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[alekcen]

As Cyprus marks yet another summer of tragic anniversaries, Makarios Droushiotis looks at how successive leaders have turned down one opportunity after another over the past 50 years



THE SUMMER in Cyprus is a time for sad anniversaries. This year, when the Cyprus issue completes 50 years as an issue of Greco-Turkish contention, the annual debates could transcend 1974 and attempt a deeper approach to the causes of this great national tragedy.



However, the political conditions prevailing on the island, as a consequence of the developments during 2004, maintain the debate in the stereotypical framework: the traitorous coup d'état, the barbaric invasion, and Makarios as the absolute victim of the conspiracy.



The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted, as is the apathy, and even the encouragement, of the US, but without the dramatic Greek mistakes we would have never come to 1974. In the 50 years of the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriots have never admitted to any of their mistakes having contributed to the disaster of 1974. They even blame the coup exclusively on the Junta, as if the previous three years of EOKA B activity had never happened.



The first lost opportunity



The new era in the Cyprus issue started with EOKA. According to historical sources, the initial purpose of the armed movement of 1955 was not to defeat the colonial power by guerrilla warfare, but to sensitise the international community, by means of limited action, to the Cypriot demand for self-determination, and to force Great Britain to compromise by diplomatic means, and certainly not by military ones.



The founding of EOKA coincided – by pure chance – with the challenge to the role of Great Britain as a regional superpower in the Middle East. In their attempts to maintain a hold on the area, the British sought to close their front in Cyprus. That is, factors beyond the political planning of the Greek Cypriots created circumstances favourable to a positive settlement on the Cyprus issue by diplomatic means.



During the talks between the then Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, and Archbishop Makarios (1955-1956), the British offered the Cypriots a regime of self-administration, leaving even the prospect of Enosis (union with Greece) open in the future. The EOKA struggle, before it began in earnest, brought about the maximum possible result under the circumstances. Makarios, politically inexperienced, and blinded by the fanaticism of the era, was not in a position to see, let alone exploit, the circumstances. He rejected the British proposal and adopted the dogma of "all or nothing".



Four years of armed struggle later, and after the Turks became part of the issue, after much blood was spilt and after the barriers in the relations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus rose, Makarios found himself before the dilemma of partition or bound independence, in a common state with the Turks. Before the spectre of partition, he made the compromise of Zurich.



Independence was never a choice of the Greek Cypriots. But, under those circumstances, it was a good solution. As soon as they felt that the danger of partition was past, the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to revise the Zurich agreements. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, who were betting on their mistakes, did all they could to push them in this direction.



Makarios' attempt unilaterally to revise the constitution brought Cyprus to the brink of disaster and caused the first form of partition, with the secession of the Turkish Cypriots from the Republic of Cyprus and their concentration into geographical enclaves, with an autonomous administration under the guidance of Turkey.



The second great opportunity



History gave Cyprus another great opportunity to shake off the weight of the national problem. Six years after the collapse of Zurich, the Turkish policy of partition for Cyprus was at a dead end. The Turkish Cypriots were becoming more and more dependent on the strong Greek Cypriot economy. The enclaves began to dissolve and the young began to emigrate, while the cost of $20 million a year to Turkey for maintaining the Turkish Cypriot administration was hard to bear for the economic circumstances of the era.



At that point when the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to make a series of compromises. Within the framework of intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash, they were obliged to accept a solution improving on the Zurich agreements, and abolishing many of the privileges they secured with the 1959 agreements. Makarios did not dare to compromise while he was in a position of advantage and postponed the solution to an indeterminate future, expecting fully to absorb the Turkish Cypriots and adhering to the logic of "all or nothing".



In life as in politics, no-one knows what the next day will bring. The monster of nationalism, which had its roots in the policies of conflict of the 50s and 60s, caused chaos inside Cyprus which climaxed in the coup of July 15, 1974.



20-20 hindsight



Had the Cyprus issue been solved, there would never have been a coup, for the simple reason that there would be no army on Cyprus. And if the Junta dared a coup to prevent a solution that was an improvement on Zurich, the Cyprus crisis would have been handled completely differently by the international community, including the US.



Only after the dramatic consequences of the Turkish invasion, on July 29, 1974, did Makarios submit, via Henry Kissinger, a memo to the Turkish government, suggesting the immediate return to the status outlined by Zurich! But Zurich had already been rendered obsolete by the facts. The circumstances had changed. The rules of the game were now determined by the strong party, which under those circumstances was Turkey.



At the end of July 1974, while the Turks occupied less than 20 per cent of the land area of Cyprus, the US was pressing the Greek side hard to accept a solution of geographic federation as the only antidote to the completion of partition. Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides were in agreement, but Makarios, despite the national disaster caused by the invasion, remained attached to "all or nothing": "The Archbishop will never attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey, even if the Turks occupy the whole of Cyprus," he wrote to Karamanlis on August 2, 1974. Two years later, the faits accomplis of the invasion forced him to "attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey", by accepting a federal solution to the Cyprus issue.



Shortly before he died, Makarios publicly instituted the policy of the long-term struggle. While in the '60s the search for a solution in some indeterminate future favoured the interests of the Greek Cypriots, in this particular instance the approach to the time factor was clearly defensive. Makarios considered, correctly, that only a change in the international circumstances would make a just solution to the Cyprus issue possible. At the same time, the postponement of the solution also favoured the Turkish policy of gradual establishment of the faits accomplis as permanent.



The last wasted coincidence



It took three decades for the international circumstances to change. After the 1974 drama, Cyprus had another rendezvous with History in 2004. For the first time in its history, Cyprus gained a determining role in the future of Turkey. The induction of the country in the EU and the desire on the part of Turkey to move in the direction of Europe annulled the Turkish dogma established by Ecevit, which stated that the Cyprus issue had been solved in 1974.



At this unique historic juncture, the Cyprus issue was found to be administered by two politicians of the EOKA era and the 1960s: Glafcos Clerides at first, and, later, Tassos Papadopoulos. Both have admitted that the political choices of the past were disastrous:



l Papadopoulos (Vima, Athens, May 2004) called the Makarios - Harding talks a real lost opportunity. Also, at a public speech in Nicosia

(January 13, 2005) he called the Zurich solution a "blessing".



l Clerides thinks of the non-completion of the 1973 agreement as a lost opportunity, while he believes that if Makarios accepted federation in 1974 instead of 1976, the Cyprus issue could have been solved. (E, July 15, 2004).



Clerides is thought of as the spokesman for the realistic school, and Papadopoulos as the one for the rejectionist school on the Cyprus issue. However, they both share the common characteristic of never having learnt from the mistakes of the past:



l Clerides, though he was President for 10 years, never prepared society for a solution, but only for non-solution and conflict: he was elected President in 1993 to bury the ideas proposed by UN Secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Gali, which had been accepted by his predecessor George Vassiliou, and in 1998 on the platform of the S-300 missiles.

l It took Papadopoulos 45 years to realise that independence was, under the circumstances of the time, a good solution in 1959. "The Cypriot people had become possessed by emotion, and had not been able to temper emotion with logic," he said about Zurich.




Forty-five years after Zurich, by stirring the same emotions, Papadopoulos led the people, who were unprepared for a solution, to repeat the same mistake. He himself - like Makarios in 1955 - did not see, let alone exploit, the historic confluence of 2004, to negotiate assertively, but also constructively, the solution of the Cyprus issue, at a time when the US, Turkey and the EU were eager to rid themselves of the problem. Having wasted the opportunity with decisions which have excused Turkey of her criminal responsibilities for 1974, he is now applying a policy of seeking a solution in some indeterminate future, based on the bankrupt policy of "all or nothing", with the expectation of absorbing the Turkish Cypriots.



Makarios Droushiotis

Cyprus Mail

07/08/2005


© Copyright: Μακαριος Δρουσιώτης | δημοσιογράφος, συγγραφέας

[alekcen]

A great article to be read.

[halil]

As Cyprus marks yet another summer of tragic anniversaries, Makarios Droushiotis looks at how successive leaders have turned down one opportunity after another over the past 50 years



THE SUMMER in Cyprus is a time for sad anniversaries. This year, when the Cyprus issue completes 50 years as an issue of Greco-Turkish contention, the annual debates could transcend 1974 and attempt a deeper approach to the causes of this great national tragedy.



However, the political conditions prevailing on the island, as a consequence of the developments during 2004, maintain the debate in the stereotypical framework: the traitorous coup d'état, the barbaric invasion, and Makarios as the absolute victim of the conspiracy.



The criminal responsibilities of Turkey are granted, as is the apathy, and even the encouragement, of the US, but without the dramatic Greek mistakes we would have never come to 1974. In the 50 years of the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriots have never admitted to any of their mistakes having contributed to the disaster of 1974. They even blame the coup exclusively on the Junta, as if the previous three years of EOKA B activity had never happened.



The first lost opportunity



The new era in the Cyprus issue started with EOKA. According to historical sources, the initial purpose of the armed movement of 1955 was not to defeat the colonial power by guerrilla warfare, but to sensitise the international community, by means of limited action, to the Cypriot demand for self-determination, and to force Great Britain to compromise by diplomatic means, and certainly not by military ones.



The founding of EOKA coincided – by pure chance – with the challenge to the role of Great Britain as a regional superpower in the Middle East. In their attempts to maintain a hold on the area, the British sought to close their front in Cyprus. That is, factors beyond the political planning of the Greek Cypriots created circumstances favourable to a positive settlement on the Cyprus issue by diplomatic means.



During the talks between the then Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, and Archbishop Makarios (1955-1956), the British offered the Cypriots a regime of self-administration, leaving even the prospect of Enosis (union with Greece) open in the future. The EOKA struggle, before it began in earnest, brought about the maximum possible result under the circumstances. Makarios, politically inexperienced, and blinded by the fanaticism of the era, was not in a position to see, let alone exploit, the circumstances. He rejected the British proposal and adopted the dogma of "all or nothing".



Four years of armed struggle later, and after the Turks became part of the issue, after much blood was spilt and after the barriers in the relations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus rose, Makarios found himself before the dilemma of partition or bound independence, in a common state with the Turks. Before the spectre of partition, he made the compromise of Zurich.



Independence was never a choice of the Greek Cypriots. But, under those circumstances, it was a good solution. As soon as they felt that the danger of partition was past, the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to revise the Zurich agreements. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, who were betting on their mistakes, did all they could to push them in this direction.



Makarios' attempt unilaterally to revise the constitution brought Cyprus to the brink of disaster and caused the first form of partition, with the secession of the Turkish Cypriots from the Republic of Cyprus and their concentration into geographical enclaves, with an autonomous administration under the guidance of Turkey.



The second great opportunity



History gave Cyprus another great opportunity to shake off the weight of the national problem. Six years after the collapse of Zurich, the Turkish policy of partition for Cyprus was at a dead end. The Turkish Cypriots were becoming more and more dependent on the strong Greek Cypriot economy. The enclaves began to dissolve and the young began to emigrate, while the cost of $20 million a year to Turkey for maintaining the Turkish Cypriot administration was hard to bear for the economic circumstances of the era.



At that point when the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to make a series of compromises. Within the framework of intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash, they were obliged to accept a solution improving on the Zurich agreements, and abolishing many of the privileges they secured with the 1959 agreements. Makarios did not dare to compromise while he was in a position of advantage and postponed the solution to an indeterminate future, expecting fully to absorb the Turkish Cypriots and adhering to the logic of "all or nothing".



In life as in politics, no-one knows what the next day will bring. The monster of nationalism, which had its roots in the policies of conflict of the 50s and 60s, caused chaos inside Cyprus which climaxed in the coup of July 15, 1974.



20-20 hindsight



Had the Cyprus issue been solved, there would never have been a coup, for the simple reason that there would be no army on Cyprus. And if the Junta dared a coup to prevent a solution that was an improvement on Zurich, the Cyprus crisis would have been handled completely differently by the international community, including the US.



Only after the dramatic consequences of the Turkish invasion, on July 29, 1974, did Makarios submit, via Henry Kissinger, a memo to the Turkish government, suggesting the immediate return to the status outlined by Zurich! But Zurich had already been rendered obsolete by the facts. The circumstances had changed. The rules of the game were now determined by the strong party, which under those circumstances was Turkey.



At the end of July 1974, while the Turks occupied less than 20 per cent of the land area of Cyprus, the US was pressing the Greek side hard to accept a solution of geographic federation as the only antidote to the completion of partition. Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides were in agreement, but Makarios, despite the national disaster caused by the invasion, remained attached to "all or nothing": "The Archbishop will never attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey, even if the Turks occupy the whole of Cyprus," he wrote to Karamanlis on August 2, 1974. Two years later, the faits accomplis of the invasion forced him to "attach his signature to an arbitrary act by Turkey", by accepting a federal solution to the Cyprus issue.



Shortly before he died, Makarios publicly instituted the policy of the long-term struggle. While in the '60s the search for a solution in some indeterminate future favoured the interests of the Greek Cypriots, in this particular instance the approach to the time factor was clearly defensive. Makarios considered, correctly, that only a change in the international circumstances would make a just solution to the Cyprus issue possible. At the same time, the postponement of the solution also favoured the Turkish policy of gradual establishment of the faits accomplis as permanent.



The last wasted coincidence



It took three decades for the international circumstances to change. After the 1974 drama, Cyprus had another rendezvous with History in 2004. For the first time in its history, Cyprus gained a determining role in the future of Turkey. The induction of the country in the EU and the desire on the part of Turkey to move in the direction of Europe annulled the Turkish dogma established by Ecevit, which stated that the Cyprus issue had been solved in 1974.



At this unique historic juncture, the Cyprus issue was found to be administered by two politicians of the EOKA era and the 1960s: Glafcos Clerides at first, and, later, Tassos Papadopoulos. Both have admitted that the political choices of the past were disastrous:



l Papadopoulos (Vima, Athens, May 2004) called the Makarios - Harding talks a real lost opportunity. Also, at a public speech in Nicosia

(January 13, 2005) he called the Zurich solution a "blessing".



l Clerides thinks of the non-completion of the 1973 agreement as a lost opportunity, while he believes that if Makarios accepted federation in 1974 instead of 1976, the Cyprus issue could have been solved. (E, July 15, 2004).



Clerides is thought of as the spokesman for the realistic school, and Papadopoulos as the one for the rejectionist school on the Cyprus issue. However, they both share the common characteristic of never having learnt from the mistakes of the past:



l Clerides, though he was President for 10 years, never prepared society for a solution, but only for non-solution and conflict: he was elected President in 1993 to bury the ideas proposed by UN Secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Gali, which had been accepted by his predecessor George Vassiliou, and in 1998 on the platform of the S-300 missiles.

l It took Papadopoulos 45 years to realise that independence was, under the circumstances of the time, a good solution in 1959. "The Cypriot people had become possessed by emotion, and had not been able to temper emotion with logic," he said about Zurich.




Forty-five years after Zurich, by stirring the same emotions, Papadopoulos led the people, who were unprepared for a solution, to repeat the same mistake. He himself - like Makarios in 1955 - did not see, let alone exploit, the historic confluence of 2004, to negotiate assertively, but also constructively, the solution of the Cyprus issue, at a time when the US, Turkey and the EU were eager to rid themselves of the problem. Having wasted the opportunity with decisions which have excused Turkey of her criminal responsibilities for 1974, he is now applying a policy of seeking a solution in some indeterminate future, based on the bankrupt policy of "all or nothing", with the expectation of absorbing the Turkish Cypriots.



Makarios Droushiotis

Cyprus Mail

07/08/2005


© Copyright: Μακαριος Δρουσιώτης | δημοσιογράφος, συγγραφέας

alekcen ; are u second Bayrak !

great post . you will be under the attack now .

they will hate you by trying to show other side of the coin and telling them from where to where we came today ......................

[paliometoxo]

from mongolia you people come from...

[Nikitas]

Droushiotis will have a big surprise when and if Turkey ever opens her foreign ministry files. There is a false assumption in his writing that Turkey had no active role in the Cyprus problem and all could have been regulated by Cypriots. This is total nonsense. First there was that statement by the British foreign minister that Cyprus was vital to Britain and therefore could never become independent which effectively told the EOKA to go ahead with their armed struggle. Then there were the Turkish plans and their local expression titled (very telling!) Rcapture of Cyprus or the KIP plan wich was put into effect in the mid 50s.

Makarios did not take Cyprus seriously as a nation. It was a major historic mistake but in the circumstance understandable, it is hard to go from colonial possession to full fledged independence. Union with Greece seemed more doable at the time.

And while Droushiots criticizes the GC side for failure to understand the issue he has not a word to say about the TC community which has shown, and is still demonstrating, total contempt for the idea of an independent Cyprus. The evidence is everywhere- full absorption into the Turkish economy and defence structure, total submission and subordination of the local TC institutions to the commands of the occupying army authority. Willingness under the Annan plan to cede important areas of Cypriot sovereignty to Turkey.

Droushiotis also overlooks the active undermining of Cyprus by its three guarantor powers- Greece, Britain and Turkey who in various combinations conspired against the independence of the island. In 1974 we saw the culmination of those conspiracies and how the conspirators even cheated on another. Why would they respect an independent Cyprus if it was established earlier uner Harding's plan or later under the Clerides Dentkash agreements?

Droushiotis finds no credit in the monumental achievement of GC society to survive and rebound from a disaster in 1974. Nor of the subsequent success in meeting and often exceeding all EU standards for accession. Would CYprus have been able to do all this with the fetters of the 1960 constitution? Will it be able to function as an independent and sovereign nation in the form of veto bound BBF? Droushiotis and other like minded analysts avoid that issue altogether.

His monotone is that it is all the GCs fault as if this story had no other players. It is a totally naive analysis.

[alekcen]

Droushiotis will have a big surprise when and if Turkey ever opens her foreign ministry files. There is a false assumption in his writing that Turkey had no active role in the Cyprus problem and all could have been regulated by Cypriots. This is total nonsense. First there was that statement by the British foreign minister that Cyprus was vital to Britain and therefore could never become independent which effectively told the EOKA to go ahead with their armed struggle. Then there were the Turkish plans and their local expression titled (very telling!) Rcapture of Cyprus or the KIP plan wich was put into effect in the mid 50s

I think u should read better what the whole article is about. Droushiotis is not trying to remove the responsibilities from turkey, they guys is trying to make us understand that we are also responsible for our situation and not only Turkey and the military Junta in Greece. U know something, whats wrong with many of u here is that u refuse to recognise the GC responsibilities in the story, by understanding ur mistakes it does not mean that u say Turkey is innocent. And to be honest we are to blame for many things, we ourselves but our fates into this suicidal road which lead us to 1974.

Makarios did not take Cyprus seriously as a nation. It was a major historic mistake but in the circumstance understandable, it is hard to go from colonial possession to full fledged independence. Union with Greece seemed more doable at the time

More doable at the time???? Even the pri-minister of Greece Karamanlis ( before the junta) warned makarios and all the others not to attemp such a thing cause it will bring only destruction, as well not to change the 1960s constitution, which he attemped one-sided despite all the warnings from Karamanlis.

And while Droushiots criticizes the GC side for failure to comprehend and understand the issue he has not a word to say about the TC community which has shown, and is still demonstrating, total contempt for the idea of an independent Cyprus

TC showing total contemp for the idea of an independent Cyprus?? what do u mean by this? Cause i havent seen such a think, TC are by far more willing to live in an independent re-united Cyprus, I think that is the GC who are less willing to do so.

Willingness under the Annan plan to cede important areas of Cypriot sovereignty to Turkey.

Please show me where in the Anna plan this thing is said??? Please show me ?? I want u to show me where did u read this thing???? I want u to search the anna plan and send me the part that says such a thing.

[Nikitas]

Read the Annan plan provisions for search and rescue.

Doable as understood by them at the time. As for Karamanlis pushign Makarios not to change the constitution etc, yes, but at the same time Greek intelligence officers were formulating plans for the island. There was a big parliamentary debate in Greece some years ago when both the right and left wing parties admitted that their policies for Cyprus in the 60s were "unionist" which is a euphemistic way of saying "conquest".

TCs are willing to live in a reunited Cyprus which is bizonal and the term was explained by Talat to exclude GCs from the north. This is not the form an independent federal state takes in other federal democracies. People are free to move, reside, and do business eveywhere in their country. And there is no need for a permanent Turkish military presence in an independent country member of the EU.

[alekcen]

Read the Annan plan provisions for search and rescue.

Please if u can, can u provide me of that information?

th

e same time Greek intelligence officers were formulating plans for the island.

Greek intelligence officers who later on helped with the military junta?

TCs are willing to live in a reunited Cyprus which is bizonal and the term was explained by Talat to exclude GCs from the north. This is not the form an independent federal state takes in other federal democracies. People are free to move, reside, and do business eveywhere in their country. And there is no need for a permanent Turkish military presence in an independent country member of the EU.

People will be free to move everywhere and reside in the north if the want to also. Everyone will be able to do business there is nothing preventing this, what the BBF says is that they wont have the right to vote in the central goverment elections of the constituent state, and thats to ensure the political equality, cause if this didnt not apply, we could just move 300 000 GC in the north and become majority and be able to elect both presidents and parliament in both south and north.
Everyone will be able to move freely, the thing is that they wont be able to vote for central goverment for north if they are GC and if they are TC they wont vote for central goverment in south.


Also do u prefer to have 40 000 Turkis troops, or 450 soldiers that will be a peace corp, and also except the 450 Turkish soldiers i there will also be a force of 650 or 950 Greek soldiers. ( ELDIK AND TURDIK)
So what do u prefer? Or are u afraid that the 450 and 950 Greeks will cause problems? And now ur feeling sucere with 40 000 Turkish soldiers???

[Piratis]

Please show me where in the Anna plan this thing is said??? Please show me ?? I want u to show me where did u read this thing???? I want u to search the anna plan and send me the part that says such a thing.

The first thing you should learn is that it is called the Annan plan, not the "Anna plan".

Apparently you don't even know the basics and yet you come here trying to teach others.

So your whole argument is "GCs have some responsibilities too". OK, lets assume this is true. How much responsibilities do the GCs have compared to what the Turks have? Do you want to analyze this and see (1) who started the conflicts, (2) who made the most murders and crimes, (3) who continues with crimes and illegalities today?

If the GCs have 1% of responsibility, then the Turks have the rest 99%. After all if it wasn't for the Turkish agression and expansionist against us there wouldn't be any "TCs" in Cyprus to begin with. And there wouldn't be any inter-communal conflict either, since it is the TCs who started it:



So the question now is:

If GCs have 1% of responsibility, and Turks the 99%, then why should the one who has 1% of responsibility be punished, while the one who has the 99% of the responsibility not only not be punished but also be rewarded?

[alekcen]

I like ur way of thinking how u end up to 1%.

There are facts, and we are responsible first of all for breaking the 1960s constitution. We started the conflicts my friend, we were the first to create para-military groups, papadopoulos and others created the Akritas plan for the extermination of TC. Back then the minister of interior Giorkatzis, had his own policy towards TC, no light, no roads, no schools were made to the TC villages, and all this with the tolerance of makarios!!!! Also let me remind u that even though makarios was president of both GC and TC he was systematically talking about ENOSIS!!! Also let me remind u of 1967 and the Greek brigade here, when grivas as the leader of the army invaded the TC village of kofinou committing atrocities and war crimes.

Also let me remind u the threads of Makarios towards the foreign powers that if Turkey invades they wont leave a TC alive.

Those are facts my friends.


Also let me ask u a question, who do u consider a murderer my friend, someone who killed 7 people or someone who killed 12 people????

My opinion is that they both of them are murderers.

Something last is that i never said Turkey is innocent, but we should realise our share of responsibility in the whole issue.