From Zaman newspaper, Reader's voice
Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Council decided on 17th December, 2004, to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October, 2005. But despite EU promises that "Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States". (Para. 12 of the Helsinki Agreement 11-12 December, 1999) an extraordinary condition was imposed on Turkey before negotiations could begin. Many others would follow afterwards. It required Turkey "to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States". (See Conclusion of the Council of Ministers 17th December, 2004).
The Ankara Agreement between Turkey and the EU was signed in 1963. It was not deemed necessary to sign any further protocols to cover the new members which joined the EU since that date. Neither was it necessary to do so after the Customs Union came into effect between the EU and Turkey in 1995. Why is it necessary now? Well, Cyprus became one of the new members of Europe on 1st May, 2004 despite the fact that 76% of the Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan at the referendum held on 24th April, 2004. The Turkish Cypriot North voted in favour by a resounding "yes" vote of 65%. The Annan Plan was approved and supported by the EU itself. Therefore, its rejection by the Greek Cypriots was a slap in the face of the EU. But instead of punishing them by suspending their full membership to Europe the EU rewarded the Greek Cypriots with full membership on 1st May, 2004. All the promises made to the Turkish Cypriots to persuade them to vote "yes" are still in abeyance, unlikely ever to materialise. Armed with the power to veto decisions within the EU the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Ankara Agreement be expanded to cover all the new members including "Cyprus" (NB: not "The Republic of Cyprus). The Greek Cypriots convinced themselves that by signing the new protocol Turkey would be recognising the Greek Cypriot Administration as the government of "Cyprus". This would enable them to tell Turkey to withdraw all its troops from Northern Cyprus thereby establishing Greek hegemony over all the Island. Turkey refused to accept this condition for fear that it would amount to such a recognition, but later recanted upon assurances by the EU leaders that this would not be the case.
Turkey has resisted similar demands in respect of her military intervention in 1974. Accusations of "invasion" and "occupation" have been used since 1974 against Turkey, without any legal basis or justification, to demand its withdrawal from Cyprus. Turkey did not invade, neither is she occupying Northern Cyprus illegally. Turkey militarily intervened in 1974 using her legal rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, in order to prevent "enosis" and to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Cypriots. The political pressure exerted upon Turkey has hitherto failed because "politics" is usually synonimous with lies, deceit and propaganda. Anything gained through such means cannot but fail in the long run.
Turkey recently signed this protocol but also informed all EU member States in writing emphasising that the protocol expanding the Ankara Agreement should in no way be construed as recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Government of Cyprus as a whole. Neither should it be in any way assumed as recognition of the "Cyprus Republic".
However, the Greek Cypriot leadership strongly insists that by signing this Protocol Turkey will be recognising "Cyprus" and thereby also recognise the Greek Cypriot Administration whose authority is limited to two-thirds of the Island in the South, as the government of the Island as a whole.
Opinion is divided amongst lawyers, academics and politicians as to whether signing the protocol would amount to such a recognition by Turkey. Some believe it does not amount to recognition but it may gradually lead to recognition. Others believe that it amounts to indirect or implied recognition and so on. What is rather surprising, however, is that no opinion has been expressed as to how the Greek Cypriot Administration (internationally recognised as the Government of the "Republic of Cyprus") will be affected by Turkey's recognition if such a recognition were assumed to exist. So far only one side of the coin has been analysed. Now it is time for a look at the other side of the coin.
"In practice, the chief function of recognition is to acknowledge the existence of an entity as a subject of international law with whom another state can maintain diplomatic relations". (see Encyclopaedia Britannica). Turkey will not recognise "The Cyprus Republic" or a "Government of Cyprus" because such an entity does not exist. The Cyprus Republic ceased to exist when the Greek Cypriots abrogated the 1960 Constitution which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus. The House of Commons Select Committee of Foreign Affairs First Report on Cyprus published in 1976 referred to the 1960 Constitution as "a dead letter". By definition the "Republic of Cyprus" was also dead. But the international community (except Turkey) relied on UN resolution No.186 dated 4th March, 1964 when defending its recognition of the "Republic of Cyprus" since that date. However, that resolution has no legal basis. It is a semi de-facto recognition the UN had to presume existed in order to enable it to send troops to the Island to stop the massacring of the Turkish Cypriots. It could be said that the UN was being "pragmatic" at the time. But the Turkish Cypriots have been suffering the consequences of this pragmatic approach ever since. The British Government of the time, and all the others since, are mainly responsible for this act of treachery, masterly deceit and derogation from their obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee.
In Cyprus there are two nations or two entities (Greek and Turkish) and two States. The Greek Cypriot State in the South and the Turkish Cypriot State in the North. These are the names given in the Annan Plan. Turkey recognises the TRNC but does not recognise the Greek Cypriot State in the South. The paradox is that the international community recognise the Greek Cypriot Administation in the South as the Government of the "Republic of Cyprus" for reasons of expediency as explained above. If this anomaly were removed and the international community came to recognise that there are two nations and two States in Cyprus, Turkey would have no difficulty in recognising the Greek Cypriot State in the South.
Another aspect of recognition is that it is "in principle, discretionary". It is also "a matter of intent" (Enc.Brinannica). Above all, it is not a one-sided event. It takes two states to recognise each other. It is a mutual affair. Therefore, let us assume, just for the sake of argument, that Turkey by signing the said protocol recognises the "Cyprus Republic" and its Government (i.e. the Greek Cypriot administration in the South). As the process of recognition demands, the Cyprus Republic will also be required to recognise the Republic of Turkey and establish diplomatic relations with it. But by so doing the Republic of Cyprus (i.e. the Greek Cypriots) will be recognising, explicitly or by implication, the occupation and presence of thirty-thousand Turkish troops on one-third of the Island. Will the "Republic of Cyprus" afford such recognition to the Republic of Turkey? Of course, not. The Greek Cypriots will be the first to denounce such recognition. Therefore, both recognitions will in fact be mutually exclusive and will be dead before they are proclaimed.
Those who ask, "How can Turkey be trading with Cyprus without recognising it?" should also be asking, "how can Cyprus be trading with Turkey without recognising it?" Trading is mutual and so is recognition. Above all they should ask, "How can Cyprus be trading with Turkey - a country it accuses of invading and occupying part of its territory?!". Only then will the arguments about recognition make sense and enable us to arrive at a proper conclusion.
Since the referendum of 24th April, 2004 the Greek Cypriots have lost the sympathy of the world. Their political power in the UN has diminished significantly. The UN Secretary General's Report of 28th May, 2004 speaks volumes to that effect. They are now trying to salvage whatever they can of their previous political power through their membership within the EU. They threaten to use their power of veto within the EU to achieve their aim of ultimately Hellenising the Island. If they persist in their present belligerent and divisive attitude causing havoc within Europe, and defying European values and principles, the EU will soon lose its patience and resort to drastic measures. Perhaps similar to those taken against Austria not very long ago. If Turkey stands firm in its dealings with the EU, the role of the Greek Cypriots will be reduced to a toothless dog barking on the sidelines.
Given the above analysis it is clear that the Greek Cypriot expectations from EU membership will not materialise. If anything they will backfire on them. Their only remedy is to accept the Annan Plan or come to terms with a divided Island for ever.
Niyazi Eren
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What is he talking about?
Does he believe what he writes? 
