TODAYSZAMAN wrote:
Why, when and how Turkey becomes a nuclear power (2)
MEHMET KALYONCU*
Parallel to the decline of the US military presence in Iraq, the current multi-ethnic Iraqi government in Baghdad has stagnated due to the conflict between the Sunni and the Shiite members of the government.
The Kurds in the north and in the central government refrain from becoming involved in the conflict and prefer rapprochement with Ankara. Once the ethnic conflict in Iraq turns into a civil war primarily between the Sunnis and the Shiites, Iran will continue to clandestinely support the Shiites militarily and politically. In the meantime, in order to divert the Muslims’ growing criticism of it for being the force behind the Shiite upheaval, Tehran will become increasingly hostile and confrontational with Israel. That is, Tehran will become more vocal about the “Israeli occupation of the holy Muslim land.” In order to back up its confrontational position, Tehran will also declare publicly that it is continuing with its nuclear program and that soon Iran will be a nuclear power. Alarmed with Iran’s threats, Israel and the US will carry out air strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. The White House, if occupied by John McCain-Sarah Palin, would stand firmly behind and pledge its continuous military support to Israel. At this juncture, it may be useful to remember that, according to the projections of the US National Intelligence Council, a series of terrorist attacks in various European capitals of no lesser scale than the Sept. 11 attacks may take place between the years 2010 and 2012. Such likely terrorist attacks would naturally increase the overall European support for the so-called war on terror. This time, Iran would be legitimized as the main target.
In turn, Iran seeks to further exploit the situation in Iraq in order to turn it into a hell for US troops. The ongoing conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq is triggering similar conflicts in neighboring Arab countries, most notably in Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s likely exploitation of those conflicts irritates Riyadh, Damascus and Cairo, forcing them to find ways to counterbalance Tehran. Acquiring nuclear weapons or the capability to build nuclear weapons would seemingly be the only means to counterbalance the emerging nuclear hegemon.
In the meantime, Turkish public opinion is increasing pressure on the Ankara government, be it an AK Party government or any other, to assert itself against Iran, which is constantly increasing its power in the region. The marginal leftist groups known as the ulusalcılar (neo-nationalists) and the center-left parties take advantage of the situation and criticize the AK Party government for its sluggishness in responding to national security challenges. In addition, the extremist groups on both the left and the right criticize the government for relying on Western security alliances such as NATO and not being able to even develop defense capabilities to protect the nation without permission from the US and the EU. In the meantime, as a major nuclear power, Russia is becoming increasingly assertive in its international relations in general and in its relations with its neighbors in particular, giving more salience to the idea that Turkey must have its own nuclear weapon capabilities.
Consequently, Ankara is intensifying its lobbying in Western capitals, most notably in Washington, to get the green light to develop nuclear weapons. Ankara presents itself as the most viable nuclear power in the region to counterbalance the nuclear Iran, pointing out that the other likely candidates, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, which lack democratic institutions, checks and balances and transparency, cannot be trusted with such military capabilities. Furthermore, Ankara is seeking to justify its quest for nuclear weapons by arguing that with or without the approval of its Western allies Turkey has to develop such capabilities because a nuclear Iran next to its border puts Turkish national security under threat. Accordingly, Ankara is seeking assistance from the major material and know-how suppliers, such as the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and Israel. Finally, the United States tacitly approves Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapon capabilities in order to both counterbalance a nuclear Iran in the Middle East and to prevent another rogue state in the region besides Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Consequently, the US is competing with the other suppliers to seize the lion share in Turkey’s emerging nuclear market.
Alternative scenario
Any possible reluctance on the side of Turkey’s Western allies to provide Turkey with the necessary material and know-how to develop nuclear weapons will encourage Ankara to seek other possible partners, which are quite numerous, including Iran itself. The most likely scenarios and the alternative scenarios of Turkey acquiring nuclear weapons or the capability of building nuclear weapons differ from each other not in terms of Turkey’s driving motivations but in terms of the acquisition process.
It is possible that the United States and the European Union will not give the green light to Turkey to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities, and will at the same time try to deter Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and/or another nuclear aspirant from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. However, the two cannot succeed in doing so, as is the case with Iran. In addition, the US and the EU may not provide a credible and reliable guarantee to Turkey that they will protect Turkey against a nuclear threat. Actually, no such guarantee, including the NATO membership, may suffice to convince Turkey to stop its quest for nuclear weapon capabilities given the destructive capability of a nuclear attack and the fact that its very national security is at stake. Worried with the risk of remaining weak and vulnerable in its region and being threatened by a rogue nuclear power, Turkey would then seek nuclear weapon capabilities, risking confrontation with both the United States and the European Union. After all, then the domestic public opinion wouldn’t just condone Turkey acquiring nuclear weapons, but demand it from the government.
Given that Turkey’s Western allies do not condone Turkey becoming a nuclear power, Ankara is forced to seek non-Western partners and suppliers for its nuclear program. Turkey does not have difficulty in finding them. Actually, most likely, they would find Turkey anyway. Respectively, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and finally Iran are among the possible partners in Turkey’s nuclear endeavor. Historically, Pakistan has always been supportive of the idea of Turkey becoming a nuclear power. Islamabad first approached Ankara to offer Pakistan’s assistance to Turkey in developing nuclear weapons during the rule of Gen. Zia Ul-Haq in the 1960s and then during the rule of Nawaz Sharif in the late 1990s. However, Ankara had to disregard both offers because of concerns about alienating its Western allies. However, under the current circumstances, the national security threat Turkey faces and the Western allies’ refusal to address Turkey’s concerns make it imperative for Ankara to seek Pakistan’s help in developing a nuclear weapons program.
Once Turkey comes out as a possible buyer of nuclear material and technology, Israel, Turkey’s long-time ally in the Middle East, would also want to help Turkey by selling it the necessary material, equipment and know-how. Similarly, Russia is likely to reap the benefits of this emerging market for its nuclear technology before the US or the EU does. Finally, though reluctantly, Tehran would also be willing to assist Ankara, calculating that Turkey’s becoming a nuclear power would only further legitimize Iran having nuclear weapons, even if it would eliminate Iran’s chances of becoming the sole regional leader.
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* Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author of the book titled “A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gulen Movement in Southeast Turkey.”
19 September 2008, Friday
