by Oracle » Sun Sep 28, 2008 7:06 pm
Cem wrote:[
Pakistan had nuclear weapons because in no way this country has had any aspirations to become either democratic or to be part of the western world.
As for Turkey, it may not be the best democracy in the world, but Turkey has always strived to have strong ties with the west ...
by Cem » Mon Sep 29, 2008 10:06 am
Oracle wrote:Cem wrote:[
Pakistan had nuclear weapons because in no way this country has had any aspirations to become either democratic or to be part of the western world.
As for Turkey, it may not be the best democracy in the world, but Turkey has always strived to have strong ties with the west ...
So how do you explain Turkey's strong collaborations with Pakistan?
by Oracle » Mon Sep 29, 2008 11:06 am
Cem wrote:Oracle wrote:Cem wrote:[
Pakistan had nuclear weapons because in no way this country has had any aspirations to become either democratic or to be part of the western world.
As for Turkey, it may not be the best democracy in the world, but Turkey has always strived to have strong ties with the west ...
So how do you explain Turkey's strong collaborations with Pakistan?
Pakistan has had traditionally strong ties with Turkey every since it was founded and these two have been cooperating in civilian and military areas for a very long time, moreover, with the active support coming from the USA. There is nothing new about that, except maybe for you.
You ever heard about CENTO ???).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CENTO.
This, however, does not mean that both can evade western world's vigilance and control when it comes to matters such as cooperation in nuclear areas. Even admitting that the Pakis might be adventurous, Turkey can not take such a risk.
Besides, if one day Turkey decides to build a nuclear power plant, why should she rely on a relatively backward Pak technology rather than advanced western technology?
The Turkish-Pakistani Connection
Turkey has long been known as a vital transit and assembly point for contraband nuclear materials. It has been aiding the nuclear aspirations of Pakistan, in particular, since a military coup in 1980. A report from back in 2000 recalled that:
"[T]urkey has already been implicated in nuclear arms aid to Pakistan. An earlier attempt to build an Argentinean-designed reactor was likely aimed at plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all pointed to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development has leant credence to this evidence."
Over the past 20 years, various Turkish and Pakistani governments, as well as sections of the military, have looked kindly on the idea of creating Islamic nuclear states. The countries were specifically linked in the A.Q. Khan network; this July 2004 summary gives detailed information:
"[W]orkshops in Turkey made the centrifuge motor and frequency converters used to drive the motor and spin the rotor to high speeds. These workshops imported subcomponents from Europe and elsewhere, and they assembled these centrifuge items in Turkey. Under false end-user certificates, these components were shipped to Dubai for repackaging and shipment to Libya."
Today, it is not known whether Turkey possesses nuclear weapons. But remember, the crucial part of the above-cited 2000 report is:
"[E]vidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all pointed to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development has leant credence to this evidence."
Total trafficking levels are hard to adduce, though it's clear that more supplies get through than are caught. From 1993-1999 alone, there were 18 high-profile incidents of nuclear trafficking involving Turkey – the sort of cases that Valerie Plame's unit sought to investigate. As this report details, "these cases include nuclear material seized in Turkey, nuclear material interdicted en route to Turkey, and seizure of nuclear material smuggled by Turkish nationals." In most of the cases, the nuclear materials originated in unstable former Soviet states such as Georgia, Romania, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia itself. Among the destination states, Libya and Iran jump out. In addition to Turks, detained smugglers included nationals of Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Romania, as well as a Kazakh army colonel and suspected Iranian secret service agents.
A couple of years later, on Sept. 10, 2001, the N.Y. Times reported that "in the last eight years, there have been 104 attempts to smuggle nuclear material into Turkey, according to an internal report by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority."
An Unpredictable Future
As Seymour Hersh related in his 1993 article, Pakistani leaders were smart enough to know that the U.S. was just using them for their proximity to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. They knew that when the Russians withdrew, the U.S. would have no further need for them – and would be less enthusiastic about letting the country go nuclear. However, by the time the Soviets pulled out, the damage had long been done. After all, A.Q. Khan had been boasting since the mid-1980s that his country had the bomb.
An even more frightening prospect is a nuclear Turkey. The country has been militarily subsidized even more than Pakistan; mass military aid and technology transfer were justified first of all by Turkey's status as a key Cold War ally and thereafter as a bulwark of secular Islam, holding the wall against Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
However, the very same American leaders who have been arming Turkey and allowing, in some cases even profiting from, nuclear smuggling there have also ruined the delicate balance of regional power with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and brought the world far closer to nuclear confrontations.
In the former case, they put huge strain on the "pro-Western" Musharraf government, strengthening the hand of fundamentalist Islamists in both the mosque and in the armed forces. Musharraf has survived multiple assassination attempts, but there is no guarantee that he will enjoy lucky escapes forever. If he goes, what then? Any coup by a populist, fundamentalist-based leader would instantly put both Pakistan and India on high alert, taking us back to previous near-apocalyptic nuclear showdowns. Mired in numerous other bloody commitments of its own making, there's no certainty that the U.S. could finesse the situation as it did in 1990.
While Turkey is much less likely to fall victim to an Islamist coup, preserved as it is by a strongly secular military, it could easily grow more isolationist. Major changes have occurred since the invasion of Iraq that have manifested themselves in a demoted role for Turkey in U.S. foreign policy considerations, a shifting relationship between it and Europe, a return to Islamic roots, and the revival of armed Kurdish insurrectionists in the southeast.
With 2002's war planning, the neocons decided that it was not enough to merely keep Turkey on as the dependable bulwark of the West's hinterland; instead, they chose to take the bull by the horns and seize the whole neighborhood for themselves. After the Iraq invasion gave the U.S. troops a huge and probably permanent regional military presence and the capabilities to easily strike Iran and Syria, Turkey's strategic importance has been downgraded. At the same time, the revival of Kurdish terrorism in Turkey, inspired by the "liberation" next door in Iraq, has left many Turks feeling angry and apprehensive that the U.S. no longer has its best interests in mind. They also sympathize on religious grounds with fellow Muslims who are being injured and killed every day in Iraq.
The way Turkey's other external relationships are handled in the coming months will also play a role in deciding the direction of future trends. The European Union recently began candidacy negotiations with Turkey, something about which large sections of the European public have deep misgivings. It's hard to see how they will become more eager to welcome Turkey aboard after having seen the rioting of Muslim immigrants that swept France and neighboring countries in recent weeks.
The issue of the EU is controversial not only in Europe, however; nationalist and religious-minded Turks do not want to make the sometimes humiliating concessions and "reforms" Brussels is requesting of them. That the Iraq war added to the volatility of the Middle East, rather than to its stabilization, goes without saying. But Turkey's sudden drop in the estimation of U.S. policy planners and its arm's-length treatment from the EU can only increase feelings of frustration and alienation among the general populace, strengthening the religious-based parties and go-it-alone nationalist sentiment alike.
Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"
This is a startling question that no one hopes will be asked. If it is, it certainly won't come as a surprise to those neocons of long experience who have gotten rich by helping Pakistan (and perhaps soon Turkey) realize nuclear ambitions – making the world a safer place for all of us in the process.
by Cem » Mon Sep 29, 2008 2:38 pm
Oracle wrote:No it is not news to me that Turkey and Pakistan have been affiliated for a long time ...
But you have not answered why that should be the case, if Turkey has been making noises about wanting to be part of the West for an even longer time.
So far only this article seems to answer the question you failed to tackle.The Turkish-Pakistani Connection
Turkey has long been known as a vital transit and assembly point for contraband nuclear materials. It has been aiding the nuclear aspirations of Pakistan, in particular, since a military coup in 1980. A report from back in 2000 recalled that:
"[T]urkey has already been implicated in nuclear arms aid to Pakistan. An earlier attempt to build an Argentinean-designed reactor was likely aimed at plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all pointed to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development has leant credence to this evidence."
Over the past 20 years, various Turkish and Pakistani governments, as well as sections of the military, have looked kindly on the idea of creating Islamic nuclear states. The countries were specifically linked in the A.Q. Khan network; this July 2004 summary gives detailed information:
"[W]orkshops in Turkey made the centrifuge motor and frequency converters used to drive the motor and spin the rotor to high speeds. These workshops imported subcomponents from Europe and elsewhere, and they assembled these centrifuge items in Turkey. Under false end-user certificates, these components were shipped to Dubai for repackaging and shipment to Libya."
Today, it is not known whether Turkey possesses nuclear weapons. But remember, the crucial part of the above-cited 2000 report is:
"[E]vidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all pointed to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development has leant credence to this evidence."
Total trafficking levels are hard to adduce, though it's clear that more supplies get through than are caught. From 1993-1999 alone, there were 18 high-profile incidents of nuclear trafficking involving Turkey – the sort of cases that Valerie Plame's unit sought to investigate. As this report details, "these cases include nuclear material seized in Turkey, nuclear material interdicted en route to Turkey, and seizure of nuclear material smuggled by Turkish nationals." In most of the cases, the nuclear materials originated in unstable former Soviet states such as Georgia, Romania, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia itself. Among the destination states, Libya and Iran jump out. In addition to Turks, detained smugglers included nationals of Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Romania, as well as a Kazakh army colonel and suspected Iranian secret service agents.
A couple of years later, on Sept. 10, 2001, the N.Y. Times reported that "in the last eight years, there have been 104 attempts to smuggle nuclear material into Turkey, according to an internal report by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority."
An Unpredictable Future
As Seymour Hersh related in his 1993 article, Pakistani leaders were smart enough to know that the U.S. was just using them for their proximity to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. They knew that when the Russians withdrew, the U.S. would have no further need for them – and would be less enthusiastic about letting the country go nuclear. However, by the time the Soviets pulled out, the damage had long been done. After all, A.Q. Khan had been boasting since the mid-1980s that his country had the bomb.
An even more frightening prospect is a nuclear Turkey. The country has been militarily subsidized even more than Pakistan; mass military aid and technology transfer were justified first of all by Turkey's status as a key Cold War ally and thereafter as a bulwark of secular Islam, holding the wall against Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
However, the very same American leaders who have been arming Turkey and allowing, in some cases even profiting from, nuclear smuggling there have also ruined the delicate balance of regional power with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and brought the world far closer to nuclear confrontations.
In the former case, they put huge strain on the "pro-Western" Musharraf government, strengthening the hand of fundamentalist Islamists in both the mosque and in the armed forces. Musharraf has survived multiple assassination attempts, but there is no guarantee that he will enjoy lucky escapes forever. If he goes, what then? Any coup by a populist, fundamentalist-based leader would instantly put both Pakistan and India on high alert, taking us back to previous near-apocalyptic nuclear showdowns. Mired in numerous other bloody commitments of its own making, there's no certainty that the U.S. could finesse the situation as it did in 1990.
While Turkey is much less likely to fall victim to an Islamist coup, preserved as it is by a strongly secular military, it could easily grow more isolationist. Major changes have occurred since the invasion of Iraq that have manifested themselves in a demoted role for Turkey in U.S. foreign policy considerations, a shifting relationship between it and Europe, a return to Islamic roots, and the revival of armed Kurdish insurrectionists in the southeast.
With 2002's war planning, the neocons decided that it was not enough to merely keep Turkey on as the dependable bulwark of the West's hinterland; instead, they chose to take the bull by the horns and seize the whole neighborhood for themselves. After the Iraq invasion gave the U.S. troops a huge and probably permanent regional military presence and the capabilities to easily strike Iran and Syria, Turkey's strategic importance has been downgraded. At the same time, the revival of Kurdish terrorism in Turkey, inspired by the "liberation" next door in Iraq, has left many Turks feeling angry and apprehensive that the U.S. no longer has its best interests in mind. They also sympathize on religious grounds with fellow Muslims who are being injured and killed every day in Iraq.
The way Turkey's other external relationships are handled in the coming months will also play a role in deciding the direction of future trends. The European Union recently began candidacy negotiations with Turkey, something about which large sections of the European public have deep misgivings. It's hard to see how they will become more eager to welcome Turkey aboard after having seen the rioting of Muslim immigrants that swept France and neighboring countries in recent weeks.
The issue of the EU is controversial not only in Europe, however; nationalist and religious-minded Turks do not want to make the sometimes humiliating concessions and "reforms" Brussels is requesting of them. That the Iraq war added to the volatility of the Middle East, rather than to its stabilization, goes without saying. But Turkey's sudden drop in the estimation of U.S. policy planners and its arm's-length treatment from the EU can only increase feelings of frustration and alienation among the general populace, strengthening the religious-based parties and go-it-alone nationalist sentiment alike.
Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"
This is a startling question that no one hopes will be asked. If it is, it certainly won't come as a surprise to those neocons of long experience who have gotten rich by helping Pakistan (and perhaps soon Turkey) realize nuclear ambitions – making the world a safer place for all of us in the process.
Source: antiwar
Turkey has long been known as a vital transit and assembly point for contraband nuclear materials.
It has been aiding the nuclear aspirations of Pakistan, in particular, since a military coup in 1980.
Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all pointed to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development has leant credence to this evidence.
A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"
by Nikitas » Mon Sep 29, 2008 4:06 pm
by Cem » Mon Sep 29, 2008 4:25 pm
Nikitas wrote:Centralising energy production by resorting to large industrial means of power production is undemocratic.
The reason technocrats prefer heavy industrial means of power generation is precisely because large plants give them control over power and thus over every household.
Renewables, like Photovoltaics and small scale windmills diffuse power production to the local level and often can enable families to produce their own power off grid. In other words they make the consumer power independent and not a slave to the technoplutocrats.
This is the problem with Turkey and other countries and not whether the plant will be nuclear or if it will lead to weapons.
All neighboring countries have problems accepting renewables and are dragging their feet over their introduction. They will license large plants belonging to the same big business names, but not to small producers. Cyprus, Greece, Italy and others are in the same boat when it comes to power generation.
by Oracle » Mon Sep 29, 2008 5:37 pm
Buying some conventional weapons capability and basic nuclear generation technology from dullard US defense contractors is one thing. The real question is this: How did Pakistan and Turkey escaped US scrutiny while developing nuclear weapons and Turkey helped pay for them with drug money and technology?
The Brotherhood: Pakistanis, Turks and Americans
Against the backdrop of the USA versus USSR Cold War, and the Iran versus Iraq war—US officials like Cheney and Rumsfeld—and those operating in and out of government, (and their counterparts in Pakistan and Turkey) took a Pontius Pilate approach to Pakistan's black market acquisition of nuclear weapons components, as well as Turkey's complicity in helping that cause through drug trade profits, to include the illicit manufacture of parts essential to a nuclear weapon. According to Anwar Iqbal of UPI (October 2004), Turkish workshops "made the centrifuge motor and frequency converters used to drive the motor and spin the rotor to high speeds. These workshops imported subcomponents from Europe and elsewhere, and they assembled these centrifuge items in Turkey. Under false end-user certificates, the components were then shipped to Dubai . . ."
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