BirKibrisli wrote:One aspect of this whole sad saga keeps staring us in the face...
In 1950 there were 400,000 GCs and 100,000TCs give or take a few thousand other minorities....Yet
the GCs totally ignored the feelings of the TCs and pushed ahead with their demand for ENOSIS....What did they think the TCs would do against such a terrible possibility (for them!)????
I am yet to read any attempt by any rightthinking member of this Forum addressing this issue...And please don't say "bad luck,majority rules"...
My point is those pushing for ENOSIS knew how the TCs would react...So how did they really hope to overcome the TC resistance??? Come on people,time to show some
empathy for your TC compatriots...What would you do if you were in their shoes???? And put your hands on your hearts and tell me,
was it not asking for real trouble for GCs to disregard the TC feelings on this...given the past 450 years of Cyprus history????
The truth on the above question is that the TC community and its whatever feelings or reactions, was totally ignored in this campaign. So high was the conviction among the GCs about the legitimacy and rightfulness of their struggle that they never thought the TC community would have considered disputing it -set aside dared to confront it. As a result, the possibility that complications in the course of the struggle due to TC reaction, were totally ignored, or better almost totally escaped their minds.
Furthermore, there are a few more things one should take into consideration. TC reaction -more so a violent one- did not come around until after the British themselves manipulated and motivated it, something the GC leadership of the time never anticipated, i.e. that the British would have gone that far. The GCs at the time only saw the TCs as basically a sleepy and passive minority, remnants of the previous occupier, with little or no moral ground to object the choices of the more active and richer majority. It is a fact that the TC leadership, at the time before the Eoka campaign, besides some sporadic and low profile objections, never raised their voice loud and strong enough, against the possibility of union with Greece, and even so, such voices were totally ignored and rather easily discredited by the GC leadership. One may call it miscalculation, over-ambition, or even arrogance, but that was the climate at the time.
Another thing that needs to be taken into consideration was the fact that it was a period of time soon after the end of the WWII, in which the Greeks fought together with the British against Nazism; a war in which some 25,000 GC joined the British army in order to help out, even on the disguised promise that once the war would have been over, their turn would come to meet their national aspirations. Naturally, one would have expected that the British would have seen and treated Greece and Greeks in general as an allied nation that they should have trusted and should have had no reason not to want to facilitate in their national aspirations, besides their economic needs at the time. This, in conjunction with the fact that Britain itself had in the past considered and even proposed union of Cyprus with Greece, the fact that Turkey had long before waved any rights or claims on Cyprus with the treaty of Lausanne, and the fact that post WWII period was characterised by a world-wide decolonisation campaign (the establishment of the UN and the universal declaration of human rights, including the right of peoples self-determination against colonial ruling;) had all contributed in convincing the GCs, not just about the absolute rightfulness and legitimacy of their demand, but also about its almost certain attainability without much difficulty.