Callaghan talked Mavros into accepting the Turkish viewpoint.

Ecevit, however, was adamant in refusing to accept the section on troop withdrawal. He is reported to have told Haluk Ulman of the Turkish delegation: 1 can't accept this clause, Haluk, I can't have the Turkish flag lowered from Kyrenia Castle where I had it hoisted. I can't promise to withdraw the Turkish troops whom I sent there myself.' Haluk Ulman: 'Bulent Bey, the experts say that the word "withdraw" is tied up with so many other conditions it is not important in itself. Moreover, the period of withdrawal will not be fixed.' Ecevit: 'We are a government that fulfills its pledges. I can't give such an assurance while the Greeks totally reject our point of view . ..' He finally said: 1 don't wish to see any mention of withdrawal in this agreement. I would rather you abandon the conference.'

As the time for the next session of the conference drew near, Ecevit again spoke to GüneÕ by phone. He said: 1 am reading to you the decision of the Government. If our proposals are rejected, abandon the conference.' GüneÕ: 'Bulent Bey, the responsibility for breaking up the conference is not one to be accepted lightly. I think you are making a wrong decision.' Ecevit would not budge. So all that GüneÕ and Barutgu could do was to put up such impossible demands that the Greeks would feel obliged to leave the conference rather than accept. The Turkish delegation thus returned to the conference with the object of bringing about its collapse, and who but CoÕkun Kirca could best find a formula for achieving this?

His first demand was that DenktaÕ should be allowed to resume his duties as Vice-President of the Cyprus Republic. Mavros accepted this on condition that the island should return to the 1960 Constitution. So that attempt to wreck the conference failed.

A new demand was made: That the three foreign ministers should accept the defacto existence of two separate autonomous administrations in the island. Mavros was affronted. This is going too far. I can't accept this. Are we trying to partition the island?' There was a long argument during which British diplomacy showed its superiority. Callaghan: 'Mr. Mavros, if you notice, the Turkish proposal uses the term "'defacto'' , isn't that so? And isn't that just what we have got?' After consulting with his colleagues, Mavros again accepted the proposal. So the Turkish side had to think up something else. Finally, it came out with the suggestion that the section referring to 'the return of the refugees to their homes' should be deleted. After more discussions, the Greek side again announced its acceptance!

The Turkish delegation was at its wit's end in view of the evident determination of Mavros and his colleagues to save the conference from collapse, GüneÕ had no alternative but to come out into the open. GüneÕ: 'I must consult my Government regarding the withdrawal of troops.' Mavros: 'What is the meaning of this? You, as Turkish Foreign Minister, have accepted this section. I don't consult Athens on matters I have already accepted. I consider this incompatible with good faith.' GüneÕ: 'Are not all our agreements here subject to ratification by our government?=

At 03.00, GüneÕ contacted Ecevit by phone and explained the situation to him at some length. He wanted very much to save the conference and felt hurt and some-what humiliated by Ankara's attitude. He tried to win Ecevit over by reminding him of the importance of world opinion, and the likely reaction against Turkey of the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union if the conference broke down. Ecevit finally agreed that the conference should not be dropped at this stage and promised to ring back as soon as he had consulted the Council of Ministers.

Emerging from the conference hall, Mavros told the waiting journalists: 'Everything now depends on Ankara where the Council of Ministers is in session. If they accept, the agreement will be signed immediately.'

Monday, July 29th 1974

Agreement at last?

Clause 4, which dealt with the withdrawal of troops from Cyprus, troubled Ecevit's mind all night and, early next morning, he rang up his Foreign Minister in Geneva to explain, in detail, why it could not be accepted in its present form Meanwhile, from the General Staff H.Q. came official confirmation of reports that Greece was dispatching re-inforcements to the Dodecanese islands.

Coming from a Cabinet meeting, Ecevit told reporters: The agreement may, or may not, be signed in Geneva. Our Government has decided to reject any suggestion that Turkish forces should be withdrawn by a definite date, or anything that would require the suspension of re-inforcements. The bitter memories of the past have not been forgotten; the Greeks have trampled on too many previous agreements.'

This decisive stand by Ecevit was immediately conveyed to Callaghan in Geneva. He had a lengthy consultation with the Greek Foreign Minister,Mavros, and then asked to see CoÕkun Kirca, of the Turkish delegation. Callaghan: 'You must be aware of the terrific repercussions that would follow a break-down of the conference over clause 4. Everyone is awaiting your reply. A wrong step at this stage would open the door to grave doubts regarding the real intentions behind the Turkish intervention.'

Callaghan had a second meeting with Mavros and then contacted first Ecevit and then Kissinger. He was determined to save the conference, but if it failed, he would put the blame on Turkey in the strongest possible terms. Mavros, meanwhile, was holding a press conference at which he had promised to 'reveal the facts.' Everyone jumped to the conclusion that the conference had reached dead-lock in a flourish of drawn swords -- and the winner would be whoever could speak most convincingly to the Press.

At 17.00 hrs, GüneÕ entered Callaghan's room with no premonition of the fact that he was about to be subjected to the most furious verbal onslaught of his whole life. Callaghan: 'This rejection is too much. Your role here is no more than that of a messenger-boy . . . If a minister is allowed no powers or initiative, he should resign. You are just like a telephone receiver . ..' GüneÕ restrained himself with difficulty. Had these words been uttered by anyone else, he would have had an ashtray flung at his head at once. But a brawl between two ministers was too ridiculous to be thought of and, after all, the man facing him WAS the British Foreign Secretary. He bit his lip and tugged nervously at his moustache. He put up with the humiliation but, during those few minutes, he must have lost a few years of life. However, he refused to let himself be carried away by the rudeness of the man opposite him and, in a superbly cool and scornful tone, said, 1 believe there is nothing more normal than for the Government to decide in matters of such importance. Our stand is perfectly plain and clear.' In an unguarded moment, due to nervous strain, Callaghan gave voice to his notorious ultimatum: 1 am not here to await your pleasure I have other things to do. By 9.30 tomorrow morning, you either come here and approve the clause we have proposed, or you put forward one that will be acceptable to all concerned. Otherwise, I am leaving! I shall then stir NATO and the U.N. into action and I shall also report to the House of Commons that you are responsible for the collapse of the conference."

GüneÕ left the room without even shaking Callaghan's hand and, when he rejoined the members of his delegation, he was still livid with anger. He told them: 'Under these conditions, I have no option but to resign.' Turning to Kirca, he added: 'CoÕkun Bey, Turkey has rejected Britain's ultimatum. Our Government insists on its latest proposal and, if no other course is left open, is prepared to withdraw from the conference. Please communicate this situation to the British Foreign Secretary, Callaghan, and tell him that, if he has such urgent affairs to attend to, he can leave Geneva at once." Kirca was dumbfounded. He said: 'Sir, I can carry out your orders immediately but, as number two in our delegation, I believe I have the right to draw your attention to the fact that it would be sheer folly for Turkey to abandon the conference at this stage. Having come so far, and having achieved so much, we can't afford to drop out." These words had the effect of clearing the atmosphere at once, though there were still tears of anger in GüneÕ's eyes. He had become a bag of nerves and was utterly exhausted.

That night, Kirca officially conveyed GüneÕ's answer to Wiggin, his opposite number on the British side. He told him: Your Excellency, Turkey is not used to receiving ultimatums. Our attitude remains exactly as described by GüneÕ to Callaghan." The conference was living its last moments . . . Wiggin grasped the situation and tried to smooth things over. Wiggin: 'There must be some misunderstanding. We have issued no ultimatum. Callaghan simply mentioned the time of departure of his plane. He has to take part in the preparations for the Labour Party Congress . . . Please tell your Government that what was said was not intended to be an ultimatum in any way."

Kissinger once more

Kissinger was again on the phone. He tried to persuade Ecevit to accept Callaghan"s proposal, saying: 'Do you have to comply with that section of the agreement which calls for the withdrawal of troops? Your soldiers, I seem to remember, continued to advance although you had accepted the cease-fire." Ecevit: 'No, had there been no firing from the opposite side; there would have been no cease-fire violations by us. This, however, is different. How can we accept restrictions on our troops while the Greeks are free to re-inforce theirs?" Ecevit explained that he could, however; accept a formula which required Turkish troops to be withdrawn only after a final solution to the Cyprus dispute had been found. After telephone exchanges had continued until 04.30, a text to this effect was hammered out between them. Kissinger then informed Callaghan and Karamanlis and obtained their approval. This agreement was finally signed by the three foreign ministers with due ceremony and in an atmosphere of friendliness and good-will.

Tuesday, July 30th 1974

The question of the airport and of the security zone had still to be settled but having failed to reach agreement on the width of the zone, the foreign minister decided to leave these matters to the second Geneva Conference. The signing ceremony was followed by press conferences. Mavros praised GüneÕ and emphasised the importance of the Turco-Greek accord. He declared that his country wanted nothing but peace, and concluded: 'These two countries are destined to live together as friends.' For his part, Callaghan told reporters: 'In a week's time, on Aug. 8th, there will be a second conference in which the leaders of the two Cypriot communities will participate; and this will restore constitutional order to the island. The formation of two separate autonomous administrations has been accepted and the issues raised by this decision will be discussed at that conference. The conditions of siege to which Turkish-Cypriot villages have been subjected are to be lifted and, meanwhile, pending the full restoration of constitutional order, both sides will be allowed to provision and maintain their units on the island.'

Speaking to the Turkish journalists, GüneÕ said: I can state with complete assurance that there is no longer any question of a return to the old state of affairs in Cyprus. A victory has been achieved here in Geneva. For this happy out-come, let us openly acknowledge, the credit goes to the heroic efforts of the Mehmetçiks in Cyprus rather than to me. In the eyes of the world "Might is Right". On this occasion, Turkey was both in the right and mighty; it is to this that we owe our success.=

July 31st to August 7th 1974

THE BEST-LAID SCHEMES . . .

Returning to Athens, Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister, announced that the U.N. Resolution 353 had been incorporated into the Geneva agreement and that the Turkish forces had promised to halt. He concluded: '. .. The agreement is based on friendship between Greece and Turkey. These two nations cannot afford the luxury of being at loggerheads with each other. Geographically and ideologically, their friendship and co-operation is imperative . . . We have brought peace to the Greek nation; this is the first stage. The real solution will crystallise at the second conference. For our part, we resolutely reject federation, partition and enosis.' The initial reaction in Greece was one of relief that the threat of war had receded. No one wanted war with Turkey.

I flew to Athens in the same plane as the Greek delegation, hoping for an interview with Prime Minister Karamanlis. On the Greek side there was a similar desire to talk to Ecevit. Amongst the questions asked were some dealing with matters which were arousing suspicion in the minds of both peoples. From a Greek diplomat, I learned that the Greek Foreign Ministry was firmly convinced that Turkey was raising the question of the continental shelf as a step towards grabbing the Dodecanese. He told me: 'You wish to extend your sovereignty over the continental shelf to take in the islands. Then when you have scared the islanders back to us, you will come and say "Now let us solve the Thrace affair by an exchange of territory".' How could I make anyone believe that the Turkish Foreign Ministry is quite incapable of such political subtlety? I could only listen and laugh. Every day brought new developments. The atmosphere of relief which was created by the signing of the agreement did not last long. Progressive changes in the attitudes of the two sides killed the second conference before it was born -- and each felt completely justified in its actions. If I am not gravely mistaken, neither Turkey nor Greece wanted a second clash. If one had to choose a single cause for the early death of the second Geneva conference and the launching, by Turkey, of the second phase of her intervention, then it would be the lack of communication between the two sides. Only a high-level meeting could have removed the extreme suspicion and distrust which dogged the two opponents. The political situation in Greece was also a major factor in the course taken by subsequent developments.

Dissentient voices in Athens

As soon as the platonic reactions of the first day wore off, the real opposition began to show itself. The left-wing parties and the papers -- which were not entirely happy over the selection of Karamanlis -- began to describe the agreement as a disgrace while the Greek-Cypriots took the view that 'Greece has let us down.' Even derides declared that 'there are many ambiguities in the agreement.' Kyprianou, the former Greek-Cypriot Foreign Minister, who had been sent from London by Makarios to see Karamanlis, told reporters that the first Geneva conference was far too negative and that more care must be exercised at the next one. As the spate of criticism increased, Karamanlis, whose first concern was the survival of his regime, found his freedom of manoeuvre severely restricted. The situation in Ankara was very different. GüneÕ was given such a tumultuous welcome that he felt it necessary to emphasise that they were still only at the beginning of things. The absence of Erbakan from the welcoming ceremonies was noted. He was known to be displeased with the Geneva agreement, against holding the second conference and in favour of the immediate implementation of phase II. His views were thus diametrically opposed to those of Ecevit. Nor was Erbakan's the only disapproving voice. Apart from the Reliance Party, all the opposition parties had come up with demands such as 'Partition is essential', 'We want the Dodecanese', 'We want Salonika!' They came within an ace of demanding the occupation of Greece itself! These were just wild gestures and Turkish public opinion gave them no heed.

Cyprus

In Cyprus, the outlook was bleak indeed. Turkish reinforcements were steadily arriving. In their restricted bridgehead there were 240 tanks, 400 armoured vehicles and some 30,000 troops, including one of Turkey's crack regiments, the 28th. The Turkish-Cypriot villages were still besieged and derides, having little control over events, could do even less about it. Sampson was still at large, making provocative speeches and increasing tension; while Makarios was busy helping to worsen the situation through messages urging the Greek-Cypriots to resist and make no concessions.

Hardening stand in Athens

Greece's prestige had increased and, in view of the strong stand being taken by his party, Mavros realised that he would have no mandate to sign an agreement. In a sternly worded statement, issued three days before the second conference, Mavros said: 'The firing has not ceased; Turkey is constantly violating the agreement. How on earth can I go to Geneva?' Athens was, in fact, having second thoughts about the second conference. In Turkey, GüneÕ was accusing the Greeks of not having retreated from the Turkish villages, while Ecevit was saying that the conference might not materialise after all.

Greater interest was aroused, however, by a request to Britain for help. I learned from British diplomats in Athens that the British Ambassador had been approached by the Greek Foreign Ministry who had put the point: 'Our forces in the island are very weak, while Turkey is strengthening hers all the time. We want to send 20,000 troops and armoured vehicles to restore the balance. For this, air support is needed.' Britain's reply was immediately forthcoming. Callaghan answered: 'Right from the start, Britain has refused to take sides. We shall not depart from that decision.'

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had offered to support Greece in taking the matter to the United Nations. Greece was willing to accept help from anybody and there was feverish diplomatic activity in Athens resulting in formal com- plaint being lodged with the U.N. Security Council, with the support of the Eastern bloc. However, America and Britain, particularly the latter, persuaded Greece to attend the second Geneva conference before pursuing the matter in New York. Callaghan, in an attempt to avert any last-minute surprises, announced: 'I am going to Geneva, and whoever wishes to come, too, may do so.= The West clearly did not want the U.N. to play a leading role as this would bring the Soviet Union into the act.

The Makarios faction was also becoming more self-assertive. The antipathy between Karamanlis and the Archbishop was widely known and Makarios, in London, was declaring that he would have both derides and Karamanlis branded as traitors and, further, that he would accept no agreement that was signed without his prior approval. In this, he had the support of Mavros who believed that the Greek-Cypriots would never identify themselves with anything of which Makarios did not approve. In these circumstances, the Karamanlis Government decided not to sign any agreement at the second Geneva conference. Mavros would insist on the full implementation of the cease-fire and the creation of the buffer zone, but would go no further. Having thus exposed Turkey to world opinion and sealed off the Turkish forces, Greece would then demand the discussion of the constitutional issues between derides and Denktash. Intent on carrying out these delaying tactics, Mavros left for Geneva.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From M.A. Birand, 30 Hot Days (LefkoÕa: K. Rustem and Bro., 1985), pp. 2-25, 48-52, 62-79.

[-mikkie2-]

The fact is that Turkey signed up to a ceasefire after the 1st invasion.

Turkey was making demands to effectively scrap the RoC and to enter a new state of affairs based on a federal state.

All the while these negotiations were going on, Turkey was violating the ceasefire and finally put an ultimatum to Clerides to accept Turkish terms or else Turkey will proceed to a full invasion.

Many TC's say that the reason for the 2nd invasion was that TC's were being murdered by GC's. In fact when the 2nd operation started, that is when GC's started attacking TC's.

In any case, can you guys honestly defend the actions of Turkey, which killed thousands of people, was raping and pillaging en masse, put many GC's in mass graves that to this day your protectors refuse to divulge their true locations (many of which lie in designated military zones - I wonder why?)

You can put blame on GC's all you like, but the facts on the ground speak volumes and the pathetic attempts of coopoeration of the Turks in establishing the fate of the missing speak even louder.