Cyprus-Forum.com

[halil]

Intercommunal discussions 1967-1974
In March 1966, a more modest attempt at peacemaking was initiated under the
auspices of Carlos Bernades, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for
Cyprus. Instead of trying to develop formal proposals for the parties to bargain over,
he aimed to encourage the two sides to agree to settlement through direct dialogue.
However, ongoing political chaos in Greece prevented any substantive discussions
from developing. The situation changed the following year. On 21 April 1967, a coup
in Greece brought to power a military administration that appeared determined to
settle the Cyprus issue. On 9-10 September 1967, the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers met for two meetings on either side of their border in Thrace. The
discussions were a fiasco. Following an indication from Washington that it would be
met with a sympathetic ear, the Greek Junta proposed Enosis as a solution. The
Turkish Government immediately and categorically rejected the idea. Greece was
now forced to abandon the idea of union for the foreseeable future
Two months later, in November 1967, Cyprus witnessed its most severe bout
of intercommunal fighting since 1964. Responding to a major attack on Turkish
Cypriot villages in the south of the island, which left 27 dead, Turkey warned Greek
Cypriot forces and appeared to be readying itself for an invasion. Greece was forced
to capitulate. It agreed to recall General Grivas, the Commander of the Greek Cypriot
National Guard and former EOKA leader, and reduce its forces on the island.
Capitalising on the weakness of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed
their own provisional administration. Makarios immediately declared the new
administration illegal. Nevertheless, a major change had occurred. The Archbishop,
along with most other Greek Cypriots, began to accept that the Turkish Cypriots
would have to have some degree of political autonomy. It was also realised that
unification of Greece and Cyprus was unachievable under the prevailing
circumstances.
In May 1968, intercommunal talks began between the two sides under the
auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General. It was an important
moment. Quite apart from being supported by Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom, the talks were also supported by Washington, which had hitherto favoured
a settlement decided by Athens and Ankara. It also marked a coming together of two
men who would play an enormous role in future talks. Rather than hold talks between
Makarios and Vice-President Kuchuk, it was instead decided that the discussions
would be conducted by the presidents of the communal chambers, Glafcos Clerides
and Rauf Denktas. However, the talks made little progress. During the first round,
which lasted until August 1967, the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several
concessions regarding constitutional matters, but Makarios refused to grant them
greater autonomy. The second round of talks, which focused on local government,
was equally unsuccessful, even though the Junta lobbied hard for a settlement. In
December 1969 a third round of discussion started. This time they focused on
constitutional issues. Yet again there was little progress and when they ended in
September 1970 the Secretary-General blamed both sides for the lack of movement.
A fourth and final round of intercommunal talks also focused on constitutional issues,
but again failed to make headway before they were forced to a halt in 1974.

[Get Real!]

Intercommunal discussions 1967-1974
In March 1966, a more modest attempt at peacemaking was initiated under the...

Give up the Turkish Cypriot way of crime and make your family PROUD by respecting author’s copyrights, respecting forum threads by making sense and being on-topic, but more importantly by…

RESPECTING YOURSELF!

[Oracle]

The Turkish Cypriot acquittal of responsibility…

Putting all the Cyprus history and “Cyprus Problem” theories aside, the following are the stark REALITIES on the ground in the occupied territory of Cyprus…


When Syrians and other illegal immigrants are being conned via “ferry boats” into the “TRNC” by Turkish Cypriots, only to find their death in the green line or on a freeway, or face utter misery in RoC incarceration for years, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When priceless ancient artifacts are being stripped off ancient Orthodox churches and historic sites, and sold off for peanuts by Turkish Cypriots liaising with foreign criminals, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When GC properties are constantly being prostituted by Turkish Cypriots with the blessings of the TC authorities thus exacerbating the enormous refugee problem, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When Turkish Cypriot authorities provide a safe haven to foreign criminal fugitives, contravening international law, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When Turkish Cypriot authorities approve of the desecration of mountain sides and other natural places, for nationalistic symbols and/or “development”, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When Turkish Cypriot authorities encourage and maintain the criminal underworld of the “TRNC”; incidentally even a crime infested country like Colombia is starting to look like paradise next to the “TRNC”, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?

When Turkish Cypriots are active participants with Turkey in the illegal alteration of Cyprus’ demographics with the constant importation and accommodation of Anatolian settlers, who is responsible for this irresponsible act?


Let us NOT kid ourselves anymore because we are dealing with a people, comprised of tens of thousands of mature adults who have WILLINGLY established and embraced a life of crime, yet the Turkish Cypriot community PROFESSES to want a “solution” to the Cyprus Problem when all along they ARE the Cyprus Problem itself it seems!

When the Turkish Cypriots were mixed with Greek Cypriots they had “problems” they say, but since Turkey divided them in 1974 they have EVEN BIGGER problems! It appears that this “black cloud” follows the Turkish Cypriots wherever they go and one can’t help but wonder why…

Is the Turkish Cypriot acquittal of responsibility to blame?


Regards, GR.

This is their answer GR!...

....But it looks as if it is too long a jump for the TCs...

It's apparently too much to ask of the TCs ...

Blind Freddie can see now that we cannot go from where we are to a unitary state based on one-vote one -value democracy...It is the reality I have come to accept

They are comfortable where they are. Their one-vote has more "value" in their criminal set-up.

Why should they give anything up?

[halil]

After reading all of it i will give my ideas . be patient , we will see TC's and GC's responsibilies together .

Invasion and division, 1974
While tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots subsided after 1967, a dangerous
new conflict had arisen within the Greek Cypriot community. Although Makarios had
effectively abandoned Enosis in favour of an ‘attainable solution’, many others
continued to believe that the only legitimate political aspirations for Greek Cypriots
was union with Greece In September 1971 Grivas secretly returned to the island
and formed EOKA-B, a vehemently pro-union organisation. Over the next few years
it would repeatedly try to overthrow Makarios.In early 1974 Grivas died and
EOKA-B fell under the direct control of Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, the new head
of the Junta in Athens. Ioannidis was determined to bring about Enosis as soon as
possible. Fearing the consequences of such a step, in early July 1974 Makarios
wrote an open letter to the military dictatorship requesting that all Greek officers be
removed from the island. On 15 July, Ioannidis replied by ordering the overthrow of
the Archbishop. He was replaced by Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA gunman, who
was well known for both his anti-Turkish views and his avid support for union between Greece and Cyprus.


Turkey immediately started planning its response. After failing to secure British
support for a joint intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, Bulent Ecevit, the
Turkish prime minister, decided to act unilaterally. On 20 July Turkey launched a
military invasion of the island. Within two days Turkish forces had established a
narrow corridor linking the north coast with Nicosia. The invasion led to turmoil in
Greece. On 23 July the military Junta collapsed. Two days later formal peace talks
were convened in Geneva between Greece, Turkey and Britain. Over the course of the
following five days Turkey agreed to halt its advance on the condition that it would
remain on the island until a political settlement was reached between the two sides.
On 8 August another round of discussion was held in Switzerland. Unlike before, this
time the talks involved the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. During the discussions the
Turkish Cypriots, supported by Turkey, insisted on some form of geographical
separation between the two communities. Makarios refused to accept the demand,
insisting that Cyprus must remain a unitary state. Despite efforts to break the
deadlock, the two sides refused to budge. The talks collapsed on 14 August. Within
hours, Turkey had resumed its offensive. By the time a new, and permanent,
ceasefire was called 36 per cent of the island was under the control of the Turkish
military.
The effect of the division was catastrophic. Thousands of Greek and Turkish
Cypriots had been killed and wounded and many more were missing. A further two
hundred thousand Greek and Turkish Cypriots had been displaced. In addition to the
entire north coast and the Karpas peninsula, the Greek Cypriots had also lost Varosha,
the predominantly Greek Cypriot region of the eastern port city of Famagusta. All
this changed the parameters of a settlement. For a start, Enosis was finally dead as an
aspiration for Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots had no reason to accept union
with Greece for the sake of minority rights. Moreover, the territory held by the
Turkish Cypriots ensured that talk of a continuance of a unitary state was out of the
question. Any settlement would have to be based on a state that would include some
form of Turkish Cypriot territorial entity. To prove the point, in February 1975 the
Turkish Cypriots announced the formation of the Turkish Federated State of Northern
Cyprus.

[BirKibrisli]

The question you should realy ask yourself is this:

Why did the TCs feel the need to distance themselves from the GCs by first siding with the British,and later by turning to Turkey for survival...????

You might also like to think of why the TCs felt less Cypriot than Turkish after 400 years of living in Cyprus????

Until you do that and come up with some sensible answers you are only peddling hatred and bitterness towards one group of Cypriots you need to convince you are a nice guy,in order to have a realistic solution to Cyprob....

And I am not going to give you any hints either...Lets see what you come up with your great googling skills...

Irrelevant rubbish! Read the thread again... it highlights some of the various Turkish Cypriot crimes HAPPENING TODAY not 50 years ago!

If your intention is to sabotage any possible solution other than what you think is the only desirable one,you are doing a great job,GR...

Thank you.

It looks like Bir didn't even bother to read the article and just went straight on the defensive instinctively, EXACTLY what this thread says is happening... TC acquittal of responsibility!

Of course it is irrevelant rubbish...When you have no anwer to it,it is irrevelant rubbish...I know what you are highlighting,GR. My point is what is happenening today in the North of our country has its beginning in our recent history...You mentioned the figure 50 years,so you know some things happened around that time and earlier and later than that as well...Now show some guts and confess to the historical facts which have led to the present situation...It is facile and reprehensible to blame the co-victims of any tragedy solely,and idiotic to expect them to agree with you...

Time and time again you are proving EXACTLY was this thread has set out to prove.

That you are JUSTIFYING TODAY’S Turkish Cypriot crimes because you feel Greek Cypriots “forced” Turkish Cypriot to do certain things in the past that somehow GRANTED the Turkish Cypriots a RIGHT to crime today and God knows for how many more years…

So according to BirKibrisli Turkish Cypriots now have a Allah-given right to crime!

I suppose it’s pointless to ask if DT’s father-in-law’s death just six moths ago at the hands of Turkish Cypriots is ALSO JUSTIFIED by something from the past, as you’ve seemingly already made your mind up to issue an ETERNAL ACQUITTAL OF RESPONSIBILITY to all Turkish Cypriots! Well done… the “Poor little Turkish Cypriot” syndrome strikes again!

You are incorrigible and pathetic!

Pathetic are your attempts to paint all TCs with the same criminal brush...
And your attempts to turn a blind eye and deaf ear to what I am getting at... Our present predicament is the result of complex historical,geographical,political,and strategic factors well beyond the control of the TCs and the GCs... Until and unless you acknowledge this you have no credibility in my eyes,and your cries of injustice will seem hollow and premeditated nonsense...DT's father-in -law died in the hands of certain criminals who happen to be of TC or Turkish settler background...There is no excuse for such vile acts of inhumanity...And I hope the perpetrators will be brought to justice one day...To use this barbarous act to blame all TCs is nothing less than nefarious moral turpitude...

[Get Real!]

The question you should realy ask yourself is this:

Why did the TCs feel the need to distance themselves from the GCs by first siding with the British,and later by turning to Turkey for survival...????

You might also like to think of why the TCs felt less Cypriot than Turkish after 400 years of living in Cyprus????

Until you do that and come up with some sensible answers you are only peddling hatred and bitterness towards one group of Cypriots you need to convince you are a nice guy,in order to have a realistic solution to Cyprob....

And I am not going to give you any hints either...Lets see what you come up with your great googling skills...

Irrelevant rubbish! Read the thread again... it highlights some of the various Turkish Cypriot crimes HAPPENING TODAY not 50 years ago!

If your intention is to sabotage any possible solution other than what you think is the only desirable one,you are doing a great job,GR...

Thank you.

It looks like Bir didn't even bother to read the article and just went straight on the defensive instinctively, EXACTLY what this thread says is happening... TC acquittal of responsibility!

Of course it is irrevelant rubbish...When you have no anwer to it,it is irrevelant rubbish...I know what you are highlighting,GR. My point is what is happenening today in the North of our country has its beginning in our recent history...You mentioned the figure 50 years,so you know some things happened around that time and earlier and later than that as well...Now show some guts and confess to the historical facts which have led to the present situation...It is facile and reprehensible to blame the co-victims of any tragedy solely,and idiotic to expect them to agree with you...

Time and time again you are proving EXACTLY was this thread has set out to prove.

That you are JUSTIFYING TODAY’S Turkish Cypriot crimes because you feel Greek Cypriots “forced” Turkish Cypriot to do certain things in the past that somehow GRANTED the Turkish Cypriots a RIGHT to crime today and God knows for how many more years…

So according to BirKibrisli Turkish Cypriots now have a Allah-given right to crime!

I suppose it’s pointless to ask if DT’s father-in-law’s death just six moths ago at the hands of Turkish Cypriots is ALSO JUSTIFIED by something from the past, as you’ve seemingly already made your mind up to issue an ETERNAL ACQUITTAL OF RESPONSIBILITY to all Turkish Cypriots! Well done… the “Poor little Turkish Cypriot” syndrome strikes again!

You are incorrigible and pathetic!

Pathetic are your attempts to paint all TCs with the same criminal brush...
And your attempts to turn a blind eye and deaf ear to what I am getting at... Our present predicament is the result of complex historical,geographical,political,and strategic factors well beyond the control of the TCs and the GCs... Until and unless you acknowledge this you have no credibility in my eyes,and your cries of injustice will seem hollow and premeditated nonsense...DT's father-in -law died in the hands of certain criminals who happen to be of TC or Turkish settler background...There is no excuse for such vile acts of inhumanity...And I hope the perpetrators will be brought to justice one day...To use this barbarous act to blame all TCs is nothing less than nefarious moral turpitude...

The Turkish Cypriot people DO NOT have a “open ticket” to commit crime today!!!

Grow up and get over yourselves!


Irresponsibility: Lacking a sense of responsibility; unreliable or untrustworthy. In law, not mentally or financially fit to assume responsibility.

[halil]

The Vienna Talks and the High Level Agreements, 1975-1981

On 28 April 1975, Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, launched a new
mission of Good Offices. Starting in Vienna, over the course of the following ten
months Clerides and Denktash discussed a range of humanitarian issues relating to the
events of the previous year. However, attempts to make progress on the substantive
issues – such as territory and the nature of the central government – failed to produce
any results. After five rounds the talks fell apart in February 1976. In January 1977,
the UN managed to organise a meeting in Nicosia between Makarios and Denktash.
This led to a major breakthrough. On 12 February, the two leaders signed a four point
agreement confirming that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation
made up of two states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal).

The size of the
states would be determined by economic viability and land ownership. The central
government would be given powers to ensure the unity of the state. Various other
issues, such as freedom of movement and freedom of settlement, would be settled
through discussion.
The agreement marked a monumental change of direction for the Greek
Cypriots, who now accepted that Cyprus would be reunited as a federation and that
the Turkish Cypriots would have their own zone of control.
Enosis was officially
dead. For their part, the Turkish Cypriots had recognised the essential unity of the
state. Taksim was now out of the question.
Significantly, the agreement opened the
way for a sixth round of the Vienna Talks, held from 31 March-7 April 1977.
However these quickly showed that, in spite of the four-point agreement on the broad
generalities of a solution, the two sides were an ocean apart on the specifics. The
Greek Cypriots presented proposals on territorial issues that took little notice of the
principle of bi-zonality. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot presented ideas on the role
and functions of the central government that were more confederal, rather than
federal, in nature. Little progress was made and discussions soon came to an end.
Just months later, in August 1977, Makarios died. He was replaced by Spyros
Kyprianou, the foreign minister. The following November a new twelve-point
proposal was drafted by the United States, Britain and Canada and presented to the
two sides by the Secretary-General. In line with the 1977 Agreement, the proposal
envisaged a federation of two states. One would be predominantly Greek Cypriot and
the other mainly Turkish Cypriot. The central government would deal with foreign
affairs, external defence, currency and central banking, inter-regional and foreign
trade, communications, federal finance, customs, immigration and civil aviation. Any
issue not specifically covered by the central government would be the responsibility
of the states. A bicameral parliament would be established. The upper chamber would
be composed of equal numbers of representatives from the two communities. The
lower chamber would be proportional to the size of the two populations. The system
of a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president would be
maintained. Importantly, the number of Greek and Turkish troops on the island would
be reduced to 1960 levels – 950 and 650 respectively. Moreover, the plan stated that
Varosha would be re-settled by Greek Cypriots.
Despite the fact that the initiative was broadly in line with the 1977 agreement,
it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. They objected to the fact that the agreement did
not enshrine the three basic freedoms that they insisted must be part of any ‘just and
viable’ settlement: the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right
to own property.The UN remained undeterred. In May 1979, Waldheim visited
Cyprus and secured a further ten-point set of proposals from the two sides. These not
only reaffirmed the 1977 agreement, but also included a number of new provisions,
such as demilitarisation and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and
actions. It was also agreed that the question of Varosha would also be addressed as a
matter of priority and that the two sides would deal with all territorial and
constitutional aspects of the problem. Shortly afterwards a new round of discussions
began in Nicosia. Again, they were short lived. For a start, the Turkish Cypriots did
not want to discuss Varosha, which was a key issue for the Greek Cypriots. Secondly,
the two sides failed to agree on the concept of ‘bicommunality’. Rather than call a
complete halt to the talks, the UN decided to put the negotiations on hold.
The following summer, 1980, Waldheim tried to resurrect the process by
putting forward a proposal for an Interim Agreement. This included measures to
promote a more positive atmosphere on the island, such as the return of Varosha to
civilian control and the lifting of the economic embargoes placed on the Turkish
Cypriots. It also called for the opening of Nicosia International Airport, which had in
fact been agreed by the two sides during the first round of the Vienna Talks. On 9
August, new negotiations opened under Hugo Gobbi, the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative. They focused on four areas: improving levels of goodwill between the
two sides, the return and resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in Varosha,
constitutional matters and territorial issues. But this time the talks ran into difficulties
over the term ‘bizonality’. The Turkish Cypriots interpreted this in terms of a
confederation, arguing that the two states should have their own sovereignty. The
Greek Cypriots insisted sovereignty must rest with the central state according to the
standard model of a federation.

[Kifeas]

Halil, why don't you tell us whose views and opinion are you presenting above?

[Viewpoint]

Halil, why don't you tell us whose views and opinion are you presenting above?

Kifeas why dont you tell us when you think the current talks will break down?

[halil]

Halil, why don't you tell us whose views and opinion are you presenting above?

no one . from above writings we will try to understand from where we came to today .
more to come up to present day . in those writing tell me which ones are wrong .

The ‘TRNC’ and the Draft Framework Agreement, 1982-1988
In January 1982, Javier Perez de Cuellar took over as UN Secretary-General. As a
former UN Special Representative for Cyprus (1977-79), he had clear ideas about
what he wanted to achieve and decided to take a more active role than his
predecessor. Throughout 1982 he met with the two sides and with representatives of
Greece and Turkey. However, in May 1983, his effort to resume talks foundered after
the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all
occupation forces from Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots were furious at the resolution
and threatened to declare independence. Nevertheless, in August de Cuellar gave the
two sides a set of proposals for consideration that called for a rotating presidency, the
establishment of a bicameral assembly along the same lines as previously suggested
and 60:40 representation in the central executive. In return for increased
representation in the central government, the Turkish Cypriots would surrender 8-13
per cent of the land in their possession. Both Kyprianou and Denktash accepted the
proposals in principle.
Despite the seemingly positive development, hopes for a settlement suffered a
major setback just a few months later. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots
took advantage of political disruption in Turkey, which was just returning to civilian
rule after a military coup in 1980, and unilaterally declared independence. While the
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) was quickly recognised by Turkey,
the rest of the international community condemned the move. Within days the
Security Council passed a resolution making it clear that it would not accept the new
state and that the decision disrupted efforts to reach a settlement.Denktash denied
this. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General informing him of the decision, he
insisted that the move was not intended to kill off settlement hopes. Instead, it was a
guarantee that any future settlement would be truly federal in nature.
In early 1984 steps were taken to resume the peace process. In March de
Cuellar presented the two sides with a five-point suggestion for confidence building
measures. New talks began in September. After three rounds of discussions a
blueprint was reached. Cyprus would become a bizonal, bicommunal, non-aligned
federation. The Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 per cent for their federal state and
all foreign troops would leave the island. In January 1985, the two leaders met for
their first face-to-face talks since the 1979 agreement. While the general belief was
that the meeting was being held to agree a final settlement, Kyprianou insisted that it
was a chance for further negotiations. The talks collapsed. In the aftermath, the
Greek Cypriot leaders came in for heavy criticism, both at home and abroad.
Denktash walked away with a public relations victory and a reprieve. More
importantly, he made it clear that he was unlikely to make so many concessions
again.
De Cuellar nevertheless continued his efforts. In March 1986, he presented the
two sides with a ‘Draft Framework Agreement’. Again, the plan envisaged the
creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state in Cyprus.
However, the Greek Cypriots were unhappy with the proposals. They argued that the
questions of removing Turkish forces from Cyprus was not addressed, nor was the
repatriation of the increasing number of Turkish settlers on the island. Moreover,
there were no guarantees that the full three freedoms would be respected. Finally, they
saw the proposed state structure as being confederal in nature. Further efforts to
produce an agreement failed as the two sides remained steadfastly attached to their
positions. Meanwhile, hopes of any movement the following year suffered a setback
as a result of increased Greek-Turkish hostility in the Aegean.