Cyprus-Forum.com

[DT.]

Halil, what everyone is trying to tell you is that there is a lot of subjective information here that is open to the authors interpretation. It will help us all if you tell us who wrote this and when. Otherwise your objective of reading the "facts" and answering questions later will not be achieved due to a mistrust of your source.

[BirKibrisli]

The question you should realy ask yourself is this:

Why did the TCs feel the need to distance themselves from the GCs by first siding with the British,and later by turning to Turkey for survival...????

You might also like to think of why the TCs felt less Cypriot than Turkish after 400 years of living in Cyprus????

Until you do that and come up with some sensible answers you are only peddling hatred and bitterness towards one group of Cypriots you need to convince you are a nice guy,in order to have a realistic solution to Cyprob....

And I am not going to give you any hints either...Lets see what you come up with your great googling skills...


If your intention is to sabotage any possible solution other than what you think is the only desirable one,you are doing a great job,GR...

Bir, I have given many times the only sensible answer as to why the TCs have sided and continue to side with the UK and Turkey. "Fear" or "survival" are not the main answers.

These two elements might have played a role only at the very beginning, and only because Turkey and the UK made sure to exaggerate this fear among TCs. Soon after however, greed replaced fear as the main drive of the TCs actions, when UK and Turkey promised to them a ton of unfair and disproportinal gains on the loss of the rest of Cypriots. Lets not forget that partition is not something that was first thought in 1974, but somehting that the TCs had been promised since the 50s, along with several other unfair gains on the loss of the rest of Cypriots, many of which were granted to them with the 1960 agreements that were forced on the Cypriot people.

The "divide and rule" practice for Cyprus was simple: Offer the minority a ton of unfair gains on the lost of the rest of people, make this minority actually believe that the have the right for such unfair gains, and then see them fight.

This was and continues to be the only sensible answer. If you disagree with me, then tell me what else other than greed makes TCs today to demand that any agreement should grand to their 18% minority the 30% of land? Such demands can not be explained with the "fear" or the "survival" theories. They demand such things simply because Turkey and UK continue to promise to them that they can have such unfair gains on our loss if the TCs continue to play their divide and rule game so that Turkey and the UK can continue to have troops and control over our island.

I think you are underestimating the fear factor,Piratis...I urge you to have a good look at the 1964-74 period,and the period just before that,say from 1955 -60...Sure Denktash was stirring the pot and so was TMT and the Turkish Deep State,but the Menderes govrenment had to be dragged into taking any interest in Cyprus by the British and the Deep State via the Special War Office or whatever they were called at the time...Nobody wants to leave their place of birth for any amount of money. And the TCs are not any different...The whole tragedy developed slowly iof course,almost organically,once hatred and bitterness gave way to fear and suspicion...In any case the number of TCs who benefited from the War are not that great...Most,certainly the 65,000 thousand refugees from the South fared very badly indeed unless they had friends in high places,and many didn't....If the TCs had made as much gains as you suggest how do you explain their dwindling numbers in the trnc??? More TCs left Cyprus after 1974 than before,and they are still leaving,especially the young...As you know all Cypriots want their kids to go to university,and most who do simply stay away these days...More than half of my own extended family have left Cyprus,about twice as many after 1974 than between 1950-74...The people who made the real gains were the ones well connected politically,certain members of the TMT,and the inital settlers who were brought in and given GC land freely...Since than of course you can count the casino and brothel operators,the drug barons,gambling establishments,and recently the real estate developers...Most of these people too are from Turkey,and other international lawbreakers and criminals...The average TC is millions of miles away from all this...usually in another country

[Kifeas]

Halil, why don't you tell us whose views and opinion are you presenting above?

Kifeas why dont you tell us when you think the current talks will break down?

Soon VP, very soon! Already your leader Talat started preparing the ground with his latest statements! He is seeking an excuse to walk away, or to lead the discussions to a dead lock, despite Christofias good will! They will break down in a matter of months, but do not hope anything good to come around regarding the status quo and your isolation! Only Turkey will find itself fully exposed, and in 2009 it will finally receive the final "boot" from its EU accession process for not fulfilling its undertaken obligations towards the EU and Cyprus, with all the detrimental consequences for its internal stability! Turkey is a closed boiling pot! The only thing that holds it together from not exploding, it is its EU accession process! It is the valve that allows some steam to escape! Once this valve is blocked ….keep a distance from it! Kurds against Turks, Kemalsits against islamists, ending of all foreign investment and repatriation foreign capital, civil unrest, bombs in tourist resorts making tourists run away from Turkey, economic devastation, etc, etc! Don't make up your mind soon and start thinking of ways to co-operate with the GCs (saving in this way your "motherland" too,) and I see you badly affected by this situation as well!

[Viewpoint]

Halil, why don't you tell us whose views and opinion are you presenting above?

Kifeas why dont you tell us when you think the current talks will break down?

Soon VP, very soon! Already your leader Talat started preparing the ground with his latest statements! He is seeking an excuse to walk away, or to lead the discussions to a dead lock, despite Christofias good will! They will break down in a matter of months, but do not hope anything good to come around regarding the status quo and your isolation! Only Turkey will find itself fully exposed, and in 2009 it will finally receive the final "boot" from its EU accession process for not fulfilling its undertaken obligations towards the EU and Cyprus, with all the detrimental consequences for its internal stability! Turkey is boiling pot! The only thing that holds it together from not exploding, it is its EU accession process! It is the valve that allows some steam to escape! Once this valve is blocked ….keep a distance from it! Kurds against Turks, Kemalsits against islamists, ending of all foreign investment, civil unrest, bombs in tourist resorts making tourists run away from Turkey, economic devastation, etc, etc! Don't make up your mind soon and start thinking of ways to co-operate with the GCs (saving in this way your "motherland" too,) and I see you badly affected by this situation as well!

Gcs have always painted a picture of doom and gloom for Turkey that's how they wish to see the picture, but shes still around and fighting her corner. I do agree with you on certain points that Turkey will have to make a move if she wants to keep negotiations going with the EU which path she chooses is not very clear right now has the Turkish people have lost the momentum that is necessary to go into the EU. I personally do not believe Turkey will ever make it the best she can expect is a special partnership.

If that's the route she takes and EU progression is halted then the Cyprus issue will never be resolved and the north will be assimilated by Turkey, which means that GCs will never get the north back with no EU leverage or TC support. Which speeches do you not like of President Talats, he always gives us the impression he is all for a BBF with political equality 100%, what have you read to the contrary, you are no doubt aware of his difficult balancing act with Turkey and comments are sometimes to please the crowds but in reality bear no connection with whats being agreed around the table with the GCS.

[halil]

Halil, what everyone is trying to tell you is that there is a lot of subjective information here that is open to the authors interpretation. It will help us all if you tell us who wrote this and when. Otherwise your objective of reading the "facts" and answering questions later will not be achieved due to a mistrust of your source.

İ don't think so DT ,
Read every post and say where it is wrong .

From U Thant to Kofi Annan: UN Peacemaking in
Cyprus, 1964-2004
Dr James Ker-Lindsay is Director of Civilitas Research and an associate fellow of the
European Security Programme at the London-based Royal United
Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). His publications include EU Accession and UN
Peacemaking in Cyprus, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-64
(Bibliopolis, University of Mannheim, 2004) and The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). He holds a BSc (econ.) from London University and an MA and
PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent.


The Set of Ideas and Confidence Building Measures, 1988-1994
At the start of 1988, George Vassiliou replaced Kyprianou. As a fresh face on the
political scene he was expected to take an entirely new approach. Such hopes were
further fuelled by an improvement in relations between Athens and Ankara following
a ground-breaking meeting between Prime Ministers Ozal and Papandreou at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Making the most of the new situation
in Cyprus, and the wider region, de Cuellar called upon the two sides to meet with
him in Geneva in August. There the two leaders agreed to abandon the March 1986
Draft Framework Agreement and return to the 1977 and 1979 High Level
Agreements. Negotiations resumed in August 1988 with the hope that an agreement
would be secured by the following June. But yet again the talks soon faltered. This
time the cause was the Greek Cypriot announcement that they intended to apply for
membership of the European Community, a move strongly opposed by Denktash. In
June 1989, the UN presented a new document to the two communities – the ‘Set of
Ideas’. It was quickly rejected by Denktash. He not only disagreed with the substance
of the proposals, he also argued that the Secretary-General had no right to present
formal plans to the two sides. Following a failed attempt to open direct talks with the
Greek Cypriots, free from UN involvement, the Turkish Cypriot leader was
eventually persuaded to return to the table and, in February 1990, the two sides met
again in New York. It was another short lived effort. Denktash demanded that the
Greek Cypriots recognise the existence of two people in Cyprus and their basic right
to self-determination.
On 4 July 1990, Cyprus formally applied to join the European Community
(EC). Turkey, which had applied for membership in 1987, was outraged by the
application, as were the Turkish Cypriots. Denktash claimed that Cyprus could only
join the Community at the same time as Turkey and called off all talks with UN
officials. He also threatened to open up Varosha for settlement, contrary to UN
resolutions. It had little effect. In September, the EC Council of Ministers
unanimously decided to refer the Cypriot application to the Commission for formal
consideration. In retaliation, Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration
abolishing passport controls and introducing a customs union just weeks later.
Undeterred by the deterioration in the climate, de Cuellar continued his search for a
solution throughout 1991. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Gulf War there was even
talk of an international conference to address the Cyprus issue. It came to nothing. In
his last report to the Security Council, presented in October 1991, de Cuellar noted
that progress on his set of ideas had gone no further. This was largely due to
Denktash’s demand that the two communities should have equal sovereignty and a
right to secession.
In January 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over as UN Secretary-General.
He continued to work on the Set of Ideas. On 3 April 1992, he presented the Security
Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation
that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with another state.
While the Greek Cypriots accepted the Set of Ideas as a basis for negotiation,
Denktash refused to engage in substantive discussions on the plan as it stood and
again criticised the Secretary-General for exceeding his authority. In response, the
Turkish Cypriot leader again called for direct talks with the Greek Cypriots, free from
UN involvement. The offer was rejected. When he did eventually return to the table,
the Turkish Cypriot leader complained that the proposals failed to recognise his
community. In November, Ghali called a halt to the process. Although the Turkish
Cypriot side had accepted 91 of 100 of the proposals, Denktash’s unwillingness to
engage in substantive talks on the remaining nine core areas of difference meant that
he bore ultimate responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement. In the aftermath
of yet another failure, Ghali now changed tack. Instead of focusing on a
comprehensive settlement, he would try to encourage the two sides to develop a
climate of goodwill though a series of eight Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
These included reducing military forces on the island, transferring Varosha to direct
UN control, reducing restrictions on contacts between the two sides, undertaking an
island-wide census and conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution. The
Security Council endorsed the approach.
In February 1993, Glafcos Clerides took over as the Greek Cypriot leader. Preelection
hopes that the long-standing relationship between Clerides and Denktash
might enable the two sides reach an agreement more easily were seemingly confirmed
when, shortly after the election, the two men met for dinner under UN auspices. It was
the first time that the leaders of the two sides had met face-to-face for several years.
Yet again the optimism was short lived. On 24 May, the Secretary-General formally
presented the two sides with his CBMs. Although he was willing to accept some of
the proposals, Denktash was not prepared to agree to the package as a whole. Soon
afterwards he also announced that he would not attend a further round of talks that
had been scheduled for mid-June. Meanwhile, Cyprus was about to take a step closer
to eventual EU membership. Just weeks later, on 30 June, the European Commission
returned its opinion on the Cypriot application for membership. While the decision
provided a ringing endorsement of the case for Cypriot membership, it refrained from
opening the way for immediate negotiations. Instead, after noting that a settlement
would further ‘reinforce’ its European vocation, the Commission concluded that as
soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer it would be ready to start the accession
process. However, the door was left nonetheless open for the Greek Cypriots in the
event that the talks fell apart. The Commission stated that it felt that the issue should
be reconsidered in January 1995, taking into account the ‘the positions adopted by
each party in the talks.’
In December, in an effort to advance the CBM process, Clerides put forward a
proposal for the complete demilitarisation of the island. Denktash immediately
dismissed it as an impractical propaganda stunt.48 However, in January 1994, the
Turkish Cypriot leader reversed his earlier position on the CBMs. He announced that
he would be willing to accept the measures in principle. Proximity talks started the
following month. In March, the UN presented the two sides with a draft document
outlining the proposed measures in greater detail. In response, Clerides said that he
would be willing to accept the document if Denktash did. The Turkish Cypriot leader
refused, stating that it would severely affect the balance of forces on the island. Once
again, Ghali had little choice but to pin the blame for another breakdown of talks on
the Turkish Cypriot side. Soon afterwards Denktash relented. He would be willing to
accept mutually agreed changes. But Clerides refused to negotiate any further changes
to the March proposals. Further proposals put forward by the Secretary-General in an
attempt to break the deadlock were rejected by both sides.

[Piratis]

The question you should realy ask yourself is this:

Why did the TCs feel the need to distance themselves from the GCs by first siding with the British,and later by turning to Turkey for survival...????

You might also like to think of why the TCs felt less Cypriot than Turkish after 400 years of living in Cyprus????

Until you do that and come up with some sensible answers you are only peddling hatred and bitterness towards one group of Cypriots you need to convince you are a nice guy,in order to have a realistic solution to Cyprob....

And I am not going to give you any hints either...Lets see what you come up with your great googling skills...


If your intention is to sabotage any possible solution other than what you think is the only desirable one,you are doing a great job,GR...

Bir, I have given many times the only sensible answer as to why the TCs have sided and continue to side with the UK and Turkey. "Fear" or "survival" are not the main answers.

These two elements might have played a role only at the very beginning, and only because Turkey and the UK made sure to exaggerate this fear among TCs. Soon after however, greed replaced fear as the main drive of the TCs actions, when UK and Turkey promised to them a ton of unfair and disproportinal gains on the loss of the rest of Cypriots. Lets not forget that partition is not something that was first thought in 1974, but somehting that the TCs had been promised since the 50s, along with several other unfair gains on the loss of the rest of Cypriots, many of which were granted to them with the 1960 agreements that were forced on the Cypriot people.

The "divide and rule" practice for Cyprus was simple: Offer the minority a ton of unfair gains on the lost of the rest of people, make this minority actually believe that the have the right for such unfair gains, and then see them fight.

This was and continues to be the only sensible answer. If you disagree with me, then tell me what else other than greed makes TCs today to demand that any agreement should grand to their 18% minority the 30% of land? Such demands can not be explained with the "fear" or the "survival" theories. They demand such things simply because Turkey and UK continue to promise to them that they can have such unfair gains on our loss if the TCs continue to play their divide and rule game so that Turkey and the UK can continue to have troops and control over our island.

I think you are underestimating the fear factor,Piratis...I urge you to have a good look at the 1964-74 period,and the period just before that,say from 1955 -60...Sure Denktash was stirring the pot and so was TMT and the Turkish Deep State,but the Menderes govrenment had to be dragged into taking any interest in Cyprus by the British and the Deep State via the Special War Office or whatever they were called at the time...Nobody wants to leave their place of birth for any amount of money. And the TCs are not any different...The whole tragedy developed slowly iof course,almost organically,once hatred and bitterness gave way to fear and suspicion...In any case the number of TCs who benefited from the War are not that great...Most,certainly the 65,000 thousand refugees from the South fared very badly indeed unless they had friends in high places,and many didn't....If the TCs had made as much gains as you suggest how do you explain their dwindling numbers in the trnc??? More TCs left Cyprus after 1974 than before,and they are still leaving,especially the young...As you know all Cypriots want their kids to go to university,and most who do simply stay away these days...More than half of my own extended family have left Cyprus,about twice as many after 1974 than between 1950-74...The people who made the real gains were the ones well connected politically,certain members of the TMT,and the inital settlers who were brought in and given GC land freely...Since than of course you can count the casino and brothel operators,the drug barons,gambling establishments,and recently the real estate developers...Most of these people too are from Turkey,and other international lawbreakers and criminals...The average TC is millions of miles away from all this...usually in another country

Bir, the excuse of "fear" can not explain the demands for things like 30% goverment positions and other unfair gains on the expense of the rest of Cypriots in the 1960 agreements. Neither they can explain the TC demands today that in a BBF solution they should keep 30% of the land and the other unfair and disproportinal gains they demand on our loss.

Also you have to take into consideration the sequence of events. What came first was the collaboration of UK - Turkey - TCs with the aim to defeat the Cypriot revolution and with an agreement that they would all have unfair gains on the loss of the rest of Cypriots once the revolution was defeated. The inter-communal conflict came as a result of this collaboration and with a TC initiative in 1958.

During WWI when the UK was offering Cyprus to Greece I didn't see much reaction from TCs mentioned anywhere. If Britain wanted to allow Cyprus to be part of Greece then it would have happened without any reaction from TCs. In the 50s the TCs reacted exactly because the UK wanted them to react and they helped them to do so by exaggerating their fears and promising to them huge gains on our loss. Since then the TC leadership continues to play the divide and rule game of the UK and Turkey in the exact same way: They exaggerate the fears of TCs by a factor of 1000, and they also make them to believe that they actually deserve all these unfair gains they demand.

And yes, you are right that most TCs didn't manage to gain much. And that is because we didn't allow that to happen. But ask any average TC today, and they will continue to demand disproportionally large amounts in almost every aspect (land, power, positions, coast line etc) because Turkey and the UK continue to promise to them that they supposedly have rights for such unfair gains.

[BirKibrisli]

halil gardash,just give the link and let people make what they will of it...
Otherwise it lacks credibility...inadi birak...

[DT.]

Halil, what everyone is trying to tell you is that there is a lot of subjective information here that is open to the authors interpretation. It will help us all if you tell us who wrote this and when. Otherwise your objective of reading the "facts" and answering questions later will not be achieved due to a mistrust of your source.

İ don't think so DT ,
Read every post and say where it is wrong .

From U Thant to Kofi Annan: UN Peacemaking in
Cyprus, 1964-2004
Dr James Ker-Lindsay is Director of Civilitas Research and an associate fellow of the
European Security Programme at the London-based Royal United
Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). His publications include EU Accession and UN
Peacemaking in Cyprus, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-64
(Bibliopolis, University of Mannheim, 2004) and The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). He holds a BSc (econ.) from London University and an MA and
PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent.


The Set of Ideas and Confidence Building Measures, 1988-1994
At the start of 1988, George Vassiliou replaced Kyprianou. As a fresh face on the
political scene he was expected by who? to take an entirely new approach. Such hopes were
further fuelled by an improvement in relations between Athens and Ankara following
a ground-breaking meeting between Prime Ministers Ozal and Papandreou at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Making the most of the new situation
in Cyprus, and the wider region, de Cuellar called upon the two sides to meet with
him in Geneva in August. There the two leaders agreed to abandon the March 1986
Draft Framework Agreement and return to the 1977 and 1979 High Level
Agreements. Negotiations resumed in August 1988 with the hope that an agreement
would be secured by the following June. But yet again the talks soon faltered. This
time the cause was the Greek Cypriot announcement that they intended to apply for
membership of the European Community, a move strongly opposed by Denktash. Why then was Denktash blamed by the UN for the brea down in talks?In
June 1989, the UN presented a new document to the two communities – the ‘Set of
Ideas’. It was quickly rejected by Denktash. He not only disagreed with the substance
of the proposals, he also argued that the Secretary-General had no right to present
formal plans to the two sides. Following a failed attempt to open direct talks with the
Greek Cypriots, free from UN involvement, the Turkish Cypriot leader was
eventually persuaded to return to the table and, in February 1990, the two sides met
again in New York. It was another short lived effort. Denktash demanded that the
Greek Cypriots recognise the existence of two people in Cyprus and their basic right
to self-determination.
On 4 July 1990, Cyprus formally applied to join the European Community
(EC). Turkey, which had applied for membership in 1987, was outraged who says? by the
application, as were the Turkish Cypriots. Denktash claimed that Cyprus could only
join the Community at the same time as Turkey and called off all talks with UN
officials. He also threatened to open up Varosha for settlement, contrary to UN
resolutions. It had little effect who says?. In September, the EC Council of Ministers
unanimously decided to refer the Cypriot application to the Commission for formal
consideration. In retaliation, who is he to say this is in retaliation, it coud have been a long term policy. Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration
abolishing passport controls and introducing a customs union just weeks later.
Undeterred by the deterioration in the climate, de Cuellar continued his search for a
solution throughout 1991. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Gulf War there was even
talk of an international conference to address the Cyprus issuewhere di he hear that?. It came to nothing. In
his last report to the Security Council, presented in October 1991, de Cuellar noted
that progress on his set of ideas had gone no further. This was largely due to
Denktash’s demand that the two communities should have equal sovereignty and a
right to secession. thats not what denktahs says
In January 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over as UN Secretary-General.
He continued to work on the Set of Ideas. On 3 April 1992, he presented the Security
Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation
that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with another state.
While the Greek Cypriots accepted the Set of Ideas as a basis for negotiation,
Denktash refused to engage in substantive discussions on the plan as it stood and
again criticised the Secretary-General for exceeding his authority. In response, the
Turkish Cypriot leader again called for direct talks with the Greek Cypriots, free from
UN involvement. The offer was rejected. When he did eventually return to the table,
the Turkish Cypriot leader complained that the proposals failed to recognise his
community. In November, Ghali called a halt to the process. Although the Turkish
Cypriot side had accepted 91 of 100 of the proposals, Denktash’s unwillingness to
engage in substantive talks on the remaining nine core areas of difference meant that
he bore ultimate responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement. In the aftermath
of yet another failure, Ghali now changed tack. Instead of focusing on a
comprehensive settlement, he would try to encourage the two sides to develop a
climate of goodwill though a series of eight Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
These included reducing military forces on the island, transferring Varosha to direct
UN control, reducing restrictions on contacts between the two sides, undertaking an
island-wide census and conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution. The
Security Council endorsed the approach.
In February 1993, Glafcos Clerides took over as the Greek Cypriot leader. Preelection
hopes that the long-standing relationship between Clerides and Denktash
might enable the two sides reach an agreement more easily were seemingly confirmed
when, shortly after the election, the two men met for dinner under UN auspices. It was
the first time that the leaders of the two sides had met face-to-face for several years.
Yet again the optimism was short lived subjective. On 24 May, the Secretary-General formally
presented the two sides with his CBMs. Although he was willing to accept some of
the proposals, Denktash was not prepared to agree to the package as a whole. Soon
afterwards he also announced that he would not attend a further round of talks that
had been scheduled for mid-June. Meanwhile, Cyprus was about to take a step closer
to eventual EU membership. Just weeks later, on 30 June, the European Commission
returned its opinion on the Cypriot application for membership. While the decision
provided a ringing endorsement of the case for Cypriot membership, it refrained from
opening the way for immediate negotiations. Instead, after noting that a settlement
would further ‘reinforce’ its European vocation, the Commission concluded that as
soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer it would be ready to start the accession
process. However, the door was left nonetheless open for the Greek Cypriots in the
event that the talks fell apart. The Commission stated that it felt that the issue should
be reconsidered in January 1995, taking into account the ‘the positions adopted by
each party in the talks.’
In December, in an effort to advance the CBM process, Clerides put forward a
proposal for the complete demilitarisation of the island. Denktash immediately
dismissed it as an impractical propaganda stunt.48 However, in January 1994, the
Turkish Cypriot leader reversed his earlier position on the CBMs. He announced that
he would be willing to accept the measures in principle. Proximity talks started the
following month. In March, the UN presented the two sides with a draft document
outlining the proposed measures in greater detail. In response, Clerides said that he
would be willing to accept the document if Denktash did. The Turkish Cypriot leader
refused, stating that it would severely affect the balance of forces on the island. Once
again, Ghali had little choice but to pin the blame for another breakdown of talks on
the Turkish Cypriot side. Soon afterwards Denktash relented. He would be willing to
accept mutually agreed changes. But Clerides refused to negotiate any further changes
to the March proposals. Further proposals put forward by the Secretary-General in an
attempt to break the deadlock were rejected by both sides.

I couldn't be bothered with the rest but you get my drift halil. Some of this stuff is a matter of the authors opinion. We'd like to know who he is before any further debate is made on this.

[halil]

DT, as far as i can see he analised Cyprob.well and we can find tips from him what will be present talks will be at future talks . this is my opinion

here is the link
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectur ... indsay.pdf

information about writer


Dr James Ker-Lindsay is Director of Civilitas Research and an associate fellow of the
European Security Programme at the London-based Royal United
Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). His publications include EU Accession and UN
Peacemaking in Cyprus, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-64
(Bibliopolis, University of Mannheim, 2004) and The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). He holds a BSc (econ.) from London University and an MA and
PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent.

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/sho ... rdId=17818

[CopperLine]

Those who live by the words, Get Real, shall die by the words (so said
the dyslexic.

After having berated Halil for his English language competence you use a title for a thread which not only mangles the English language but insodoing confuses the issue .....

The phrase 'The Turkish Cypriot acquittal of responsibility ...' does not describe what you have actually written in the following paragraphs. If you had written "Turkish Cypriot abrogation of responsibility ...' or if you'd written 'Turkish Cypriots refuse responsbility for XYZ' then you would have been on the right lines. But you didn't, instead you wrote 'acquittal of responsibility' - and since only other people can acquit your headline is both literally non-sensical and certainly not English. The use of the definite article at the beginning makes the Turkish Cypriots the unequivocal active subjects of the sentence. It is them doing the acquitting. But to be 'acquitted of responsibility' requires one actor to do the 'acquitting' of the actions or responsibility of another.

So, again, Get Real you are plain wrong.