Cyprus-Forum.com

[Paphitis]

Thank you Cem, for your intelligent response. Your post is most appreciated and I will do it justice by taking the time and responding to it in kind.

First, sorry for my late posting but this one above particularly struck me as being very odd.

Well Paphitis, if you say 80% GC s were right in their demand to ask for Enosis , then 20% TCs were also right in their opposition to Enosis.

I agree that the TCs also had the right to object to ENOSIS.

When you fight for the independence of your country, it is only independence and independence ONLY, not union with a foreign country that SHOULD matter.

Regardless of whether the majority may have ethnic ties with that country..or not..

For me personally, it was not the ideal of ENOSIS that is the determining factor. It was the ideal of "self determination" and cutting loose from the British Imperial Yoke. It is the latter which stirred my feelings and not the former, despite the ethnic ties.

You are fighting for independence against colonial rule..fine, spilling a lot of blood even at the expense of killing your fellow GCs, let alone TCs and Britts....sad but fine ...(the end justifies the means after all) and all these sufferings and bloodshed ....for a union with a country which has a wonderful track record of mass-murdering each other in a civil war, just because at that time...independence per se was not viable..
WHY ???

Because we were fed up with being ruled by foreign powers over many centuries. We felt that we needed our mother country at the time, much in the same way the TCs obviously still believe that they need their mother country, even in this day and age!!

I mentioned earlier, that the fundamental ideal for EOKA in the 50s was for self determination, and not necessarily ENOSIS.

If you go through all these hardships just to throw your country under the yoke of another country ??....
And what country ???? Greece...
What the hell you are talking about ??

We went through these struggles for our own self determination, and not to place ourselves under the yoke of another foreign country.

We were fed up with foreign rule and domination, and we felt that we needed our mother country at the time. Much like the TCs today.

Self Determination is what I am talking about.

Had it been for a mere joint struggle against britts, then TCs would have gladly helped you out ...

If the TCs did help out, then I firmly believe that things may have been different today.

Britain's "Divide and Rule" would have failed. The TCs would be considered our patriots, and I would like to think that ENOSIS would also have been abandoned for independence.

I am afraid you are being too much a romantic, Paphidis..

Maybe.

I can only tell you my opinion, based on my personal morals and ideals.

Suppose the TCs had their demands accepted by the original EOKA at that time and Enosis went back to fridge.....temporarily...
What were the guarantees that GCs would have hold on to their commitments ??

There would have been no guarantee.

Just a mere worldy promise by Grivas who later came back to resuscitate EOKA again ???
What were to keep them from being annihilated by the succeeding EOKA, namely EOKA-B...???

I would like to think the majority of GCs would have defended you.

I would also like to point out that I personally have no allegiance with EOKA B or for Grivas himself. But I would always defend the honor of the original EOKA, particularly those young and idealistic boys that I believe are heroes.

EOKA B was indeed much hated amongst GCs, and apart from causing lots of pain and suffering to the TC community, it also betrayed the Republic by assisting the Greek Coup and assassination attempt against Makarios.

That EOKA-B which did not hesitate to overthrow the legal Cyprus government and attempt to assasinate its own president just for the sake of joining a country whic, at that time, was ruled by one of the most rabid and fascist regimes in the world.
I bet, even at that time, Greece was lagging much behind Cyprus in many areas, starting with democracy...

You are absolutely correct.

EOKA B and the Coup were an absolute disaster to Cyprus.

EOKA had lived up its time and should have gone defunct by 1960..
No need to resuscitate a zombie from its grave...

I hate how people do not differentiate between EOKA and EOKA B. For me EOKA was an idyllic struggle for self determination, from individuals that I admire. EOKA B was not even close to that. Both shared a common fanatical leader, which is often the case in armed struggles, who decided to adopt the same name and adding the B. Apart from that, the 2 movements were a world apart.

In my opinion, EOKA B should never have been formed.

If Enosis was the wish of majority of cypriots, this would have come true over time by a common membership with a modern and democratic Greece in EU... as is now...

Agreed.

Sorry Paphidis, but I am afraid the seeds of the discord were already planted in EOKA..... and in the original version...that is EOKA was already pregnant and carrying the Greek infant in its womb at that time..

I do not believe that you can compare the likes of Evagoras Pallikaridis, Afxentiou, Dimitris Matsios etc with the likes of Grivas.

Grivas was a fanatical fascist, who should not have done what he did in the 60s.

Objection of a negligeable and a dormant minority would have certainly gone unheeded..

I would like to think not.

Maybe I am a bit of a romantic, but I consider it the duty of every citizen to defend their other fellow citizens against such illegal insurgent forces.

Still, I can hear your objection...you might say "but, the TCs also themselves wanted to bring down the ROC in collaboration with Turkey"..

And that is why I say that our history is full of missed opportunities where a "real brotherhood and patriotism" could have been sparked. But alas, I guess we both fell victim to British "Divide and Rule" and so here we are.

Then it is the duty of a legitimate government to bring down all kinds of insurgencies without discrimanation and with firmness ..be it TC-originated (TMT) or GC-originated (EOKA-B)...

Correct.

Also the duty of every fellow citizen and patriot.

If a newly created republic backed by 3 powerfull guarantors can not handle these, then that republic does not deserve to exist..

With your last point, I can not agree. The 3 powerful guarantors are the root cause of many problems. Greece for example was under the control of the ruthless Junta, which on 1 fine day decided to overthrow the legitimate Cyprus Government. Another guarentor power, Turkey, decided to invade and claimed she was acting responsibly as a guarantor to The Republic of Cyprus and to protect the TC community. It still occupies Cyprus after 34 years despite it's obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee to respect the sovereignty of Cyprus and the 1960 state of affairs, as offered by the GCs before Turkey broke out from the ceasefire line in August. And finally, the other guarantor, Britain did absolutely nothing to defend Cyprus. In actual fact, there is also evidence that Britain, but in particular the USA, collaborated with the Greek Junta in overthrowing Makarios, whilst at the same time allowing the Turkish Invasion to occur. The objective was partition, and many things occurred behind closed doors, in order to bring about the present situation.

So as far as I am concerned, Cyprus does not need these Guarantees any more. And we can not ever accept any solution with such treaties imposed.

Once bitten, twice shy!

[Bananiot]

Paphitis, self determination means that we acquire the right to decide on our destiny. Let us be honest for a change. Had we won this right we would have gone feet first for enosis and mercilessly take out anyone who objected to this.

Do you honestly believe that in 1955 we started an armed struggle for self determination in order to set up an independent Cyprus?

[zan]

The Akritas Plan

The rising tensions of the early 1960s spurred the formation of paramilitary groups on both sides, and as the constitutional crisis came to a head in 1962-63, both prepared for violence. The Greek Cypriots were better armed and more ideologically driven, and appeared to welcome the crisis---possibly including Makarios's Thirteen Points, which it sets out as a course of action---as a likely provocation to Turkish Cypriots. An expected reaction from the Turkish Cypriot community, either to Makarios's constitutional gambit or some other incident, would in turn set the Greek Cypriot cadres into action. The plan for that action, revealed by a Greek Cypriot newspaper after the fact, was the so-called Akritas Plan, which is reproduced below.



The recent public statements of His Beatitude have outlined the course which our national issue will follow. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it possible to fix time limits for the achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must always be examined and judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the moment, and the measures which will be taken, the tactics, and the time of implementing each measure must be determined by the conditions existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must necessarily pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final result are many and varied. It is sufficient, however, that all should understand that the

measures which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national objective, i.e., to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-determination of the people.

Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains is to examine the subject of tactics. It is necessary to divide the subject of tactics under two headings, that is: internal tactics and external, since in each case both the presentation and the handling of our cause will be different.

A. External tactics (international).

During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been presented to diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Cyprus. In securing the right of self-determination obstacles have been created by the well-known conditions, the existence of a Turkish minority, by the inter-communal conflict and the attempts to show that co-existence of both communities under one government was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the two sides.

a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved an the solution requires revision.

b) Our first objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression that:

(i) The solution given is neither satisfactory not fair;

(ii) The agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting views;

(iii) That the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;

(iv) That the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and

(v) That the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turkish Cypriots.

c) All the above has required very difficult effort, and has been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the foreign representatives have been convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. It is significant argument that the solution achieved has not been ratified by the people, because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to ratify it by a plebiscite, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have done if called upon.

Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks have confined themselves to a negative role.

d) Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we mus programme the second stage of our activities and objectives on the international level. These objectives in general can be outlined as follows:

(i) The Greek efforts are directed towards removing unreasonable and unfair provisions of administration and not to oppress the Turkish Cypriots;

(ii) The removal of these oppressive provisions must take place now because tomorrow it will be too late;

(iii) The removal of these provisions, despite the fact that this is reasonable and necessary, because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks is not possible bv agreement, and therefore unilateral action is justified;

(iv) The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of military or other intervention;

(v) The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

e) Today it has been generally demonstrated that the international climate is against every type of oppression and, more specifically, against the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is estimated that we have better chances of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for union with Greece (Enosis). In order, however, to secure the exercise of complete and free self-determination, we must get free of all those provisions of the constitution and of the agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance) which prevent the free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people and which create dangers of external intervention. It is for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When this is achieved no legal or moral power can prevent us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.

From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of actions is needed, each of which is necessary, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically unachieved, while at the same time we will expose our people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be summed up as follows:

a) Amendment of the negative elements of the agreements and parallel abandonment of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time intervention from outside to prevent us amending them is unjustified and inapplicable;

b) As a result of our above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (right of unilateral intervention) becomes legally and substantively inapplicable;

c) The people, once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, will be able to give expression to and implement their desire.

d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State of every internal or external intervention.

It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any chance of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages are necessary, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments in stage (a) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the negative aspects of the constitution by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning of the State if stage (d) is revealed?

The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the internal front:

B. Internal Front.

1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention, by force, not so much because of the material damage, nor because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. Intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both internationally and in the United Nations.

From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of intervention, whether legally justified or not, has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the invader without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations, and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received as a concession the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Naturally, more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.

If, on the other hand, we consider and justify our action under (a) above well, on the one hand, intervention is not justified and, on the other, it cannot be carried out before consultations between the guarantors Greece, Turkey and the UK. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention) that we need international support. We shall have it if the proposed amendments by us appear reasonable and justifiable.

Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we would request in the first stage.

Tactics: We shall attempt to justify unilateral action for constitutional amendments once the efforts for a common agreement are excluded. As this stage the provisions in (ii) and (in) are applicable in parallel.

2. It is obvious that in order to justify intervention, a more serious reason must exist and a more immediate danger than a simple constitutional amendment.

Such a reason could be an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a) - (c) or serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacres of the Turks.

Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, it remains only to consider the danger of inter-communal violence. Since we do not intend, without provocation, to attack or kill Turks, the possibility remains that the Turkish Cypriots, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution,

will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage, under orders, killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be justified, for their protection.

Tactics. Our actions for constitutional amendments will be in the open and we will always appear ready for peaceful negotiations. Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature.

Should clashes occur, they will be dealt with in the initial stages legally by the legally established security forces, in accordance with a plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.

3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts, such as, for example, the use of force to unify the separate municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react violently. On the contrary, it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio in the public service, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but to refusal to act (to implement).

The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regard to taxation legislation.

These measures have already been considered and a series of similar measures have been chosen for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established de facto by such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more decidedly.

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been described above, without the Turks at tempting to create or to stage violent clashes. For this reason, the existence of our organisation is an imperative necessity because:

a) In the event of instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the towns and thus losing substantial vital areas, while, on the other hand, an immediate show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant acts, and

b) In the event of a planned or staged Turkish attack, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation (in one or two days), no outside, intervention would be either justified or possible.

c) In either of the above cases, effective use of force in dealing with the Turks will facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will now that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community, and

d) In the event of the clashes becoming more general or general we must be ready to proceed with the actions described in (a) to (b), including the immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.

5. At no stage should we neglect the need to enlighten, and to face the propaganda and the reactions of those who cannot or should not know our plans. It has been shown that our struggle must pass through four stages and that we must not reveal publicly and at improper times our plans and intentions. Complete secrecy is more than a national duty.

IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY FOR SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS.

This will not prevent the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagogy nor to bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before the next elections, for obvious reasons, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool.

At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. This can only be done by the necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.

In the first instance, we must uncover what the reactionaries stand for. Some of them are opportunist and irresponsible, as their recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but without at the same time offering a substantive and practical solution. We need a steady and strong government in order to promote our plans up to the last moment. These opponents are verbalists and sloganists, but unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves. They must, therefore, be isolated.

In parallel, we shall brief our members only ORALLY about our intentions. Our sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others.

NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OF ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO TREASON AGAINST THE NATION.

No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document or its publication by our opponents. With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing, all our other actions, i.e., publications in the Press, resolutions, etc., must be very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of the Leader or Deputy Leaders, references in general terms to the plan. They must also have the authorisation of either the Leader or the Deputy Leader who must approve the text. ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION PERMITTED.

Tactics. Complete briefing of our people and of the public by word of mouth. Publicly we shall endeavour to appear as moderates. Projection of or reference to our plans in the Press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will continue to brief and to raise the morale and the desire for the struggle of our people, but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the Press or otherwise.

NOTES: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the Leader and the Deputy Leader in the presence of all the members of the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies or part copies are prohibited: members of the staff of the Office of the Deputy Leader may have copies on the personal responsibility of the Leader, but may not remove them from the Office of the Deputy Leader.

The Leader AKRITAS

[Paphitis]

Paphitis, self determination means that we acquire the right to decide on our destiny. Let us be honest for a change. Had we won this right we would have gone feet first for enosis and mercilessly take out anyone who objected to this.

Do you honestly believe that in 1955 we started an armed struggle for self determination in order to set up an independent Cyprus?

Why is it that I feel like I must cover the same ground over and over again?

The answer to your questions lie within my earlier posts in this thread.

You even replied to those posts, so you know my stance.

[halil]

3rd part of the Cyprus 1960-1974 and up to 2008

Polycarpos Yorgadjis, a man who ran his ministry as if he were still in EOKA and who attracted to himself attributions of the most intricate plotting, used the constitutional breakdown over tax collection as an excuse for getting Makarios’s authority for building up a “secret army” of ex-EOKA men. There were also other freelance gangs of armed irregulars on the Greek side.
On Nov. 30, 1963, President Makarios wrote to Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük proposing 13 amendments to the constitution which, he said, would “remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state.” He did so apparently with the knowledge and encouragement of the British high commissioner, Sir Arthur Clarke, whether personally or officially is not clear: The full story of this remains obscure. Taken together, the amendments would have had the effect of resolving all outstanding issues in the Greek favor.
• The president and vice president would lose the right of veto.
• The necessity for separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members for the passage of certain laws, including taxes, to be cancelled.
• No separate municipalities.
• The ratio in the public services and in the army and police would be the same as the ratio of population.
• The Public Service Commission would be smaller and take decisions by a simple majority.
• The separate Greek Communal Chamber would be abolished.
• The administration of justice would be unified so that a Greek could not demand to be tried by a Greek judge and a Turk by a Turkish judge.
It must be said in favor of these proposals that they streamlined the administration and removed many of the features that laid stress on whether a Cypriot citizen was Greek or Turkish.
But from the Turkish Cypriot point of view they removed almost all the props to their claim to be the “co-founders” of the republic and demoted them to the status of a minority. In the view of Greek Cypriot constitutional lawyer Polyvios Polyviou, who is a sharp critic of the 1960 constitution, the course followed by the archbishop was “a grievous error” which “could not but have appeared to the Turkish Cypriots as a dangerous development that might change the internal balance of power and be taken internationally as a sign that the bi-communal nature of the state was giving way to unitary and majority principles.” In Polyviou’s opinion it would have been much better to have tried to change things gradually; a view shared at the time by the Greek government which, not having been warned in advance, told Makarios that if he had asked their advice it would have been against.
The archbishop’s proposals were hastily rejected by the vice president, Dr. Küçük, and by the government of Turkey, as one of the guarantors of the RoC. The atmosphere after the presentation of the 13 proposals was very tense, with the Turkish Cypriots interpreting the move as a preparation to slide into enosis. On Dec. 21, 1963 a street brawl in a Turkish quarter in Nicosia between a Turkish Cypriot crowd and Yorgadjis’ plainclothes special constables was followed immediately by a major Greek Cypriot attack by the various paramilitary forces against the Turks in Tahtakala region at Nicosia and in Larnaca. At first an attempt to calm the situation was made jointly by the President Makarios and the vice president Küçük and by other leaders, but it had clearly gotten out of hand and in any case the ex-EOKA element was strong in the security forces.
Although the TMT organized the defense of the Turkish minority and there were a number of acts of retaliation directed at the Greek Cypriots, there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months were Turkish Cypriots. Seven hundred Turkish Cypriot hostages, including women and children, were seized in the northern suburbs of Nicosia. During the first half of 1964, fighting continued to flare up between neighboring villages. One hundred ninety-one Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks remained missing and could also be presumed dead.
There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia Villages(Dağyolu,Pınarbaşı,Agırdağ ,Boğaz and Hamitköy (Hamid Mandres) of Nicosia. Twenty-four wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Houses were demolished by the Greeks with the intention of destroying the hopes of Turkish Cypriots returning one day. Food, clothing, medical supplies and monetary aid to the immigrants were organized immediately by Turkey, one of the guarantors of the RoC, and shipped in. Most of the evacuation seems to have been after planned Greek assaults, with the people leaving clothing, furniture, food, machinery and hopes behind. But in some cases orders were received for the people to immigrate safely to Turkish Cypriot areas before any expected Greek Cypriot assaults took place. The partition of the island inevitably started after these Greek assaults.


In Nicosia the guarantors -- Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece -- began to move over the Christmas week of 1963. The 650-man Turkish army contingent in Cyprus under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance moved out of its barracks and positioned itself astride the Nicosia-Kyrenia road in Ortaköy (Ortakeuy).
Turkish jets from the mainland buzzed Nicosia. The Turkish fleet set sail for Cyprus. President Makarios, by now alarmed that a Turkish army might indeed land, agreed that the British should intervene from the sovereign bases in order to avoid a worse situation. This produced a cease-fire in Nicosia, an exchange of hostages and the establishment of a “Green Line,” a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish quarters in the capital which has existed till the present day. Turkish Cypriots expelled from their side of that line the entire Armenian community of Nicosia on the grounds that it had aligned itself with the Greek position.
What the guarantors did not do was carry out the one purpose for which they existed: the restoration of the 1960 constitution. The establishment of the Green Line brought peace to Nicosia, though not yet to other places, but it did not bring the fractured government together.Greek and Turkish Cypriot ministers remained on opposite sides of the line.
According to the Turkish Cypriot thesis, there was, from this time on, no legal government in Cyprus -- only provisional bodies on both sides pending the establishment of a new legal order -- the old one having been overthrown by force. Turkish Cypriot deputies and all the Turkish Cypriot civil servants were removed from their posts in Cyprus’ government by brute force and never allowed to return.
According to the Greek Cypriot thesis, there continued to be a legitimate and democratically elected government representing the great majority of the people which had, as many ex-colonial countries were doing, asserted its right to gain control of its institutions and had done so at a time, moreover, when the Turkish Cypriot vice president and ministers had willfully continued to absent themselves.
At a conference in London of the three guarantor states and the two Cypriot communities, Makarios demanded the termination of the 1960 agreements as unworkable and their replacement by “unfettered independence,” a unitary Greek government with freedom to amend the constitution. He offered the Turkish Cypriots minority rights, which as usual they rejected out of hand. The Turks said that the December fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. Consequently they demanded a fully federal state of Cyprus with a border between Turkish and Greek provinces known as the Attila line, which is not unlike the present cease-fire line, or, failing that, “double enosis” which would bring a frontier across Cyprus between Greece and Turkey themselves, both solutions that would imply a population transfer.
The London conference broke down with no chance of agreement. Greek Cypriots preferred to hold their position of being the only recognized government of Cyprus internationally and did not fancy sharing the power with Turkish Cypriots.While the cease-fire held in Nicosia, the British were unable to prevent Greek Cypriots from attacking Turkish Cypriots at Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos, causing widespread casualties and damage.
Turkey announced for the second time that her fleet was sailing for Cyprus and the British, desperately anxious not to get bogged down in another Cyprus conflict, insisted on the peace-keeping burden being shared. Aiming above all at preventing a clash between two NATO partners, but wanting to keep the dispute within the NATO family, the United States tried to organize a NATO intervention, but Makarios would not consider it. It was necessary after all to bring in the United Nations. By the March 4, 1964 Security Council resolution, UNFICYP (UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus) and a UN mediator were set up and despite a further severe Turkish warning, the danger passed. Makarios interpreted the UN resolution as recognizing “unfettered independence,” which he sought, and appointed Greek Cypriot ministers to take over the Turkish portfolios and the seized state to be the only recognized government of Cyprus.The UN force which was set up and remains till the present day was originally of over 6,000 men and is now [2008] about 750. It has always had a substantial British contingent, often over 1,000, but quite few at present, making it unusual among UN forces which normally exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council.
It has achieved a good deal but not what was expected of it by either side since, as is usual with peace-keeping operations, it does not use force except in self-defense.The force’s main deterrent was its presence. By use of persuasion they were able to prevent many killings that would almost certainly have happened, but they could not be everywhere and they could not stop a determined attack. In the first few months the UN had the greatest difficulty in getting a purchase on events because there were repeated outbreaks of fighting in different parts of the island.
Since there was no Cypriot Army, President Makarios now formed a National Guard, Ethniki Fruro, introducing conscription and ignoring the veto of Vice President Küçük. Arms supplies came in from Czechoslovakia and a Greek general from the mainland took command.

[Paphitis]

Thank you Cem, for your intelligent response. Your post is most appreciated and I will do it justice by taking the time and responding to it in kind.

First, sorry for my late posting but this one above particularly struck me as being very odd.

Well Paphitis, if you say 80% GC s were right in their demand to ask for Enosis , then 20% TCs were also right in their opposition to Enosis.

I agree that the TCs also had the right to object to ENOSIS.

When you fight for the independence of your country, it is only independence and independence ONLY, not union with a foreign country that SHOULD matter.

Regardless of whether the majority may have ethnic ties with that country..or not..

For me personally, it was not the ideal of ENOSIS that is the determining factor. It was the ideal of "self determination" and cutting loose from the British Imperial Yoke. It is the latter which stirred my feelings and not the former, despite the ethnic ties.

You are fighting for independence against colonial rule..fine, spilling a lot of blood even at the expense of killing your fellow GCs, let alone TCs and Britts....sad but fine ...(the end justifies the means after all) and all these sufferings and bloodshed ....for a union with a country which has a wonderful track record of mass-murdering each other in a civil war, just because at that time...independence per se was not viable..
WHY ???

Because we were fed up with being ruled by foreign powers over many centuries. We felt that we needed our mother country at the time, much in the same way the TCs obviously still believe that they need their mother country, even in this day and age!!

I mentioned earlier, that the fundamental ideal for EOKA in the 50s was for self determination, and not necessarily ENOSIS.

If you go through all these hardships just to throw your country under the yoke of another country ??....
And what country ???? Greece...
What the hell you are talking about ??

We went through these struggles for our own self determination, and not to place ourselves under the yoke of another foreign country.

We were fed up with foreign rule and domination, and we felt that we needed our mother country at the time. Much like the TCs today.

Self Determination is what I am talking about.

Had it been for a mere joint struggle against britts, then TCs would have gladly helped you out ...

If the TCs did help out, then I firmly believe that things may have been different today.

Britain's "Divide and Rule" would have failed. The TCs would be considered our patriots, and I would like to think that ENOSIS would also have been abandoned for independence.

I am afraid you are being too much a romantic, Paphidis..

Maybe.

I can only tell you my opinion, based on my personal morals and ideals.

Suppose the TCs had their demands accepted by the original EOKA at that time and Enosis went back to fridge.....temporarily...
What were the guarantees that GCs would have hold on to their commitments ??

There would have been no guarantee.

Just a mere worldy promise by Grivas who later came back to resuscitate EOKA again ???
What were to keep them from being annihilated by the succeeding EOKA, namely EOKA-B...???

I would like to think the majority of GCs would have defended you.

I would also like to point out that I personally have no allegiance with EOKA B or for Grivas himself. But I would always defend the honor of the original EOKA, particularly those young and idealistic boys that I believe are heroes.

EOKA B was indeed much hated amongst GCs, and apart from causing lots of pain and suffering to the TC community, it also betrayed the Republic by assisting the Greek Coup and assassination attempt against Makarios.

That EOKA-B which did not hesitate to overthrow the legal Cyprus government and attempt to assasinate its own president just for the sake of joining a country whic, at that time, was ruled by one of the most rabid and fascist regimes in the world.
I bet, even at that time, Greece was lagging much behind Cyprus in many areas, starting with democracy...

You are absolutely correct.

EOKA B and the Coup were an absolute disaster to Cyprus.

EOKA had lived up its time and should have gone defunct by 1960..
No need to resuscitate a zombie from its grave...

I hate how people do not differentiate between EOKA and EOKA B. For me EOKA was an idyllic struggle for self determination, from individuals that I admire. EOKA B was not even close to that. Both shared a common fanatical leader, which is often the case in armed struggles, who decided to adopt the same name and adding the B. Apart from that, the 2 movements were a world apart.

In my opinion, EOKA B should never have been formed.

If Enosis was the wish of majority of cypriots, this would have come true over time by a common membership with a modern and democratic Greece in EU... as is now...

Agreed.

Sorry Paphidis, but I am afraid the seeds of the discord were already planted in EOKA..... and in the original version...that is EOKA was already pregnant and carrying the Greek infant in its womb at that time..

I do not believe that you can compare the likes of Evagoras Pallikaridis, Afxentiou, Dimitris Matsios etc with the likes of Grivas.

Grivas was a fanatical fascist, who should not have done what he did in the 60s.

Objection of a negligeable and a dormant minority would have certainly gone unheeded..

I would like to think not.

Maybe I am a bit of a romantic, but I consider it the duty of every citizen to defend their other fellow citizens against such illegal insurgent forces.

Still, I can hear your objection...you might say "but, the TCs also themselves wanted to bring down the ROC in collaboration with Turkey"..

And that is why I say that our history is full of missed opportunities where a "real brotherhood and patriotism" could have been sparked. But alas, I guess we both fell victim to British "Divide and Rule" and so here we are.

Then it is the duty of a legitimate government to bring down all kinds of insurgencies without discrimanation and with firmness ..be it TC-originated (TMT) or GC-originated (EOKA-B)...

Correct.

Also the duty of every fellow citizen and patriot.

If a newly created republic backed by 3 powerfull guarantors can not handle these, then that republic does not deserve to exist..

With your last point, I can not agree. The 3 powerful guarantors are the root cause of many problems. Greece for example was under the control of the ruthless Junta, which on 1 fine day decided to overthrow the legitimate Cyprus Government. Another guarentor power, Turkey, decided to invade and claimed she was acting responsibly as a guarantor to The Republic of Cyprus and to protect the TC community. It still occupies Cyprus after 34 years despite it's obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee to respect the sovereignty of Cyprus and the 1960 state of affairs, as offered by the GCs before Turkey broke out from the ceasefire line in August. And finally, the other guarantor, Britain did absolutely nothing to defend Cyprus. In actual fact, there is also evidence that Britain, but in particular the USA, collaborated with the Greek Junta in overthrowing Makarios, whilst at the same time allowing the Turkish Invasion to occur. The objective was partition, and many things occurred behind closed doors, in order to bring about the present situation.

So as far as I am concerned, Cyprus does not need these Guarantees any more. And we can not ever accept any solution with such treaties imposed.

Once bitten, twice shy!

[Bananiot]

Well, Paphitis, let me spell it out for you. Stop beating about the bush. We had one and only objective in 1955. Enosis and only enosis. Anyone who interfered with this objective was a candidate for the next life. We did not need a mother (spare us the agony with this silly analysis). We wanted to fulfill a lifelong aspiration that grew on us over the eons.

[Paphitis]

Well, Paphitis, let me spell it out for you. Stop beating about the bush. We had one and only objective in 1955. Enosis and only enosis. Anyone who interfered with this objective was a candidate for the next life. We did not need a mother (spare us the agony with this silly analysis). We wanted to fulfill a lifelong aspiration that grew on us over the eons.

You have spoiled nothing and please stop twisting my thoughts around.

I beleive you can go back and re-read my posts, and then come back with an intelligent comment, and then I will respond.

What you say is pure interpretation and speculation. What I see was a struggle to break loose from the British Yoke.

You should read Evagoras Pallikaridis poetry. There you will see the ideals of this young man and understand what he was fighting for.

The answer lies within the poetry.

This is the Man I worship!

[Bananiot]

Pallikarides was a 17 year old boy. He was not responsible for the charting of the policies of EOKA.
P.S. What in heaven is pure interpretation?

[Paphitis]

Pallikarides was a 17 year old boy. He was not responsible for the charting of the policies of EOKA.
P.S. What in heaven is pure interpretation?

The EOKA struggle had as it's leader a former Greek Military Commander, and a ruthless one at that. Ruthlessness is a pre-requisite for initiating what he did, partiticularly when confronting a superpower.

He was a sworn officer to The Hellenic Army and to The Greek Monarch. Where else do you think his allegiances would lie?

Grivas had his purpose and served it well. He was not at all interested in confronting the TC community, but later had no choice. He tried to defend the GC community against TMT and Police Auxillary, whilst at the same time trying to overthrow the British. By this stage, the TCs had well and truelly chosen their allegiance, whilst ignoring an opportunity to unite with the GCs against the British Yoke. ENOSIS was not the be all and end all as far as the GCs were concerned.