Cyprus-Forum.com

[denizaksulu]

The consitution was not the result of an exercise of popular sovereignty, sure. But by the time we had gone to negotiate in London and Zurich we had been outflanked by the the gang of four (Britain, Turkey, Greece and USA). It was a simple plan: by entering negotiations we had foregone the military option. So when the negative aspects of the constitution were put on the table we were stuck, we did not like them, but there was nothing we could do about it.

The fact that Makarios was put in that position is yet another piece of evidence that shows that he had no conception of the use of power. The man was a typical monk, not a politician. He should have returned to the church and left politics to others.

I hate Hypotheticals but;
Let us for the moment accept that The Late President was forced to accept the 1960 Constitution. If he had not, he did not have much options open to him. It would have been back to the Seychelles (or Kykkos), but would the 'minotity' TCs be given a fair chance in running the island together/amicably/in partnership? Since we will never know, I see no point in arguing this point.

Let us find a common purpose/goal (if there is one) and proceed forward. If not let the negotiators pack there bags and depart.

[observer]

I do have a life but ...

The 1960s were well before the age of the internet, so the authorities I gave (Sunday Express, UPI and Die Welt) are not available from that period on-line so my quotations are from secondary sources. However, from the RoCs own website.

http://www.supremecourt.gov.cy/judicial ... enDocument

How and when was the Supreme Court established in its current form?
The 1960 Constitution by which the Republic of Cyprus was established, provided for the existence of both a High Court as well as a Supreme Constitutional Court. These Courts were composed of Greek, Turkish and neutral judges, i.e. judges coming from a foreign country excluding Greece and Turkey. The two neutral judges presided over the Courts. This Constitutional arrangement lasted only until the beginning of 1964 due to the eruption of intercommunal hostilities in Cyprus, as a result of which the neutral presidents vacated their posts without being replaced. In order to face this situation which paralysed the judiciary, there was enacted the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law no. 33/64. By virtue of this law, the two highest courts were merged into one, the Supreme Court of Cyprus, to which the jurisdiction and powers of the two pre-existing courts were transferred. The establishment and operation of the new Supreme Court was held to be in conformity with the Constitution on the basis of recognised principles of the law of necessity. The Turkish Cypriot members of the pre-existing Courts participated in the composition of the Supreme Court for a few years since its establishment, but withdrew later. The Supreme Court was originally composed of 5 judges but the number of judges was gradually increased by legislation to its current number of 13 judges.

Dr Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral President of the Supreme Constitutional Court actually sent his letter of resignation to Makarios on 21 May 1963, it becoming effective on 15 July, after Makarios declared that he would not comply with the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court regarding municipalities.

Note the date – a little before the outbreak of “intercommunal hostilities”. Makarios then changed the Constitution, as described on RoC’s government website, merging the two courts and abolishing the neutral judges, a provision of Article 133 of the Constitution.

QED

[Nikitas]

Deniz,

The fault I find with Makarios is that having been shown by Greece herself that Enosis was not desirable, he kept on flogging that dead horse. The Greek stance has been analysed in public by close aides to the the prime minister Karamanlis. Greece did not want Enosis despite in 1959. It was later governments who changed this policy after the events of 1963.

And in addition he did it without taking the issue of power into account. Now add to that the total disregard for the average TC, the man on the street, and you have a recipe for disaster.

It is interesting that after years of hostilities, in 1973 we finally agreed on separate municipalities. The Cypriot mindset is an internationally unique phenomenon.

[repulsewarrior]

what i understand of Cypriot history, the idea of the interlocutors was to split the ilsand, as it is today. Makarios was the one who kept it whole with the effortd he made, resulting in the Treaty if Zurich; this seems to make sense, with what followed.

as for 1963, i too believe that it was a heavy handed attempt by the government of the day to make changes. the fact that the Communal chamber was never opened, in my opinion ultimately sealed the fate of "Turks" who by some design were moved into isolation from their "Greek" counterparts. And in the long run drove the parties into adding to the Bicommunal process a geographic context (Bizonal, as yet lacking a definition.)

[Get Real!]

Dr Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral President of the Supreme Constitutional Court actually sent his letter of resignation to Makarios on 21 May 1963, it becoming effective on 15 July, after Makarios declared that he would not comply with the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court regarding municipalities.

Surely the British, the UN, and/or some other authority would’ve recorded something about a neutral President of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the RoC being “FORCED TO RESIGN BY MAKARIOS”!

So, let’s do a search for …

“Dr. Ernst Forsthoff was forced to resign”


Here is the result…
http://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt=A0g ... 1&ei=UTF-8


In which you’ll find that the ONLY websites that claim that “Dr. Ernst Forsthoff was forced to resign” are the following…


The Turkish Weekly… (our friend Ata ATUN!)
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=48593

Today's Zaman (our friend Ata ATUN again!)
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazar ... rno=122278

The “TRNC presidency”
http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/ ... PAGE09.htm

The standard ATCA acrobat propaganda manual…
http://www.atcanews.org/archive/HISTORI ... GROUND.pdf


And the remaining few sites in this search are irrelevant to the issue!

Why don't you take another 48 hours to hopefully find a CREDIBLE SOURCE including the alleged letter. Good luck.

[Filitsa]

The consitution was not the result of an exercise of popular sovereignty, sure. But by the time we had gone to negotiate in London and Zurich we had been outflanked by the the gang of four (Britain, Turkey, Greece and USA). It was a simple plan: by entering negotiations we had foregone the military option. So when the negative aspects of the constitution were put on the table we were stuck, we did not like them, but there was nothing we could do about it.

The fact that Makarios was put in that position is yet another piece of evidence that shows that he had no conception of the use of power. The man was a typical monk, not a politician. He should have returned to the church and left politics to others.

Nikitas, given the circumstances, do you believe a Cypriot politician could have possibly achieved more?

[Nikitas]

Filitsa,

For a nation of enterprising businessmen it is unrealistic to say we did not have a negotiator who could have achieved more than a person with monastic and theological training. The "other side" had a barrister as negotiator and obviously achieved a lot more with much less cost. So yes, there were other GC politicians who could have haggled more effectively in London and Zurich. At least a more pragmatic personality whould have realised that Greece did not want union at that time and would have concluded from that fact alone that it was not worth escalating the problem till it culminated in violence in 1963.

The advice given by Karamanlis to the Greek Cypriots after the Zurich deal was "give the TCs what they ask for and give them a loukoumi on top" which means that this is as good as you are likely to get and be thankful for it. When your "motherland" says this you have no excuse for not getting the message.

A book written by Makarios' personal secretary, and withdrawn from circulation, details how he felt pity for politicians who entered into elections that were not a sure thing. He could not counenance the possibility of failure. Yet he could not understand the elements for success when it came to the use of power. Maybe he believed in some kind of divine destiny.

He also failed to act as president to the TCs, a fact he realised too late, when he went to see the TCs collected together at Episkopi, in 1974,waiting for transfer to the occupied north. They booed him and he had to leave, obviously pissed, maybe at himself for neglecting basic PR with a fifth of the Cypriot population. Good politicians never neglect PR.

[Filitsa]

Nix

[Filitsa]

Filitsa,

For a nation of enterprising businessmen it is unrealistic to say we did not have a negotiator who could have achieved more than a person with monastic and theological training. The "other side" had a barrister as negotiator and obviously achieved a lot more with much less cost. So yes, there were other GC politicians who could have haggled more effectively in London and Zurich. At least a more pragmatic personality whould have realised that Greece did not want union at that time and would have concluded from that fact alone that it was not worth escalating the problem till it culminated in violence in 1963.

The advice given by Karamanlis to the Greek Cypriots after the Zurich deal was "give the TCs what they ask for and give them a loukoumi on top" which means that this is as good as you are likely to get and be thankful for it. When your "motherland" says this you have no excuse for not getting the message.

A book written by Makarios' personal secretary, and withdrawn from circulation, details how he felt pity for politicians who entered into elections that were not a sure thing. He could not counenance the possibility of failure. Yet he could not understand the elements for success when it came to the use of power. Maybe he believed in some kind of divine destiny.

He also failed to act as president to the TCs, a fact he realised too late, when he went to see the TCs collected together at Episkopi, in 1974,waiting for transfer to the occupied north. They booed him and he had to leave, obviously pissed, maybe at himself for neglecting basic PR with a fifth of the Cypriot population. Good politicians never neglect PR.

Nikitas, given the powers at hand, who, for example, would have been this pragmatic personality, and why did he/she not "step up to the plate"? Were there other viable alterntives to Makarios?

[Nikitas]

The counter candidate in the first election was Yannis Clerides, father of the later president Glafkos. Cyprus had several outstanding personalities who could have vied for the presidency in 1960. Problem is that a climate grew in which it was assumed that those that took part in the armed struggle against the British should somehow be rewarded with government positions which led to political power. The same happened on the TC side and the more militant people took over. The educated class was bypassed in those first years. We now know the results.